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Introduction

2. Preparation for war

2.1 US plans

2.2 Japanese plans

3. Pearl Harbor

Conclusion

Introduction

japan pacific war

War is one of the terrible things that mankind has come up with. But, despite this, it has always attracted, and will attract historians. Scientists have been studying the history of the Second World War for a long time, but this does not reduce the interest and demand for knowledge about the bloodiest war of the 20th century.

The relevance of this topic: At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, Japan entered the stage of monopoly capitalism, and the process of its transformation into an imperialist power proceeded at an accelerated pace. The intensification of rivalry between the capitalist countries was noticeably manifested in the arms race and the implementation of the plan to create "Great Asia".

The war in the Pacific occupies a special place in the fate of mankind. The US and Japan are separated by the Pacific Ocean. The contradictions between these countries affected the fate of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (US sphere of influence), China (Japanese sphere of influence), Southeast Asia (UK sphere of influence), and also had a significant impact on the course of World War II.

The purpose of the course work: to show the clash of interests, politics and diplomacy of Japan and the United States, as well as the background and reasons for the outbreak of the Pacific War.

The main objectives of this work are:

To reveal the essence and main directions of the Pacific policy of the USA and Japan;

Analyze the background and reasons for the start of the war.

Give an assessment of the role that Japan's attack on the naval and air base at Pearl Harbor played in the Pacific War.

This work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a list of references.

1. Reasons for the start of the war in the Pacific

1.1 Aggravation of Japanese-American relations

On July 7, 1937, Japan attacked China. The Japanese-Chinese war began. Military operations unfolded over a vast territory, and soon two of China's largest ports, Shanghai and Tianjin, were captured.

The United States could not stand silently watching Japan's aggression against China. First, the Japanese aggression completely upset the US expectation that China would remain the largest potential market for world capitalism. Secondly, it meant that Japan was taking over the country that was the most desirable object of capital investment for the United States. Thirdly, if as a result of Japan's aggression it was possible to master the richest Chinese market, then the import of cotton and scrap iron from America to Japan would stop, and this would mean the loss of the most important Japanese market for the United States. Fourth, by settling in China, Japan would seize extremely advantageous positions in order to wrest Southeast Asia from the United States, from where the American capitalists obtained rubber, tin, quinine, manila hemp, and other important strategic materials. Japan's takeover of China would also heighten the risk of total US loss of markets in the Pacific. History of the Pacific War. In 5 volumes. T. 3.- M., 1958.- S. 191.

The United States provided material assistance to China. America did not want Japan to establish itself as the winner in the Far East. At the same time, she did not want the complete defeat of Japan. By providing military assistance to both Japan and China at the same time, the United States sought to allow these countries to bleed each other and establish their dominance in the Far East after the war.

The export of American raw materials to Japan, and in particular oil and scrap metal, for which private companies assumed responsibility, continued to worsen the situation in the Far East.

From Japan's point of view, trade ties with America, which until then had been Japan's main supplier of war materials, were about to break. Under such circumstances, Japan could not silently wait for further developments.

After the failure of attempts to collude with the Chinese government to establish peace, Japan faced the prospect of a long war. In order to provide itself with the materials necessary for such a war, Japan turned its eyes to the resources of the countries of the South Seas.

The favorable development of events on the fronts in Europe as a result of the expansion of German aggression contributed to the intensification of the Japanese policy of moving south.

The American government verbally protested against these new aggressive actions of Japan, which began to advance in a southerly direction, but no practical measures were taken. History of the Pacific War. In 5 volumes. T.3.- M., 1958.- S. 198. .

For the United States, starting a war with Japan meant forever losing the opportunity, at the last stage of the war, to dictate the terms of a peace settlement to the world. The inclusion of Japan in the sphere of its influence of the Far East meant for the United States to lose forever existing and potential markets. America decided to pursue a foreign policy line between these two courses.

Japan painfully felt the need to strengthen its international position, its positions in relation to the United States and Britain.

The Japanese government's foreign policy pursued two goals: to seize the resources of the countries of the South Seas and to temporarily soften relations with the Soviet Union, so that, having gained time, to proceed directly to the implementation of aggression against the USSR. But it was quite clear that the advance to the south caused strong discontent of the American government. In response to Japan's southward advance, on September 25, 1940, the American government decided to provide China with an additional loan, and on September 26 announced a "ban" on the export of scrap metal and metals to Japan. It is quite understandable that the American government, which was not faced with the question of life and death in the then military situation, still cherished the dream that Japan would nevertheless direct its aggression in a northerly direction, and in the field of exporting scrap metal and metal continued follow the Hattori T. license system. Japan in the war 1941-1945. - St. Petersburg, 2003. - S. 25. .

But be that as it may, such an undertaking by the American government made one of the channels for supplying Japan with the most important materials for it extremely unstable.

By their political and economic measures, behind which a clear hostility was hidden, the Americans strengthened the determination of Japan to put an end to the hateful arrogance of the Yankees. Enlisting the support of Hitler, she sought to use the international situation that was favorable for her.

1.2 Japanese-American negotiations

The advance of Japan to the south caused strong discontent in the United States, but the American government was inclined to resolve these issues through conventional diplomatic negotiations and tried in every possible way to avoid a direct collision with Japan. Since the ultimate goal of the Japanese government was aggression against the USSR, the advance to the south was only a means to provide themselves with strategic resources to start this war. The Japanese government, for its part, also wanted to avoid armed conflict with the United States if possible. This was the real reason for the Japanese-American negotiations.

Negotiations between the United States and Japan were doomed to failure, because both governments did not want to make any concessions and each wanted only to gain time. Washington knew that the Japanese Foreign Ministry had scheduled the end of November for the end of negotiations, after which "events would develop automatically." On November 26, the United States handed the Japanese a note demanding the evacuation of troops from China. There was no hope that Japan would accept this demand. On November 27, the US Department of the Navy sent an alarming warning to Pearl Harbor stating that the Department considered it possible that Japanese forces could move towards the Philippines, Malaya, or Borneo. The Americans were so convinced by Japanese preparations to advance south that they did not attach importance to the possibility of a Japanese strike in any other direction.

By December 6, it became known in Washington that the Japanese handed over to their ambassador a note for delivery to the US government about the severance of diplomatic relations. Japanese diplomats in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila and Washington were also known to burn their secret documents and ciphers, usually done when war was imminent.

2. Preparation for war

2.1 US plans

One of the consequences of the conclusion of the tripartite pact was the intensification of US military preparations in the Pacific. At the very beginning of October, American dive bombers began to arrive in the Aleutian Islands, Alaska and Hawaii. On October 5, 1940, the United States announced the mobilization of all reserve navies. Warships concentrated off the Hawaiian Islands were put on alert, and ships sent to San Diego for routine repairs were ordered to return to Honolulu. Preparations were being made to send a cruiser squadron on a "goodwill mission" to Australia and Indonesia. Another detachment of ships went to the North Pacific Ocean to patrol between Hawaii and the Aleutian Islands. In connection with this regrouping of the naval forces, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Richardson, wrote to the chief of the main naval headquarters, Admiral Stark, that the patrolling of American warships in the Pacific Ocean should "scare off" Japan and "somewhat reduce" its aggressive intentions Sevostyanov G.N. in the Pacific Ocean (September 1939 - December 1941). - M .: AN SSSR, 1962. - S. 254 -255. .

War with Japan was becoming inevitable. The only question was when it would break out. It is quite understandable that under these conditions, both for the United States and for Britain, the war in China, which diverted and exhausted the main forces of Japan, acquired no small importance.

To conduct active offensive operations (including preventive ones), it was necessary to base the US fleet in Pearl Harbor. However, at that moment the United States could not resort to such a strategy - the position of the isolationists in Congress was too strong. For President Roosevelt, who knew that the policy of isolation would lead America to lose in any outcome of the European (then) war, the only way to overcome the resistance of the opposition without splitting the country was to force the enemy to attack first. Roosevelt, believing that relations with the USSR would not allow the enemy to act actively, took an extremely tough position: on August 1, 1941, an American ban on the export of all important strategic materials to Japan came into force. Military measures were also taken: the Philippine army came under the control of the American command, and a group of American military advisers went to China. html.

Thus, the "economic war" and the military measures of the parties were an expression of the further aggravation of the contradictions between Japan and the United States, the oil embargo was reinforced by the ultimatum demand to cleanse China.

