At 7 o'clock in the morning on June 22, 1941, Adolf Hitler's address to the people of Germany was read on German radio:

“Burdened with heavy worries, doomed to months of silence, I can finally speak freely. German people! At this moment, an offensive is underway, comparable in scale to the greatest that the world has ever seen. Today I again decided to entrust the fate and future of the Reich and our people to our soldiers. May God help us in this struggle."

A few hours before this announcement, Hitler was informed that everything was going according to plan. At exactly 3:30 am on Sunday, June 22, fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war.

June 22, 1941...

What do we know about this terrible day in the history of Russia?

“The First Day of the Great Patriotic War”, “The Day of Mourning and Sorrow” is one of the saddest and saddest dates in the history of Russia. It was on this day that the manic Adolf Hitler carried out his ruthless and cold-blooded plan to destroy the Soviet Union.

On June 22, 1941, at dawn, the troops of Nazi Germany attacked the borders of the Soviet Union without declaring war and bombed Soviet cities and military formations.

The invading army, according to some sources, numbered 5.5 million people, about 4,300 tanks and assault guns, 4,980 combat aircraft, 47,200 guns and mortars.

The great leader of the peoples Joseph Stalin. Non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union - better known in history as Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as well as a number of secret agreements and arrangements with Germany lasted only 2 years. The vile and ambitious Hitler was more cunning and far-sighted than Stalin, and in the early stages of the war this advantage turned into a real disaster for the Soviet Union. The country was not ready for an attack, and even more so for a war.

It is difficult to accept the fact that Stalin, even after numerous reports from our intelligence about Hitler's real plans, did not take proper measures. I didn’t double-check, I didn’t insure myself, I didn’t make sure personally. He remained imperturbably calm even when the decision to go to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler at a meeting with the high military command as early as July 31, 1940, shortly after the victory over France. And intelligence reported to Stalin about this ... What Stalin hoped for is still the subject of controversy and discussion ...

Hitler's plan was simple - the liquidation of the Soviet state, the seizure of its wealth, the extermination of the main part of the population and the "Germanization" of the country's territory up to the Urals. The idea of ​​an attack on Russia was hatched by Hitler long before the invasion was planned. In his famous book "Mein Kampf" he published his ideas related to the so-called. eastern lands (Poland and the USSR). The peoples inhabiting them must be destroyed in order for representatives of the Aryan race to live there.

Why was Stalin silent?

Despite the fact that the war from its first days became Holy and Popular, Great Patriotic War it will officially become only 11 days later, precisely after Stalin's radio address to the people on July 3, 1941. Until then, from June 22 to July 3, the Soviet people did not hear their leader. Instead, at noon on June 22, 1941, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov, announced the beginning of the war with Germany to the Soviet people. And in the following days, this appeal was already published in all newspapers with a portrait of Stalin next to the text.

From Molotov's address, I would like to single out one most interesting paragraph:

"This war is not imposed on us the German people, not by German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose sufferings we understand well, but by a clique of bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany who enslaved the French, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other peoples.

The working people of Leningrad listen to the message about the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti

It is clear that Molotov only read out what he was given to read. That the compilers of this “statement” were other people ... Decades later, you look at this statement more with reproach ...

This paragraph, as evidence that the authorities in the USSR perfectly understood who the fascists were, but for unknown reasons, people in power decided to pretend to be innocent sheep, stood aside when Hitler, frostbitten to the whole head, subjugated Europe - the territory that was next to THE USSR.

The passivity of Stalin and the party, as well as the cowardly silence of the leader in the first days of the war, speaks volumes... In reality modern world, the people would not forgive their leader for this silence. And then, at that time, he not only closed his eyes to this, but also fought "for the Motherland, for Stalin!"

The fact that Stalin did not address the people immediately after the outbreak of the war was immediately perplexing to some. It is widely believed that Stalin in the initial period of the war was constantly or for a long period in a depressed state or in prostration. According to Molotov's memoirs, Stalin did not want to express his position immediately, in conditions where little was still clear.

Stalin's speech itself is also curious, when he gave the status of the war - the Great and Patriotic! It was after this appeal that the phrase “Great Patriotic War” came into circulation, and in the text the words “great” and “patriotic” are used separately.

The speech begins with the words: “Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I turn to you, my friends!

Stalin goes on to talk about plight at the front, about the areas occupied by the enemy, the bombing of cities; he states: "A serious danger hangs over our Motherland." He rejects the "invincibility" of the Nazi army, while citing the defeat of the armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm II as an example. The failures of the first days of the war are explained advantageous position German army. Stalin denies that the non-aggression pact was a mistake - it helped secure a year and a half of peace.

Then the question is raised: "What is required in order to eliminate the danger hanging over our Motherland, and what measures must be taken in order to defeat the enemy?" First of all, Stalin proclaims the need for all Soviet people "to realize the full depth of the danger that threatens our country" and to mobilize; it is emphasized that we are talking about "the life and death of the Soviet state, about the life and death of the peoples of the USSR, about whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement."

Assessing Stalin's speech, V. V. Putin said:

“At the most critical moments in our history, our people turned to their roots, to their moral foundations, to religious values. And you remember well when the Great Patriotic War began, the first to inform the Soviet people about this was Molotov, who turned "citizens and citizens". And when Stalin spoke, despite all his rather tough, if not cruel, policy towards the church, he addressed himself in a completely different way - "brothers and sisters". And this made a huge sense, because such an appeal is not just words.

It was an appeal to the heart, to the soul, to history, to our roots, in order to describe, firstly, the tragedy of the ongoing events, and secondly, to encourage people to mobilize them to defend their homeland.

And it was always like this when we faced some difficulties and problems, even in atheistic times, after all, the Russian people could not do without these moral foundations.”

So, June 22, 1941 - "Day of Remembrance and Sorrow" - what else do we know about this day - briefly:

The name "Great Patriotic War" was born by analogy with the Patriotic War of 1812.

Directive No. 21 "Option Barbarossa" - this is how the plan of attack on the USSR is officially called, was adopted and signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. According to the plan, Germany was to "defeat Soviet Russia in one short campaign." Therefore, on the very first day of the war, more than 5 million German soldiers were “thrown off the chain” on the USSR. According to the plan, the main cities of the USSR - Moscow and Leningrad were to be massively attacked on the 40th day of the war.

The armies of Germany's allies - Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria - participated in the war against the Soviet Union.

Bulgaria did not declare war on the USSR and Bulgarian military personnel did not participate in the war against the USSR (although Bulgaria's participation in the occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia and military operations against Greek and Yugoslav partisans freed up German divisions to be sent to the Eastern Front). In addition, Bulgaria placed at the disposal of the German military command all the main airfields and ports of Varna and Burgas (which the Germans used to supply troops on the Eastern Front).

The Russian Liberation Army (ROA) under the command of General A. Vlasov also sided with Nazi Germany, although it was not part of the Wehrmacht.

On the side of the Third Reich, national formations from the natives of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia were also used - the Bergmann Battalion, the Georgian Legion, the Azerbaijani Legion, the North Caucasian SS detachment.

Hungary did not immediately take part in the attack on the USSR, and Hitler did not demand direct assistance from Hungary. However, the Hungarian ruling circles urged the need for Hungary to enter the war in order to prevent Hitler from resolving the territorial dispute over Transylvania in favor of Romania.

Cunning Spaniards.

Autumn 1941 fighting on the side of Germany, the so-called Blue Division of Spanish volunteers also began.

Not wanting to openly drag Spain into the Second world war on the side of Hitler and at the same time seeking to strengthen the Falange regime and ensure the security of the country, Francisco Franco took a position of armed neutrality, providing Germany on the Eastern Front with a division of volunteers who wished to fight on the side of the Germans against the Soviet Union. De jure, Spain remained neutral, did not join Germany's allies, and did not declare war on the USSR. The division got its name from the blue shirts - the uniform of the Phalanx.

Foreign Minister Sunyer, announcing the formation of the Blue Division on June 24, 1941, said that the USSR was guilty of the Spanish Civil War, that this war dragged on, that there were mass executions, that there were extrajudicial killings. In agreement with the Germans, the oath was changed - they did not swear allegiance to the Fuhrer, but acted as fighters against communism.

The motivations of the volunteers were different: from the desire to avenge those who died in civil war close to the desire to hide (among the former Republicans - they, as a rule, subsequently made up the bulk of defectors to the side of the Soviet army). There were people who sincerely wanted to redeem their Republican past. Many were guided by selfish considerations - the soldiers of the division received a decent salary for those times in Spain, plus a German salary (respectively 7.3 pesetas from the Spanish government and 8.48 pesetas from the German command per day)

As part of the army of Nazi Germany, the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps of the SS, General von Panwitz, and other Cossack units fought. In order to justify the use of the Cossacks in the armed struggle on the side of Germany, a "theory" was developed, according to which the Cossacks were declared descendants of the Ostrogoths. And this is despite the fact that the Ostrogoths are an ancient Germanic tribe that constituted the eastern branch of the Gothic tribal association, which by the middle of the 3rd century had broken up into two tribal groups: the Visigoths and the Ostrogoths. They are considered one of the distant ancestors of modern Italians.

The protection of the state border of the USSR at the time of the attack consisted of only about 100 thousand people.

One of the first to suffer was the city of Brest and the famous Brest Hero Fortress. Commander of the German 2nd Panzer Army Group Center Heinz Guderian writes in his diary: “Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they did not suspect anything about our intentions. In the courtyard of the fortress of Brest, which was visible from our observation posts, to the sounds of an orchestra, they were holding guards. Coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops.

According to the plan, the fortress should have been captured by 12 o'clock on the first day of the war. The fortress was taken only on the 32nd day of the war. One of the inscriptions in the fortress reads: “I am dying, but I do not give up. Farewell, Motherland. 20/VII-41".

Curious fact:

It is noteworthy that on September 22, 1939, a joint solemn parade of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army was held along the streets of Brest. All this took place during the official procedure for the transfer of the city of Brest and the Brest Fortress to the Soviet side during the invasion of Poland by the troops of Germany and the USSR. The procedure ended with the solemn lowering of the German flag and the raising of the Soviet flag.

Historian Mikhail Meltyukhov notes that at that time Germany tried in every possible way to show England and France that the USSR was its ally, while in the USSR itself they tried in every possible way to emphasize their "neutrality". This neutrality will turn the USSR into a second fall of the Brest Fortress, though a little later - on the very first day of the war on June 22. And only a year later, it will become known about the defenders of the Brest Fortress and their unshakable stamina - from the reports of German soldiers about the battles in Brest.

German troops invade the territory of the USSR

In fact, in fact, the war began on the evening of June 21 - in the north of the Baltic, where the implementation of the Barbarossa plan began. That evening, German minelayers based in Finnish ports set up two large minefields in the Gulf of Finland. These minefields were able to lock the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the eastern part Gulf of Finland.

And already on June 22, 1941, at 0306 hours, the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev, ordered to open fire on Nazi aircraft that invaded far into the airspace of the USSR, which made history: it was the very first combat order to repulse the fascists who attacked us in the Great Patriotic War.

The official time of the beginning of the war is considered to be 4 o'clock in the morning, when the Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop presented the Soviet ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov with a note declaring war, although we know that the attack on the USSR began earlier.

In addition to Molotov’s address to the people on the day of the declaration of war on June 22, on the radio, the Soviet people remembered most of all the voice of another person - the voice of the famous radio announcer Yu. Levitan, who also informed the Soviet people about the German attack on the USSR. Although for many years there was a belief among the people that it was Levitan who was the first to read the message about the beginning of the war, in reality, this already textbook text was first read on the radio by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, and Levitan repeated it after some time.

It is noteworthy that such marshals as Zhukov and Rokossovsky also wrote in their memoirs that the announcer Yuri Levitan was the first to convey the message. So this championship was preserved by Levitan.

From the memoirs of announcer Yuri Levitan:

“They call from Minsk: “Enemy aircraft over the city”, they call from Kaunas:

“The city is on fire, why are you not transmitting anything on the radio?”, “Enemy planes are over Kiev.” Women's crying, excitement: “Is it really a war? ..” However, no official messages are transmitted until 12:00 Moscow time on June 22.

On the third day of the war - June 24, 1941 - the Soviet Information Bureau was created with the aim of "... covering international events, military operations on the fronts and the life of the country" in the press and on the radio.

Every day throughout the war, millions of people froze at the radios at the words of Yuri Levitan "From the Soviet Information Bureau ...". General Chernyakhovsky once said: "Yuri Levitan could replace an entire division."

Adolf Hitler declared him his personal enemy number one and promised to "hang him as soon as the Wehrmacht enters Moscow." A reward was even promised for the head of the first announcer of the Soviet Union - 250 thousand marks.

At 5:30. on the morning of June 22 on the German radio, the Reich Minister of Propaganda Goebbels read out an appeal Adolf Hitler to the German people in connection with the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union: “Now the hour has come when it is necessary to oppose this conspiracy of Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow ...

IN this moment the greatest in terms of its length and volume of the performance of troops, which the world has ever seen ... The task of this front is no longer defense individual countries but the security of Europe and thereby the salvation of all."

June 22 is known for two more speeches - by Adolf Hitler to the German people on the radio on the occasion of the attack on the USSR, where he outlined in detail the reasons for the attack ... and the speech of the most ardent opponent of communism, Winston Churchill, on the air of the BBC radio station.

The most interesting excerpts from this speech:

1. “At 4 o’clock this morning, Hitler attacked Russia.

All his usual formalities of treachery were followed with scrupulous precision. There was a solemnly signed non-aggression pact between the countries. Under the cover of his false guarantees, the German forces drew up their vast force in a line stretching from the White Sea to the Black Sea, and their air force and armored divisions moved slowly and methodically into position. Then suddenly, without a declaration of war, even without an ultimatum, German bombs fell from the sky on Russian cities, German troops violated Russian borders, and an hour later, the German ambassador, who just the day before generously lavished his assurances of friendship and almost an alliance on the Russians, paid a visit to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that Russia and Germany were at war.

2. “All this did not come as a surprise to me.

