On Sunday, June 22, 1941, at dawn, the troops of fascist Germany, without declaring war, suddenly attacked the entire western border of the Soviet Union and launched bombing air strikes on Soviet cities and military formations.

The Great Patriotic War began. She was expected, but still she came suddenly. And the point here is not a miscalculation or Stalin's distrust of intelligence data. During the pre-war months, different dates were given for the start of the war, for example, May 20, and this was reliable information, but due to the uprising in Yugoslavia, Hitler postponed the date of the attack on the USSR to a later date. There is another factor that is rarely mentioned. This is a successful disinformation campaign by German intelligence. So, the Germans spread rumors through all possible channels that the attack on the USSR would take place on June 22, but with the direction of the main attack in an area where it was obviously impossible. Thus, the date also looked like disinformation, so it was on this day that the attacks were least expected.
And in foreign textbooks, June 22, 1941 is presented as one of the current episodes of the Second World War, while in the textbooks of the Baltic States this date is considered positive, giving "hope for liberation".

Russia

§4. Invasion of the USSR. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War
At dawn on June 22, 1941, Nazi troops invaded the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began.
Germany and its allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia) did not have an overwhelming advantage in manpower and equipment and, according to the Barbarossa plan, they relied on the blitzkrieg ("lightning war") tactics on the surprise attack factor. The defeat of the USSR was supposed within two to three months by the forces of three army groups (Army Group North, advancing on Leningrad, Army Group Center, advancing on Moscow, and Army Group South, advancing on Kyiv).
In the first days of the war, the German army inflicted serious damage on the Soviet defense system: military headquarters were destroyed, the activities of communications services were paralyzed, and strategically important objects were captured. The German army was rapidly advancing deep into the USSR, and by July 10, Army Group Center (commander von Bock), having captured Belarus, approached Smolensk; Army Group "South" (commander von Rundstedt) captured the Right-Bank Ukraine; Army Group North (commander von Leeb) occupied part of the Baltic. The losses of the Red Army (including those who were surrounded) amounted to more than two million people. The current situation was catastrophic for the USSR. But the Soviet mobilization resources were very large, and by the beginning of July, 5 million people were drafted into the Red Army, which made it possible to close the gaps formed at the front.

V.L.Kheifets, L.S. Kheifets, K.M. Severinov. General history. Grade 9 Ed. Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.S. Myasnikov. Moscow, publishing house "Ventana-Graf", 2013

Chapter XVII. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders
The perfidious attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR
Fulfilling the grandiose tasks of the third Stalinist five-year plan and steadily and firmly pursuing a policy of peace, the Soviet government, at the same time, did not for a moment forget about the possibility of a new "imperialist attack on our country. Comrade Stalin tirelessly called on the peoples of the Soviet Union to be in mobilization readiness. In February 1938 In his response to a letter from Komsomol member Ivanov, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to turn a blind eye to the fact of a capitalist encirclement and think that our external enemies, for example, the fascists, will not try, on occasion, to launch a military attack on the USSR.”
Comrade Stalin demanded the strengthening of the defense capability of our country. “It is necessary,” he wrote, “to strengthen and strengthen in every possible way our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Aviation, Osoaviakhim. It is necessary to keep our entire people in a state of mobilization readiness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no “accident” and no tricks of our external enemies could take us by surprise ... "
Comrade Stalin's warning alerted the Soviet people, made them more vigilantly follow the intrigues of the enemies and strengthen the Soviet army in every possible way.
The Soviet people understood that the German fascists, led by Hitler, were striving to unleash a new bloody war with which they hope to win world domination. Hitler declared the Germans a "superior race" and all other peoples inferior, inferior races. With particular hatred, the Nazis treated the Slavic peoples and, first of all, the great Russian people, who more than once in their history came out to fight against the German aggressors.
The Nazis based their plan on the plan of a military attack and lightning defeat of Russia developed by General Hoffmann during the First World War. This plan provided for the concentration of huge armies on the western borders of our homeland, the capture of the vital centers of the country within a few weeks and the rapid advance deep into Russia, up to the Urals. Subsequently, this plan was supplemented and approved by the Nazi command and was called the Barbarossa plan.
The monstrous war machine of the Nazi imperialists began its movement in the Baltic States, Belorussia and the Ukraine, threatening the vital centers of the Soviet country.

Textbook "History of the USSR", 10th grade, K.V. Bazilevich, S.V. Bakhrushin, A.M. Pankratova, A.V. Foght, M., Uchpedgiz, 1952

Austria, Germany

Chapter "From the Russian Campaign to Complete Defeat"
After careful preparations that lasted for many months, on June 22, 1941, Germany launched a "war of total annihilation" against the Soviet Union. Its goal was to conquer a new living space for the Germanic Aryan race. The essence of the German plan was a lightning attack, called "Barbarossa". It was believed that under the rapid onslaught of a trained German military machine Soviet troops unable to put up a decent resistance. In a few months, the Nazi command seriously hoped to reach Moscow. It was assumed that the capture of the capital of the USSR would finally demoralize the enemy and the war would end in victory. However, after a series of impressive successes on the battlefields, after a few weeks, the Nazis were thrown back hundreds of kilometers from the Soviet capital.

Textbook "History" for grade 7, team of authors, Duden publishing house, 2013.

Holt McDougal. The World History.
For Senior High School, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., 2012

Hitler began planning an attack on his ally, the USSR, as early as the early summer of 1940. The Balkan countries of Southeast Europe played a key role in Hitler's invasion plan. Hitler wanted to create a foothold in Southeastern Europe to attack the USSR. He also wanted to be sure that the British would not interfere.
In order to prepare for the invasion, Hitler moved to expand his influence in the Balkans. By early 1941, by threatening to use force, he persuaded Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to join the Axis. Yugoslavia and Greece, ruled by pro-British governments, fought back. In early April 1941, Hitler invaded both countries. Yugoslavia fell after 11 days. Greece surrendered after 17 days.
Hitler attacks the Soviet Union. By establishing tight control over the Balkans, Hitler could carry out Operation Barbarossa, his plan to invade the USSR. Early on the morning of June 22, 1941, the roar of German tanks and the drone of aircraft marked the beginning of the invasion. The Soviet Union was not ready for this attack. Although he had the largest army in the world, the troops were neither well equipped nor well trained.
The invasion progressed week after week until the Germans penetrated 500 miles into the territory of the Soviet Union (804.67 kilometers. - Ed.). Retreating, the Soviet troops burned and destroyed everything in the way of the enemy. The Russians used such a scorched earth strategy against Napoleon.

Section 7. World War II
The attack on the Soviet Union (the so-called Barbarossa plan) was carried out on June 22, 1941. The German army, which numbered about three million soldiers, launched an offensive in three directions: in the north - on Leningrad, in the central part of the USSR - on Moscow and in the south - on the Crimea. The onslaught of the invaders was swift. Soon the Germans laid siege to Leningrad and Sevastopol, came close to Moscow. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but the main objective fascists - the capture of the capital of the Soviet Union - never materialized. The vast expanses and early Russian winter, with the fierce resistance of the Soviet troops and ordinary inhabitants of the country, thwarted the German plan for a blitzkrieg. In early December 1941, units of the Red Army under the command of General Zhukov launched a counteroffensive and drove the enemy troops back 200 kilometers from Moscow.

History textbook for the 8th grade of elementary school (Klett publishing house, 2011). Predrag Vajagić and Nenad Stošić.

Never before have our people treated the German invasion otherwise than with determination to defend their land, but when Molotov announced the German attack in a trembling voice, the Estonians felt everything but sympathy. On the contrary, many have hope. The population of Estonia enthusiastically welcomed the German soldiers as liberators.
Russian soldiers aroused dislike in the average Estonian. These people were poor, poorly dressed, extremely suspicious, and at the same time often very pretentious. The Germans were more familiar to the Estonians. They were cheerful and fond of music, from the places where they gathered, laughter and playing musical instruments could be heard.

Lauri Vahtre. Textbook "Turning Moments in Estonian History".

Bulgaria

Chapter 2: The Globalization of Conflict (1941-1942)
Attack on the USSR (June 1941). On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched a major offensive against the USSR. Starting the conquest of new territories in the east, the Fuhrer put into practice the theory of "living space", proclaimed in the book "My Struggle" ("Mein Kampf"). On the other hand, the termination of the German-Soviet pact again made it possible for the Nazi regime to present itself as a fighter against communism in Europe: the aggression against the USSR was presented by German propaganda as a crusade against Bolshevism with the aim of exterminating the "Jewish Marxists".
However, this new blitzkrieg developed into a long and exhausting war. Shaken by the surprise attack, bled dry by Stalin's repressions and ill-prepared, the Soviet army was quickly driven back. In a few weeks, the German armies occupied one million square kilometers and reached the outskirts of Leningrad and Moscow. But the fierce Soviet resistance and the rapid arrival of the Russian winter stopped the German offensive: the Wehrmacht could not defeat the enemy on the move in one campaign. In the spring of 1942, a new offensive was required.

Long before the attack on the USSR, the German military-political leadership was developing plans for an attack on the USSR and the development of the territory and the use of its natural, material and human resources. The future war was planned by the German command as a war of annihilation. On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive 21, known as Plan Barbarossa. In accordance with this plan, Army Group North was to advance on Leningrad, Army Group Center - through Belarus to Moscow, Army Group South - to Kyiv.