As it became apparent that Japan was preparing a force to move south, the United States tried to align its military plans with those of its likely allies. At an ABC meeting held in Washington in early 1941, it was determined that the United States would be responsible for the Pacific theater in the event of war with Japan. The next conference in Singapore, held in April 1941, did not take any important decisions and limited itself only to recommendations on mutual support against possible aggression.

2.2 Japanese plans

On the eve of World War II, Japan - an ally of Germany and Italy - developed a plan to create a "Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" - a sphere of domination of Japanese imperialism over a vast territory, including "Japan, Manchuria, China, the Maritime Territories of the USSR, Malaya, Dutch India, British East India, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines, islands of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Propaganda for the creation of the "Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" was used to ideologically justify the creation of a military-political alliance with Germany and Italy in Europe, directed against the Soviet Union. The plans to create a "Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" aroused the alarm of other imperialist powers - England, France and Holland, since these plans threatened their colonies. However, the anti-Soviet course of Japanese foreign policy gave them hope that Japan would unleash a war against the USSR, which would take a protracted character, weaken opponents and make it possible to eliminate Japan as a competitor and rival in world markets Vorontsov V. B. Pacific Policy of the USA 1941-1945 . - M., 1967. - S. 17.

Unlike the American ones, Japanese strategic plans became public after the war. The main goal of the war was to create an economically independent Japanese Empire surrounded by a reliable "belt of defense". To achieve this goal, it was supposed to capture the area lying within the line connecting the Kuril and Marshall Islands (including Wake Island), the Bismarck Archipelago, the Timor, Java, Sumatra Islands, as well as Malaya and Burma, to strengthen it, after which to persuade the United States to conclude peace (apparently, it was supposed to use terrorist-raid operations as an "argument" in this case). However, this ambitious plan could be implemented only on one condition - the "paralysis" of the main forces of the US Navy.

The first step in the implementation of the grand plan of conquest was to be a Japanese surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. This operation was designed by Admiral Yamamoto. Practical preparations for its implementation began in July 1941, when the Japanese fleet began rehearsing an attack on the American fleet in Kagoshima Bay.

3. Pearl Harbor

In the initial period of the Second World War, Japan's foreign policy was finally reoriented towards the southern, Pacific direction. Its ideological basis was the concept of the "Great East Asian Space" - it was the formation of a single military, political, economic, cultural space in Southeast Asia with the close cooperation of Japan and Asian states liberated from colonial dependence.

In the summer of 1941, due to the intensification of the aggressive aspirations of the Japanese militarists, the contradictions between the major imperialist powers in the Pacific continued to escalate. The ruling circles of Japan, assessing the military-political situation in the world, believed that with the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, favorable opportunities were opening up for the implementation of their broad plans of conquest in the Pacific Ocean, in East and Southeast Asia.

Japan's only hope lay in a war that would exhaust her enemy, while in America, the majority of the population was against the war, although the head of state wanted war. If war became inevitable, the first step to create the conditions under which attrition could set in was to force the leader to declare war, against the will of the majority of the people. Japan could achieve this by carefully avoiding an attack on any American possession until such time as the United States itself committed a direct act of war or declared war on Japan. If President Roosevelt had taken the second path and declared war on Japan, the American people could only interpret his decision as a readiness to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Britain, that is, to save the British Empire. But such a war, however carefully disguised, would hardly have been popular with the American people.

By launching an undeclared war with the United States, Japan solved all the difficulties facing Roosevelt in one blow and secured the support of all Americans for him. The inexplicable stupidity of the Japanese lies in the fact that, by exposing the Americans to the ridicule of the whole world, Japan dealt a blow to their sense of dignity more than to the fleet. Five months before the attack, America had declared economic war on Japan, which, given Japan's position, was bound to lead to armed conflict. "Nevertheless, the Americans were so short-sighted that they, like green youths, were fooled" Quoted from: Fuller J. World War II. - See: Rusich, 2004. - S. 161. .

Back in early 1941, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, proposed attacking Pearl Harbor in the event of a war with the United States in order to paralyze the US fleet and make it impossible to intervene from the flank when Japan was busy conquering "living space in the southern seas." The details of the attack on Pearl Harbor were worked out in the early autumn of 1941, and on December 1, at a meeting with the emperor, the final decision was made on Japan's entry into the war.

The forces intended to attack Pearl Harbor, which were already at sea when the imperial council made the final decision, consisted of six aircraft carriers - Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku - escorted by two battleships, three cruisers and nine destroyers. The ships sailed north to avoid detection by American air reconnaissance and reduce the chance of encountering merchant ships. Even earlier, 27 submarines went to sea, of which 11 had aircraft on board, and 5 carried midget submarines designed to penetrate inside the Pearl Harbor harbor.

On December 6, Japanese aircraft carriers received the latest data on the ships stationed in Pearl Harbor, where at that time no one even suspected an impending disaster. The warning received on November 27 indicated only that Washington considered it possible for Japanese forces to move south, that is, towards the Philippines or Malaya.

The calm atmosphere of Sunday morning was somewhat disturbed at 06.45 when a destroyer sank a midget submarine on the outer roads of Pearl Harbor, but the report of this fact did not cause a general alarm. In fact, this report did not even indicate any danger to the ships sheltered in the harbor. Many officers were having breakfast, the ships were preparing for the usual change of watch, when the first Japanese aircraft appeared over the island. Their hostile intentions were finally revealed only at 0755, when the first bombs began to fall. The main blow was dealt to the battleships stationed to the east of Ford Island. Despite the suddenness of the raid, the American sailors quickly took their places at combat posts, but they failed to upset the plans of the enemy. Attacks by torpedo bombers were followed by attacks by dive bombers. The main damage to the ships was inflicted during the first attack, which ended around 0830. Then, after a short break, a second wave of aircraft appeared, consisting of 170 bombers and fighters, choosing ships that had not yet been damaged to attack. Nimitz C., Potter E. War at Sea (1939-1945). - See: Rusich, 1999. - S. 310-311. Shortly after the Japanese attack, the battleship Arizona sank. She received several direct hits from torpedoes and bombs at the very beginning of the attack; the small ship-workshop "Vestal" standing near its side could not provide protection for the battleship. The ship engulfed in flames sank, taking away more than a thousand of the crew.

The battleship Oklahoma, which was stationed with the battleship Maryland, received three torpedo hits in the very first seconds of the attack, immediately rolled over and turned over. Oklahoma was completely destroyed. The battleship West Virginia was on the outside of the battleship Tennessee and was also torpedoed at the very beginning of the attack. However, the decisive actions of the crew to equalize the list by flooding the opposite compartments prevented the ship from capsizing. The crew continued to fight, as the ship landed on the ground in a shallow place. The Tennessee, which was inboard, was hit twice by bombs and was in danger of being blown up by the burning oil on the Arizona, but fortunately the damage to that ship was not so severe. Maryland escaped with only two direct hits from aerial bombs.

The battleship California stood alone. Having received hits from two torpedoes and one bomb, he sat on the ground on an even keel. The battleship "Nevada", also standing separately, was the only ship capable of moving. Despite a torpedo hit in the bow, he nevertheless set off and, under a hail of bombs, threw himself ashore so as not to sink in the fairway. The flagship of the Pacific Fleet, the battleship Pennsylvania, was docked, and it was impossible to attack it with torpedoes. He fired at the planes so intensely that they could not reach him. As a result, he received only one bomb hit.

The main targets of the Japanese attack were the ships of the fleet, but they also attacked the airfields located in the area of ​​this base. The Americans hastily took some measures to protect the airfields, but the planes standing in close formation still suffered losses. In total, the fleet lost 80 aircraft, the Army Air Force - 231 aircraft. After the attack, only 79 aircraft remained combat-ready. During the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese lost 29 vehicles, not counting those that crashed while landing on aircraft carriers.

The total US casualties in people amounted to 3681 people. The Navy and Marine Corps lost 2,212 men killed and 981 wounded, the Army 222 men killed and 360 wounded. From the American point of view, the consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor turned out to be less significant than they seemed at first, and certainly much less than they could have been. The old ships sunk at Pearl Harbor were too weak to take on the latest Japanese battleships or escort the new, fast American aircraft carriers. After all of these ships, except for the Arizona and Oklahoma, were raised and repaired, they were used only for shelling the coast. The temporary loss of battleships made it possible to free up well-trained personnel to complete the aircraft carrier and landing forces, which were greatly lacking. Lacking battleships, the United States was forced to rely entirely on aircraft carriers, and this proved to be a decisive factor in the war at sea.