In fact, I clearly and clearly warned Stalin about the upcoming events. I warned him as I had warned others before. One can only hope that my signals were not ignored. All I know at the moment is that the Russian people are defending their native land and their leaders have called for resistance to the last.”

3. "Hitler is an evil monster,

insatiable in its lust for blood and plunder. Not satisfied with the fact that all of Europe is either under his heel, or intimidated to a state of humiliated obedience, he now wants to continue the slaughter and devastation in the vast expanses of Russia and Asia ... No matter how poor the Russian peasants, workers and soldiers, he must steal their daily bread . He must destroy their arable land. He must take away from them the oil that drives their plow, and thus bring on a famine of which the history of mankind has never known. And even the bloody slaughter and ruin that, if he wins (although he has not yet won), threatens the Russian people, will only be a stepping stone to an attempt to plunge four or five hundred million people living in China and 350,000,000 living in India into this bottomless abyss of human degradation. , above which the diabolical emblem of the swastika flutters proudly.

4. The Nazi regime is indistinguishable from worst features communism.

It is devoid of any foundations and principles, except for a hateful appetite for racial domination. He is sophisticated in all forms of human malice, in effective cruelty and ferocious aggression. No one has been a more staunch opponent of communism over the past 25 years than I have been. I won't take back a single word said about him. But all this pales before the spectacle unfolding now.

The past, with its crimes, follies and tragedies, recedes.

I see Russian soldiers, as they stand on the border of their native land and guard the fields that their fathers plowed from time immemorial. I see how they guard their homes; their mothers and wives pray - oh yes, because at such a time everyone prays for the preservation of their loved ones, for the return of the breadwinner, patron, their protectors.

I see all the ten thousand Russian villages where livelihoods were so laboriously wrested from the ground, but there are also primordial human joys, girls laughing and children playing, and all this is attacked in a disgusting, frenzied attack by the Nazi war machine with its clicking heels , rattling weapons, immaculately dressed Prussian officers, with her skillful secret agents, who had just pacified and tied hand and foot a dozen countries.

5. "My mind returns through the years ago,

in the days when the Russian troops were our ally against the same mortal enemy, when they fought with great courage and firmness and helped to win a victory, the fruits of which, alas, they were not allowed to use, although through no fault of ours ...

We have only one single goal and one unchanging task. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime. Nothing can turn us away from this. Nothing. We will never negotiate, we will never discuss terms with Hitler or any of his gang. We will fight him on land, we will fight him at sea, we will fight him in the air until, with God's help, we rid the earth of his shadow and free the nations from his yoke.

Any person or state fighting against Nazism will receive our help. Any person or state marching with Hitler is our enemy.

Therefore, we must give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can. We must call on all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to follow a similar course and pursue it as steadfastly and steadily as we will, to the very end.

We have already offered the Government of Soviet Russia any technical or economic assistance which we are in a position to give and which may be useful to it. We will bomb Germany day and night, on an increasing scale, dropping heavier bombs on them from month to month, so that the German people themselves taste every month an ever sharper portion of the misfortunes that they brought down on humanity.

6. “I cannot speak of the actions of the United States on their behalf,

but I will say this: if Hitler imagined that his attack on Soviet Russia would cause even the slightest divergence in the goals or weaken the efforts of our great democracies determined to destroy him, then he is sadly mistaken ... Now is not the time to moralize over the mistakes of countries and governments that allowed to topple themselves one by one, while by united efforts they could easily save themselves and the whole world from this catastrophe ... "

7. “Hitler's motive is much deeper.

He wants to destroy the power of Russia, because he hopes, if he succeeds, to turn back the main forces of his army and air fleet from the East to our island, because he knows that he will either have to conquer it or pay for his crimes.

The attack on Russia is nothing more than a prelude to an attempt to conquer the British Isles. No doubt he hopes that all this can be completed before the winter comes, and that he can overwhelm Great Britain before the United States Navy and Air Force can intervene.

He hopes that he can again repeat, on an even larger scale than ever before, the very process of destroying his opponents one by one, which has allowed him to flourish and prosper for so long, and that in the end the stage will be cleared for the last act, without which all his conquests will be in vain - namely, the subjugation of the entire Western Hemisphere to his will and his system.

Therefore, the danger that threatens Russia is a threat to us and a threat to the United States, and in the same way, the cause of every Russian who fights for his home and hearth is the cause of all free people and peoples in all parts of the globe."

June 22 is a special day for Russia and all the peoples of the former USSR. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War - 1417 days of the most terrible war in the history of mankind.

This day reminds us of all those who died in battle, were tortured in fascist captivity, died in the rear from hunger and deprivation. We mourn for all those who, at the cost of their lives, fulfilled their holy duty, defending our Fatherland in those harsh years.

In the direction of the main attacks of the Nazis, 257 Soviet frontier posts held the defense from several hours to one day. The remaining frontier outposts held out from two days to two months. Of the 485 frontier posts attacked, not a single one withdrew without an order. The story of a day that forever changed the lives of tens of millions of people.

“They don’t suspect anything about our intentions”

June 21, 1941, 13:00. German troops receive the code signal "Dortmund", confirming that the invasion will begin the next day.

The commander of the 2nd Panzer Group of the Army Group Center, Heinz Guderian, writes in his diary: “Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they did not suspect anything about our intentions. In the courtyard of the fortress of Brest, which was visible from our observation posts, to the sounds of an orchestra, they were holding guards. Coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops.

21:00. Soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant's office detained a German soldier who had crossed the border river Bug by swimming. The defector was sent to the headquarters of the detachment in the city of Vladimir-Volynsky.

23:00. German minelayers, who were in Finnish ports, began to mine the way out of the Gulf of Finland. At the same time, Finnish submarines began laying mines off the coast of Estonia.

June 22, 1941, 0:30. The defector was taken to Vladimir-Volynsky. During interrogation, the soldier identified himself as Alfred Liskov, a serviceman of the 221st regiment of the 15th Wehrmacht infantry division. He reported that at dawn on June 22 the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information has been passed on to the higher command.

At the same time, the transfer of directive No. 1 of the People's Commissariat of Defense for parts of the western military districts begins from Moscow. “During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may begin with provocative actions,” the directive said. - "The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications."

The units were ordered to be put on alert, covertly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border, and aviation was dispersed over field airfields.

It is not possible to bring the directive to the military units before the start of hostilities, as a result of which the measures indicated in it are not carried out.

“I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory”

1:00. The commandants of the sections of the 90th border detachment report to the head of the detachment, Major Bychkovsky: "nothing suspicious was noticed on the adjacent side, everything is calm."

3:05. A group of 14 German Ju-88 bombers drops 28 magnetic mines near the Kronstadt raid.

3:07. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to the Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov: “The VNOS [air surveillance, warning and communications] system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea of ​​a large number of unknown aircraft; The fleet is on full alert.

3:10. The UNKGB in the Lvov region transmits by telephone to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR the information obtained during the interrogation of the defector Alfred Liskov.

From the memoirs of the head of the 90th border detachment, Major Bychkovsky: “Without finishing the interrogation of a soldier, I heard strong artillery fire in the direction of Ustilug (the first commandant's office). I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory, which was immediately confirmed by the interrogated soldier. I immediately began to call the commandant by phone, but the connection was broken ... "

3:30. The chief of staff of the Western District, General Klimovskikh, reports on an enemy air raid on the cities of Belarus: Brest, Grodno, Lida, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi and others.

3:33. The chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General Purkaev, reports on air raids on the cities of Ukraine, including Kyiv.

3:40. The commander of the Baltic Military District, General Kuznetsov, reports on enemy air raids on Riga, Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas and other cities.

German soldiers cross the state border of the USSR.

"Enemy raid repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships has been thwarted."

3:42. Chief of the General Staff Zhukov calls Stalin and reports the start of hostilities by Germany. Stalin orders Timoshenko and Zhukov to arrive at the Kremlin, where an emergency meeting of the Politburo is being convened.

3:45. The 1st frontier post of the 86th Augustow border detachment was attacked by an enemy reconnaissance and sabotage group. The personnel of the outpost under the command of Alexander Sivachev, having entered the battle, destroy the attackers.

4:00. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to Zhukov: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships has been thwarted. But there is destruction in Sevastopol.”

4:05. The outposts of the 86th August Frontier Detachment, including the 1st Frontier Post of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev, are subjected to heavy artillery fire, after which the German offensive begins. The border guards, deprived of communication with the command, engage in battle with superior enemy forces.

4:10. The Western and Baltic Special Military Districts report the start of hostilities by German troops on land.

4:15. The Nazis open massive artillery fire on the Brest Fortress. As a result, warehouses were destroyed, communications were disrupted, there big number killed and wounded.

4:25. The 45th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht begins an attack on the Brest Fortress.

"Defending not individual countries, but ensuring the security of Europe"

4:30. A meeting of members of the Politburo begins in the Kremlin. Stalin expresses doubt that what happened is the beginning of the war and does not exclude the version of a German provocation. People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Zhukov insist: this is war.

4:55. In the Brest Fortress, the Nazis manage to capture almost half of the territory. Further progress was stopped by a sudden counterattack by the Red Army.

5:00. The German ambassador to the USSR, Count von Schulenburg, presents the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov with a “Note from the German Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Government”, which says: “The German government cannot be indifferent to a serious threat on the eastern border, so the Fuhrer gave the order to the German armed forces by all means ward off this threat. An hour after the actual start of hostilities, Germany de jure declares war on the Soviet Union.

5:30. On the German radio, Reich Minister of Propaganda Goebbels read out Adolf Hitler's appeal to the German people in connection with the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union: “Now the hour has come when it is necessary to oppose this conspiracy of Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow ... At the moment the greatest in terms of its length and volume of the performance of the troops, which the world has ever seen ... The task of this front is no longer the protection of individual countries, but the security of Europe and thereby the salvation of all.

7:00. Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop begins a press conference at which he announces the start of hostilities against the USSR: "The German army has invaded the territory of Bolshevik Russia!"

“The city is on fire, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?”

7:15. Stalin approves the directive to repel the attack Nazi Germany: "The troops should use all their strength and means to attack the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border." The transfer of "Directive No. 2" due to the violation by saboteurs of the communication lines in the western districts. Moscow does not have a clear picture of what is happening in the war zone.

9:30. It was decided that at noon Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, would address the Soviet people in connection with the outbreak of war.

10:00. From the memoirs of announcer Yuri Levitan: “They call from Minsk: “Enemy planes over the city”, they call from Kaunas: “The city is on fire, why are you not transmitting anything on the radio?”, “Enemy planes are over Kiev.” Women's crying, excitement: “Is it really a war? ..” However, no official messages are transmitted until 12:00 Moscow time on June 22.

10:30. From the report of the headquarters of the 45th German division on the battles on the territory of the Brest Fortress: “The Russians are fiercely resisting, especially behind our attacking companies. In the citadel, the enemy organized defense with infantry units supported by 35-40 tanks and armored vehicles. The fire of enemy snipers led to heavy losses among officers and non-commissioned officers.

11:00. The Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts.

“The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours"

12:00. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov read out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union: "Today at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed from our cities - Zhytomyr, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others - with their own planes, more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory ... Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to repel the piratical attack and drive the German troops from the territory of our homeland ... The government calls on you, citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally their ranks still more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader Comrade Stalin.

Our cause is right. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

12:30. Advanced German units break into the Belarusian city of Grodno.

13:00. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues a decree "On the mobilization of those liable for military service ..."

“On the basis of Article 49 of paragraph “o” of the Constitution of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announces mobilization on the territory of the military districts - Leningrad, Special Baltic, Western Special, Kiev Special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North - Caucasian and Transcaucasian.

Those liable for military service who were born from 1905 to 1918 inclusive are subject to mobilization. Consider June 23, 1941 as the first day of mobilization. Despite the fact that June 23 is named the first day of mobilization, recruiting offices at the military registration and enlistment offices begin to work by the middle of the day on June 22.

13:30. The Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov, flies to Kyiv as a representative of the newly created Headquarters of the High Command on the Southwestern Front.

"Italy also declares war on the Soviet Union"

14:00. The Brest Fortress is completely surrounded by German troops. Soviet units blockaded in the citadel continue to offer fierce resistance.

14:05. Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano states: “In view of the current situation, due to the fact that Germany has declared war on the USSR, Italy, as an ally of Germany and as a member of the Tripartite Pact, also declares war on the Soviet Union from the moment German troops enter Soviet territory.”

14:10. The 1st frontier post of Alexander Sivachev has been fighting for more than 10 hours. The border guards, who had only small arms and grenades, destroyed up to 60 Nazis and burned three tanks. The wounded head of the outpost continued to command the battle.

15:00. From the notes of the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock: “The question of whether the Russians are carrying out a planned withdrawal is still open. There is now ample evidence both for and against this.

It is surprising that nowhere is any significant work of their artillery visible. Strong artillery fire is conducted only in the north-west of Grodno, where the VIII Army Corps is advancing. Apparently, our air force has an overwhelming superiority over Russian aviation.

Of the 485 frontier posts attacked, none retreated without an order.

16:00. After a 12-hour battle, the Nazis occupy the positions of the 1st frontier post. This became possible only after all the border guards who defended it died. The head of the outpost, Alexander Sivachev, was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class.

The feat of the outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev became one of the hundreds accomplished by the border guards in the first hours and days of the war. The state border of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea on June 22, 1941 was guarded by 666 border outposts, 485 of them were attacked on the very first day of the war. None of the 485 outposts attacked on June 22 withdrew without orders.

The Nazi command took 20 minutes to break the resistance of the border guards. 257 Soviet frontier posts held the defense from several hours to one day. More than one day - 20, more than two days - 16, more than three days - 20, more than four and five days - 43, from seven to nine days - 4, more than eleven days - 51, more than twelve days - 55, more than 15 days - 51 outposts. Up to two months, 45 outposts fought.

Of the 19,600 border guards who met the Nazis on June 22 in the direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, more than 16,000 died in the first days of the war.

17:00. Hitler's units manage to occupy the southwestern part of the Brest Fortress, the northeast remained under the control of Soviet troops. Stubborn battles for the fortress will continue for another week.