The plan of "blitzkrieg" against the USSR
The German command expected to approach Moscow by August 15, to end the war against the USSR and create a defensive line against "Asian Russia" by October 1, 1941, and to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line by the winter of 1941.
On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began with the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Mobilization was announced in the USSR. Voluntary entry into the Red Army acquired a mass character. Popular militia became widespread. Fighter battalions and self-defense groups were created in the front line to protect important national economic facilities. The evacuation of people and property began from the territories threatened by the occupation.
Military operations were led by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, created on June 23, 1941. The rate was headed by I. Stalin. Italy
June 22, 1941
Giardina, G. Sabbatucci, V. Vidotto, Manuale di Storia. L "eta`contemporanea. History textbook for the 5th grade of high school. Bari, Laterza. Textbook for the 11th grade of high school "Our New History", Dar Aun Publishing House, 2008
With the German attack on the Soviet Union in the early summer of 1941, a new phase of the war began. The widest front was opened in the east of Europe. Great Britain was no longer forced to fight alone. The ideological confrontation was simplified and radicalized with the termination of the anomalous agreement between Nazism and the Soviet regime. The international communist movement, which after August 1939 adopted an ambiguous position of condemnation of "opposing imperialisms", revised it in favor of allying with democracy and fighting fascism.
The fact that the USSR was the main target of Hitler's expansionist intentions was no mystery to anyone, including Soviet people. However, Stalin believed that Hitler would never attack Russia without ending the war with Britain. So when, on 22 June 1941, the German offensive (code-named "Barbarossa") began on a 1,600-kilometer front, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Russians were unprepared, and this lack of readiness, exacerbated by the fact that the 1937 purge had deprived the Red the army of its best military leaders, made the task of the aggressor easier at first.
The offensive, which also included the Italian expeditionary force sent in great haste by Mussolini, who dreamed of participating in a crusade against the Bolsheviks, continued throughout the summer: in the north through the Baltics, in the south through Ukraine in order to reach the oil regions in the Caucasus .

In the literature about the Second World War, the idea that Hitler did not defeat the USSR only because he did not have time to take Moscow before winter is a red thread. And he did not have time to do this because he made the invasion too late. For some reason, he waited until the end of June, instead of attacking in the spring. Moreover, the initial date of the attack seemed to be scheduled for May 15, 1941. That is, it turns out that Hitler lost precious time due to some whim or bewilderment? Or were there objective reasons that forced him to postpone the implementation of the Barbarossa plan?

First of all, let's clarify where it came from that Hitler set the date for the invasion of the USSR on May 15th. This date has only one source: the directive of the Wehrmacht High Command No. 21, otherwise the Barbarossa plan, signed by the Fuhrer on December 18, 1940. It reads: “I will give the order on the strategic deployment of the armed forces against the Soviet Union, if necessary, eight weeks before the scheduled date for the start of operations. Preparations requiring a longer time, if they have not yet begun, should begin now and be completed by 15.5.41.

It does not follow from this that May 15 was already scheduled as the date of the attack. By this date, the transfer of Wehrmacht troops to areas from where their strategic deployment for operations against the USSR could begin was only to be completed. The appointment of a start date for the operation is the subject of a special order. From the same text it follows that this order should have been given no later than eight weeks before the scheduled date of the invasion. That is, if this deadline was May 15, then the order should have been received no later than March 20, 1941. As you know, there was no such order.

Of course, Hitler was interested in attacking the USSR as soon as possible, and the Barbarossa plan clearly indicates this: "The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign." May 15 was the target date. As early as April 3rd, the OKH issued an order that called for the postponement of Operation Barbarossa "by at least four weeks." The delay was motivated by the need for a military operation in the Balkans. On April 30, after the completion of the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece, the new order for the first time named a specific date for the attack - June 22, and it was held. On June 17, the troops of Germany and its allies received the Dortmund code signal to advance to their original positions.

So, the reason for the delay seems to be beyond doubt, since the Germans themselves named it. However, some historians doubt the truth of this official version.

According to some mystically minded people, Hitler specifically timed the attack on the USSR to the day when the Russian Orthodox Church celebrated "The Day of All Saints Who Shone in the Russian Land." Considering that Hitler considered the campaign against the USSR as “a fight against godless Bolshevism”, and that the German administration everywhere opened churches in the occupied regions that had previously been closed by the Bolsheviks, this “version” should be discarded as an absurd myth. Let's consider more serious explanations.

According to such authors as V. Suvorov (Rezun) and M. Solonin, Hitler undertook the invasion at the most favorable moment in order to preempt the Soviet troops, who themselves were preparing to attack Germany. On July 6, 1941, Stalin allegedly appointed the start of the Red Army's campaign in Europe. Hitler, knowing this, chose the time to defeat the Soviet troops, concentrated near the borders and completely unprepared for defense, with a sudden blow. Therefore, he postponed the attack until June 22, in order to act for sure.

However, this version does not yet find direct documentary evidence. The problem for her is not even the secrecy of the most important Soviet archival documents of the pre-war period. In all German documents, there are absolutely no indications that the preparation of German troops for the invasion of the USSR was carried out depending on the information about the supposedly impending Soviet invasion and in order to forestall it. All the data available today indicate that Nazi Germany was preparing an attack on the USSR, completely regardless of what the Soviet leadership was doing.

English historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote back in the 70s of the last century: “Subsequently, it was believed that the implementation of the Barbarossa plan ... was ... postponed due to events in Yugoslavia ... This is a legend invented by German generals to justify their defeat in Russia and, in fact, on nothing founded. Only 15 out of 150 [more precisely, out of 153 -I WOULD. ] German divisions intended for the first strike were diverted to the Balkans. It's hardly a big loss. The plans for mobilization in Germany for the Eastern Front were not completed by May 15 ... due to a lack of supplies, especially vehicles ... The delay may even have been opportune, since after the spring snowmelt, the ground dried out by mid-June.

One more thought can be added to this. The factor of strategic surprise would certainly have been used by Germany to a greater extent if the invasion had been undertaken in the month of May. At this time, Stalin would have considered the German army the least capable of striking, since its ground operation in the Balkans had just ended, and it had yet to capture Crete.

Therefore, the hypothesis that the Wehrmacht missed a convenient time to defeat the USSR only for purely technical reasons (difficulties in concentrating the material part), and not because of the sudden need to conduct an operation in the Balkans (carried out by very limited forces), deserves serious attention.

Part 1.

Seventy-six years ago, on June 22, 1941, the peaceful life of the Soviet people was interrupted, Germany treacherously attacked our country.
Speaking on the radio on July 3, 1941, I.V. Stalin called the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany - the Patriotic War.
In 1942, after the establishment of the Order of the Patriotic War, this name was officially fixed. And the name - "Great Patriotic" war appeared later.
The war claimed about 30 million lives (now they are talking about 40 million) of Soviet people, brought grief and suffering to almost every family, cities and villages were in ruins.
Until now, the question of who is responsible for the tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War, for the colossal defeats that our army suffered at its beginning and the fact that the Nazis ended up at the walls of Moscow and Leningrad is being discussed. Who was right, who was wrong, who did not fulfill what he was obliged to do, because he took the oath of allegiance to the Motherland. You need to know the historical truth.
As almost all veterans recall, in the spring of 1941, the approach of the war was felt. Informed people knew about its preparation, the townsfolk were alarmed by rumors and gossip.
But even with the declaration of war, many believed that “our indestructible and best army in the world”, which was constantly repeated in the newspapers and on the radio, would immediately defeat the aggressor, moreover, on his own territory, encroaching on our borders.

The existing main version about the beginning of the War of 1941-1945, born during the time of N.S. Khrushchev by the decisions of the XX Congress and the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, reads:
- “The tragedy of June 22 occurred because Stalin, who was “afraid” of Hitler, and at the same time “trusted” him, forbade the generals to put the troops of the western districts on alert before June 22, thanks to which, as a result, the soldiers of the Red Army met the war sleeping in their barracks »;
- “The main thing, of course, that dominated him, over all his activities, which also responded to us, was the fear of Hitler. He was afraid of the German armed forces ”(From the speech of G.K. Zhukov in the editorial office of the Military History Journal on August 13, 1966. Published in the magazine Ogonyok No. 25, 1989);
- “Stalin made an irreparable mistake by trusting false information that came from the relevant authorities .....” (G.K. Zhukov “Memoirs and Reflections”. M. Olma -Press.2003.);
- “…. Unfortunately, it must be noted that I.V. Stalin, on the eve and at the beginning of the war, underestimated the role and significance of the General Staff .... he was little interested in the activities of the General Staff. Neither my predecessors nor I had the opportunity to fully report to I. Stalin on the state of the country's defense and on the capabilities of our potential enemy ..». (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”. M. Olma - Press. 2003).