Focusing on warships, the Japanese did not attach importance to the destruction of warehouses and workshops. They also overlooked the fuel depots located near the harbor, where there were 400,000 tons of fuel oil. These accumulated stocks from year to year would be very difficult to replace, in view of the fact that the United States assumed an obligation to supply fuel, primarily to Europe.

Despite the triumph that prevailed on the Japanese aircraft carriers, disputes immediately broke out regarding an additional attack. The planes were refueled and rearmed. They were ready to strike again, but in the end it was decided not to risk it. Nagumo discussed the matter with his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, who concluded from the intercepted radio messages that a large number of base bombers still survived (although this conclusion was completely wrong). Therefore, Kusaka believed that the Carrier Strike Force should get out of their range as quickly as possible.

The Japanese reconnaissance aircraft only had a range of 250 miles, so everything outside this zone remained unknown. There was also no news from the submarines, which could provide additional information. Returning pilots reported that there was a thick cloud of smoke over Pearl Harbor, which would make it very difficult for pilots to find targets in the event of a third attack. The most important argument is that there were no American aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor. Where they are - remained a mystery, and the threat emanating from them could be real. At 1335, Nagumo ordered a full speed retreat towards the Marshall Islands.

The next day the Strike Force was no longer within range of the American bombers. Soryu and Hiryu, the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, and the destroyers Urakaze and Tanikaze were detached to support the Wake invasion. The remaining ships of the Strike Force went at full speed to bases in the Inland Sea Yakovlev N. N. Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Reality and fiction. M.: Politizdat.-1988.- S. 259.

Conclusion

The question of dominance in the Pacific was of decisive importance in the event of any conflict between Japan and the United States (military, economic, political). In turn, this meant that the United States had to come to terms with either the prospect of an accelerating naval arms race or the prospect of war. I must say that it was a pleasant alternative. The US was economically superior to Japan. And since the latter was also poor in energy resources - in particular, the arms race, supplemented by at least minimal trade restrictions, did not bode well for Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese fleet was inferior to the American one, so that, in principle, the Americans could, without particularly risking anything, go for a military solution to the conflict. Pereslegin S. B., Pereslegina E. B. Pacific premiere. - M. - 2001. - S. 49.

The United States announced an embargo on the supply of strategic materials to Japan, primarily oil. After Great Britain and Holland joined the embargo, Japan was forced to start spending its very meager strategic fuel reserves. From that moment on, the Japanese government was faced with a choice - an early conclusion of an agreement with the United States or the start of hostilities. However, the limited resources of raw materials made it impossible to successfully conduct a more or less long war.

The Japanese command faced a difficult task: to defeat the fleet of the United States of America, capture the Philippines and force the Americans to conclude a compromise peace. Before us is a rather rare example of a global war with limited goals. At the same time, it was necessary to achieve the set goals quickly - the country simply did not have enough resources for a long war.

The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to neutralize the US Pacific Fleet, and therefore protect Japan's conquests in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, where it sought access to natural resources such as oil and rubber.

It was the attack on Pearl Harbor that caused the United States to enter World War II - on the same day the United States declared war on Japan, thereby entering the war.

What did the Pearl Harbor attack achieve? For Japan, this meant war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The Japanese fleet was supposed to neutralize the American Pacific Fleet and cut the Wake-Guam-Philippines supply line. The American fleet was indeed neutralized, but the absence of aircraft carriers in the harbor at the time of the attack shortened its period of inactivity. The threat of American aircraft carrier strikes against Japanese ships was still a cause for concern.

The brilliant victory of the Japanese could not be diminished by any losses suffered by the Japanese fleet. In any case, the deadly struggle between the Japanese Empire and the United States began with the attack on Pearl Harbor.

By 10 a.m. on December 7, the American fleet in the Pacific had virtually ceased to exist. If at the beginning of the war the ratio of the combat power of the American and Japanese fleets was 10:7.5, now the ratio in large ships has changed in favor of the Japanese naval forces. On the very first day of hostilities, the Japanese won dominance at sea and were able to carry out extensive offensive operations in the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch Indies. History of the Pacific War. In 5 volumes. T.Z. - M., 1958. S. 266.

List of sources used

1. Vorontsov V. B. US Pacific Policy 1941-1945.- M., 1967.- 322 p.

2. History of the Pacific War. In 5 volumes. T. 3.- M., 1958.- 398 p.

3. World War: The Perspective of the Vanquished, 1939-1945 - M.: Polygon., 2003. - 736 p.

4. Nimitz Ch., Potter E. War at sea (1939-1945). - Smolensk: Rusich., 1999. - 592 p.

5. Pereslegin S. B., Pereslegina E. B. Pacific premiere. - M., 2001. - 704 p.

6. Causes of the war between Japan and the USA in 1941 //http://www.protown.ru/information/hide/5041.html

7. Sevostyanov G.N. Preparations for the war in the Pacific. (September 1939 - December 1941) / G.N. Sevostyanov. - M.: AN SSSR., 1962. - 592 p.

8. Fuller J. World War II / per. from English. - Smolensk: Rusich., 2004. - 544 p.

9. Hattori T. Japan in the war 1941-1945. - SPb., 2003.- 881s.

10. Yakovlev N. N. Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. True story and fiction. - M .: Politizdat., 1988. - 286 p.

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On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor. The operation involved 441 aircraft based on 6 Japanese aircraft carriers, 8 battleships and 6 US cruisers were sunk and damaged, more than 300 aircraft were destroyed. However, by that time the main force of the American fleet - an aircraft carrier formation, by coincidence, was absent at the base.

The next day, Great Britain and its dominions declared war on Japan. On December 11, Germany and Italy, and on December 13, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria declared war on the United States.

On December 8, the Japanese blocked the British military base in Hong Kong and launched an invasion of Thailand, British Malaya and the American Philippines. After a short resistance, on December 21, 1941, Thailand agreed to a military alliance with Japan, and on January 25, 1942, declared war on the United States and Great Britain. Japanese aircraft from the territory of Thailand began the bombing of Burma.

On December 8, the Japanese broke through the British defenses in Malaya and, advancing rapidly, pushed the British troops back to Singapore. Singapore, which until then the British considered an "impregnable fortress", fell on February 15, 1942, after a 6-day siege. About 70 thousand British and Australian soldiers were captured. In the Philippines, at the end of December 1941, the Japanese captured the islands of Mindanao and Luzon. The remnants of the American troops managed to gain a foothold on the peninsula of Bataan and the island of Corregidor.
In January 1942, Japanese troops invaded the Dutch East Indies and soon captured the islands of Borneo and Celebs.

The allies tried to create a powerful defense on the island of Java, but by March 2 they capitulated. At the end of January 1942, the Japanese captured the Bismarck Archipelago, and then captured the northwestern part of the Solomon Islands, in February - the Gilbert Islands, and in early March invaded New Guinea. In May they dominated almost all of Burma, defeating British and Chinese troops and cutting off southern China from India. However, the beginning of the rainy season and the lack of forces did not allow the Japanese to build on their success and invade India. On May 6, the last grouping of American troops in the Philippines capitulated. By the end of May 1942, Japan, at the cost of minor losses, had established control over Southeast Asia and Northwestern Oceania. American, British, Dutch and Australian troops were soundly defeated and lost all of their main forces in the region.

In the summer of 1942 - in the winter of 1943, a radical turning point occurs in the war in the Pacific. To strengthen their positions in the South Pacific, the Japanese armed forces decided to capture Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi Island in the Solomon Islands. To provide air support for the attack, the group included several aircraft carriers. The entire group of Japanese troops was commanded by Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue. Thanks to intelligence, the United States was aware of the attack plans and sent two aircraft carrier groups under the command of Admiral Fletcher to counter the attack. On May 3 and 4, Japanese forces captured Tulagi Island, the Battle of the Coral Sea began (May 4-8, 1942). After the Japanese became aware of the presence of US Navy forces, aircraft carriers entered the Coral Sea in order to search for and destroy enemy forces.

Starting May 7, the groups exchanged air raids for two days. On the first day of the collision, the Americans sank the light aircraft carrier Shoho, while the Japanese destroyed the destroyer and severely damaged the tanker. The next day, the Japanese aircraft carrier Shokaku was heavily damaged, and the American aircraft carrier Lexington was sunk as a result of significant damage. The USS Yorktown was also damaged, but remained afloat. After the loss of ships and aircraft of this level, both fleets withdrew from the battle and retreated. And due to the lack of air support, Shigeyoshi Inoue canceled the attack on Port Moresby. Despite the tactical victory of the Japanese and the sinking of several main ships, the strategic advantage was on the side of the Allies. The offensive of the Japanese forces was interrupted for the first time.