“The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox for the protection sacred borders our Motherland"

18:00. The Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna, addresses the faithful with a message: “Fascist robbers have attacked our homeland. Trampling all sorts of treaties and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already irrigating our native land ... Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. Together with him, she carried trials, and consoled herself with his successes. She will not leave her people even now… The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox to defend the sacred borders of our Motherland.”

19:00. From the notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder: “All the armies, except for the 11th Army of the Army Group South in Romania, went on the offensive according to plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, was a complete tactical surprise for the enemy on the entire front. The border bridges across the Bug and other rivers have been everywhere captured by our troops without a fight and in complete safety. The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command what to do ... The Air Force command reported, that today 850 enemy aircraft have been destroyed, including entire squadrons of bombers, which, having taken to the air without fighter cover, were attacked by our fighters and destroyed.

20:00. Directive No. 3 of the People's Commissariat of Defense was approved, ordering the Soviet troops to go on the counteroffensive with the task of defeating the Nazi troops on the territory of the USSR with further advancement into enemy territory. The directive prescribed by the end of June 24 to capture the Polish city of Lublin.

"We must give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can"

21:00. Summary of the High Command of the Red Army for June 22: “At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, the German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Krystynopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes and take the towns of Kalvaria, Stojanow and Tsekhanovets (the first two at 15 km and the last at 10 km from the border).

Enemy aviation attacked a number of our airfields and settlements, but everywhere they met a decisive rebuff from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy planes."

23:00. Appeal of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the British people in connection with the German attack on the USSR: “At 4 o'clock this morning, Hitler attacked Russia. All his usual formalities of treachery were observed with scrupulous precision ... suddenly, without a declaration of war, even without an ultimatum, German bombs fell from the sky on Russian cities, German troops violated Russian borders, and an hour later the German ambassador, who just the day before generously lavished his assurances to the Russians in friendship and almost an alliance, paid a visit to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that Russia and Germany were in a state of war ...

No one has been a more staunch opponent of communism over the past 25 years than I have been. I will not take back a single word said about him. But all this pales before the spectacle unfolding now.

The past, with its crimes, follies and tragedies, recedes. I see Russian soldiers standing on the border of their native land and guarding the fields that their fathers have plowed since time immemorial. I see how they guard their homes; their mothers and wives pray - oh yes, because at such a time everyone prays for the preservation of their loved ones, for the return of the breadwinner, patron, their protectors ...

We must give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can. We must call on all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to follow a similar course and pursue it as steadfastly and steadily as we will, to the very end.

June 22 has come to an end. Ahead were another 1417 days of the most terrible war in the history of mankind.

The first and most difficult day of the Great Patriotic War

The implementation of Hitler's plan "Barbarossa" began at dawn on June 22, 1941. It was at this time that the Wehrmacht troops concentrated on the border of the USSR received an order to launch an invasion.

That first day of the war began unusually early, not only for the troops of the western border military districts, but also Soviet people living in the border regions of the USSR. At dawn, hundreds of German bombers invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union. They bombarded airfields, areas where the troops of the western border districts were stationed, railway junctions, communication lines and other important objects, as well as big cities Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova.

At the same time, Wehrmacht troops concentrated along the entire length of the State Border of the USSR opened heavy artillery fire on border outposts, fortified areas, as well as formations and units of the Red Army stationed in its immediate vicinity. After artillery and aviation preparation, they crossed the State Border of the USSR over a huge stretch - from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

The Great Patriotic War began - the most difficult of all wars ever experienced by Russia and its people.

Germany and its allies (Finland, Romania and Hungary)

for the war against the Soviet Union deployed a powerful grouping,

numbering 190 divisions, 5.5 million people, over 47 thousand guns and mortars,

about 4300 tanks and assault guns, 4200 aircraft.

They were united in three army groups - "North", "Center" and "South",

which were intended to strike in the directions of Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv.

The immediate strategic goal of the German military leadership was to defeat the Soviet troops in the Baltic states, Belarus and the Right-Bank Ukraine.

The main blows of the Wehrmacht were directed at Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The efforts of one of the army groups were concentrated in each direction.

The troops of Army Group North deployed in East Prussia advanced on Leningrad. They were supposed to destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic states, seize ports on the Baltic Sea and the North-Western regions of the USSR. In cooperation with this group of armies, a little later, the German army "Norway" and the Karelian army of the Finns, who had the task of capturing Murmansk, were to act. The enemy grouping directly operating in the Baltic direction was opposed by the troops of the Baltic Special Military District under the command of General F.I. Kuznetsov, and in the Murmansk sector the troops of the Leningrad Military District, which was headed by General M.M. Popov.

The troops of the Army Group Center were operating in the main Moscow direction, which were supposed to defeat the Soviet troops in Belarus and develop an offensive to the East. In this direction, the USSR State Border was covered by the troops of the Western Special Military District under the command of General D.G. Pavlova.

Army Group South, deployed from Vlodava to the mouth of the Danube, struck in the general direction of Kyiv. This grouping of enemy troops was opposed by the forces of the Kyiv Special Military District, commanded by General M.P. Kirponos and the Odessa Military District under the command of General Ya.T. Cherevichenko.

In Moscow, the first reports of the invasion came from the border guards. "Advance on all fronts. Parts of the border guards are fighting ... - the command of the Bialystok border section reported to the Main Directorate of the Border Troops, - The Germans are advancing Kretinga ... Bialystok. At the same time, the General Staff received similar information from the western border districts. At about 4 o'clock in the morning, his boss, General G.K. Zhukov reported to I.V. Stalin about what happened.

Only an hour and a half after the invasion of the Wehrmacht troops into Soviet territory, the German Ambassador to the USSR F. Schulenburg arrived at the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, and gave him an official note from his government, which stated: “In view of the further intolerable threat, due to the massive concentration ... of the armed forces of the Red Army. The German government considers itself compelled to immediately take military countermeasures. However, even after receiving an official document from the German embassy, ​​I.V. Stalin could not fully believe that this was a war. He demanded that Marshal S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff General G.K. Zhukov, so that they would immediately figure out if this was a provocation of the German generals, and ordered the troops to order the border not to cross until special instructions.

The whole country learned about the German attack only at 12 noon, when the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. The appeal ended with the words that became the slogan of the Soviet people in the fight against the invaders: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

Already after the speech of V.M. Molotov, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a number of decrees aimed at mobilizing all the forces of the state to repel the attack, as well as to ensure public order and state security within the country:

• "On the announcement of mobilization on the territory of 14 military districts from June 23";
• "On the introduction of martial law in certain areas of the USSR."

Crowding around loudspeakers installed on the streets and industrial enterprises, people listened to Molotov's speech, afraid to miss a word. At first, almost none of them doubted that the Red Army would need only a few weeks to defeat the enemy "with little blood, with a mighty blow." The tragedy of the situation was not fully realized by the military-political leadership of the country due to the lack of objective information from the front.

Only by the end of that day, it became clear to the head of the Soviet government that military operations on the western borders of the USSR were by no means a large-scale military provocation by Germany, but the beginning of a war - the most terrible and cruel. “At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea,” the population of the country was informed in the first report of the High Command of the Red Army, “and during the first half of the day they were held back. In the afternoon ... after fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Krystynopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes ... ".

Already in this report from the front, to some extent, the whole drama of the first border battles and battles, the most severe in their intensity and consequences, was visible. But then, on the first day of the war, no one could even imagine what inhuman tests would fall on the shoulders of every Soviet person, not only at the front, but also in the rear.

The population of Germany about the beginning new war I learned from Hitler's appeal to the people, which at 5:30 minutes was read out on the Berlin radio by the Minister of Propaganda I. Goebbels. Judging by this appeal, the political leadership of Germany sought not only to justify the aggression in the eyes of the world community, but also to attract Western powers to participate in the anti-Soviet war and thereby deprive the USSR of possible allies. However, both the leaders of the leading powers and the majority of sober-minded European politicians clearly understood that the Nazi statements were just a propaganda trick with which they hoped to justify another act of their aggressive aspirations.

The British were the first to react. Already in the evening of the same day, British Prime Minister W. Churchill made a statement about the support of the USSR in the war against Nazi Germany. He clearly articulated the purpose of British policy in the war and guaranteed a tough and consistent position for his country:

“We have only one single unchanging goal. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime...”.

He ended his speech with promises "to provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can."

The speech of the British Prime Minister had a huge resonance all over the world. All points were placed: England clearly defined its attitude towards the Soviet Union, which was subjected to aggression. To clarify the positions of many other states of the world, primarily the countries of the British Commonwealth, which are accustomed to traditionally orient themselves on the opinion of London, Churchill's speech was of fundamental importance. In a certain sense, it also influenced the position of the United States of America. True, the events that took place in Europe did not affect the Americans much. After all, they were away from the world war. Nevertheless, on the morning of June 23, Acting Secretary of State S. Welles, at the direction of President F. Roosevelt, made an official statement about rendering assistance to the USSR. The next day, Roosevelt himself at a press conference at the White House said that the United States would provide all possible assistance to the USSR in its struggle against Germany, but noted that it was not yet known what form it would take.

And yet, at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Western powers spoke more about supporting the USSR than actually helping it. The reasons for this slowness are obvious. The temptation was already very great to strengthen their own positions - to take advantage of the mutual weakening and exhaustion of the two irreconcilable enemies of Germany and the Soviet Union. And there was not so much confidence that the Red Army would withstand the battle with the seemingly invincible Wehrmacht. Indeed, already on June 22, the strike groups of the German troops achieved tangible success in all directions, due to the decisive concentration by his command in the first strategic echelon of more than 80% of all forces intended for the eastern campaign - 130 divisions, 8 brigades, 3350 tanks, about 38 thousand people. guns and mortars and about 5 thousand aircraft.

A strike of such force for all the troops of the western border districts was a complete surprise. They were not ready for such a development of events. The Soviet border guards, who were the first to stand in the way of the German troops, did not expect this blow either. The enemy hoped to crush the border outposts in a short time, but he did not succeed. The border guards fought to the death.

In extremely unfavorable conditions, the formations and cover units of the western border districts had to start hostilities. Not put on alert in advance, they were unable to provide a proper rebuff to the enemy. As early as half past two in the morning of June 22, the headquarters of the border military districts received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 1 that an attack on the country by the German armed forces was possible on June 22 or 23. But, this document did not give permission to put into effect a plan to cover the state border in full, since it only prescribed "not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications ...".

The insufficiently specific content of the given order caused many questions from commanders of all levels, and most importantly, it fettered their initiative. So, in the directive of the Baltic Special Military District, it was indicated to the 8th and 11th armies:

“During the night of June 22, covertly occupy the defense of the main zone ... Do not issue live ammunition and shells ... Do not open fire in case of provocative actions by the Germans.”

At 02:25, similar instructions were given to the armies by the military council and the Western Special Military District.

The army headquarters, having received district directives a few minutes before the start of the war, brought this order to subordinate formations and units until 5-6 in the morning. Therefore, only a few of them were put on alert in a timely manner. Most of them were alerted by the first explosions of enemy artillery shells and aerial bombs. The commanders of the 3rd and 4th armies of the Western Special Military District managed to give the formation commanders only some preliminary orders. At the headquarters of the 10th Army, the directive was received after the outbreak of hostilities. There were several reasons. On the night of June 22, in the entire border zone, as a result of the actions of enemy sabotage groups, wire communications in the army-corps-division link were significantly disrupted. The lack of pre-worked out documents on covert command and control of troops, the low provision of headquarters with radio equipment, as well as radio fear led to the fact that they practically did not use this type of communication.

Former Chief of Staff of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front, General I.T. Schlemin noted:

“On June 22, in the afternoon, wire and radio communications with the district were interrupted. It was impossible to find the district ... The district headquarters, receiving cipher telegrams from the army by radio, believed that the ciphers were coming from the enemy, and, afraid to give out their plan and their location, decided not to respond to the army's requests.

As a result of the first massive enemy air strikes on the places of deployment of troops, a large number of means of communication and transport were destroyed. Already in the first hours of the war, the commander of the 3rd Army, General V.I. Kuznetsov reported to the headquarters of the Western Front:

"Wire communication with the units is broken, radio communication is not established until 8 o'clock."

A similar situation was observed at the headquarters of the 14th mechanized corps. Later, its commander, General S.I. Oborin also reported to the headquarters of the Western Front:

“The communications battalion was killed by 70% on June 22, 1941 in the morning, during the bombardment of the city of Kobrin. The headquarters of the 14th mechanized corps remained in the composition of 20% of the regular number.

Lacking accurate information from the troops about the development of events, the commanders and staffs were unable to assess the seriousness of the situation. The installation of the People's Commissar of Defense, in his directive No. 1 "not to succumb to any provocations," continued to operate, which limited the decisive actions of the commanders of the formations and units of the covering armies. Thus, the commander of the 3rd Army reported to the headquarters of the Western Front:

"Enemy aviation is bombing Grodno, waiting for orders from General Pavlov ... artillery and machine-gun fire from the Germans ... waiting for instructions."

Practically the same was noted by the commander of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front, General M.S. Shumilov: “The war began at 0400... I immediately reported to the commander of the 8th Army... I received an order: “Do not open fire, do not succumb to provocation.” But the troops, without orders, returned fire.

The commanders of most formations and units acted similarly in other sectors of the state border cover of the western border districts. Orders "from above" came much later. So, the Military Council of the Western Front sent a directive to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies only at 5 hours and 25 minutes: “In view of the mass hostilities that have been identified by the Germans, I order: to raise troops and act in combat.”

Hard-to-replace losses from enemy air strikes were suffered by army aviation, destroyed for the most part at airfields. 66 airfields, where the most combat-ready aviation regiments of the western border districts were stationed, were subjected to massive raids. Thus, in the 10th mixed aviation division of the 4th Army of the Western Front, more than 70% of the aircraft of the attack and fighter aviation regiments were destroyed at airfields in the Vysokoye and Pruzhany regions. In the 7th mixed aviation division of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front by 15 o'clock there were only five or six aircraft left, the rest were destroyed. As a result, Soviet aviation lost over 1,200 aircraft that day.