Until now, in different interpretations, it sounds that the “main culprit”, of course, was Stalin, since “he was a tyrant and despot”, “everyone was afraid of him” and “nothing happened without his will”, “did not allow the troops to be brought into combat readiness in advance", and "forced" the generals to leave soldiers in the "sleeping" barracks before June 22, etc.
In a conversation in early December 1943 with the commander of long-range aviation, later Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, unexpectedly for the interlocutor, Stalin said:
“I know that when I am gone, more than one tub of dirt will be poured on my head, a pile of rubbish will be put on my grave. But I am sure that the wind of history will dispel all this!”
This is also confirmed by the words of A.M. Kollontai, recorded in her diary, back in November 1939 (on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war). According to this testimony, even then Stalin clearly foresaw the slander that would fall upon him as soon as he passed away.
A. M. Kollontai recorded his words: “And my name will also be slandered, slandered. Many atrocities will be attributed to me."
In this sense, the position of Marshal of Artillery I.D. Yakovlev, who was repressed in his time, is typical, who, speaking about the war, considered it most honest to say this:
“When we undertake to talk about June 22, 1941, which covered our entire people with a black wing, then we need to digress from everything personal and follow only the truth, it is unacceptable to try to put all the blame for the surprise attack of fascist Germany only on I.V. Stalin.
In the endless lamentations of our military leaders about the "surprise" one can see an attempt to relieve themselves of all responsibility for the mistakes in the combat training of the troops, in their command and control in the first period of the war. They forget the main thing: having taken the oath, commanders of all units - from front commanders to platoon commanders - are obliged to keep the troops in a state of combat readiness. This is their professional duty, and to explain the non-fulfillment of it with references to I.V. Stalin is not to the face of the soldiers.
Stalin, by the way, just like them, gave a military oath of allegiance to the Fatherland - below is a photocopy of the military oath given in writing by him as a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on February 23, 1939.

The paradox is that those who suffered under Stalin, but even under him, rehabilitated people subsequently showed exceptional decency towards him.
Here, for example, what the former People's Commissar of the USSR aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin said:
“You can’t blame everything on Stalin! The minister should also be responsible for something ... For example, I did something wrong in aviation, so I will definitely bear responsibility for this. And then everything is on Stalin ... ".
The great Commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, and Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov were the same.

Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, one might say, “sent” Khrushchev very far with his proposal to write something nasty about Stalin! He suffered for this - he was very quickly sent into retirement, removed from the post of Deputy Minister of Defense, but he did not renounce the Supreme. Although he had many reasons to be offended by I. Stalin.
I think that the main one is that he, as the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, who was the first to reach the distant approaches to Berlin and was already preparing for its future assault, was deprived of this honorable opportunity. I. Stalin removed him from the Command of the 1st Belorussian Front and appointed him to the 2nd Belorussian.
As many said and wrote, he did not want Pole to take Berlin, and G.K. became the Marshal of Victory. Zhukov.
But K.K. Rokossovsky showed his nobility here too, leaving G.K. Zhukov almost all of his officers of the Front Headquarters, although he had every right to take them with him to the new front. And the staff officers at K.K. Rokossovsky have always been distinguished, as all military historians note, by the highest staff training.
Troops led by K.K. Rokossovsky, unlike those led by G.K. Zhukov, were not defeated in a single battle during the entire war.
A. Ye Golovanov was proud that he had the honor to serve the Motherland under the command of Stalin personally. He also suffered under Khrushchev, but he did not renounce Stalin!
Many other military figures and historians speak about the same.

Here is what General N.F. Chervov writes in his book “Provocations against Russia”, Moscow, 2003:

“... there was no surprise attack in the usual sense, and Zhukov’s wording was invented at one time in order to shift the blame for the defeat at the beginning of the war onto Stalin and justify the miscalculations of the high military command, including their own during this period ... ".

According to the long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, General of the Army P. Ivashutin, “Neither strategically nor tactically, the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union was not sudden” (VIZH 1990 No. 5).

The Red Army in the prewar years was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in terms of mobilization and training.
Hitler declared universal military service from March 1, 1935, and the USSR, based on the state of the economy, was able to do this only from September 1, 1939.
As you can see, Stalin first thought about what to feed, what to wear and how to equip the conscripts, and only then, if the calculations proved this, he drafted into the army exactly as much as, according to the calculations, we could feed, clothe and arm.
On September 2, 1939, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars No. 1355-279ss approved the "Plan for the Reorganization of the Ground Forces for 1939 - 1940", developed by the head since 1937. General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.

In 1939, the Wehrmacht numbered 4.7 million people, the Red Army - only 1.9 million people. But by January 1941. the number of the Red Army increased to 4 million 200 thousand people.

It was simply impossible to train an army of such size and re-equip it in a short time to wage a modern war against an experienced enemy.

I. V. Stalin understood this very well, and very soberly assessing the capabilities of the Red Army, he believed that she would be ready to fully fight the Wehrmacht no earlier than mid-1942-43. That is why he sought to delay the start of the war.
He had no illusions about Hitler.

I. Stalin knew very well that the Non-Aggression Pact, which we concluded in August 1939 with Hitler, was considered by him as a disguise and a means to achieve the goal - the defeat of the USSR, but continued to play a diplomatic game, trying to play for time.
All this is a lie that I. Stalin trusted and was afraid of Hitler.

Back in November 1939, before the Soviet-Finnish war, in the personal diary of the USSR Ambassador to Sweden A.M. Kollontai, an entry appeared that recorded the following words of Stalin personally heard by her during an audience in the Kremlin:

“The time for persuasion and negotiations is over. We must practically prepare for a rebuff, for a war with Hitler.

As to whether Stalin "trusted" Hitler, his speech at a meeting of the Politburo on November 18, 1940, when summing up the results of Molotov's visit to Berlin, testifies very well:

“... As we know, immediately after the departure of our delegation from Berlin, Hitler loudly declared that “German-Soviet relations have been finally established.”
But we well know the price of these statements! For us, even before meeting with Hitler, it was clear that he would not want to take into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, dictated by the requirements of the security of our country ....
We considered the Berlin meeting as a real opportunity to probe the position of the German government....
Hitler's position during these negotiations, in particular his stubborn refusal to reckon with the natural security interests of the Soviet Union, his categorical refusal to stop the de facto occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that, despite demagogic assurances about not infringing on the "global interests" of the Soviet Union, in fact, preparations are underway for an attack on our country. In seeking the Berlin meeting, the Nazi Fuhrer sought to disguise his true intentions...
One thing is clear: Hitler is playing a double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, at the same time he tries to buy time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the question of the further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations ....
It was at this time that we managed to prevent the attack of fascist Germany. And in this case, the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with her played a big role ...

But, of course, this is only a temporary respite, the immediate threat of armed aggression against us has only been somewhat weakened, but not completely eliminated.

But by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany, we have already won more than a year to prepare for a decisive and deadly struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course, we cannot regard the Soviet-German pact as the basis for creating reliable security for us.
State security issues are now becoming even more acute.
Now that our borders have been moved to the west, we need a powerful barrier along them, with operational groupings of troops put on alert in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear.
(The final words of I. Stalin are very important for understanding who is to blame for the fact that our troops on the Western Front were taken by surprise on June 22, 1941).

On May 5, 1941, at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of military academies, I. Stalin said in his speech:

“... Germany wants to destroy our socialist state: exterminate millions of Soviet people, and turn the survivors into slaves. Only a war with fascist Germany and victory in this war can save our Motherland. I propose to drink for the war, for the offensive in the war, for our victory in this war .... "

Some saw in these words of I. Stalin his intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. But this is not so. When Marshal S.K. Timoshenko reminded him of the statement about the transition to offensive actions, he explained: “I said this in order to encourage those present to think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, which the newspapers of the whole world are trumpeting about.”
On January 15, 1941, speaking at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin spoke to the commanders of the troops of the districts:

“The war creeps up imperceptibly and will begin with a surprise attack without declaring war” (A.I. Eremenko “Diaries”).
V.M. Molotov in the mid-1970s recalled the beginning of the war:

“We knew that war was not far off, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was how far we would have to retreat - to Smolensk or to Moscow, we discussed this before the war .... We did everything to delay the war. And we succeeded in this for a year and ten months .... Even before the war, Stalin believed that only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on an equal footing. …. Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov told me that after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, Stalin said: “God grant that we end this war in 1946.
Yes, by the hour of the attack, no one could be ready, even the Lord God!
We were waiting for the attack, and we had a main goal: not to give Hitler a reason to attack. He would say: “Soviet troops are already gathering on the border, they are forcing me to act!
The TASS report of June 14, 1941 was sent to give the Germans no reason to justify their attack... It was needed as a last resort.... It turned out that on June 22, Hitler became the aggressor in front of the whole world. And we have allies .... Already in 1939 he was determined to unleash a war. When will he untie her? The delay was so desirable for us, for another year or a few months. Of course, we knew that we had to be ready for this war at any moment, but how to ensure this in practice? It is very difficult ... "(F. Chuev. "One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov."

Much is said and written about the fact that I. Stalin ignored and did not trust the mass of information on the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR, which was presented by our foreign intelligence, military intelligence and other sources.
But this is far from the truth.

As one of the leaders of foreign intelligence at that time, General P.A. Sudoplatov, “although Stalin was irritated with intelligence materials (why, it will be shown below-sad39), nevertheless, he sought to use all the intelligence information that was reported to Stalin to prevent war in secret diplomatic negotiations, and our intelligence was instructed to bring it to the German military circles of information about the inevitability for Germany of a long war with Russia, emphasizing that we have created a military-industrial base in the Urals, invulnerable to German attack.