Japan's attack on the possessions of the United States and Great Britain on December 7-8, 1941 became one of the important events in the history of the Second World War, which became the boundary of its two initial stages. It turned out to be closely connected with another major event of this milestone - a change in the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front. On December 5-6, the formations of the Red Army launched a counteroffensive near Moscow and drove the enemy back in the central direction of the Soviet-German front for one hundred to one hundred and thirty kilometers. This event, which became the first major success of the forces that had opposed the aggressors since September 1939, caused a great resonance in the world and led to a crisis in the top leadership of the Wehrmacht. Hitler, extremely irritated by the unexpected turn of affairs, fired a number of major military leaders, dismissed the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal W. Brauchitsch, and took over his duties.

The thunderous event in the Pacific began to noticeably approach in October-November 1941. The leadership of Japan faced a choice: either to achieve the lifting of the American embargo on oil and other strategic goods in order to continue its aggression against China while maintaining peace with Washington and London, or under the refusal of the United States to inflict an unexpected strong blow on the positions of the Western powers in the Pacific, to seize the initiative in a new theater of war, and to seize the most important strategic positions and sources of raw materials in Southeast Asia. Roosevelt formally pursued a policy of dragging out negotiations (Hell-Nomura), trying to get Tokyo to stop expansion into Southeast Asia and withdraw from China in exchange for the resumption of American supplies. In essence, this meant pushing Japan to choose the second option for its possible political and strategic expansion - to the north, against the USSR. The president's military advisers considered Roosevelt's tactics only as a means of delaying a military conflict, quite acceptable to Washington, and hoped for the "prudence" of the Japanese leaders.

Churchill, who closely followed the growing Japanese-American tension, feared that Tokyo would strike at Indonesia and British possessions, where there were large reserves of strategic raw materials, and leave American positions in Southeast Asia intact, and this would not allow Roosevelt to achieve US entry into war. Therefore, in November 1941, he diplomatically but persistently advised Roosevelt to issue a strong warning to Tokyo "which might prevent a war between Japan and our two countries" (Great Britain and the United States). At the same time, Churchill quite sincerely assured Roosevelt that "if the United States declares war on Japan, we (Great Britain) will immediately follow their example." Thus, for all the difference in the tactical lines of Roosevelt and Churchill, both of them "fit" into the course of action chosen by Tokyo.

On December 1, a meeting of the top Japanese leadership with the participation of the emperor made the final conclusion that in this situation only a surprise attack on the Western powers, which had been preparing for several months, would allow Japan to achieve its goals. On December 2, the army and navy received the necessary signal and began to advance to their original positions to start hostilities. In the last week, the teams of Roosevelt and Churchill actively discussed what targets the aggressor had chosen. Thailand, Malaya, especially Singapore, Indonesia were considered the most probable, the Philippines was considered unlikely, and the Hawaiian Islands were practically not included in this list. But it was American possessions that became important targets for the Japanese strikes on December 8, especially the sinking at Pearl Harbor of more than half of the US Pacific Fleet. In addition to the political and operational-strategic miscalculation of the White House and the leadership of the army, the shortcomings of the American air and radio surveillance service played a big role in this. This event, which became a "shame on both sides," made the domestic political situation extremely easy for the White House. The country, only yesterday deeply split into a mass of currents, from extreme isolationists to extreme leftists, although few in number, on December 8 practically in unison supported the determination of the White House and Congress to repulse the insidious enemy.

Choosing this option to start a war in the Pacific, the Japanese leadership correctly calculated that Washington, which did not expect an attack on the Hawaiian Islands, would allow Tokyo to deliver a devastating blow to the US Pacific fleet. Whereas if only British and Dutch possessions were attacked, Washington would probably enter the war, and there would be no easy prey at Pearl Harbor. In addition, Tokyo either correctly calculated or received a signal that Germany would support its ally in the Tripartite Pact: on December 3, the Japanese leadership informed Berlin and Rome about the upcoming hostilities. And then something happened that can be called, in the words of A. S. Pushkin, "a strange rapprochement." On December 4, the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald, the leading isolationist newspapers of the United States, under the flashy headline "F.D.R. War Plans" the main content of the Anglo-American agreement ABC-1 and the "Victory Program" were published.

A rare leak of these top-secret plans in all the years of the war occurred, as it became known much later, at the suggestion of the British secret service in the United States through the isolationist senator B. Wheeler. London apparently hoped that such a disclosure would move Berlin into actual war with the American fleet in the Atlantic. Indeed, Admirals E. Raeder and K. Doenitz back in November 1941 advised Hitler to declare a merciless war on American merchant and warships. However, the Fuhrer hesitated and waited for a more favorable moment. The attack on Pearl Harbor simplified the solution of Germany's "American problem". On December 11, in his speech to the Reichstag, Hitler declared war on Washington.

An objective analysis of the decision on December 11, as well as on December 7-8, already at that time made it possible to draw a conclusion, at least, about their riskiness, to say the least. But at that time, not only the political leadership, but also the military circles considered these actions as quite adequate, opening up the prospect of forming a "common strategy" of the Tripartite Pact and its implementation in the relatively near future. On December 11, Foreign Minister J. Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador H. Oshima signed an agreement on a joint military strategy in Berlin. Hitler believed that "the most important thing for Germany in the near future" was to maintain favorable prospects on three strategic fronts: the Atlantic, the Pacific and the East.

In the first week after December 7-8, the mood in the capitals of the Big Three was different. Of course, Roosevelt and Churchill were pleased that the aggressor had resolved two most difficult problems - overcoming the split of the American nation and creating conditions for the military unity of London and Washington in all theaters of war. But at the same time, they were very depressed by the new heavy defeats of their troops, not only in the Pacific Ocean, but also in the Atlantic, and then in the Mediterranean. In addition to the first successes of Japan in the struggle for Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya, on December 12 the aggressor dealt another heavy blow - two of the largest British ships, the Prince of Wells and Repulse, were sunk. Churchill's enthusiastic mood evaporated overnight: in both oceans at that moment the Allies did not have a single battleship.

Stalin's mood was more definite and generally positive at that time. First of all, the counter-offensive near Moscow was successfully developing. The news of the beginning of the war in the Pacific removed his fears about the threat of a Japanese offensive against the Soviet Far East, although the problem of redistributing American supplies arose, and the Soviet leader was very realistic about this. Finally, he was encouraged that Churchill, despite the emergency situation for London, had not canceled Eden's agreed visit to Moscow.

From the point of view of the immediate prospects, the British leadership was in the most difficult position. In addition to serious failures in Southeast Asia, the failure of hopes for a major success in Libya, and significant losses of tonnage in the Atlantic, the urgent issues of coordinating strategy and tactics with Washington in the new theater of war, as well as determining priorities for the fight against Berlin and Tokyo, were on the agenda. And in this regard, relations with Moscow also acquired importance, especially in light of the need to strengthen allied relations with Stalin and at least alleviate his suspicions about the real intentions of London in the war with Germany. Therefore, the British War Cabinet approved the Prime Minister's initiative to meet the President immediately in Washington and the decision not to postpone Eden's trip to Moscow, although the Foreign Office chief himself reluctantly agreed with him. The completely justified, although unique, decision to leave the first two government officials for a sufficiently long period, accompanied by major military figures, testifies both to the courage and courage of the British leadership, and to the high unity of the nation around Churchill's military cabinet.

From the very beginning of the Pacific War, Roosevelt, like Churchill, was very concerned about the immediate development of Soviet-Japanese relations. As early as December 8, in a conversation with Ambassador M. Litvinov, the president asked whether "we (the USSR) expect Japan to declare war on us." Probably, Roosevelt did not dare to directly ask whether Moscow was thinking of declaring war on Tokyo. Litvinov reasonably replied that "from the point of view of the interests of Japan itself, such a production is doubtful." Developing the theme of possible American-Soviet cooperation in the war with Japan, Roosevelt said that American planes could bomb Japan from the Philippines and return back, but "if they entered Vladivostok, they could take more cargo." For some reason, Litvinov did not point out the impossibility of such a turn of affairs.