Already from the very first hours of the war, the enemy, taking advantage of the almost complete absence of anti-aircraft weapons in the military air defense units, ensured complete air supremacy. Commander of the 3rd mechanized corps, General A.V. Kurkin, in one of his reports to the commander of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front, noted:

“... there is no our aviation. The enemy is bombing all the time."

The troops of the western border military districts, alerted, sought to reach their cover areas, but, having no information about the situation, not knowing what was happening on the border, they were still attacked by German aviation and its ground forces while still in march formations. Even before they came into contact with the enemy, they suffered huge losses. On this occasion, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General G. Goth, in the reporting document indicated:

“There were no signs of purposeful and planned command and control of enemy forces in general. The direct control of the troops was characterized by inactivity, schematic ... Not a single Soviet military commander accepted independent decision destroy crossings and bridges.

In such a situation, at 7:15 a.m., the headquarters of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts received Directive No. 2 of the People's Commissar of Defense, in which the commander of the front troops was tasked: "to attack enemy forces with all their forces and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.

However, under the circumstances, this order of the People's Commissar was not feasible. Already at 8 o'clock in the morning, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal F. Bock, reported to the command of the Wehrmacht:

“The offensive continues successfully. On the entire front of the offensive, the enemy still offers little resistance ... the enemy in all sectors was taken by surprise.

A few documents testify to the complexity of the first day of the war. So, the commander of the North-Western Front, General F.I. Kuznetsov reported to Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko:

“Large forces of tanks and motorized units break through to Druskeniki. The 128th Rifle Division is mostly surrounded, there is no exact information about its condition ... I can’t create a grouping to eliminate the breakthrough. Please help."

Head of the Operational Directorate of the Western Front, General I.I. Semenov reported to the General Staff: “Rifle-machine-gun and artillery fire along the entire border ... We don’t have wired communications with the armies.”

Some formations and units of the front were already fighting in the encirclement during these first hours, it was not possible to establish contact with them. From the commander of the 3rd armies, General V.I. Kuznetsov, the headquarters of the Western Front from the beginning of the war until 10 a.m. received only three combat reports. From the commander of the 10th Army, General K.D. Golubev received only one message during the same time, and the commander of the 4th Army, General A.A. Korobkov was able to send the first combat report only at 06:40.

Nevertheless, commanders of all levels and in these difficult conditions withdrew their subordinate formations and units to their cover areas. So, in the zone of the Western Front, out of ten formations of the first echelon of the 3rd, 10th and 4th armies, three rifle divisions still managed to reach their operational areas. In the zone of the Southwestern Front, the advanced units of the 62nd and 87th rifle divisions of the 26th Army were the first to reach the state border.

In total, 14 divisions from 57 planned formations of the first echelon were withdrawn to cover the border on June 22, mainly on the flanks of the Soviet-German front. They went into battle on the move, defended in wide lanes, in one-echelon battle formations, sometimes on terrain not equipped in engineering terms, moreover, without significant artillery support, without proper air cover and anti-aircraft weapons, having a limited amount of ammunition. In this regard, they were forced to retreat with heavy losses.

By the middle of the day, the Wehrmacht strike groups managed to create a large gap on the adjacent flanks of the Northwestern and Western fronts, into which the 3rd Panzer Group of General G. Hoth rushed. Not knowing the true state of affairs, the commander of the North-Western Front, General F.I. Kuznetsov reported to the People's Commissar of Defense that the formations of the 11th Army continued to hold back the enemy, although in reality they retreated hastily and disorganized with heavy losses.

Toward evening, the most threatened situation developed in the zone of the Western Front. His command, which had not yet realized the threat of deep bilateral coverage of the troops of the front by enemy tank formations, was more concerned about the situation on the northern face of the Bialystok salient, where the enemy was rushing towards Grodno. The situation in the Brest direction was assessed by him as more or less stable. However, by the end of the day, formations and units of the 4th Army were thrown back from the border by 25-30 km, and the advanced tank units of the enemy managed to advance even deeper - by 60 km, and occupy Kobrin.

Without understanding the situation, the commander of the front, General D.G. Pavlov at 5 pm sent a report to the General Staff, which essentially disorientated the political and military leadership of the country:

“Parts of the Western Front during the day of 22.6.41 fought holding battles ... putting up stubborn resistance to superior enemy forces ... Parts of the 4th Army fought defensive battles, presumably at the line ... Brest, Vlodava.”

In fact, the troops of the Western Front continued to hastily retreat to the east in scattered groups.

On the basis of reports from the headquarters of the North-Western and Western fronts, not fully imagining the real situation, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff concluded that most of the fighting was taking place near the border. At that time, they were most worried about the situation in the Grodno direction, where a deep coverage of the Bialystok ledge from the north was already observed. Because of the misleading reports of the headquarters of the Western Front, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff clearly underestimated the powerful enemy grouping that was striking from the Brest region.

Trying to turn the tide of events and believing that there were quite enough forces for a retaliatory strike, the High Command at 21:15 sent directive No. enemy. However, aiming them at defeating the enemy groupings, which posed the greatest danger in the strip of each front, the General Staff did not take into account the difficulties that the front command would have in organizing and preparing strikes against the enemy during one night.

The real situation that had developed by the end of the first day of the war on the entire Soviet-German front turned out to be much more complicated than the military-political leadership of the country knew. Therefore, the requirements of the High Command were no longer realistic, since they did not meet the rapidly changing situation.

Meanwhile, the position of the troops of the Western Front became more and more critical: “The enemy, having bypassed the right flank of the army, strikes in the Lida direction ... - the commander of the 3rd Army, General Kuznetsov, reported to the front headquarters, - we have no reserves, and to fend off the blow nothing." By the end of the first day of the war, the troops of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts, under the unrelenting onslaught of the enemy, were forced to retreat, conducting rearguard battles.

The events of June 22 took place differently on the flanks of the Soviet-German front, where the enemy did not show activity or acted with limited forces. This allowed the Soviet troops, operating in a relatively calm situation, to advance to the border and take up defensive lines in accordance with the cover plans.

In general, by the end of the first day of hostilities in the western direction, an extremely difficult situation developed for the Red Army. The enemy forestalled formations and covering units in occupying defensive zones and lines. By the end of the day, the forward detachments of the German 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups penetrated the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of 60 km. Thus, they began to cover the main forces of the Western Front from the north and south and created favorable conditions for their troops operating in other directions.

Thus ended the first day of the war. Under the onslaught of the superior forces of the enemy, the Soviet troops with heavy fighting retreated into the interior of the country. They still had a whole war ahead of them, which lasted 1418 days and nights. During the Great Patriotic War, there were undoubtedly more fateful days for our country, but that first day will forever remain in the memory of the peoples of Russia.

22 JUNE 1941 OF THE YEAR - THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

On June 22, 1941, at 4 am, without declaring war, Nazi Germany and its allies attacked the Soviet Union. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War fell not just on Sunday. It was a church holiday of All Saints who shone in the Russian land.

Parts of the Red Army were attacked by German troops along the entire length of the border. Riga, Vindava, Libau, Siauliai, Kaunas, Vilnius, Grodno, Lida, Volkovysk, Brest, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi, Bobruisk, Zhytomyr, Kiev, Sevastopol and many other cities, railway junctions, airfields, naval bases of the USSR were bombed , artillery shelling of border fortifications and areas of deployment of Soviet troops near the border from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians was carried out. The Great Patriotic War began.

Then no one knew that it would go down in the history of mankind as the most bloody. No one guessed that the Soviet people would have to go through inhuman trials, go through and win. Rid the world of fascism, showing everyone that the spirit of a Red Army soldier cannot be broken by the invaders. No one could have imagined that the names of the hero cities would become known to the whole world, that Stalingrad would become a symbol of the resilience of our people, Leningrad a symbol of courage, Brest a symbol of courage. That, on a par with male warriors, old men, women and children will heroically defend the earth from the fascist plague.

1418 days and nights of war.

Over 26 million human lives...

These photographs have one thing in common: they were taken in the first hours and days of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

On the eve of the war

Soviet border guards on patrol. The photograph is interesting because it was taken for a newspaper at one of the outposts on the western border of the USSR on June 20, 1941, that is, two days before the war.

German air raid

The first to take the blow were the border guards and the fighters of the cover units. They not only defended, but also went on the counterattack. For a whole month, the garrison of the Brest Fortress fought in the rear of the Germans. Even after the enemy managed to capture the fortress, some of its defenders continued to resist. The last of them was captured by the Germans in the summer of 1942.

The picture was taken on June 24, 1941.

During the first 8 hours of the war, Soviet aviation lost 1,200 aircraft, of which about 900 were lost on the ground (66 airfields were bombed). The Western Special Military District suffered the greatest losses - 738 aircraft (528 on the ground). Having learned about such losses, the head of the Air Force of the district, Major General Kopets I.I. shot himself.

On the morning of June 22, Moscow radio broadcast the usual Sunday programs and peaceful music. Soviet citizens learned about the beginning of the war only at noon, when Vyacheslav Molotov spoke on the radio. He reported: "Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country."

1941 poster

On the same day, a decree was published by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1905-1918 on the territory of all military districts. Hundreds of thousands of men and women received summons, appeared at the military registration and enlistment offices, and then went to the front in trains.

The mobilization capabilities of the Soviet system, multiplied by the patriotism and sacrifice of the people during the Great Patriotic War, played an important role in organizing a rebuff to the enemy, especially on initial stage war. The call "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" was accepted by all the people. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens voluntarily went into the army. In just a week since the beginning of the war, more than 5 million people were mobilized.

The line between peace and war was invisible, and people did not immediately perceive the change of reality. It seemed to many that this was just some kind of masquerade, a misunderstanding, and soon everything would be resolved.

The fascist troops met stubborn resistance in the battles near Minsk, Smolensk, Vladimir-Volynsky, Przemysl, Lutsk, Dubno, Rovno, Mogilev and others.And yet, in the first three weeks of the war, the troops of the Red Army left Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, a significant part of Ukraine and Moldova. Minsk fell six days after the start of the war. The German army advanced into various directions from 350 to 600 km. The Red Army lost almost 800 thousand people.

The turning point in the perception of the war by the inhabitants of the Soviet Union, of course, was August 14. It was then that the whole country suddenly learned that The Germans occupied Smolensk . It really was a bolt from the blue. While the fighting was going on "somewhere in the west", and in the reports flashed cities, the location of which many could imagine with great difficulty, it seemed that the war was still far away anyway. Smolensk is not just the name of the city, this word meant a lot. Firstly, it is already more than 400 km from the border, and secondly, only 360 km from Moscow. And thirdly, unlike Vilna, Grodno and Molodechno, Smolensk is an ancient purely Russian city.

The stubborn resistance of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 frustrated Hitler's plans. The Nazis failed to quickly take either Moscow or Leningrad, and in September the long defense of Leningrad began. In the Arctic, Soviet troops, in cooperation with the Northern Fleet, defended Murmansk and the main base of the fleet - Polyarny. Although in Ukraine in October-November the enemy captured the Donbass, captured Rostov, and broke into the Crimea, nevertheless, here, too, his troops were fettered by the defense of Sevastopol. The formations of the Army Group "South" could not reach the rear of the Soviet troops remaining in the lower reaches of the Don through the Kerch Strait.

Minsk 1941. Execution of Soviet prisoners of war

September 30th within Operation Typhoon the Germans started general attack on Moscow . Its beginning was unfavorable for the Soviet troops. Pali Bryansk and Vyazma. On October 10, G.K. was appointed commander of the Western Front. Zhukov. On October 19, Moscow was declared under a state of siege. In bloody battles, the Red Army still managed to stop the enemy. Having strengthened the Army Group Center, the German command resumed the attack on Moscow in mid-November. Overcoming the resistance of the Western, Kalinin and right wing of the South-Western fronts, the enemy strike groups bypassed the city from the north and south and by the end of the month reached the Moscow-Volga canal (25-30 km from the capital), approached Kashira. On this, the German offensive bogged down. The bloodless Army Group Center was forced to go on the defensive, which was also facilitated by the successful offensive operations of the Soviet troops near Tikhvin (November 10 - December 30) and Rostov (November 17 - December 2). On December 6, the counteroffensive of the Red Army began. , as a result of which the enemy was driven back from Moscow by 100 - 250 km. Kaluga, Kalinin (Tver), Maloyaroslavets and others were liberated.

On guard of the Moscow sky. Autumn 1941

The victory near Moscow was of great strategic and moral-political significance, since it was the first since the beginning of the war. The immediate threat to Moscow was eliminated.

Although, as a result of the summer-autumn campaign, our army retreated 850-1200 km inland, and the most important economic regions fell into the hands of the aggressor, the plans for the "blitzkrieg" were nevertheless frustrated. The Nazi leadership faced the inevitable prospect of a protracted war. The victory near Moscow also changed the balance of power in the international arena. They began to look at the Soviet Union as the decisive factor in the Second World War. Japan was forced to refrain from attacking the USSR.

In winter, units of the Red Army carried out an offensive on other fronts. However, it was not possible to consolidate the success, primarily because of the dispersal of forces and means along a front of enormous length.

During the offensive of the German troops in May 1942, the Crimean Front was defeated on the Kerch Peninsula in 10 days. May 15 had to leave Kerch, and July 4, 1942 after a hard defense fell Sevastopol. The enemy completely took possession of the Crimea. In July - August, Rostov, Stavropol and Novorossiysk were captured. Stubborn battles were fought in the central part of the Caucasus Range.

Hundreds of thousands of our compatriots ended up in more than 14 thousand concentration camps, prisons, ghettos scattered throughout Europe. Dispassionate figures testify to the scale of the tragedy: only on the territory of Russia, the fascist invaders shot, choked in gas chambers, burned, and hanged 1.7 million. people (including 600 thousand children). In total, about 5 million Soviet citizens died in concentration camps.

But, despite the stubborn battles, the Nazis failed to solve their main task - to break through into the Transcaucasus to master the oil reserves of Baku. At the end of September, the offensive of the fascist troops in the Caucasus was stopped.