So, for example, I. Stalin ordered to acquaint the German military attache in Moscow with the industrial and military power of Siberia.
In early April 1941, he was allowed to tour the new military factories that produced tanks and aircraft of the latest designs.
And about. German attache in Moscow G. Krebs reported on April 9, 1941 to Berlin:
“Our representatives were allowed to see everything. Obviously, Russia wants to intimidate potential aggressors in this way.”

Foreign intelligence of the People's Commissariat of State Security, on Stalin's instructions, specifically provided the Harbin residency of German intelligence in China with the opportunity to "intercept and decipher" a certain "circular from Moscow," which ordered all Soviet representatives abroad to warn Germany that the Soviet Union was preparing to defend its interests." (Vishlev O.V. “On the eve of June 22, 1941.” M., 2001).

The most complete information about Germany's aggressive intentions against the USSR was obtained by foreign intelligence through its agents ("the magnificent five" - ​​Philby, Cairncross, MacLean and their comrades) in London.

Intelligence obtained the most secret information about the negotiations that British Foreign Ministers Simon and Halifax conducted with Hitler in 1935 and 1938, respectively, and Prime Minister Chamberlain in 1938.
We learned that England agreed to Hitler's demand to lift part of the military restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany's expansion to the East was encouraged in the hope that access to the borders of the USSR would remove the threat of aggression from Western countries.
At the beginning of 1937, information was received about a meeting of the highest representatives of the Wehrmacht, at which issues of war with the USSR were discussed.
In the same year, data were obtained on the operational-strategic games of the Wehrmacht, conducted under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt, which resulted in the conclusion ("Sect's testament") that Germany would not be able to win the war with Russia if the hostilities dragged on for a period more than two months, and if during the first month of the war it is not possible to capture Leningrad, Kyiv, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, simultaneously occupying the main centers of the military industry and the extraction of raw materials in the European part of the USSR.
The conclusion, as we see, was fully justified.
According to General P.A. Sudoplatov, who oversaw the German direction of intelligence, the results of these games were one of the reasons that prompted Hitler to take the initiative to conclude a non-aggression pact in 1939.
In 1935, information was received from one of the sources of our Berlin residency, agent Breitenbach, about testing a liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of up to 200 km, developed by engineer von Braun.

But the objective, full-fledged characterization of Germany's intentions towards the USSR, the specific goals, the timing, and the direction of its military aspirations remained not yet clarified.

The obvious inevitability of our military clash was combined in our intelligence reports with information about a possible German armistice agreement with England, as well as Hitler's proposals to delimit the spheres of influence of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR. This naturally caused a certain distrust in the reliability of the intelligence data received.
We must also not forget that the repressions that took place in 1937-1938 did not bypass intelligence either. Our residency in Germany and other countries was severely weakened. In 1940, People's Commissar Yezhov declared that he "cleaned 14,000 Chekists"

On July 22, 1940, Hitler decides to start aggression against the USSR even before the end of the war with England.
On the same day, he instructs the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces to develop a plan for war with the USSR, completing all preparations by May 15, 1941, in order to start hostilities no later than mid-June 1941.
Hitler's contemporaries claim that he, as a very superstitious person, considered the date of June 22, 1940 - the surrender of France - very happy for himself and then appointed June 22, 1941 as the date of the attack on the USSR.

On July 31, 1940, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, at which Hitler justified the need to start a war with the USSR, without waiting for the end of the war with England.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed directive No. 21 - Plan "Barbarossa".

“For a long time it was believed that the USSR did not have the text of Directive No. 21 - “Plan Barbarossa”, and it was indicated that American intelligence had it, but did not share it with Moscow. American intelligence did have information, including a copy of Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa".

In January 1941, Sam Edison Woods, the commercial attache of the US Embassy in Berlin, obtained it through his connections in the German government and military circles.
US President Roosevelt ordered that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington K. Umansky be acquainted with the materials of S. Woods, which was carried out on March 1, 1941.
At the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, his deputy, Samner Welles, handed over these materials to our Ambassador Umansky, moreover, with an indication of the source.

The information of the Americans was very significant, but nevertheless an addition to the information of the NKGB intelligence department and military intelligence, which at that time had much more powerful intelligence networks in order to independently be aware of the German plans of aggression and inform the Kremlin about it. (Sudoplatov P.A. "Different days of the secret war and diplomacy. 1941". M., 2001).

But the date - June 22, is not and never was in the text of Directive No. 21.
It contained only the date of completion of all preparations for the attack - May 15, 1941.

First page of Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa

The long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSh), General of the Army Ivashutin, said:
"The texts of almost all documents and radiograms relating to the military preparations of Germany and the timing of the attack were reported regularly according to the following list: Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defense and Chief of the General Staff."

Therefore, the statement of G.K. looks very strange. Zhukov that “... there is a version that on the eve of the war we were allegedly aware of the Barbarossa plan ... Let me state with all responsibility that this is pure fiction. As far as I know, neither the Soviet government, nor the People's Commissar of Defense, nor the General Staff had any such data ”(G.K. Zhukov“ Memories and Reflections ”M. APN 1975. p. vol. 1, p. 259.).

It is permissible to ask, what data did the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, if he did not have this information, and was not even familiar with the memorandum of the head of the Intelligence Directorate (since February 16, 1942, the Intelligence Directorate was transformed into the Main Intelligence Directorate - GRU) of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, who was subordinate to directly G.K. Zhukov, dated March 20, 1941 - "Variants of military operations of the German army against the USSR", compiled on the basis of all intelligence information obtained through military intelligence and which was reported to the country's leadership.

This document outlined the options for the possible directions of attacks by the German troops, and one of the options essentially reflected the essence of the "Barbarossa plan" and the direction of the main attacks of the German troops.

So G.K. Zhukov answered a question posed to him by Colonel Anfilov many years after the war. Colonel Anfilov subsequently cited this answer in his article in Krasnaya Zvezda dated March 26, 1996
(Moreover, it is characteristic that in his most "truthful book about the war" G.K. Zhukov described this report and criticized the incorrect conclusions of the report).

When Lieutenant General N.G. Pavlenko, whom G.K. Zhukov assured that he knew nothing on the eve of the war about the “Barbarossa plan,” G.K. Zhukov copies of these German documents, which were signed by Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov and Abakumov, then according to Pavlenko - G.K. Zhukov was amazed and shocked. Strange forgetfulness.
But F.I. Golikov quickly corrected the mistake he had made in his conclusions of the March 20, 1941 report and began to present irrefutable evidence of the Germans preparing to attack the USSR:
- 4, 16. April 26, 1941 Head of the General Staff Directorate F.I. Golikov sends special messages to I. Stalin, S.K. Timoshenko and other leaders about strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border of the USSR;
- May 9, 1941, the head of the RU F.I. Golikov introduced I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, received a report “On the plans for a German attack on the USSR”, which assessed the grouping of German troops, indicated the directions of attacks and gave the number of concentrated German divisions;
- May 15, 1941, the report of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On the distribution of the armed forces of Germany in theaters and fronts as of May 15, 1941” was presented;
- On June 5 and 7, 1941, Golikov presented a special report on the military preparations of Romania. Until June 22, a number of messages were submitted.

As mentioned above, G.K. Zhukov complained that he did not have the opportunity to report to I. Stalin about the potential capabilities of the enemy.
What capabilities of a potential adversary could the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov report on if, according to him, he was not familiar with the main intelligence report on this issue?
Regarding the fact that his predecessors did not have the opportunity for a detailed report to I. Stalin - also a complete lie in "the most truthful book about the war."
For example, only in June 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko spent 22 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office, Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov 17 hours 20 minutes.
G.K. Zhukov, from the moment he was appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff, i.e. from January 13, 1941 to June 21, 1941, spent 70 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office.
This is evidenced by entries in the journal of visits to I. Stalin's office.
("At a reception at Stalin's. Notebooks (journals) of records of persons received by I.V. Stalin (1924-1953)" Moscow. New Chronograph, 2008. Records of reception secretaries on duty I.V. Stalin for 1924-1953, in which every day, to the nearest minute, the time spent in Stalin's Kremlin office of all his visitors was recorded).

In the same period, Stalin's office was repeatedly visited, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief. General Staff, Marshalov K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny, Deputy People's Commissar Marshal Kulik, General of the Army Meretskov, Lieutenant Generals of Aviation Rychagov, Zhigarev, General N.F. Vatutin and many other military leaders.

On January 31, 1941, the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces issued Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in order to implement the Barbarossa plan.

The directive determined "Day B" - the day the offensive began - no later than June 21, 1941.
On April 30, 1941, at a meeting of the top military leadership, Hitler finally announced the date of the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941, writing it on his copy of the plan.
On June 10, 1941, Order No. 1170/41 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces Halder “On setting the date for the start of the offensive against the Soviet Union” was determined;
"one. Day "D" of the operation "Barbarossa" is proposed to be considered June 22, 1941.
2. In case of postponement of this period, the corresponding decision will be made no later than June 18. Data on the direction of the main strike will continue to remain secret.
3. At 13.00 on June 21, one of the following signals will be transmitted to the troops:
a) Dortmund signal. It means that the offensive will begin on June 22 as planned, and that you can proceed to the open execution of the order.
b) Alton's signal. It means that the offensive is postponed to another date. But in this case, it will already be necessary to fully disclose the goals of the concentration of German troops, since the latter will be in full combat readiness.
4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive and the flight of aircraft across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of aircraft, then the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own.