Perhaps such a cautious behavior of the Soviet ambassador prompted Roosevelt to ask Moscow through the State Department and Litvinov about "the position of the USSR in connection with the Japanese-American war." Roosevelt acted tactfully without asking the Soviet leader personally, probably guessing what his answer would be. On December 11, Litvinov, upon receiving Molotov's telegram, was received by the president and outlined the position of the USSR - the preservation of the neutrality pact - and its motives. The main thing was obvious: in the conditions of "a difficult war with Germany and the concentration of almost all of our forces against her, we would consider it unreasonable and dangerous for the USSR to now declare a state of war with Japan and wage war on two fronts." In addition, the ambassador added, since Japan is observing the neutrality pact, "the USSR will be forced to remain neutral."

The president was ready for such a position, and he replied that "he regrets this decision, but in our place he would have acted the same as we did." The only request that Roosevelt conveyed to Moscow was, Ambassador wrote to Molotov, "that we not publicly announce our decision to remain neutral, but consider the issue as if unresolved, in order to tie as many Japanese forces as possible to our front. He (Roosevelt ) repeated this request several times.

Obviously, the president has taken a controversial position. He could not help but understand that if Moscow really remained neutral in the war in the Pacific, without even announcing it publicly, Tokyo would do it with great pleasure. By the way, on December 9, the Japanese ambassador to the USSR I. Tatekawa, having informed the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs about the war between Japan and the USA, Great Britain and the dominions and announcing Tokyo's intention to comply with the neutrality pact on April 13, 1941, actually asked Moscow whether it intended to comply with this agreement. Therefore, Roosevelt's proposal to Litvinov "to draw up, together with Hull, some kind of communique in the sense that we (the USSR) can take any decision regarding Japan at any time" should be considered an unfortunate way out of a delicate situation.

Churchill was also worried about the problem of Soviet-Japanese relations. The latter recognized the great interest of Washington and London in creating a "second front" against Japan. On December 12, on the day of his departure from London, the Prime Minister informed Eden, who was on his way to Moscow, that, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, "Russia's declaration of war on Japan would be very advantageous to us, provided - but only under the condition - that the Russians We are confident that this will not affect their position on the Western Front now or next spring. Outlining the arguments of his military advisers, Churchill once again emphasized that the main importance is the need to avoid the defeat of Russia on the Western Front. "Thus, on this very important and complex issue, the British leader took a balanced and reasonable position, unlike his American partner. The reason is obvious , consisted in a closer interdependence, in a more positive balance of coincidence and opposition of interests and ambitions of London and Moscow, than was the case in relations between Washington and Moscow, and this complex relationship was clearly manifested at Eden's talks in Moscow, where he arrived on December 15.

Stalin at the very first meeting and without lengthy preambles proposed drafts of two treaties: on a military alliance and mutual assistance of the two countries in the war against Germany and on the resolution of post-war problems "in the spirit of mutual cooperation." They were quite harmless and, in principle, did not arouse objections from the British Minister. Then the leader presented a draft secret protocol, which outlined "a general scheme for the reorganization of European borders after the war." Its central point was the interconnected change in the borders of the USSR, Poland and Germany, which recognized the transition of Eastern Poland into the USSR (border on June 22, 1941), the transition of East Prussia and the "Polish corridor" into Poland and the resettlement of the German population from there to Germany . The pre-war borders of a number of countries - victims of aggression - Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece - were restored with the addition of some territories of neighboring countries - satellites of Germany (Bulgaria suffered especially significant losses in favor of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey).

Stalin went on to lay out the main strategic elements of the post-war world order in Europe. The USSR, in addition to securing Eastern Poland, part of the territory of Finland, the Baltic republics, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, should have military alliances with Finland and Romania with the right to establish their military, air and naval bases there. Great Britain, for its part, could "in the interests of its security" have military bases on the French coast of the English Channel (Boulogne, Dunkirk and others), as well as "conclude an open military alliance with Belgium and Holland with the right to maintain military bases in them" . Moscow also considered the serious general weakening of Germany to be an important part of the post-war world. In addition to the indicated loss of East Prussia and the "corridor" with Danzig, it was proposed to separate the Rhine zone from Prussia with the subsequent decision of its fate, the restoration of the independence of Austria and the possible separation of Bavaria, as well as forcing Germany "to compensate the countries affected by it (Great Britain, the USSR, Poland and others . - A. Ch.) the harm caused by it. "

If we include this scheme in the context of the general state of world affairs in mid-December 1941 and the prospects for its development, one cannot help but be surprised at such a quick transition of Stalin's mood from recent hints about the "possible cessation of the struggle in Eastern Europe", as well as a relatively modest request to London to recognize the Soviet borders on June 22, 1941 to the grandiose plan of turning the USSR into the leading power in Europe. This plan was slightly covered by the formation of the military-strategic presence of London in France, Belgium and Holland, as well as the idea of ​​"creating a military alliance of democratic states with a central body that has at its disposal an international military force." It is hardly possible to doubt what kind of power could really be the basis of such an alliance.

Even with the naked eye it is clear that the scheme of the Soviet leader meant the exclusion of the West not only from Eastern Europe, but also to a large extent from Central. It is important to note that in this plan there was no place for Washington: in his explanation, Stalin never mentioned the United States. After all, after the Atlantic Charter, it became obvious that without them it would be impossible to satisfactorily resolve any major international issue, especially the problem of the post-war structure of Europe.

What prompted Stalin to put forward such a far-reaching scheme? First of all, the beginning of the war in the Pacific and the declaration of war on Washington by Berlin. It was quite reasonable to assume that in the face of a sharp deterioration in the geostrategic position of the United States and Great Britain and their inevitable losses, Churchill and Roosevelt would be forced to accept Stalin's basic demands, no matter how undesirable they might be. The second reason lies in a clear overestimation of the successes of the Moscow counteroffensive. It was on December 13-15 that the German retreat became more massive, and it probably seemed to Stalin that his prediction in a speech on November 7, 1941 that "the German fascist invaders are facing a catastrophe, Germany is bleeding, having lost four and a half in four months of the war million soldiers", comes true.

In his reply Eden took a very flexible position. He supported the obviously positive or rather constructive for London provisions of the Stalinist plan for "the reconstruction of Europe under the leadership of the USSR and Great Britain" together with the United States, if they go for it. In passing, Eden expressed his gratitude to Stalin for his promise to support Great Britain in acquiring air, sea and other bases in the countries of Western Europe. But at the same time, he made it clear that a coordinated reconstruction of Europe is impossible without Washington's participation. Rejecting the general meaning of the secret protocol, he rejected the very possibility of London signing such a document, and at first he referred not to the very fundamental impossibility for the British government to accept this protocol, but to the promise given to Roosevelt “not to assume any secret obligations on the post-war reconstruction of Europe without prior consultation with him.

Churchill (he was in the ocean on his way to the USA), having received a message about Soviet demands, fully approved the position of his minister, including the refusal to single out the problem of the borders of the USSR and solve it, if not in a treaty, then by way of an exchange of notes in London. Churchill stressed: "Stalin's demands regarding Finland, the Baltic states and Romania completely contradict the first three points of the Atlantic Charter signed by Stalin." Even without Churchill's explanation, the Soviet leader perfectly understood this contradiction, but it was in this direction that he increased his pressure on Eden. He stated that "the question of the borders of the USSR is of exceptional importance. also because it was precisely the question of the Baltic countries and Finland that became a stumbling block in the negotiations on a mutual assistance pact in 1939." Following this transparent hint, Stalin repeated that for Moscow the issue of recognizing its western border "is an axiomatic", especially in conditions when "the USSR is waging a fierce struggle against Germany, bearing the gravest victims and the brunt of the war," and he insists on its solution here without much agreement with the British government.

The British minister again had to resort to diplomatic resourcefulness and to hide London's own unwillingness to recognize the legality of Soviet territorial acquisitions during the period of "friendship" with Germany by referring to the need for consultations with the dominions and the United States. But when Stalin declared that with such an interpretation "the Atlantic Charter is directed not against those people who aspire to world domination, but against the USSR," Eden actually confirmed London's unwillingness to recognize the Soviet acquisitions of 1939-1940. He recalled that "the British Prime Minister has long publicly stated that Britain cannot recognize any change in the frontiers in Europe that has taken place during the war."

Stalin tried to pin Eden to the wall by declaring that "Eden's position is essentially no different from the position of the Chamberlain government on the question of the Baltic states." And the Soviet leader was right in his own way: as in the case of Chamberlain's stubbornness in the summer of 1939, when he did not want to agree to carte blanche for Moscow in relation to the Baltic republics, Eden did not want to approve the inclusion of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in that period. composition of the USSR with the help of Berlin. Therefore, the British minister only added that "the Atlantic Charter does not allow changing the status of states without the consent of their population."