To contain the enemy onslaught in the east, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. On July 17, 1942, the enemy under the command of General von Paulus delivered a powerful blow on the Stalingrad front. In August, the Nazis broke through to the Volga in stubborn battles. From the beginning of September 1942, the heroic defense of Stalingrad began. The battles went on literally for every inch of land, for every house. Both sides suffered huge losses. By mid-November, the Nazis were forced to stop the offensive. The heroic resistance of the Soviet troops made it possible to create favorable conditions for them to launch a counteroffensive near Stalingrad and thereby initiate a radical change in the course of the war.

By November 1942, almost 40% of the population was under German occupation. The regions captured by the Germans were subject to military and civil administration. In Germany, even a special ministry for the affairs of the occupied regions was created, headed by A. Rosenberg. Political supervision was in charge of the SS and police services. On the ground, the occupiers formed the so-called self-government - city and district councils, in the villages the posts of elders were introduced. Persons dissatisfied were involved in cooperation Soviet power. All residents of the occupied territories, regardless of age, were required to work. In addition to participating in the construction of roads and defensive structures, they were forced to clear minefields. The civilian population, mostly young people, was also sent to forced labor in Germany, where they were called "Ostarbeiter" and used as cheap labor. In total, 6 million people were hijacked during the war years. From hunger and epidemics in the occupied territory, more than 6.5 million people were destroyed, more than 11 million Soviet citizens were shot in camps and at their places of residence.

November 19, 1942 Soviet troops moved into counteroffensive at Stalingrad (Operation Uranus). The forces of the Red Army surrounded 22 divisions and 160 separate units of the Wehrmacht (about 330 thousand people). The Nazi command formed the Don Army Group, consisting of 30 divisions, and tried to break through the encirclement. However, this attempt was not successful. In December, our troops, having defeated this grouping, launched an offensive against Rostov (Operation Saturn). By the beginning of February 1943, our troops liquidated the grouping of fascist troops caught in the ring. 91 thousand people were taken prisoner, led by the commander of the 6th German Army, Field Marshal von Paulus. Behind 6.5 months Battle of Stalingrad(July 17, 1942 – February 2, 1943) Germany and its allies lost up to 1.5 million people, as well as a huge amount of equipment. The military power of fascist Germany was significantly undermined.

The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep political crisis in Germany. It was declared three days of mourning. The morale of the German soldiers fell, defeatist sentiments swept over the general population, which less and less believed the Fuhrer.

The victory of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of World War II. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In January-February 1943, the Red Army was conducting an offensive on all fronts. In the Caucasian direction, Soviet troops advanced by the summer of 1943 by 500-600 km. In January 1943, the blockade of Leningrad was broken.

The command of the Wehrmacht planned summer 1943 conduct a major strategic offensive operation in the area of ​​the Kursk salient (Operation Citadel) , defeat the Soviet troops here, and then strike at the rear of the Southwestern Front (Operation Panther) and subsequently, building on success, again create a threat to Moscow. To this end, up to 50 divisions were concentrated in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge, including 19 tank and motorized divisions, and other units - a total of over 900 thousand people. This grouping was opposed by the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which had 1.3 million people. During the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle of the Second World War took place.

On July 5, 1943, a massive offensive of the Soviet troops began. Within 5 - 7 days, our troops, stubbornly defending themselves, stopped the enemy, who had penetrated 10 - 35 km beyond the front line, and launched a counteroffensive. It started July 12 near Prokhorovka , Where the largest oncoming tank battle in the history of wars (with the participation of up to 1,200 tanks on both sides) took place. In August 1943, our troops captured Orel and Belgorod. In honor of this victory in Moscow, a salute was fired for the first time with 12 artillery volleys. Continuing the offensive, our troops inflicted a crushing defeat on the Nazis.

In September, Left-bank Ukraine and Donbass were liberated. On November 6, formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front entered Kyiv.

Having thrown the enemy back 200-300 km from Moscow, the Soviet troops set about liberating Belarus. From that moment on, our command held the strategic initiative until the end of the war. From November 1942 to December 1943, the Soviet Army advanced 500-1300 km westward, freeing about 50% of the territory occupied by the enemy. 218 enemy divisions were destroyed. During this period, partisan formations inflicted great damage on the enemy, in the ranks of which up to 250 thousand people fought.

Significant successes of the Soviet troops in 1943 intensified diplomatic and military-political cooperation between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. On November 28 - December 1, 1943, the Tehran Conference of the "Big Three" was held with the participation of I. Stalin (USSR), W. Churchill (Great Britain) and F. Roosevelt (USA). The leaders of the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition determined the timing of the opening of a second front in Europe (the landing operation "Overlord" was scheduled for May 1944).

Tehran Conference of the "Big Three" with the participation of I. Stalin (USSR), W. Churchill (Great Britain) and F. Roosevelt (USA).

In the spring of 1944 Crimea was cleared of the enemy.

Under these favorable conditions, the Western Allies, after two years of preparation, opened a second front in Europe in northern France. June 6, 1944 the combined Anglo-American forces (General D. Eisenhower), numbering over 2.8 million people, up to 11 thousand combat aircraft, over 12 thousand combat and 41 thousand transport ships, having crossed the English Channel and the Pas de Calais, started the biggest war in years landing Norman operation("Overlord") and entered Paris in August.

Continuing to develop the strategic initiative, in the summer of 1944, Soviet troops launched a powerful offensive in Karelia (June 10 - August 9), Belarus (June 23 - August 29), in Western Ukraine (July 13 - August 29) and in Moldova (June 20 - 29 August).

During Belarusian operation (code name "Bagration") Army Group Center was defeated, Soviet troops liberated Belarus, Latvia, part of Lithuania, eastern Poland and reached the border with East Prussia.

The victories of the Soviet troops in the southern direction in the autumn of 1944 helped the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak peoples in their liberation from fascism.

As a result of the hostilities of 1944, the state border of the USSR, treacherously violated by Germany in June 1941, was restored along its entire length from the Barents to the Black Sea. The Nazis were expelled from Romania, Bulgaria, from most regions of Poland and Hungary. In these countries, pro-German regimes were overthrown, and patriotic forces came to power. The Soviet Army entered the territory of Czechoslovakia.

While the bloc of fascist states was falling apart, anti-Hitler coalition, as evidenced by the success of the Crimean (Yalta) Conference of the leaders of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain (from February 4 to February 11, 1945).

But still decisive role in defeating the enemy final stage played by the Soviet Union. Thanks to the titanic efforts of all the people, the technical equipment and armament of the army and navy of the USSR reached the highest level by the beginning of 1945. In January - early April 1945, as a result of a powerful strategic offensive on the entire Soviet-German front, the Soviet Army decisively defeated the main enemy forces with the forces of ten fronts. During the East Prussian, Vistula-Oder, West Carpathian and the completion of the Budapest operations, Soviet troops created the conditions for further strikes in Pomerania and Silesia, and then for an attack on Berlin. Almost all of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the entire territory of Hungary were liberated.

The capture of the capital of the Third Reich and the final defeat of fascism was carried out during Berlin operation(April 16 - May 8, 1945).

April 30 in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery Hitler committed suicide .

On the morning of May 1, over the Reichstag, sergeants M.A. Egorov and M.V. Kantaria was hoisted the Red Banner as a symbol of the Victory of the Soviet people. On May 2, Soviet troops completely captured the city. The attempts of the new German government, which on May 1, 1945, after the suicide of A. Hitler, was headed by Grand Admiral K. Doenitz, to achieve a separate peace with the USA and Great Britain failed.

May 9, 1945 at 0043 In the Berlin suburb of Karlshorst, the Act of Unconditional Surrender of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany was signed. On behalf of the Soviet side, this historical document was signed by the hero of the war, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, from Germany - Field Marshal Keitel. On the same day, the remnants of the last large enemy grouping on the territory of Czechoslovakia in the Prague region were defeated. City Liberation Day - May 9 - became the Day of Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. The news of the Victory spread like lightning all over the world. Soviet people, who suffered the greatest losses, met her with popular rejoicing. Truly, it was a great holiday "with tears in the eyes."

In Moscow, on Victory Day, a festive salute was fired from a thousand guns.

Great Patriotic War 1941-1945

Material prepared by Sergey SHULYAK

Today's lecture topic is the battle in the sky on June 22, 1941, the confrontation between the Red Army and the Luftwaffe. Today we will talk both directly about the battle and about the background.

I want to note that in Soviet times this issue was given little attention in the literature. There were no special publications on this topic at all, and in some studies that covered the development of the Soviet armed forces and, in particular, the Air Force, several paragraphs or, at best, a chapter were devoted to this problem.

Everything led to the fact that by the beginning of the 90s stereotypes had formed, a quite definite picture of this day and previous events, which can be briefly characterized by the following moments: the defeat of the Red Army Air Force was due to the suddenness of the German attack, as a rule, it was always added that there were more than 60 Soviet airfields were attacked, more than 1200 aircraft were destroyed. Almost all publications added that the Luftwaffe had a numerical superiority over the Soviet Air Force and that most of the Soviet aircraft were obsolete or technically faulty. Aircraft of new types, Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Pe-2, Il-2, were around 2 thousand. The Luftwaffe, together with the allies, in all publications was given about 5 thousand aircraft, so they were superior to the Red Army Air Force technically and numerically.

This information wandered from book to book, and there were few variations. Basically, people who were interested in this topic could draw information from the memories of eyewitnesses or participants. By the early 90s, certain myths had developed. This had negative consequences: in connection with the so-called. “freedom of speech” appeared pseudo-theories that tried to answer who is to blame. It turned out that in fact, either the generals betrayed, and this catastrophe occurred, or de Soviet soldiers were not going to fight. In particular, such a theory was put forward by the well-known Mark Solonin, who devoted several books to this topic. In them, he tries to prove that allegedly no battle took place in the air, and the Russian pilots simply fled, abandoned their equipment and retreated far to the east. It started already in the early 2000s. The first publication was called: “Where did the Stalinist falcons fly to?”. Briefly, I would like to dispel doubts: they fought the enemy as best they could, using all the forces and means that were at that moment, just the lack of documentary material made it possible for such people to operate with unverified facts.

The first thing that the same Solonin is wrong about is that he starts from the wrong tasks. He could not even determine the composition of the Soviet Air Force grouping on June 22 in the Western border districts, since at that time he did not have information about the real composition and deployment of the Air Force in the western districts. And then he, using operational reports, operational documentation, combat reports, draws incorrect conclusions. He believes that if, for example, some regiment had 50 aircraft, and the next day the report says that 20 aircraft remained, and according to losses in the same operational report, 10 aircraft are written, against this background he says: “Where Share the rest of the cars? And he makes some theses that are completely untrue, because the operational reports were very different from the loss reports, and often what was written in the morning’s operational report, for example, on June 22, 1941, did not at all correspond to what was later , a few days later was given to the higher command as losses. That is, a person initially set the wrong direction, then “planted” certain documents under his version that do not correspond to the format of the study. Roughly speaking, he starts talking about the number, and in the end he operates with operational documents that had nothing to do with this number. Thus, a person makes incomprehensible conclusions and puts forward crazy theories. The strangest thing is that this is picked up by many on the Internet, and some sort of conspiracy discussion practically begins.

How did things really work?

The state of the Red Army Air Force at the beginning of World War II, by September 1, 1939, by June 22, 1941, was far from optimal. Why? There were quite objective reasons. Firstly, the very geography of our country played against the Red Army, which meant the presence of a very powerful group in the Far East, including the air force, and in the Transcaucasus. The forces that the Soviet Union should have had at that time could not be transferred quickly. For example, aviation from Central Russia to the Far East. There was not even a flight route, so the plane had to be disassembled first, transported in echelons. It took a lot of time, so the Soviet leadership was forced to keep very powerful groups in the Far East and Transcaucasia. That is, initially the Soviet Union needed to have much more forces even in peacetime, respectively, to produce more aircraft, produce more pilots, spend more resources, fuel, engine hours, and so on.

The second aspect: the Soviet Union began industrialization only in the early 1920s. To develop such an industry as the aircraft industry in 10–15 years is a very difficult task, given that in tsarist Russia, as such, neither production nor development was carried out. Purchased engines and aircraft structures were used. Although there were outstanding designers, Sikorsky is the same, but basically what was used at the front was the equipment of the allies, which, at best, was produced under license. In general, it was not possible to overcome the problem of creating our own high-quality aircraft industry and models of equipment by the beginning of World War II.

Map of the construction of operational airfields

A striking example: by September 1, the Luftwaffe received several engines with a power above 1000 hp. Unfortunately, the Red Army Air Force did not have such equipment and lagged behind for almost a whole period.

Thus, in technical terms, Soviet aircraft lost to German ones. Another reason for this was the production of aluminum, which in the USSR was 3-4 times behind the German one. Accordingly, the Germans could afford to build all-metal aircraft from duralumin, which, naturally, is lighter, and the USSR was forced to build aircraft of mixed designs, heavier, which, in the presence of weak engines, created a difficult situation.

The second issue, which, as a rule, was not covered and is not covered, is the organizational and mobilization measures that were carried out from 1938 until the beginning of the war. The Soviet Union, as you know, although it did not fully enter the war on September 1, it began to conduct preparations long before. There was a "skew" towards quantitative parameters. There were reasons for this, including the territory. We took the path of more aircraft, pilots, formations, units, to the detriment of quality. The training of the flight crew, which was already not up to par in the 30s, completely fell to an unacceptable minimum in the 38-40s, and produced pilots, as a rule, the maximum that they could master on a combat aircraft was takeoff and landing . It was not uncommon for graduates to have literally 20-30 flights on a combat aircraft. They didn't even have to take off and land. At the beginning of 1939, the Red Army Air Force had about 150 aviation regiments, in 1940 they added another 100, in 1941 they began to form another 100 regiments. Thus, according to the quantitative characteristics of the Red Army Air Force, they had a perfect armada - 350 aviation regiments, more than 20 thousand combat aircraft, 23 thousand pilots in combat units, plus 7 thousand instructor pilots in military schools and 34 thousand simultaneously trained cadets. With such indicators, there was no question of any quality of training. This is another reason that the events were rather tragic.