Unfortunately, our external, military and political intelligence, as Sudoplatov said, “having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determined the inevitability of war, did not predict the Wehrmacht's bet on blitzkrieg. This was a fatal mistake, because the bet on the blitzkrieg indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England.

Foreign intelligence reports about German military preparations came from various residencies: England, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, Finland, etc.

Already in September 1940, one of the most valuable sources of the Berlin residency "Corsican" (Arvid Harnak. One of the leaders of the Red Chapel organization. He began to cooperate with the USSR in 1935. In 1942 he was arrested and executed) transmitted information that "at the beginning of the future Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union. There were similar reports from other sources.

In December 1940, a message was received from the Berlin residency that on December 18, Hitler, speaking about the graduation of 5 thousand German officers from schools, spoke out sharply against “injustice on earth, when the Great Russians own one sixth of the land, and 90 million Germans huddle on piece of land" and called on the Germans to eliminate this "injustice".

“In those pre-war years, there was a procedure to report to the leadership of the country each material received through foreign intelligence separately, as a rule, in the form in which it was received, without its analytical evaluation. Only the degree of reliability of the source was determined.

The information reported to the leadership in this form did not create a unified picture of the events taking place, did not answer the question for what purpose certain measures were being taken, whether a political decision had been made on the attack, etc.
Generalizing materials were not prepared, with a deep analysis of all the information received from sources and conclusions for consideration by the country's leadership.” ("Hitler's secrets on Stalin's table" ed. Mosgorarkhiv 1995).

In other words, before the war, I. Stalin was simply “filled up” with various intelligence information, in a number of cases contradictory, and sometimes false.
Only in 1943 did an analytical service appear in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
It should also be taken into account that in preparation for the war against the USSR, the Germans began to carry out very powerful camouflage and disinformation measures at the level of state policy, which were developed by the highest ranks of the Third Reich.

At the beginning of 1941, the German command began to implement a whole system of measures to falsely explain the military preparations being carried out on the borders with the USSR.
On February 15, 1941, signed by Keitel, document No. 44142/41 “Guiding instructions of the Supreme High Command for masking the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union” was introduced, which provided for hiding from the enemy preparations for the operation according to the Barbarossa plan.
The document prescribed at the first stage, “until April, to maintain the uncertainty of information about their intentions. At subsequent stages, when it will no longer be possible to hide the preparations for the operation, it will be necessary to explain all our actions as disinformation, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for the invasion of England.

On May 12, 1941, the second document was adopted - 44699/41 "Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of May 12, 1941 on the second phase of disinformation of the enemy in order to maintain the secrecy of the concentration of forces against the Soviet Union."
This document provided:

“... from May 22, with the introduction of the maximum condensed schedule for the movement of military echelons, all the efforts of disinformation agencies should be aimed at presenting the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as a maneuver in order to confuse the Western enemy.
For the same reason, it is necessary to continue with particular energy the preparations for an attack on England ...
Among the formations stationed in the East, a rumor must circulate about a rear cover against Russia and a "distracting concentration of forces in the East", and the troops stationed in the English Channel must believe in real preparations for an invasion of England ...
Spread the thesis that the action to capture the island of Crete (Operation Mercury) was a dress rehearsal for the landing in England ... ".
(During Operation Mercury, the Germans airlifted more than 23,000 soldiers and officers, more than 300 artillery pieces, about 5,000 containers with weapons and ammunition and other cargo to Crete by air. This was the largest airborne operation in the history of wars) .

Our Berlin residency was framed by an agent provocateur "Lyceum student" (O. Berlinks. 1913-1978 Latvian. Recruited in Berlin on August 15, 1940.).
Abwehr Major Siegfried Müller, who was in Soviet captivity, during interrogation in May 1947 testified that in August 1940 Amayak Kobulov (a resident of our foreign intelligence in Berlin) was substituted by a German intelligence agent, Latvian Berlings (“Lyceum student”), who, on the instructions of the Abwehr for a long time supplied him with disinformation materials.).
The results of the meeting of the Lyceum student with Kobulov were reported to Hitler. Information for this agent was prepared and coordinated with Hitler and Ribentrop.
There were reports from the "Lyceum student" about the low probability of Germany's war with the USSR, reports that the concentration of German troops on the border was a response to the movement of Soviet troops to the border, etc.
However, Moscow knew about the “double day” of the “Lyceum student”. Foreign policy intelligence and military intelligence of the USSR had such strong agent positions in the German Foreign Ministry that a quick determination of the true face of the "Lyceum student" left no difficulty.
The game began and, in turn, our resident in Berlin, Kobulov, provided the “Lyceum student” with relevant information during meetings.

In German disinformation actions, information began to appear that German preparations near our borders were aimed at putting pressure on the USSR and forcing it to accept economic and territorial demands, a kind of ultimatum that Berlin supposedly intends to put forward.

Information was circulating that Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of food and raw materials, and that without solving this problem through supplies from Ukraine and oil from the Caucasus, she would not be able to defeat England.
All this misinformation was reflected in their messages not only by the sources of the Berlin residency, but it also came to the attention of other foreign intelligence services, from where our intelligence service also received them through its agents in these countries.
Thus, it turned out to be a multiple overlap of the information obtained, which, as it were, confirmed their “reliability” - and they had one source - disinformation prepared in Germany.
On April 30, 1941, information came from the Corsican that Germany wanted to solve its problems by presenting an ultimatum to the USSR on a significant increase in the supply of raw materials.
On May 5, the same "Corsican" gives information that the concentration of German troops is a "war of nerves" in order for the USSR to accept Germany's conditions: the USSR must give guarantees for entering the war on the side of the "Axis" powers.
Similar information comes from the British residency.
On May 8, 1941, in a message from the "Sergeant" (Harro Schulze-Boysen), it was said that the attack on the USSR was not removed from the agenda, but the Germans would first present us with an ultimatum, demanding to increase exports to Germany.

And all this mass of foreign intelligence information, as they say, in its original form, fell out, as mentioned above, without conducting its generalized analysis and conclusions on the table to Stalin, who himself had to analyze it and draw conclusions ..

Here it will become clear why, according to Sudoplatov, Stalin felt some irritation with intelligence materials, but by no means with all materials.
Here is what V.M. Molotov:
“When I was the Presovnarkom, it took me half a day every day to read intelligence reports. What was not there, no matter what terms were called! And if we had succumbed, the war could have started much earlier. The task of the scout is not to be late, to have time to report ... ".

Many researchers, speaking of I. Stalin's "distrust" of intelligence materials, cite his resolution on the special message of the People's Commissar for State Security V. N. Merkulov No. 2279 / M dated June 17, 1941, containing information received from the "Foreman" (Schulze-Boysen) and "The Corsican" (Arvid Harnak):
"Tov. Merkulov. Can send your source from the headquarters of the German. aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a source, but a misinformer. I.St.”

In fact, those who spoke about Stalin's distrust of intelligence apparently did not read the text of this message, but drew a conclusion only on the basis of I. Stalin's resolution.
Although a certain amount of distrust in intelligence data, especially in the numerous terms of a possible German attack, because more than ten of them were reported only through military intelligence, Stalin apparently developed.

Hitler, for example, issued an offensive order during the war on the Western Front, and canceled it on the planned day of the offensive. On the offensive on the Western Front, Hitler issued an order 27 times and canceled it 26 times.

If we read the very message of the "Foreman", then the irritation and resolution of I. Stalin will become clear.
Here is the text of the Master's message:
"one. All military measures for the preparation of an armed uprising against the SSR have been completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time.
2. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. They emphasize that this statement cannot have any meaning.
3. The objects of German air raids will primarily be the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops ... ".
(Following the text is the report of the "Corsican" on economic and industrial issues in Germany).
.
"Foreman" (Harro Schulze-Boysen 09/2/1909 - 12/22/1942. German. Born in Kiel in the family of a captain of the 2nd rank. He studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Berlin. He was appointed to one of the departments of the communications department of the Imperial Ministry of Aviation, Schulze-Boysen established a relationship with Dr. Arvid Harnack (The Corsican) before the start of World War II. Harro Schulze-Boysen was arrested and executed on August 31, 1942. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1969. He was always honest agent who gave us a lot of valuable information.

But his report of June 17 looks rather frivolous just because it confuses the date of the TASS report (not June 14, but June 6), and the second-rate Svirskaya hydroelectric power station, Moscow factories "producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops.

So Stalin had every reason to doubt such information.
At the same time, we see that the resolution of I. Stalin applies only to the "Foreman" - an agent working in the headquarters of the German aviation, but not to the "Corsican".
But after such a resolution, Stalin then summoned V.N. Merkulov and the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina.
Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the Sources. After Fitin explained why the intelligence service trusted Starshina, Stalin said: "Go check everything and report back to me."

A huge amount of intelligence information also came through military intelligence.
Only from London, where a group of military intelligence officers was led by the military attaché, Major General I.Ya. Sklyarov, in one pre-war year, 1638 sheets of telegraph reports were sent to the Center, most of which contained information about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR.
The telegram of Richard Sorge, who worked in Japan through the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, was widely known:

In reality, there was never a message with such a text from Sorge.
On June 6, 2001, Krasnaya Zvezda published materials from a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, in which SVR Colonel Karpov quite definitely said that, unfortunately, this was a fake.