Eden's repeated reference to Washington's opinion on questions of Anglo-Soviet relations and especially their role in the post-war world in Europe was by no means a simple excuse. The White House as a whole was informed about the topics of the talks in Moscow and the position of Churchill-Eden, and through its ambassador Wynant once again reminded that Washington is resolutely against any secret agreements of a territorial and political nature. But, having learned about the Kremlin's large-scale program, the White House decided to play it safe. US Chargé d'Affaires a.i. in the USSR W. Thorston, who was with his embassy in Kuibyshev, was instructed to urgently go to Moscow as an "official observer" at the talks between the Soviet leadership and the Eden delegation. It was believed in Washington that in the event that "issues related to US interests should arise during the talks, Eden, Cripps, and possibly Molotov would consider it necessary to inform him (Thorston) of this." It is curious that the tone of the American diplomat's address to A. Vyshinsky in a conversation on December 17 was purely informative, and not a request for permission, which it should have been, given the confidentiality of Soviet-British negotiations. Thorston, who arrived in Moscow on December 18, did not have time to get involved in the Soviet-British polemic, but the very fact of such an attempt is of some interest.

In the first two conversations between Stalin and Eden, the question of Japan and the prospects for the struggle against her by Great Britain and the United States were also touched upon. The Soviet leader convinced his interlocutor of the military weakness of Tokyo and stated that "according to the Soviet military command, very large German air forces (up to one thousand five hundred aircraft) were transferred to Japan and that it was they, and not the Japanese Air Force, who delivered such sensitive blows to the British fleet on Far East". Stalin, seeing the interlocutor's seemingly trusting attitude towards this information, twice noted that Japan may have some initial successes, but "ultimately in a few months it must collapse ... The forces of the Japanese are exhausted, and they will not be able to hold out for a long time."

Such, to put it mildly, unrealistic opinion of the Soviet leader about the potential of Japan's struggle was not the result of erroneous information. Setting the interlocutor in the right mood, Stalin asked him: "If such expectations regarding Japan are justified and if our (Soviet) troops successfully push the Germans in the west, does Eden think that conditions will arise for opening a second front in Europe, for example, on the Balkans?" Eden played along with his interlocutor and declared that "he is ready to discuss this issue. And the intention to defeat E. Rommel's army in Libya is largely determined by the fact that it will prepare opportunities for offensive operations in Europe." Thus, the trial balloon was a success. But since both interlocutors thought more about something else, this topic was not developed further.

The last two conversations of the parties on December 18 and 20, as well as Cripps' meeting with Molotov on December 19, were held in equally intense discussions. Stalin, having come to terms with the refusal of the British to sign a secret protocol, tried to insert an indirect formula for recognizing the Soviet borders of 1941 into the agreement on post-war cooperation between the two countries. Tsarist Russia and no one at that time thought to protest against the union on the grounds that the named territories (Finland, Bessarabia, more than half of Poland) were part of the Russian Empire. Finally, Stalin noted that he abandoned the secret protocol and the demand for the creation of a second front or the sending of British soldiers to the Soviet front, and the issue is unclear with the operation in the Petsamo area. In view of all these concessions, he "considers himself entitled to demand a certain compensation in the form of recognition of our (Soviet) western border of 1941."

Eden repeated his previous arguments against including in the post-war treaty any mention of the recognition of the 1941 Soviet borders and confirmed his readiness to sign both treaties in the form of agreements without mentioning the Soviet borders. At the same time, he proposed "simultaneously with the signing of the post-war treaty, a letter in which he undertakes, upon his return to England, to take measures to arrange a discussion of the issue of future Soviet borders between the USA, Great Britain and the USSR." Stalin rejected this option, expressing surprise at the dependence of London's positions on the United States along the way. Cripps' interim meeting with Molotov showed that the British were interested and insisted on signing both treaties in Moscow without mentioning borders. Cripps stated that "the Soviet government underestimates the harm that will be done by the return of Eden without an agreement ... The situation will become more difficult from the point of view of the internal situation in England. Hostile elements will receive a great incentive in their activities to the detriment of Anglo-Soviet relations."

However, Stalin pointed out a clear contradiction in Eden's position: if he was ready upon his return "to raise the question of recognizing the Soviet borders of 1941 before the British government, the dominions and the US government," then it would be wiser to wait a while and sign full-fledged treaties in London. Probably, Stalin understood that the British were cunning. He drew attention to Cripps' reservation, who told Molotov: "If nothing is signed now, the situation will become more difficult. It may be many months before the agreement takes place, or it may never take place at all."

Stalin was not embarrassed by this "intimidating" statement. He took it rather as evidence of London's significant interest in the treaties under discussion and therefore did not dramatize the failure of the negotiations, replacing the irritably restless tone of reproaches in the first meetings with a calmer, more balanced one in the last two: "Regardless of whether the treaties will be signed or not, English "Soviet relations will improve. The fact of not signing treaties should not be overly tragic." The leader's last conversation with Eden ended on a completely benevolent note with a discussion of the possible development of situations in the Far East, North Africa, and also on the Soviet-German front. The communiqués prepared by each side independently turned out to be very close, and the Soviet version, according to the permanent deputy chief of the Foreign Office A. Cadogan, turned out to be better than the British one and was accepted without objection. It emphasized the "friendly atmosphere of the talks", "the unity of views on questions of the conduct of the war and the need for the complete defeat of Germany", as well as "the importance and usefulness of an exchange of views on questions of the organization of peace and security".

Thus, a new round of political-psychological polemics between Stalin and Molotov with Eden and Churchill showed that while maintaining the de facto military alliance of the two countries and their determination to defeat the main enemy, Moscow and London seriously differed in their views on the basic principles and goals of the post-war world. British leaders diplomatically but firmly rebuffed the Kremlin's attempt to impose on Britain a scheme in which the USSR essentially became the hegemon in Europe. In the same context, one should consider London's disagreement with Moscow's intention to exclude the United States from the participants in the solution of post-war European problems, as well as its refusal to recognize the Soviet western borders of 1941.

During the days of intense discussion between Stalin and Eden, a short but important test of the moods and positions of Washington and Moscow took place. On December 14, Roosevelt sent a message to the Kremlin, which set out the task of "preparing the ground for joint action not only in the coming weeks, but also for the final defeat of Hitlerism." The president saw the most effective means to achieve this in a personal meeting with Stalin. Due to the impossibility of this, Roosevelt proposed holding several major events in the near future: 1) a conference in Chongqing with the participation of Chinese, Soviet, British, Dutch and American representatives on December 17-20; 2) a naval conference in Singapore until December 20; 3) Stalin's conversations with the ambassadors of the USA, Great Britain and China in Moscow with a message to Roosevelt about their results by December 20. Roosevelt's last action was to be a discussion of the course of the war "with the British missions in Washington," that is, with Churchill, who arrived in the United States on December 19-20. The President expressed his hope that these "preliminary conferences ... would lead to the establishment of a more permanent organization for planning our efforts."

Obviously, this was a very important trial balloon: whether it would be possible to include Moscow in a single structure for planning and conducting the struggle of the anti-fascist coalition in all theaters of military operations. It was obvious that the leadership of this structure should have been in Washington. In addition, within the framework of this idea, the USSR "as if naturally" was drawn into the armed struggle against Japan. It is difficult to say what was more here - the political and psychological cunning of Washington or a lack of understanding of the general political and strategic plans and character of the Soviet leader. Probably both. But after the experience of communicating with Stalin (if not personally, but through proxies), Roosevelt should have understood that Moscow, despite the difficult situation in the fight against Germany, would not go along with not only Chinese and Dutch representatives, but also with the British and the Americans. With Stalin's understanding of the role of the Soviet front in the world war, Roosevelt's approach was more than naive, and even more so the assumption that Stalin would fall for this bait and allow himself to be drawn into the war with Japan. Not surprisingly, the Soviet leader very diplomatically rejected Roosevelt's proposals and - which is especially significant - did not respond to the idea of ​​a personal meeting between the two leaders.