In many countries, such as Japan, the opposite trend was observed. They paid too much attention to the quality of pilot training and due to this they lost a lot in numbers. When in 1942-44 the Americans knocked out the bulk of their experienced pilots - probably everyone knows this story - it turned out that the Japanese simply did not have personnel. The bias in both directions is not very good, and only the Americans managed to find the golden mean, and only due to the fact that they had the richest country. They were able to train good pilots in huge numbers and at the same time produce excellent aircraft and engines.

In view of the so-called organizational and mobilization measures, the composition of the personnel units was greatly "liquefied". Even those units that were formed in the 30s and reorganized into regiments in 1938, experienced pilots and commanders were regularly taken from them over the course of 40-41 years and sent as commanders to the newly formed units. This led to negative consequences, because the personnel structure of the personnel units was greatly weakened.

Let's move on to preparing for war. Both Germany and the Soviet Union were preparing to conduct combat operations in the air quite decisively. Both sides intended to conduct the first operations specifically to gain air supremacy and were preparing to act on airfields in the first place. However, the approaches differed. The German Air Force approached this issue in more detail. An important factor here was that the Germans held fewer organizational events, formed fewer units, keeping the pre-war ones in very good personnel. Of course, they had losses in the campaign in the West, the campaign of 1940, but on the whole the backbone remained. If the Germans at the beginning of World War II had 23 fighter groups, then on June 22 they had about 40 fighter groups, i.e. The composition has increased, but not by much. And the Soviet Air Force, which had 55 fighter regiments on September 1, 1939, by 1941 had about 150, and the number of personnel and equipment in them was greater than that of the Luftwaffe. The quality of training suffered because of this, but there were other reasons related to intelligence activities. The Germans at one time created a powerful reconnaissance aviation even before the war, which included units at all levels of subordination, starting from the Wehrmacht high command, which had eyes in the form of a specialized unit, or rather, a formation, the Rovel Ober-Group, which included both reconnaissance aviation units , and infrastructure, laboratories, airfields, which allowed them to conduct reconnaissance at the highest level. The Germans began preparing for military operations against the Soviet Union immediately after the final approval of the Barbarossa plan, which was adopted in December 1940, respectively, the Germans began preparations from the beginning of January. Aircraft were specially built, or rather, converted from existing models: high-altitude engines were installed on them, they received camouflage in the form of civilian identification marks, and all weapons were removed from them. In addition, several Yu-86 aircraft were designed with pressurized cabins, which allowed them to operate from heights of 12-13 km. At that time, this was the maximum height for interceptors, and it was difficult to use interceptor fighters effectively. Plus, the fact that there was no radar field over the Soviet-German border played a role. The Soviet Union had several radar stations, but they were all located in the region of Leningrad and Moscow, so the activities of German intelligence officers were absolutely unpunished. You can see a map, a real map from TsAMO, which gives an idea of ​​the activities of German reconnaissance aircraft.

This is the region of East Prussia and the Baltic states. One of the squadrons, based in the Königsberg area, the 2nd squadron of the Obergroup Rovel, carried out reconnaissance flights along the route: they took off from the Seerappen airfield along Königsberg, further over the Baltic Sea, entered approximately in the Libava area, further in the Riga area, carried out reconnaissance flights over the entire territory of the Baltic states, Belarus and went to their territory in the Brest region, landed at an airfield in the Warsaw region, refueled and performed a reverse reconnaissance flight along the same route in the opposite direction. Soviet VNSO posts, that is, observations and detections, very rarely recorded these flights, because they were carried out at high altitude. How many such flights were made, unfortunately, we do not know. Soviet data speaks of 200 flights, but in fact there were many more. There is no German data, but there is actual confirmation of these German actions: the Germans at one time were able to film almost all the main Soviet airfields, railway stations, and troop concentrations. For example, an aerial photograph taken from a German intelligence officer on April 10, 1941.

Aerial photography. Kaunas, April 10, 1941

Kaunas is visible on it, the famous Kaunas fortress, the airfield, more precisely, the southern part of the airfield, in which the 15th Fighter Regiment of the 8th Mixed Division was based, is visible. Visible hangars, aircraft parking. The detail of these shots was amazing, you can see everything, including every plane. The crews of the Luftwaffe, for which such tablets were being prepared, had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with future targets in detail. This activity was carried out on a daily basis, without stopping until almost June 22, until the moment of the invasion, and we have some opportunities to look in retrospect how the situation has changed.

For example, here is a later picture taken on June 9, the entire Kaunas airfield is already visible, including what we saw in the previous picture - the hangars of the 15th IAP, the planes stand in three rows in front of the hangars, you can even now count each plane. In the northern part of the airfield of the 31st IAP, you can count all the aircraft, plan approaches for bombing from both sides.

Aerial photography. June 9, 1941

What could the Red Army oppose in terms of intelligence? Many have noticed that in Lately there was a layer of publications devoted to the intelligence activities of various structures. She, of course, was very important, but, unfortunately, she did not provide materials similar to the Germans. By the way, here is the Yu-86 aircraft with a pressurized cabin, civilian registration plates are visible. This is the only vehicle lost during these reconnaissance flights. Unique photo. The crew landed in the Rovno area - their engines failed. The Germans managed to blow up the plane before they were captured, but, nevertheless, the Soviet specialists managed to extract several remnants of the photographic equipment, including a film where it was clear that the Germans were photographing the railway lines in the Korosten region.

Downed Yu-86

The Soviet Air Force could rely on intelligence information collected, as a rule, in the 30s, because permission for intelligence activities was not received until at least the beginning of June. There are several notes written by the heads of the Red Army Air Force - first Rychagov, then Zhigarev, who asked Timoshenko and Stalin to start reconnaissance over German territory, but there was no such decision until mid-June. Soviet pilots were forced to rely on less relevant data that were collected back in the 30s. For some objects, they were of sufficient quality - for example, the plan of Königsberg is quite good, there are map materials, even some photographic materials, on which the Devau airfield is marked. But the bulk of the data was represented by approximately such diagrams, on which at best there were target coordinates, a small description and the simplest diagram, which, of course, can be used as a visual aid, but it was almost impossible to find an airfield using it.

Soviet pilots were forced to act in such situations, often at random. The difference in intelligence that the Germans and the Red Army Air Force had was approximately understandable. According to the plans (we do not take political questions, who was going to attack first, who was not going to), the Soviet cover plans for the Red Army were to act aggressively, inflicting a number of attacks on German airfields. But the problem was that due to the lack of up-to-date intelligence information, part of the strikes, even according to these plans, would have been carried out on empty airfields where there were no combat units, and vice versa, those airfields where combat units were located, according to the plan, should not have been attacked .

The Germans, accordingly, could adjust their plans until June 22 and have up-to-date information, seeing the movements of the Red Army Air Force as if online. And when some comrades doubt that the Germans had such successes on June 22, this is rather strange. Because, having information where it was necessary to strike, the Germans did not even need to expend energy for this, only highlighting small groups of aircraft that delivered accurate strikes.

An interesting aspect of technical preparation for combat operations. The Luftwaffe conducted research even after the Polish, French events, and especially during the "Battle of Britain". The tactics of actions against enemy airfields were worked out, which included both tactical methods and the use of specialized ammunition. A target range of weapons was developed, including fragmentation bombs, which were supposed to become know-how, effective method destruction of aircraft at airfields. This is a small SD-2 bomb, weighing 2.5 kg, the smallest bomb at that time designed for military operations. Next came the SD-10 in the nomenclature, then the SD-50 fragmentation bomb, and the last one, the SD-250, is already a very heavy bomb, but it was rarely used. The main bombs that were used were precisely the SD-2 and SD-50.

Air bombs SD-2 and SD-50

What was their advantage? German aircraft received holders for these bombs, which made it possible to hang a very large number of them. Suppose an ordinary Messerschmitt fighter had the ability to hang 96 such bombs. Despite the fact that the bomb was small at first glance, it had an effectiveness equal to an 82-mm mine, that is, very serious: hitting an aircraft almost always disabled it. In addition, some of these munitions were provided with clockwork, which made them even more of a problem for airfields. They could explode an hour or two after they were dropped.

This is how an aircraft from the second group of the 27th fighter squadron looked in the field, equipped with bombs.

A real shot of June 1941 in the Suwalki area. Suspension SD-2 for the BF-110 heavy fighter, it has 48 bombs under each wing, the total load is 96 bombs. The suspension of 4 SD-50 bombs was also practiced, which, in principle, is also effective. I draw your attention to the fact that, for example, a typical SB, the main bomber in the Red Army Air Force by 1941, as a rule, carried a load of only 6 FAB-100 bombs, that is, the Mi-109 fighter was actually equivalent to the SB.

An interesting video of the attack with SD-2 bombs, which shows how much airfields could be sown with them. These are the first shots, this is the SD-50 bombing, by the way. But the SD-2 is being bombed. That is, even a small group of German fighters equipped with such bombs could, with a high degree of certainty, guarantee the destruction of materiel that was not covered.

German bombers were also trained specifically for operations on airfields. They, as a rule, carried (Junkers-88 and Dornier-17) 360 of these bombs, what we have just seen. A group of three aircraft could drop 1,000 of these bombs. In addition, even larger ammunition was used, mainly SD-50 bombs. In the nomenclature of the German Ju-88 and Dornier-17 bombers, 20 such bombs could be suspended without reloading, and the Heinkel-111 bomber could hang 32 such bombs without reloading. That is, the attack of the Junkers-88 link was equivalent to the attack of the SB group of 9 aircraft.

Accordingly, the Heinkel-111 link could drop almost 100 such bombs, and this is equivalent to the actions of a squadron of DB-3 aircraft, in which 10 "acres" were suspended. In addition, all German fighters at that time already carried cannon armament, two guns each or one each, if we talk about the Me-109F. Soviet aircraft were armed mainly with machine guns, there were a very small number of I-16 aircraft with cannon armament, and the Yak-1 aircraft have just gone into production.

An important factor was the very organization of the enemy. The Luftwaffe is clearly a branch of the armed forces in Germany, which reported directly to the Reichsmarschall and further to the Fuhrer and had its own fully built structure. In addition to the actual aviation units, it was also the rear and anti-aircraft artillery, very powerful. The Red Army Air Force was not fully a branch of the armed forces, it was rather a kind that was subordinate to the ground forces. An interesting fact: until June 30, 1941 there was no post of commander of the Red Army Air Force, there was a head of department. The air force commanders of the fronts reported directly to the commanders of the fronts, and this subsequently played a negative role. In addition to mobilization and organizational measures, the Soviet Air Force in 1939-40. moved to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltic states, so they were forced to build a new network of airfields along the entire border. For example, this is part of the map for the construction of airfields in the Baltic States. Accordingly, that system of subordination to the ground forces created a very serious problem: the Soviet Air Force was stretched along the entire front from Murmansk to the Black Sea in a thin layer. Part of the forces, because the construction of airfields was only underway, the Red Army Air Force was forced to keep much to the east, approximately along the Smolensk-Kyiv-Zaporozhye meridian. It turned out that the air force was divided into at least two echelons, approximately 400–500 kilometers apart. The units located in the area of ​​Tallinn, Smolensk, Orsha, Mogilev, Kyiv, Proskurovo, Krivoy Rog could not help the units of the first echelon in the first battles. And the construction of airfields was not properly carried out either in 1939 or 1940. The 41st was the year when they tried to close these gaps. The construction of 800 operational airfields immediately began, in addition, concrete standard runways began to be built at 240 airfields, which also did not add optimism, because even a person who is not familiar with construction understands that such a huge number of construction projects in six months is simply impossible build.

The layout of the lanes at the airport

Accordingly, here is one of the photographs of how the Red Army soldiers mount the grid for pouring the concrete strip.

Laying the mesh for pouring the concrete strip

Distribution of forces. In the Baltics, the first aviation corps is located approximately from Königsberg to the border, and, accordingly, the Red Army Air Force opposing it is located here the 6th division, here the 7th division, here the 8th, here the 57th, and the fourth, for example, is already located in the region of Tallinn, Tartu, and in such formation it cannot start hostilities. It cannot effectively conduct combat operations, even with bombers. That is, the Germans could use all their forces in the first strike, the Soviet Air Force could not. Moreover, even according to the cover plan, part of the forces still had to be located along the line of the Western Dvina, that is, at a distance of about 250 km from the border, and, accordingly, I also can’t imagine how they could participate in the border battle in this perspective. This happened everywhere, not only in the Baltic states, along the entire length of the Western Front, and the South-Western, and the Air Force of the 9th Army in Moldova. The Soviet Air Force entered far from being optimally composed, having been divided into several echelons. Even the first echelon was then divided into two echelons along the border, and at a distance of about 250 km, and the third echelon was at a distance of 400–500 km from the border. Everyone knows the textbook data that the Luftwaffe had somewhere around 2.5 thousand combat aircraft, the Red Army Air Force had somewhere around 7.5 thousand combat aircraft in the Western districts, but it is impossible to actually use most of the forces for the above reasons. In addition, the Red Army Air Force was under deployment, and if the Germans could field all their 20 fighter groups in the optimal composition on June 22, then out of the 69 fighter regiments represented in the western districts, 24 were of real combat value, 7 of which were in the second or third echelons. It was simply impossible to use the notorious numerical superiority. The Soviet Air Force had to enter the battle in parts, which gave the Germans an excellent opportunity to defeat them, which subsequently happened.

The preliminary part, unfortunately, is not so rosy, but, nevertheless, it was in reality. Being in such a formation, in such a state, with such forces and preparation, it must be said honestly that the Soviet Air Force did not have the slightest chance of winning the preliminary battle. They could only delay the inevitable defeat of the first echelon and wait for the approach of the second and third echelons in order to continue the battle with a more powerful composition.

Let's move on to the war itself. Here, for example, are the results of the first strike. The western and northwestern direction was planned for 4 in the morning, that is, the German planes were supposed to cross the Soviet-German border with the first salvos of the artillery offensive, after 15-20 minutes they had already struck at the forward airfields. In the southwest and south direction, it was an hour later, apparently due to light conditions.