The same fake and "resolution" L. Beria dated June 21, 1941:
"Many workers are sowing panic ... The secret collaborators of Yastreb, Carmen, Almaz, Verny should be wiped into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to quarrel us with Germany."
These lines are circulating in the press, but their falsity has long been established.

Indeed, since February 3, 1941, Beria did not have foreign intelligence under his control, because the NKVD was divided that day into Beria’s NKVD and Merkulov’s NKGB, and foreign intelligence became completely subordinate to Merkulov.

And here are some actual reports by R. Sorge (Ramsay):

- “May 2:“ I talked with the German ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR ... The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler either in May or after the war with England.
- May 30: “Berlin informed Ott that the German uprising against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure the war will start."
- June 1: “The expectation of the start of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left - on May 6 to Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post of military attache.
- June 20 "The German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told me that war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable."

Only according to military intelligence reports on the date of the start of the war with Germany, since 1940, more than 10 have come.
Here they are:
- December 27, 1940 - from Berlin: the war will begin in the second half of next year;
- December 31, 1940 - from Bucharest: the war will begin next spring;
- February 22, 1941 - from Belgrade: the Germans will perform in May - June 1941;
- March 15, 1941 - from Bucharest: war should be expected in 3 months;
- March 19, 1941 - from Berlin: the attack is planned between May 15 and June 15, 1941;
- May 4, 1941 - from Bucharest: the start of the war is scheduled for mid-June;
- May 22, 1941 - from Berlin: an attack on the USSR is expected on June 15;
- June 1, 1941 - from Tokyo: the beginning of the war - around June 15;
- June 7, 1941 - from Bucharest: the war will begin on June 15 - 20;
- June 16, 1941 - from Berlin and from France: German attack on the USSR on June 22 - 25;
June 21, 1941 - from the German Embassy in Moscow, the attack is scheduled for 3 - 4 am on June 22.

As you can see, the latest information from a source in the German Embassy in Moscow contains the exact date and time of the attack.
This information was received from an agent of the Intelligence Directorate - "HVTs" (aka Gerhard Kegel), an employee of the German embassy in Moscow, who, early in the morning of June 21. "KhVTs" himself called for an urgent meeting of his curator Colonel of the Republic of Uzbekistan K.B.Leontva.
On the evening of June 21, Leontiev once again met with an agent of the HVC.
Information "KhVTs" was immediately reported to I.V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov.

Very extensive information was received from various sources about the concentration of German troops near our borders.
As a result of intelligence activities, the Soviet leadership knew and posed a real threat from Germany, its desire to provoke the USSR into military action, which would compromise us in the eyes of the world community as the culprit of aggression, thereby depriving the USSR of allies in the fight against the true aggressor.

How extensive was the agent network of Soviet intelligence is also evidenced by the fact that the agents of our military intelligence were such celebrities as film actresses Olga Chekhova and Marika Rekk.

An illegal intelligence agent, acting under the pseudonym "Merlin", she is Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova, worked for Soviet intelligence from 1922 to 1945. The scale of her intelligence activities, the volume, and especially the level and quality of the information she sent to Moscow are clearly evidenced by the fact that the connection between O.K. Chekhova and Moscow was supported by three radio operators at once in Berlin and its environs.
Hitler conferred on Olga Chekhova the title of State Artist of the Third Reich, specially established for her, invited her to the most prestigious events, during which he defiantly showed her signs of the highest attention, invariably seated her in rows with him. (A.B. Martirosyan “The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason.”)

OK. Chekhov at one of the receptions next to Hitler.

Marika Rekk belonged to the undercover group of the Soviet military intelligence, which bore the code name "Krona". Its creator was one of the most prominent Soviet military intelligence officers, Yan Chernyak.
The group was founded in the mid 1920s. XX century and it operated for about 18 years, but none of its members was discovered by the enemy.
And it included over 30 people, most of whom became important officers of the Wehrmacht, major industrialists of the Reich.

Marika Rekk
(Known to our viewers by captured German
film "The Girl of My Dreams"

But G.K. Nevertheless, Zhukov did not miss the opportunity to cheat our intelligence and accused the Intelligence Directorate of insolvency, writing in a letter to the writer V.D. Sokolov dated March 2, 1964 the following:

“Our undercover intelligence, which was led by Golikov before the war, worked poorly and failed to reveal the true intentions of the Nazi high command. Our undercover intelligence was unable to refute Hitler's false version of his unwillingness to fight the Soviet Union.

Hitler, on the other hand, continued to play his disinformation game, hoping to outplay J. Stalin in it.

So on May 15, 1941, the non-scheduled Yu-52 aircraft (the Junkers-52 aircraft was used by Hitler as a personal transport), flying freely over Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, landed in Moscow at 11.30 on the Khodynka field, without encountering opposition from Soviet means air defense.
After this landing, many leaders of the Soviet air defense and aviation forces had very "serious troubles."
The plane brought a personal message from Hitler to J. Stalin.
Here is part of the text of this message:
“During the formation of the invasion forces far from the eyes and aviation of the enemy, as well as in connection with recent operations in the Balkans, a large number of my troops, about 88 divisions, accumulated along the border with the Soviet Union, which may have given rise to the rumors circulating now about a possible military conflict between us. I assure you on the honor of the head of state that this is not the case.
For my part, I am also sympathetic to the fact that you cannot completely ignore these rumors and have also concentrated a sufficient number of your troops on the border.
In such a situation, I do not at all rule out the possibility of an accidental outbreak of an armed conflict, which, under conditions of such a concentration of troops, can take on very large dimensions, when it will be difficult or simply impossible to determine what was its root cause. It will be no less difficult to stop this conflict.
I want to be very frank with you. I fear that one of my generals will deliberately enter into such a conflict in order to save England from her fate and frustrate my plans.
It's only about one month. Around June 15 - 20, I plan to start a massive transfer of troops to the West from your border.
At the same time, I most convincingly ask you not to succumb to any provocations that may take place on the part of my generals who have forgotten their duty. And, needless to say, try not to give them any reason.
If a provocation by one of my generals cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, do not take retaliatory actions and immediately report the incident through a communication channel known to you. Only in this way will we be able to achieve our common goals, which, it seems to me, we have clearly agreed with you. I thank you for meeting me halfway in a matter known to you, and I ask you to excuse me for the way I chose to deliver this letter to you as soon as possible. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler. May 14, 1941".

(As we see in this letter, Hitler practically himself "calls" the approximate date of the attack on the USSR on June 15-20, covering it up with the transfer of troops to the West.)

But I. Stalin always had a clear position regarding Hitler's intentions and confidence in him.
The question of whether he believed or did not believe - simply should not exist, he never believed.

And all subsequent actions of I. Stalin show that he really did not believe Hitler's "sincerity" and continued to take measures to "bring operational groupings of troops into combat readiness in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear," which he spoke about in his speech from November 18, 1940 at a meeting of the Politburo, so that the German attack would not take us by surprise.
So directly according to his instructions:

On May 14, 1941, directives of the General Staff No. 503859, 303862, 303874, 503913 and 503920 (for the Western, Kiev, Odessa, Leningrad and Baltic districts, respectively) were sent on the preparation of border defense and air defense plans.
However, the command of all military districts, instead of the deadline for submitting plans indicated in them by May 20 - 25, 1941, submitted them by June 10 - 20. Therefore, neither the General Staff nor the People's Commissar of Defense had time to approve these plans.
This is the direct fault of the commanders of the districts, as well as the General Staff, which did not demand the submission of plans by the specified date.
As a result, thousands of soldiers and officers answered with their lives with the beginning of the war;

- “... In February - April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments of the Baltic, Western, Kiev special and Leningrad military districts were called to the General Staff. Together with them, the procedure for covering the border was outlined, the allocation of the necessary forces for this purpose and the forms of their use .. ”(Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”. M., 1974);

From March 25 to April 5, 1941, a partial conscription into the Red Army was carried out, thanks to which it was possible to additionally call up about 300 thousand people;

On January 20, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense was announced on the admission to the cadres of the reserve command staff, called up for mobilization on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, who was detained in the army after the end of this war until a special order;

On May 24, 1941, at an expanded meeting of the Politburo, I. Stalin openly warned all the top Soviet and military leadership that in the very near future the USSR could be subjected to a surprise attack by Germany;

During May-June 1941. as a result of "hidden mobilization" about a million "accomplices" from the inner districts were raised and sent to the western districts.
This made it possible to bring almost 50% of the divisions up to the regular strength of wartime (12-14 thousand people).
Thus, the actual deployment and resupplying of troops in the western districts began long before June 22.
This covert mobilization could not be carried out without I. Stalin's instructions, but it was carried out covertly in order to prevent Hitler and the entire West from accusing the USSR of aggressive intentions.
After all, this has already happened in our history, when in 1914 Nicholas II announced in Russian Empire mobilization, which was seen as a declaration of war;