On December 22, after an eight-day journey of Churchill and his closest advisers (Lord Beaverbrook, Field Marshal J. Dill, Admiral E. Pound, Marshal of the Air Force S. Portal), a long and very fruitful meeting of two Western leaders began, which received a code from the Prime Minister name is Arcadia. In addition to eight official "broad meetings" (with the participation of US Secretary of the Navy G. Stimson, Secretary of the Navy F. Knox, G. Hopkins, Beaverbrook, American and British Chiefs of Staff), as well as twelve meetings of military advisers to both leaders, the president and prime minister Minister met daily (Churchill lived in the guest suite of the White House). All this made it possible to compare the views of Washington and London very thoroughly, although sometimes in extensive and rather sharp debates, and make important decisions that reflected a qualitative change in the course of the war and seriously influenced the further confrontation between the two coalitions.

First of all, Roosevelt and Churchill came to the conclusion that it was necessary for both countries to adopt a unified political and strategic concept of waging a world war. It was not formulated in any official document, just as the military alliance of the two countries itself was not formalized. The starting point of this strategy was the Atlantic Charter. An important part of it was the principle "Germany is enemy No. 1, Japan is enemy No. 2." The main goals of the armed struggle of the armies of the USA and Great Britain in 1942 were as follows: to ensure vital communications between the USA, Great Britain and the USSR, between the USA, Great Britain, India, Australia and New Zealand; a turning point in hostilities in North Africa with the possible conquest of dominance in the Mediterranean and the transition of French North Africa to the side of the Allies; seizing the initiative in the Atlantic theater of war; holding vital Allied positions in the Pacific. Obviously, these goals reflected too optimistic calculations for the successful completion of the struggle in North Africa in 1942. Churchill was especially involved in this, who overestimated the ability of the forces of the British Empire to defeat the army of E. Rommel in a short time.

A practical expression of the Anglo-American strategy and the most important tool for its implementation was the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), created at the Arcadia Conference, consisting of the American Chiefs of Staff and members of the mission of the British Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, headed by J. Dill. Although his usual stay and work in the US capital reflected a noticeable increase in the role of Washington in the allied relations between the two powers, this did not mean dominance, much less dictate by Washington in the conduct of coalition affairs. It was accepted that the work of the JCS will be carried out within the framework of an equal partnership. It was determined not only by the quite comparable contribution of London and Washington to their common struggle against the aggressors, especially since in purely military terms, Great Britain at the beginning of 1942 and in the foreseeable future was ahead of the United States. The equality of the two allies also arose from the close cooperation and high degree of mutual understanding between Roosevelt and Churchill, who, on an equal footing - and this will remain until the end of 1943 - developed the allied strategy precisely in many ways, if not in the main, on the basis of the work of the OKNSh and who were his real leaders.

An important element of the strategic course of Roosevelt and Churchill was a fairly adequate understanding of the role of the USSR in the world struggle. Since this attempt to make Moscow an ordinary member of the consultative level failed, and Stalin, for his part, did not offer any alternative, the matter was reduced to the parallelism of two strategies: Anglo-American and Soviet. This clearly reflected the fact of waging two wars - eastern and western. Roosevelt and Churchill were fully aware of the enormous importance of the Great Patriotic War for overcoming the serious crisis in which Western strategy found itself in late 1941 and early 1942. In a memorandum for a meeting with Roosevelt dated December 16, Churchill wrote: “At the moment, the factor of paramount importance is the failure of plans Hitler and his losses in Russia". At the same time, the need to overcome it (the crisis), as well as Washington's and London's doubts about Moscow's political and strategic intentions, led to a significant divergence of the two strategies within the framework of their parallelism.

In the decisions of the Arcadia conference, both officially recorded and actually agreed upon in conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill, the "second front" is not mentioned at all. It was about "providing to the Russians such assistance that would allow them to keep Leningrad, Moscow and the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus, and also to continue military operations." Roosevelt and Churchill understood that these decisions would by no means please Stalin, and therefore they did not inform the Kremlin about them either in general or in part concerning the interaction of both strategic courses.

An important event in the contacts between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin during this period was the adoption of the United Nations Declaration. At first, it was developed in parallel in the teams of the president and the prime minister, then it was agreed with the military cabinet in London, which introduced into it a clause refusing to conclude a separate peace with opponents. The Kremlin joined in the discussion of the text of the Declaration on December 27-28, agreeing with some of the "difficult" provisions for it (the inclusion of the expression "freedom of religion" instead of the words "freedom of conscience", on which the White House especially insisted) and having achieved more precise and necessary wording for it , especially taking into account the non-participation of the USSR in the war with Japan. The Declaration was signed on January 1, 1942, and at the suggestion of Roosevelt, instead of the general alphabetic signing of the Declaration, the first four signatures were given to Roosevelt, Churchill, Litvinov and the Chinese ambassador.

Although the Declaration of the United Nations was adopted before the end of the Arcadia conference, it was it that symbolized the completion of the turning point in the course of the World War, the creation of an anti-German coalition, and outlined the most important imperative facing its participants, especially the Big Three. It consisted in making the most efficient use of the forces of each member of the "Big Three" in their own theaters of military operations, as well as reasonably building political and strategic relations within the framework of the formed coalition. From the point of view of this requirement, the results of the negotiations and decisions of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in December 1941 - January 1942, despite their inconsistency, can be generally defined as positive, quite adequate to the complex interweaving of coinciding and diverging interests, ambitions and plans, which were in the minds and hearts of the leaders of Moscow, Washington and London during this period.

The most positive changes have taken place in the relationship between the White House and Whitehall. In addition to the further convergence of the views and positions of Roosevelt and Churchill and the formation of a structure for a unified leadership of the armed struggle, the Prime Minister's stay in the United States itself was of great importance, which was widely covered in the media, especially his speech to Congress on December 26. Some shifts took place in the relationship between Stalin and Roosevelt, although problematic aspects were also identified at the same time. The least noticeable were the changes in the relationship between Churchill and Stalin, and we can talk about the emergence of new sore points in the relationship between the two leaders.

Despite the difficulties and contradictions, the moral and psychological atmosphere of unity has noticeably strengthened in all three countries, especially among those groups of the population that were associated with the organization and implementation of extensive Lend-Lease supply programs. As for the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain themselves, one can say quite confidently that the predominant note in their thoughts and behavior in the ensuing difficult trials of the spring-autumn of 1942 remained the desire to realize the main requirement of the United Nations Declaration: to preserve and strengthen the unity of the anti-fascist coalition - the decisive means of defeating the aggressors.



autumn 1942 Fascist aggression reached its climax. The armed forces of Germany and its allies in Europe and North Africa, and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region, have seized a vast territory of 12.8 million km2 with a population of more than 500 million people. Almost the entire continental Western Europe, the Balkans, the Baltic States, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, the western regions of Russia, in northern Africa - part of Libya and Egypt were under the heel of the German invaders. Japan captured a significant part of China, occupied many islands and almost a third of the Pacific Ocean.
The fascist bloc at that time, in addition to Germany, included Japan, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Bulgaria, Thailand and state entities with the puppet governments of Slovakia, Croatia, Manchukuo and Nanjing. Of these, eight states led by Germany in Europe and three led by Japan in Asia directly participated in hostilities. They were opposed 34 states that were part of the anti-Hitler coalition. Among them are the USSR, USA, Great Britain, China, Mongolia, Canada, India, Australia, New Zealand, South African Union, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Panama, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and a number of other countries. However, of the entire composition of the anti-Hitler coalition, only the Soviet Union used its military and economic might in full to fight the enemy. The Soviet-German front remained the most significant in World War II.
The second most important theater of war in 1942 The city was North African. Groupings of troops, limited in composition, operated here, and the ongoing operations, in terms of scale and results achieved, could not be compared with military operations on the Soviet-German front, although they indirectly influenced the general military-political situation in the world. This summer, German-Italian troops under the command of General E. Rommel invaded the northeastern regions of Egypt. The result was a direct threat to Alexandria, Suez and Cairo. In response, American and British troops under the command of General D. Eisenhower with 8 on 11 november carried out large landings on the coast of North-West Africa in the areas of Casablanca and west of Algiers. Already to 1 December the total number of landing forces was brought to 253 thousand people. The position of the German and Italian troops in North Africa was becoming difficult: deprived of support from the European continent, squeezed from the west, south and east, under the dominance of the air and fleet of the American-British troops in the Mediterranean basin, they were doomed.
At the beginning november 1942 G. 8- I the British army, which included British, Australian, Indian, New Zealand, South African, Greek and French divisions and brigades, in the course of two weeks of offensive battles, broke the resistance of the Italo-German troops near El Alamein and drove them out of Egypt. Enemy losses were: 55 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, destroyed 320 tanks and about a thousand guns. But this is much less than in the battle of Stalingrad, where German losses during the counteroffensive amounted to more than 800 thousand people 2 thousand tanks, 10 thousand guns and mortars, 3 thousand combat aircraft. 13 May 1943 Italo-German troops in Tunisia capitulated. The hostilities in North Africa are over.
In July - August 1943 The allies landed on the island of Sicily and took possession of it. 25 July Mussolini's regime was overthrown and Italy signed a truce with the Allies, and 13 October declared war on Germany.