Here is the Kaunas airfield, its southern part. The same parking lots that we saw in the first series are visible bomb craters. Not everything is obvious, because I had to crop the picture a little.

Kaunas. the result of the bombing

People who say that it was impossible to destroy such a large number of aircraft on June 22 are sinning against the truth, because this is confirmed by objective data from German control. Shooting on June 23, this is photo control. And this is what it looked like on the ground. This is the same parking lot, hangars, standing in three rows of planes. It can be seen that the second row is completely destroyed, the back row is completely destroyed, but in the first row there is something more or less alive. The shooting was carried out on these two aircraft, in fact, they were also half burned down.

Kaunas. The result of the bombing

This gives an idea of ​​the effectiveness of German strikes. In reality, on June 22, the Red Army Air Force faced an incredibly strong enemy, persistent in achieving its goal, and there was no chance of winning this confrontation, at least the first operation.

These are photographs from the Signal magazine - the same group of aircraft, but from a different angle. Here is a spread of this "Signal". Here all the photos from the Baltics are Kaunas, Kedanyai, Alytus, a clear German report on the hostilities.

Signal magazine

As for the very first point: another negative factor was that on the morning of June 22 there was no agreement from the military-political leadership, and for a very long time no clear order was given to start hostilities. In fact, there was no surprise as such, because the troops of the Soviet border districts had long begun to rise on June 22 on alarm, and in the Baltic states, on the 19-20th, the planes were dispersed where possible, due to airfield construction, along field airfields , and one squadron was constantly at readiness number two, that is, ready to take off within 5-10 minutes. But for some reason, this completely normal state was violated on the night of June 21-22 by the infamous "Directive No. 1", which was handed over to the troops at about one in the morning on June 22. Such postulates were expressed there that when attacking, do not get involved in battle, and do not open fire in return until enemy aircraft open fire. This greatly upset the mood of the Soviet commanders and pilots. In the films of the Soviet era, they saw where, roughly speaking, Pavlov, the commander of the Western Front, or some other characters, call Tymoshenko, People's Commissar of Defense, and say: "Look, the Germans are attacking." And in response they are told not to succumb to provocations, to remain calm and so on. Instead of clearly and clearly telling the commanders how to act, they were given a choice: either to attack, or to fight, or not to fight, to wait, maybe this is a provocation. And in the context of the Air Force, this played a negative role, because on June 22, the ground forces did not enter the battle everywhere, but on June 22, the Air Force entered the battle almost at full strength. This moment, when the first blow was not repelled, had a completely negative impact in the future. Even Kaunas, the destroyed airfields that we saw - this was done during the first raid, although the Germans did not set such a goal of destruction in this first raid. They had it more like a sighting, basically they set the task of conducting additional reconnaissance, once again clarifying the goals. However, where they had excellent intelligence records, they operated in powerful groups. In the Baltic States, several airfields were destroyed, and our Air Force suffered serious losses. In Ukraine, in Belarus there was a similar situation. Even the very first blows were very effective. But I emphasize once again that this was not their main task, the main one was additional reconnaissance. Then it happens like this: some Soviet military leaders who were given such a puzzle solved it in a normal way: for example, in the Baltic States, the commander of the Air Force was Alekei Ivanovich Ionov, Major General of Aviation.

Ionov A.I., Major General of Aviation

Here he is, still a brigade commander, in a pre-war rank. He most likely received an order from the Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front, Klenov, to conduct combat operations, and in response to the first strike, they were raised (I honestly do not know if a cover plan was introduced, but at least the orders, which were given to the formations, clearly corresponded to the cover plan), bomber regiments were raised into the air, which went to bomb German airfields and other targets. For example, a man, at that time a captain, Mikhail Antonovich Krivtsov, he was the commander of the first Soviet squadron, which on the morning of June 22 dropped bombs on Tilsit.

Krivtsov Mikhail Antonovich

There is an interesting fact related to this man, which, again, speaks of the role of the individual: a directive gave people a choice, and the most decisive commanders acted decisively, such as Ionov, Krivtsov, a number of other commanders, while others simply sat on the ground and did not succumb to provocations, some regiments did not even take off into the air. And those who took off followed the order not to open fire first, and the German Air Force suffered very small losses in the first raid because of this. Not only did the directive not regulate these actions, but when the planes of the North-Western Front were already on their way to German airfields, bases, etc., from the People's Commissariat of Defense or from the General Staff, it is now difficult to say whether the order came over the radio to turn around, bombard do not produce on German territory. One squadron of the 46th Sbap returned from a combat course. But people like Krivtsov showed determination, their own opinion, and nevertheless dropped the bombs, thanks to which the Germans received at least some kind of retaliation at that moment. Further more.

They returned all the planes, they were allowed to operate only up to the border. At about 7:15 a.m., there was the so-called “Directive No. 2”, which again did not allow the plan to be put into effect, she spoke “interesting” language, and set local tasks. There was a completely incomprehensible phrase to bomb Koenigsberg and Memel - it is not clear why it was said. Otherwise, it was allowed to shoot down enemy planes, act in the tail, that is, after the strike, pursue the enemy plane and bomb its parts, but, unfortunately, it arrived in the districts by 9 in the morning. What is 9 am? The Germans carried out the first series of strikes at 4–5 am, the next series was at 7–8 am. The purpose of the latter was not only a reconnaissance mission, but also the destruction of aircraft at airfields. The second raid of German aircraft was accentuated in terms of materiel, additionally explored, that is, the German pilots had already visited German airfields once, they had no questions, they acted clearly. Several regiments in Belarus were simply completely destroyed as a result of these raids. Indeed completely, they then did not act at all. For example, the 113th and 16th bomber regiments were completely destroyed, none of their aircraft after that took part in any actions. This is not an isolated case. When the directive arrived, because of these morning stop orders, apparently, the comrades were a little on edge and were already afraid to produce some kind of independent things, and this directive also raised questions in them. An interesting fact: in the documents of the 125th high-speed bomber regiment of the Western District Air Force, the division commander persistently, several hours after receiving the directive, tries to force the regiment commander to fly out on a combat mission, he eventually, somewhere at 11.45, agrees to do this, and asks for him every 5 minutes a radiogram on board, if the order was canceled. This is what people have been driven to by such nonsense. As a result, his last doubts disappeared when they listened to Molotov's speech about declaring war in the air at 12-odd. By such actions, before dinner, aviation was put in the role of manager: either we are at war, or we are not at war. Many said and wrote that the connection was interrupted. Here are many units, whose connection with the higher authorities was interrupted, just the same, they worked better, because, having no connection, they began to conduct military operations without looking back at anyone, making a decision on their own. Before lunch, the Germans managed to complete three sorties, if we take the Baltic and the Western Front, and two sorties, if we take the Southwestern Front, on our airfields. The effect was devastating.

Here, if we take Tilsit, there were the results of the first flight of nine from Mikhail Krivtsov's 9 sbap, which was the first to drop bombs on the Tilsit railway station.

Tilsit. The result of the bombing

These are the results of the SD-2 strikes on the Vilnius airfield. You can see the burned Seagull and, possibly, its "killer", here you can see that the pylon for SD-2 is suspended.

The result of the SD-2 strikes on the Vilnius airfield

Accordingly, the Western Front - advanced airfields of three divisions were attacked, on which by 10.00, after the second raid, they were completely defeated, for example, in the 10th division - the 74th regiment, the 33rd regiment, the 123rd regiment. In the 10th mixed division, the 124th and 126th regiments were defeated. In reality, there remained in the regiments: in the 33rd - not a single aircraft, in the 74th - not a single combat-ready aircraft, the 123rd IAP was able to withdraw 13 fighters, the 126th IAP was able to withdraw 6 fighters, the 124th - 1.

I have one interesting comrade from Poland who said and wrote several times: “Mikhail, this is impossible, only a nuclear strike ...” Well, everything was possible, these are our documents, not German, it is the documents of the Red Army Air Force that confirm this level losses. At the airfield, which had 50-60 aircraft, the Germans could destroy almost all equipment in 2-3 sorties. Well, of course, these were both destroyed and damaged cars. But a damaged aircraft, if your crankcase is pierced or even the tires are shot, you cannot fix it in the near future.

The 13th sbap was completely destroyed, the 16th sbap of the neighboring 11th division, the 122nd IAP received heavy defeats. Thus, by 10 am the situation was completely unbearable. There is such a telegram, intercepted by the Germans, of the commander from Bialystok, Cherny, who almost openly asked for help. Ultimately, the only thing he was allowed to do was withdraw to the Pinsk-Baranovichi-Volkovysk-Lida line, that is, 100 kilometers away. And by 12 o’clock these formations were almost at full strength, one fighter regiment only remained, they were redeployed to the second line. But then the fact that the Red Army was just deploying, that is, there was no mobilization, therefore, the rear services were in a state of peacetime, therefore, retreat and quickly transfer the materials that were available: bombs, a supply of fuel and lubricants, to the airfields of the second runway, to which relocated, it was difficult. The airfields were in the process of being built, there were not even garrisons there, but there were mainly builders, units that were building runways. But even this retreat did not guarantee anything: the Germans bombed the Lida airfield, Pinsk, in the afternoon. It is interesting that units from the Bialystok ledge first retreated to the Bialystok area, they were bombed out from there during 2-3 sorties, and they, too, were forced to travel further after lunch. Having moved to the second line, the regiments did not conduct combat operations due to lack of material resources and became passive witnesses. Approximately the same situation developed in the Baltics, but with the addition that the energetic commander of the Air Force all the time tried to act according to his plans. He was one of the few leaders of the Red Army Air Force who understood that it was necessary to fight for dominance to the very end, but, unfortunately, on June 22, certain circumstances did not allow him to do so. Why? I have already said, the subordination of the Air Force to the ground forces, the ground commanders. At 8–9 o’clock in the morning, there were breakthroughs of German groups on Taurage and on Alytus, so the front commander or chief of staff - it is difficult to establish who really led it there - gave the order to strike at these retractable tank wedges, respectively, the entire Northwestern Air Force front were focused on combating these parts. That is, German aircraft continued to attack new Soviet airfields or repeat attacks on old ones, they operated throughout the day without stopping, even in small groups. The Soviet Air Force did not answer them in principle, acting on the motorized units of the Wehrmacht.

The belated reaction of the Western Front, what I have already described, the commander of one of the regiments asked him to give a radiogram every 5 minutes on board, whether the flight was canceled. A little later, General Pavlov gave the order for active hostilities against the enemy, somewhere at 5.30. An order was issued for actions on German airfields, but at 6–7 “amateur activity” was banned, the Air Force stood for several more hours under a hail of blows. The strikes of the Air Force of the Western Front were belated, but they were. By the way, what is interesting is that one of the regiments, the 125th Sbap, as I said, attacked the Berzhniki airfield in the Suwalki ledge. Nine attacked, bombed, damaged even one German aircraft and returned completely without loss. Another airfield was Biala Podlyaska, it was even later: from the 130th Sbap, one nine also attacked, the Germans had losses. The most interesting thing is that the Security Council was bombed from a height of 5 kilometers and nevertheless hit. To be objective, only two strikes were made on German airfields: one airfield in the Suwalki ledge, Berzhniki, and one in Byala Podlyaska, this is in the Brest region, to the west.

The plan for the location of the air force in the Baltic States

Despite these timid attacks, on June 22, morning in the Baltic states and midday in the area of ​​​​Suwalki and Brest, they were practically ineffective (the loss of three aircraft cost nothing). However, the Germans did not use fighter aircraft after that in repeated attacks, but used it for loitering and even made an airfield maneuver, that is, they transferred fighter regiments to their airfields so as not to be under attack. This again suggests that if the Red Army Air Force acted according to the cover plan for German airfields, no matter how effective it was, we now understand that most airfields would be attacked empty, since there would be no German aircraft there. However, the actions themselves, like a magnet, would attract German aircraft, respectively, did not give them the opportunity to attack Soviet airfields. And so it happened: the regiments of the advanced Western Front were thrown back from the border before lunch on June 22, in the Baltic states the same process took place after 2 hours. As soon as the sorties on the German columns ended, most of the units were immediately moved to the Riga region, in the Daugavpils, Mitava region, that is, most of the airfields, and most of the airfields of the district were generally in the 200 km zone, they were abandoned and the units moved to a distance of 200– 250 km from the border. Accordingly, the advanced units of the Soviet troops, which were still fighting on the borders, were thus completely deprived of support from fighters. That is, if the bombers could still fly quite normally with a bomb load, then the fighters could not practically operate from such a distance. The withdrawal from the Baltics suggested itself even earlier, and the commanders of all levels asked for it, but the task was to bomb the tank columns, and they nevertheless carried out these sorties and only after that they redeployed.

Approximately the same situation was in the Kiev military district. The Germans also attacked practically advanced airfields along the entire border period, starting from Kovel to Lvov, along the border to Chernivtsi. The Germans had the audacity to confront the Kyiv military district, having a limited number of forces, even to bomb Kyiv. Neither Minsk was bombed on June 22, nor Riga was bombed, but for some reason Kyiv was, although the Germans had very limited forces in the Kyiv district. KOVO itself had the most powerful air force, more than 2,000 aircraft, and most importantly, most of the fighter regiments of the Kiev district were personnel, that is, they could repulse German aircraft, which was done. The Luftwaffe suffered the greatest losses precisely in the zone of the Kyiv military district. For example, the 3rd group of the 51st bomber squadron operating in the area of ​​​​Stanislav and Lvov lost about half of its strength, that is, they were 15 aircraft. The 7th squadron of the 3rd group of the 55th squadron, which in the first sortie bombed the airfield near Brody and Dubno with 6 planes, out of 6 planes that took off 2 lost over the target, 2 burned out (one fell on Soviet territory, one landed there at the airfield , but burned down), and two were damaged with wounded arrows and landed at the airfield in Klimentsovo. That is, the Soviet Air Force also gave a very definite answer if the commanders had the determination to speak out without an order from above. But, nevertheless, all the airfields were practically attacked, some airfields were simply destroyed, for example, the airfield of the 62nd cap of Lisyachich was attacked several times, and literally 50 aircraft were destroyed in the first sortie. The Chernivtsi airfield was attacked twice, but even after the first sortie, most of the 149th was destroyed. The neighboring airfield was also attacked, most of the 247th IAP was destroyed, and the total losses somewhere reached 100 aircraft.