On June 10, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503859 / ss / s was sent to the ZapOVO, which provided: “To increase the combat readiness of the troops of the district, all deep rifle divisions ... withdraw to the areas provided for by the cover plan,” which meant the actual putting troops on high combat readiness;
- On June 11, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent on the immediate bringing into proper condition and full combat readiness of the defensive structures of the first line of fortified areas of the Western OVO, primarily strengthening their firepower.
“General Pavlov was obliged to report on the execution by June 15, 1941. But the report on the implementation of this directive has not been received.” (Anfilov V.A. “The failure of the Blitzkrieg”. M., 1975).
And as it turned out later, this directive was not implemented.
Again the question was, where was the General Staff and its chief, who were supposed to demand its execution, or were I. Stalin to control these issues for them?;

On June 12, 1941, directives from the People's Commissariat of Defense signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov were sent to put into effect Cover Plans for all western districts;

On June 13, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, a directive of the General Staff was issued on the advancement of troops located in the depths of the district, closer to the state border (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”).
In three of the four districts, this directive was implemented, except for the Western OVO (commander of the district, General of the Army D.F. Pavlov).
As military historian A. Isaev writes, “since June 18, the following units of the Kiev OVO moved closer to the border from their places of deployment:
31 sc (200, 193, 195 sd); 36 sc (228, 140, 146 sd); 37 sc (141.80.139 sd); 55 sc (169,130,189 sd); 49 sc (190.197 sd).
Total - 5 rifle corps (sk), having 14 rifle divisions (sd), which is about 200 thousand people "
In total, 28 divisions were advanced closer to the state border;

In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov also find the following message:
“People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko already in June 1941 recommended that the district commanders conduct tactical exercises of formations towards the state border in order to bring troops closer to the deployment areas according to cover plans (i.e., to defense areas in the event of an attack).
This recommendation of the People's Commissar of Defense was put into practice by the districts, however, with one significant caveat: a significant part of the artillery did not take part in the movement (to the border, to the line of defense)....
... The reason for this was that the commanders of the districts (Western OVO-Pavlov and Kyiv OVO-Kirponos), without agreement with Moscow, decided to send most of the artillery to firing ranges.”
Again the question: Where was the General Staff, its chief, if, without their knowledge, the commanders of the districts are taking such measures when a war with Germany is on the verge?
As a result, some corps and divisions of the covering forces during the attack of fascist Germany found themselves without a significant part of their artillery.
K.K. Rokossovsky writes in his book that “back in May 1941, for example, an order followed from the district headquarters, the expediency of which was difficult to explain in that alarming situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the ranges located in the border zone.
Our corps managed to defend its artillery.”
Thus, large-caliber artillery, the strike force of the troops, was practically absent in combat formations. And most of the anti-aircraft weapons of the Western OVO were generally located near Minsk, far from the border, and could not cover the units and airfields attacked from the air in the first hours and days of the war.
The district command rendered this "invaluable service" to the invading German troops.
Here is what the German General Blumentritt, the chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center, writes in his memoirs (the 2nd tank group of this army, commanded by Guderian, advanced on June 22, 1941 in the Brest region against the 4th Army of the Western OVO - the commander of the army, Major General M.A. Korobkov):
“At 3 hours 30 minutes, all our artillery opened fire ... And then something happened that seemed like a miracle: the Russian artillery did not answer ... A few hours later, the divisions of the first echelon were on the other side of the river. Bug. Tanks were being crossed, pontoon bridges were being built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy ... There was no doubt that they had caught the Russians by surprise ... Our tanks almost immediately broke through the Russian border fortifications and rushed to the east on level ground ”(“ Fatal Decisions ” Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1958).
To this it must be added that the bridges in the Brest region were not blown up, along which the German tanks moved. Even Guderian was surprised by this;

On December 27, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko issued order No. 0367 on the mandatory camouflage of the entire airfield network of the Air Force in a 500-km strip from the border with the completion of work by July 1, 1941.
Neither the Air Force Main Directorate nor the districts complied with this order.
The direct fault is the Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation Smushkevich (in accordance with the order, he was entrusted with control and a monthly report on this to the General Staff) and the Air Force command;

On June 19, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0042 was issued.
It states that “nothing significant has been done so far to mask airfields and the most important military installations”, that aircraft, in the “complete absence of their masking”, are crowded at airfields, etc.
The same order states that “... Artillery and mechanized units show a similar carelessness to camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks is not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for hitting from the air. Tanks, armored vehicles, commander's and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with paints that give a bright reflection, and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military installations...”.
What was the result of this carelessness of the command of the districts, especially the Western OVO, showed on June 22, when about 738 aircraft were destroyed at its airfields, including 528 were lost on the ground, as well as a large number of military equipment.
Who is to blame? Again I. Stalin, or the command of the military districts and the General Staff, which failed to exercise strict control over the implementation of its orders and directives? I think the answer is clear.
The commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.I. Kopets, having learned about these losses, on the same day, June 22, shot himself.

Here I will quote the words of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova:
“Analyzing the events of the last peaceful days, I assume: I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was ... He believed that at any moment, on a combat alert, they could give a reliable rebuff to the enemy ... Knowing exactly the number of aircraft deployed on his orders at border airfields , he believed that at any moment, on a combat alarm signal, they could take off into the air and give a reliable rebuff to the enemy. And he was simply stunned by the news that our planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.
Naturally, I. Stalin's idea of ​​the state of combat readiness of our Armed Forces was based on the reports, first of all, of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as other military commanders, whom he regularly heard in his office;

On June 21, I. Stalin decided to deploy 5 fronts:
Western, Southwestern. South, Northwest, North.
By this time, the command posts of the fronts were already equipped, because. As early as June 13, a decision was made to separate the command and control structures in the military districts and to transform the departments of the military districts into front-line departments.
The command post of the Western Front (Front Commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov was deployed in the area of ​​the Obuz-Lesnaya station. But only Pavlov did not appear there before the start of the war).
In the city of Ternopil, there was a front-line command post of the South-Western Front (Front Commander Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos died on 09/20/1941).

Thus, we see that before the war, on the instructions of I. Stalin, a number of measures were taken to strengthen the readiness of the Red Army to repel aggression from Germany. And he had every reason to believe, as the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, "the combat readiness of our armed forces is higher than it turned out to be in reality ...".
It should be noted that I. Stalin, receiving information about the impending war from Merkulov’s foreign intelligence residencies from the NKGB, from the military intelligence of General Golikov of the RU General Staff, through diplomatic channels, apparently could not be completely sure that all this was not a strategic provocation of Germany or Western countries that see their own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.
But there was also reconnaissance of the border troops, subordinated to L. Beria, which provided information about the concentration of German troops directly at the borders of the USSR, and its reliability was ensured by constant monitoring of the border guards, a large number of informers of the border regions who directly observed the concentration of German troops - these are residents of the border regions, train drivers , switchmen, greasers, etc.
Information from this intelligence is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it cannot but be reliable. This information, summarized and put together, gave the most objective picture of the concentration of German troops.
Beria regularly reported this information to I. Stalin:
- In information No. 1196/B dated April 21, 1941, Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko are given specific data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border.
- On June 2, 1941, Beria sends note No. 1798 / B personally to Stalin with information about the concentration of two German army groups, the increased movement of troops mainly at night, the reconnaissance carried out by German generals near the border, etc.
- On June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note No. 1868 / B on the concentration of troops on the Soviet-German, Soviet-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian border.
In June 1941, more than 10 such information messages from the intelligence of the border troops were presented.

But this is what Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov recalls, who in June 1941, commanding a separate 212th long-range bomber regiment subordinate directly to Moscow, arrived from Smolensk in Minsk to be presented to the Commander of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District I.I. Kopts and then to the Commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov himself.

During the conversation with Golovanov, Pavlov contacted Stalin via HF. And he began to ask the general questions, to which the District Commander answered the following:

“No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I'll check again, but I think it's just a provocation ... "
And then, turning to him, he said:
“Not in the spirit of the Boss. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border...”. Apparently, by this "bastard" he meant L. Beria, who was in charge of the border troops.
And many historians continue to repeat that Stalin allegedly did not believe "Pavlov's warnings" about the concentration of German troops ....
The situation heated up every day.

On June 14, 1941, a TASS message was published. It was a kind of trial balloon to test the reaction of the German leadership.
The TASS report, intended not so much for the population of the USSR as for official Berlin, refuted rumors about "the proximity of the war between the USSR and Germany."
There was no official reaction from Berlin to this message.
It became apparently clear to I. Stalin and the Soviet leadership that Germany's military preparations for an attack on the USSR had entered the final stage.

June 15 came, then June 16, 17, but no "withdrawal" and "transfer" of German troops, as Hitler assured in his letter of May 14, 1941, from the Soviet border, "toward England" did not happen.
On the contrary, an intensified accumulation of Wehrmacht troops began on our border.

On June 17, 1941, a message was received from Berlin from the naval attache of the USSR, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Vorontsov, that the German attack on the USSR would take place on June 22 at 3.30 in the morning. (Captain 1st rank Vorontsov was summoned by I. Stalin to Moscow and, according to some information, on June 21 in the evening he attended a meeting in his office. This meeting will be discussed below).