The third theater of war was the Asia-Pacific. In the middle 1942 in this theater, Japan dealt a serious blow to the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain. Its troops held the occupied part of China, seized the Hawaiian and Philippine Islands, captured Indonesia, Singapore, Burma, reached the borders of India, threatened Australia and New Zealand. However, exorbitant territorial gains only complicated the position of the aggressor. Scattered on numerous fronts and hundreds of islands, the Japanese troops were exhausted. Hopes were fading for the complete conquest of China. It was now difficult for Japan not only to carry out the planned plan to seize India and Australia, but also to keep what had been won.
With July 1942 The United States stepped up the fight against German submarines off the coast of North America, which were trying to strike at important coastal targets. Only in the second half of the year the Germans lost here 66 boats. This forced the German naval leadership to withdraw the main forces of the submarine fleet to the center of the Atlantic. But even in this area they faced increased opposition.
In the end, Hitler decided to concentrate the main efforts of surface and submarine forces in the North Atlantic in order to prevent the expected British invasion of Norway, and most importantly, to disrupt the escort of sea convoys carrying Lend-Lease cargo from England and the USA to the USSR. As a result, the activity of the German fleet in the area increased dramatically. It took more than half a year to achieve a turning point in the naval war here too.
The situation in the Balkans was unfavorable for Germany and its allies, where the national liberation struggle intensified. In Yugoslavia alone, the partisan formations of I. Broz Tito, which included 37 infantry brigades, 12 separate battalions and 34 partisan detachments (total 150 thousand people), by the end 1942 g. controlled a fifth of the country's territory.
Thus, the situation in the world as a whole, and especially on the Soviet-German front, by the beginning of the winter campaign of 1942/43 was complex and contradictory. The overall superiority in the armed forces and combat means has already passed to the side of the USSR and its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. The enemy was stopped everywhere and experienced great difficulties both at the front and in the rear. But this did not predetermine his final defeat, especially since at that moment the states of the anti-Hitler coalition, despite the changed balance of forces, also experienced considerable difficulties.

War in the Pacific

background

Since the end of the 19th century, Japan has been pursuing an aggressive foreign policy aimed at dominating the region. In the 1930s, Japanese claims led to an armed conflict with China. In 1937, this conflict escalated into a full-fledged war, in which Japan won victory after victory, and China suffered huge losses. Japanese interests extended to almost all of East and South Asia and the Pacific region, which caused tense relations with the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States, which had their own interests there, as well as colonies. In September 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy for cooperation in rebuilding the world order.

Events

December 7, 1941- Japanese aircraft and navy attacked the American military base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, causing significant damage to it. After that, the United States declared war on Japan and began to take an active part in the battles of World War II.

December 1941 - May 1942- Japan is conducting successful military operations in Hong Kong, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies, Malaysia, Burma and other regions, inflicting defeats on local, as well as American, British, Dutch, Australian and Chinese troops. In May 1942, local and American troops in the Philippines surrendered. After that, Japan controlled virtually all of Southeast Asia and northwestern Oceania.

June 4-6, 1942- Battle of Midway Atoll. The United States defeated Japan by sinking four Japanese aircraft carriers and destroying about 250 aircraft. This battle is considered by many historians as a turning point in the Pacific theater of operations, after which Japan lost the initiative.

August 1942 - February 1943- the battle for the island of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. Both the United States and Japan suffered significant losses, but in general, the United States confirmed its military superiority, after this battle, finally moving from defense to attack.

October 1944- the beginning of the use of kamikaze tactics (suicide pilots who rammed enemy ships).

October 1944 - August 1945- The Philippine operation, which ended in the defeat of the Japanese and the liberation of the Philippines.

March 10, 1945- the bombing of Tokyo with incendiary bombs, the victims of which were about 100 thousand people, mostly civilians.

August 6 and 9, 1945- the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed about 200 thousand people, not counting those who died later from exposure to radiation. The first and only use of atomic weapons in history (chronology of events in Hiroshima).

August 9, 1945- Fulfilling the promise given to the allies, the USSR declares war on Japan. The Soviet offensive in Manchuria ended with the defeat of the Kwantung Army, sharply worsening Japan's position.

Conclusion

Events in the Pacific theater were an important part of World War II. First of all, they can be characterized as a confrontation between the United States and Japan. The fate of Japan in many respects repeated the German one: by the beginning of the war, she also had a powerful army and confidence in her right to aggressive territorial expansion, but her resources were not unlimited. At the same time, Japan had no allies in the region, which reduced its chances of success and accelerated its defeat.

An important result of the war was the establishment of democratic orders in Japan and the country's rejection of imperial claims.

Abstract

December 6, 1941 Japanese forces attack US naval base in Hawaii Pearl Harbor by destroying the United States Pacific Fleet. The attack was sudden. Following this, the states of the anti-Hitler coalition declare war on Japan. In turn, the United States declares war on Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and a number of countries of the fascist bloc.

The defeat of the American fleet and the lack of large military forces in the colonies of European countries allowed Tokyo to carry out a lightning-fast seizure of the territory of Southeast Asia, Indonesia and launch an offensive against the pearl of the British Empire - India, simultaneously occupying Burma.

By 1942, the Japanese managed to establish control over the overwhelming part of East and Southeast Asia, deploying ruthless terror in these territories (especially in China). Continuing the territorial seizures, Japanese landings began to land on the islands of Oceania and the Philippines, threatening the security of Australia and New Zealand, which forced the latter to enter the war.

1943 marked by the Battle of the Solomon Islands, which ended with the victory of the United States.

The territories occupied by the Japanese were under constant attack by partisan detachments, which did not give Tokyo confidence in the safety of its rear. Sufficiently powerful resistance to the invaders was provided by partisans under the command of a communist Mao Zedong.

The protracted war was exhausting Japan. She could no longer successfully control the vast occupied territories. Trophies and minerals taken out of the occupied lands were subjected to constant bombardment by the Allied forces.

At the end of 1944, the Americans make a successful landing attempt on the Philippine Islands.. Striking at the center of the Japanese Empire, they mercilessly sank Japanese ships and submarines, shot down planes, and practically took no prisoners. The Philippines became a stronghold for the United States Navy and Air Force.

In October 1944, a major naval battle took place in Leyte Gulf, in which the Japanese fleet was almost destroyed.

Beginning in 1945, American aircraft bombed Japanese cities daily. The joint actions of the allies made it possible to liberate large areas of Asia and Oceania.

After the end of the war in Europe, following the Yalta agreements, according to which, after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the USSR should declare war on Japan, hostilities begin in the Soviet Far East.

Redeployed from Europe, battle-hardened Soviet troops formed a powerful fist. In August 1945 several operations began at once - in Northeast China, Korea, on Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. The Soviet blow was so strong that the Japanese troops were broken and fled in disarray, leaving vast territories behind.

6 and 9 August 1945of the year American command dropped on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki two atomic bombs, wiping them off the face of the earth. The Americans have demonstrated to the whole world that they have a new type of weapon.

On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the Unconditional Surrender Act on the USS Missouri.

World War II 1939-1945 ended.

Bibliography

1. Shubin A.V. General history. Recent history. Grade 9: textbook. for general education institutions. - M.: Moscow textbooks, 2010.
2. Soroko-Tsyupa O.S., Soroko-Tsyupa A.O. General history. Recent history, 9th grade. - M.: Education, 2010.
3. Sergeev E.Yu. General history. Recent history. Grade 9 - M.: Education, 2011.

Homework

1. Read §13 of A.V. Shubin's textbook, pp. 137-139 and answer questions 3 and 4 on p. 142.
2. Why did the USSR enter the war with Japan only after the end of the war in Europe?
3. Was the atomic bombing of Japanese cities necessary at the end of the war?

1. Internet portal Nb-info.ru ().
2. Internet portal Militarymaps.narod.ru ().
3. Internet portal Waralbum.ru ().