There is an opinion that in Moldova, through some incredible tricks, the district command managed to avoid defeat due to the fact that they were dispersed over operational airfields. I would like to say that this is a myth. The fact is that the Germans had a division with the Romanians somewhere along the meridian of Chisinau, and, accordingly, the German 4th air corps, which was based in Romania, operated exactly at the airfields in the Chernivtsi region. A little west of Chisinau was the airfield of the 55th IAP, Balti, was attacked several times on June 22, and also suffered heavy losses that were not reflected in the reports, which made it possible for some of the officers of this district to write in memoirs, to promote themselves that they succeeded . Although, in fact, if their opponents were not the Romanians, but the Germans, most likely, the fate of the district air force would also be sad.

In the Kiev Military District, Soviet units practically did not retreat to airfields, only some units retreated on June 22, including from Chernivtsi. Why did this happen? In fact, the strip from Kovel to Stanislav (on the Ukrainian side) is a rather undeveloped strip, and there was a problem with airfields in general. Therefore, the Germans also had airfields quite far from the border, and our closest airfields in the Lvov region were about 100 kilometers from the border. Accordingly, German aircraft were forced to operate in some places at full range and they did not succeed in achieving decisive success at all airfields by bombing. They suffered heavy losses.

The command of the Air Force front, apparently, did not even try to draw any conclusions. In addition, according to some reports, the commander of the Air Force of the front, Ptukhin, was already removed from the leadership, and, apparently, on June 22 he did not even participate in combat planning. At least there is no serious combat order.

Scheme of the deployment of Air Force units on the Western Front

If we take the Baltics and the Western Front, who at least tried to act on German airfields in response, then there was no 9th Army on the Southern Front and in the Air Force, although reconnaissance activities were carried out. If someone read Pokryshkin's memoirs, there he describes a reconnaissance raid on Romanian airfields around noon on June 22, when he flew in, reported to the command, and he was told: "Sorry, we will have other goals." And the Air Force of the 9th Army in the afternoon received an order to bomb the crossings on the Prut, and from the Air Force of the Southwestern Front, 2 regiments received the task of bombing the German tank units that crossed the Bug and advanced on Vladimir-Volynsky. That's all.

That is, on June 22, by 18:00, the Soviet Air Forces in the Baltic States and Belarus were knocked out on the rear line of airfields, there were no practical combat operations after 18:00, and the only thing they could do was barrage, patrol over their own airfields, cover it. The Luftwaffe finished its sorties on airfields somewhere later, around 20 o’clock, but it was already “after” when the German intelligence officers discovered that detour to the rear line and tried to reconnoiter in order to continue the operation the next day. The same - in the strip of the South-Western Front, the Southern Front. The enemy completely controlled the sky over the front lines, the Red Army Air Force practically did not participate in patrolling over the borders, advanced units, and the only thing that happened was a strike on German troops who were crossing the Bug in the Vladimir-Volynsky region.

The Germans, by their actions on June 22, especially in the first half of the day, secured dominance in the strip of the North-Western and Western fronts somewhere at a distance of 200–250 km from the border, completely knocking out Soviet units from there. They have not yet completely defeated, but they defeated, and the territory remained with the enemy. In the zone of the Southwestern Front, many units were also kicked out of their airfields, not all, but very many. When leadership of the Southwestern Front was resumed on June 23, almost all units were redeployed further inland, 50–100 km, that is, to the Ternopil and Rovno region. There was a situation when there were no Soviet air units somewhere 200 km from the borders. For a fighter, 200 km at that time is just to fly and come back, there is no time for air combat. The units that were along the border had already completely lost their cover. Conclusion: thanks to its unique training, its technical capabilities, perseverance in achieving goals, a well-planned plan, and tactically competent actions, the Luftwaffe, unfortunately, managed to defeat the Red Army Air Force on June 22.

Loading ammo

What can be positive aspects? First, there was no defeatist mood, despite the fact that many are now trying to create some kind of image of scurrying pilots, fleeing generals. All this is obvious nonsense. Part of the Air Force of the North-Western Front, and part of the Air Force of the Western Front, retreated, having strictly received orders, but if they had retreated earlier without an order, they could have saved part of the forces, part of the funds. The Soviet pilots did, in my opinion, everything possible. There are confirmed episodes of 4 or even 5 ramming. Sufficiently fierce fighting took place along the entire front line. However, the Germans were not "whipping boys", they received very serious experience in Western Europe, and besides, they tried to avoid serious military clashes on occasion. As an example, these are the actions of the 1st German bomber squadron against the Liepaja airfield. The 148th Fighter Aviation Regiment was based there. The Germans in a day, using such a simple technique as entering from the sea, destroyed and damaged 41 aircraft of this regiment in a day. There were no German fighters there at all. Some serious air battles were not carried out for the reason that the Germans entered, bombed and dived towards the sea. It was very problematic to catch up with the Yu-88 on the I-153. This served, at one time, as one of the theories of Solonin, when he found the operational report of the North-Western Front, where it was written that the losses were 14 aircraft per day, and on the morning of the 23rd there were 27 aircraft of the regiment in Riga. And he says: “Where did the 30 cars go?”. In fact, due to the inconsistency of operational documents, only the very first operational report of the regiment or combat report got to the front headquarters. After that, the battles for Liepaja began, respectively, the headquarters of the regiment began to move towards Riga, trying to retreat. Apparently, the data was not transmitted, so that only the first encryption reached the front headquarters, which mentioned 14 destroyed aircraft. Then there were more losses, and the last loss was around 8 pm, when the Germans, apparently, accidentally hit, at the moment when the aircraft were refueling, and destroyed almost the entire squadron. But this again suggests that the Germans did not stop acting. They had morning success, they did not stop developing it and, characteristically, even attacked targets that had already been abandoned by the Soviet units. Some airfields, for example, Vilnius, Kaunas, there were no combat-ready units of the Red Army as such, there were rear services, there were planes that did not have pilots, or they were out of order, old and subject to transfer to other units. However, the Germans continued to hammer until the evening, thus depriving the pilots, who could move there from other airfields and pick up the materiel, of such an opportunity. The Luftwaffe was not going to end the fight for air supremacy on June 22, and what they succeeded they continued with pleasure on June 23, and started even earlier, around 3 o'clock in the morning.

Some of the Soviet commanders understood this very well. Alexey Ivanovich Ionov, for example, as soon as the opportunity allowed him, as soon as they completed the battle with the German mechanized units, he withdrew the regiment to the Dvina line. Even before the appearance of Directive No. 3, which implied a Soviet offensive against Lublin, he had already given the order from the morning of June 23 to act according to the cover plan. As pilots, commanders of regiments, squadrons all day tried to counteract the enemy as best they could, so there were people at the level of Air Force commanders who were well versed in the situation, understood and tried to respond adequately. Unfortunately, the tools that were then available did not yet allow this to be done in full. That is, it was almost impossible to fight those Luftwaffe that were at that moment. Another point: anti-aircraft artillery could protect, to a certain extent, from the first strikes. Why did this happen? The Red Army was in the process of reorganization, most of the anti-aircraft units in the territory of western Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states were in the process of formation. Many people remember from Soviet films, especially when they bring charges and say: why were your anti-aircraft divisions somewhere at the training ground? The answer is obvious: anti-aircraft gunners carried out combat coordination, because for the majority of the Red Army soldiers of these units it was the first year of service, and they still had to train. Again, the Red Army was not mobilized, so the regular units of anti-aircraft machine guns that were available at each airfield were not only understaffed and instead of 9 machine guns they had only 3, well, quadruple Maxim installations, but they also felt a shortage of personnel , and there was simply no one to put into action many machine guns. Again, unlike the Germans. The Luftwaffe had a completely different organization, and the anti-aircraft units were subordinate to the Wehrmacht, and less, most of the anti-aircraft units and anti-aircraft guns were subordinate to the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe command could line up an umbrella over the location they saw fit. Accordingly, the anti-aircraft units of the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht were in a combat-ready state by the beginning of the war, they had a huge amount of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. If in the Soviet Union, before the war, about 1.5 thousand small-caliber anti-aircraft guns of 25-mm and 37-mm were fired, which they practically did not have time to master in the troops, because they were mostly fired at the end of the 40th and the beginning of the 41st and just started to enter the army. In addition, it was very a big problem, because there was very little ammunition for these anti-aircraft guns. All the documents that we looked at are 1 BC in part, and in the warehouses of the districts there were no 37-mm shells at all, as well as 85 mm for heavy anti-aircraft guns.

What conclusion could be drawn from this and why was it not drawn? Probably, that defeat was morally difficult, so there was no serious analysis. Some unit commanders wrote reports in hot pursuit, but they were still unable to rise above the situation, respectively, everyone had their own opinion, no one analyzed it, did not collect it, but reports on the combat operations of the Southwestern Front, Northwestern and Western , they were made: the South-Western - in August 1941, the Western Front - in general at the beginning of the 42nd. By this time, there were no people at the headquarters of the Air Force of the Western Front who participated in all these events, that is, the reports are half-hearted, to be honest, about nothing. The situation was not analyzed, no conclusions were even drawn close to why this unfortunate cruel defeat happened. Later, in 42-43, the Soviet Air Force stepped on the same rake. There are no examples when an attack on German airfields could end up with such an effect as that of the Luftwaffe. To discard, for example, parts of the Luftwaffe from these airfields and gain air supremacy over some area, even if it is local. That is, no tool was created, it even seems to me that it was not created throughout the war, some kind of adequate tool, nor were any specialized bombs technically prepared. This lecture was conceived in many ways to say that history does not teach anyone anything. The fact that it was possible to draw conclusions and then effectively conduct military operations - unfortunately, was not analyzed, did not materialize in conclusions, instructions. The Red Army then, unfortunately, almost the entire war attacked the same rake. And such serious operations, like those conducted by the Luftwaffe, cannot even be remembered. The events of the Battle of Kursk are often cited, allegedly there was something there, but latest research show that the preparatory things, when attempts were made to destroy raids in May-June, failed miserably and were akin, for example, to attempts on June 25, 1941 to bomb out Finnish aviation from hostilities. The same thing: the lack of serious targeted intelligence, specialized ammunition, strike tactics. The Germans must be given their due: they continued this operation, expanded it, that is, on June 23–24–25 they bombed Soviet aircraft in this zone, somewhere 200–250 km. This was the last line, because, as we saw, the configuration of the border is new, mainly airfields were built in these annexed territories. And after that, in fact, the Soviet Air Force had a paradoxical situation, they were forced to retreat to the area of ​​Pskov, Smolensk, Mogilev, Proskurovo, Kyiv, and so on. The retreat was irreversible, the vast expanses were no longer covered by anything, and the Germans could do whatever they wanted there. Soviet aviation was no longer there. Literally on the 26th, the relocation began to an even more rear line 400-500 km from the border, and the battles, in general, were still going on. Lviv was taken on June 30, the battles for Riga were on June 27-28-29, Minsk, respectively, everyone also knows when the encirclement ring was closed at the end of June. They lost air support, and all because of the actions of the Luftwaffe. This is not connected with defeatist moods, with an unwillingness to fight, with a lack of fighting spirit and patriotism. In no case. The people on the ground did everything they could. They fought to the last opportunity, having that technique, that training. Many died heroic deaths. Most of the heroes we do not even know - the same Krivtsov, who was the first to drop bombs on German territory. He died in the 44th regiment commander, he was not even a Hero of the Soviet Union. The same Ionov - unfortunately, he was arrested on June 24 in a large group of aviation commanders. Absolutely unique destiny at the person. He was a pilot back in the First World War, then went through all the stages of a military career, commanded a squadron, a brigade for a very long time, graduated from the academy, participated in the Finnish campaign as the chief of staff of the 14th Air Force Army, acted adequately in the border battle. This person had a clear focus, a clear understanding of the essence of the first operation and, in general, many processes. His talent was not even in the field of knowledge, but in the field of military art. Nevertheless, he was arrested and shot on February 42 with a large group of commanders, although I believe that this man was worthy of becoming an air marshal and commander of the Red Army Air Force.

In conclusion, maybe I'll add a spoonful of honey to our gloomy story. The only place, where the Soviet Air Force managed to defend their airfields, and defend them for a whole month - this is Moldova. Romanians operated in Moldova, who were not at all as professional as their counterparts in the Luftwaffe, plus they did not have such tools as the Luftwaffe had, that is, technical training, ammunition, intelligence, and so on. The first flights of the Romanians were akin to the Soviet ones. The Romanian Air Force, allocated for combat operations, all ran into the Bolgarika airfield, this is in the Izmail region, only one Soviet fighter regiment, the 67th, was based there, and all day the Romanians tried to bomb this regiment, attack, and as a result lost more than a dozen aircraft, actually confirmed shot down. At the same time, the regiment itself lost a minuscule amount: in the air one pilot with an aircraft, 5 aircraft damaged and two more pilots wounded. That is, all day the regiment fought off all the Romanian Air Force, in fact, and did not give the descendants of the Roman patricians the slightest opportunity to do anything. That is, all groups were dispersed, defeated, suffered losses with minimal losses of the Red Army. In many ways - the role of the individual. The chief of staff of the regiment developed a tactic, this is confirmed in documents and memoirs - patrolling in large groups over the airfield. He constantly kept one or two fully equipped squadrons over the airfield, they succeeded each other, and only single groups of aircraft could break through to the airfield, quite by accident, which could slip between patrols. Here is such a story. If the 4th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe had not operated in parts of the South-Western Front in the Chernivtsi region, but had advanced on Chisinau, Odessa, I think the outcome would have been different. And so it allowed the Soviet units in the area of ​​Izmail, Chisinau, Odessa to make their own contribution to the beginning of victorious actions.