And then a reconnaissance flight over the border was made with the "inspection" of German units near our border.
Here is what he writes in his book - “I am a fighter” - Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union G. N. Zakharov. Before the war, he was a colonel and commanded the 43rd Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District:
“Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or the eighteenth of June of the forty-first year - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and it was necessary to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.
I flew out on a U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Air Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were packed with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves, there were poorly camouflaged, or even not at all camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of a vast territory, a movement was born, which here, at our very border, slowed down, resting against it ... and ready to overflow over it.
We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed the plane on any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently saluted (as we see, he knew in advance that a plane with urgent information -sad39 would soon land) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received a report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30–50 kilometers, sat down again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, saluting, silently disappeared. By evening, in this way, we flew to Bialystok
After landing, the commander of the Air Force of the district, General Kopets, took me after the report to the commander of the district.
D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he had seen me for the first time. I had a feeling of dissatisfaction when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The intonation of the commander frankly replaced the word “exaggerate” with “panic” - he clearly did not fully accept everything that I said ... With that, we left.
D.G. Pavlov did not believe this information either ....

Original taken from Soviet childhood on June 22, 1941

Here - German troops cross the border of the USSR. Reptiles. They will bring us a myriad of grief and misfortune. But they themselves do not yet know what they will receive in full. It will not be France for them ... Today I will remember my grandfather

These photographs have one thing in common: they were taken in the first hours and days of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Source: http://www.lionblog.net/obszee/1146058318-22-iyunya-1941-goda.html

Here it is - the beginning of the war.
Shooting time: 06/22/1941

Soviet border guards on patrol. The photograph is interesting because it was taken for a newspaper at one of the outposts on the western border of the USSR on June 20, 1941, that is, two days before the war.

Shooting time: 06/20/1941

The first day of the war in Przemysl (today - the Polish city of Przemysl) and the first dead invaders on Soviet soil (soldiers of the 101st light infantry division). The city was occupied by German troops on June 22, but the next morning it was liberated by the Red Army and border guards and held until June 27.

Shooting time: 06/22/1941

June 22, 1941 near the bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav. At that time, the San River was the border between German-occupied Poland and the USSR.

Shooting time: 06/22/1941

The first Soviet prisoners of war, under the supervision of German soldiers, head west along the bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav.

Shooting time: 06/22/1941

After the failure of the sudden capture of the Brest Fortress, the Germans had to dig in. The photo was taken on the North or South Island.

Shooting time: 06/22/1941

Battle of the German strike units in the Brest area.

Shooting time: June 1941

A column of Soviet prisoners crossed the San River along the sapper bridge. Among the prisoners, there are noticeable not only the military, but also people in civilian clothes: the Germans detained and took prisoner all men of military age so that they could not be recruited into the enemy army. District of the city of Yaroslav, June 1941.

Shooting time: June 1941

Sapper bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav, on which German troops are transported.

Shooting time: June 1941

German soldiers are photographed on a Soviet T-34-76 tank, model 1940, abandoned in Lvov.

Location: Lviv, Ukraine, USSR

Shooting time: 30.06. 1941

German soldiers inspect a T-34-76 tank, model 1940, stuck in a field and abandoned.

Shooting time: June 1941

Captured Soviet female soldiers in Nevel (now the Nevelsky district of the Pskov region).

Shooting time: 07/26/1941

German infantry passes by broken Soviet vehicles.

Shooting time: June 1941

The Germans are inspecting Soviet T-34-76 tanks stuck in a water meadow. Floodplain of the Drut River, near Tolochin, Vitebsk region.

Shooting time: July 1941

Start of the German Junkers Yu-87 dive bombers from a field airfield in the USSR.

Shooting time: summer 1941

Red Army soldiers surrender to the soldiers of the SS troops.

Shooting time: June 1941

Destroyed by Soviet artillery, the German light tank Pz.Kpfw. II Ausf. C.

German soldiers next to a burning Soviet village.

Shooting time: June 1941

German soldier during the battle in the Brest Fortress.

Shooting time: June-July 1941

A rally at the Leningrad plant named after Kirov about the beginning of the war.

Shooting time: June 1941

Location: Leningrad

Residents of Leningrad near the window of LenTASS "Latest News" (Socialist street, house 14 - Pravda printing house).

Shooting time: July 1941

Location: Leningrad

Aerial photograph of the Smolensk-1 airfield taken by German air reconnaissance. An airfield with hangars and runways is marked in the upper left of the image. Other strategic objects are also marked in the picture: barracks (bottom left, marked with "B"), large bridges, anti-aircraft artillery batteries (vertical line with a circle).

Shooting time: 06/23/1941

Location: Smolensk

Red Army soldiers examine a wrecked German tank Pz 35 (t) (LT vz.35) of Czech production from the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. Neighborhood of the city of Raseiniai (Lithuanian SSR).

Shooting time: June 1941

Soviet refugees walk past an abandoned BT-7A tank.

Shooting time: June 1941

German soldiers examine a burning Soviet tank T-34-76 of the 1940 model.

Shooting time: June-August 1941

The Germans on the march at the beginning of the invasion of the USSR.

Shooting time: June 1941

Soviet field airfield, captured by the Germans. One can see an I-16 fighter shot down or dismantled on the ground, a Po-2 biplane and another I-16 in the background. A picture from a passing German car. Smolensk region, summer 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

Artillerymen of the 29th motorized division of the Wehrmacht from an ambush shot Soviet tanks into the side from a 50-mm PaK 38 cannon. The closest, on the left, is the T-34 tank. Belarus, 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

German soldiers ride along the street along the destroyed houses on the outskirts of Smolensk.

Shooting time: July 1941

Location: Smolensk

At the captured airfield in Minsk German soldiers consider the SB bomber (or its training version of the CSS, since the nose of the aircraft is visible, which differs from the glazed nose of the SB). Early July 1941.

I-15 and I-153 Chaika fighters are visible behind.

Shooting time: July 1941

Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 (model 1931), captured by the Germans. The barrel of the gun, which was transported separately, is missing. 1941, presumably Belarus. German photo.

Shooting time: 1941

The city of Demidov, Smolensk region in the early days of the occupation. July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

Destroyed Soviet tank T-26. On the tower, under the hatch cover, a burnt tanker is visible.

Shooting time: summer 1941

Surrenders soviet soldiers go to the rear of the Germans. Summer 1941. The picture was apparently taken from the back of a truck in a German convoy on the road.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A lot of broken Soviet aircraft: I-153 Chaika fighters (to the left). In the background is a U-2 and a twin-engine SB bomber. The airfield of Minsk, captured by German troops (in the foreground - a German soldier). Early July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

A lot of broken Soviet Chaika I-153 fighters. Minsk airport. Early July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

German collection point for Soviet captured equipment and weapons. On the left are Soviet 45 mm anti-tank guns, then a large number of Maxim machine guns and DP-27 light machine guns, on the right - 82 mm mortars. Summer 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

Dead Soviet soldiers at the captured trenches. This is probably the very beginning of the war, the summer of 1941: the soldier in the foreground wears a pre-war SSH-36 helmet, later such helmets were extremely rare in the Red Army and mainly in the Far East. It can also be seen that a belt has been removed from him - apparently, the work of the German soldiers who captured these positions.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A German soldier is knocking at the house of local residents. City of Yartsevo, Smolensk region, early July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

The Germans inspect the wrecked Soviet light tanks. In the foreground - BT-7, the far left - BT-5 (characteristic cabin of the tank driver), in the center of the road - T-26. Smolensk region, summer 1941

Shooting time: summer 1941

Soviet artillery wagon with a gun. A shell or air bomb exploded right in front of the horses. Neighborhood of the city of Yartsevo, Smolensk region. August 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

Grave of a Soviet soldier. The inscription on the tablet in German reads: "Here rests an unknown Russian soldier." Perhaps the fallen soldier was buried by his own, so at the bottom of the tablet you can make out the word "Here ..." in Russian. For some reason, the Germans made the inscription in their own language. The photo is German, the shooting location is presumably the Smolensk region, August 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

German armored personnel carrier, German soldiers on it and local residents in Belarus.

Shooting time: June 1941

Ukrainians welcome the Germans in Western Ukraine.

Shooting time: summer 1941

The advancing units of the Wehrmacht in Belarus. The picture was taken from a car window. June 1941

Shooting time: June 1941

German soldiers in captured Soviet positions. A Soviet 45mm cannon is visible in the foreground, and a Soviet T-34 tank of the 1940 model is visible in the background.

Shooting time: 1941

German soldiers are approaching the freshly knocked out Soviet BT-2 tanks.

Shooting time: June-July 1941

Smoke break crews tractor tractors "Stalinets". The photo is dated in the summer of 41

Shooting time: summer 1941

Soviet female volunteers are sent to the front. Summer 1941.

Shooting time: 1941

Soviet girl-rank-and-file among prisoners of war.

Shooting time: summer 1941

The machine-gun crew of the German rangers fires from the MG-34 machine gun. Summer 1941, Army Group North. In the background, the calculation covers the StuG III self-propelled guns.

Shooting time: summer 1941

The German column passes the village in the Smolensk region.

Shooting time: July 1941

Wehrmacht soldiers are watching the burning village. The territory of the USSR, the date of the picture is approximately the summer of 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A Red Army soldier near a captured Czech-made German light tank LT vz.38 (designated Pz.Kpfw.38(t) in the Wehrmacht). About 600 of these tanks took part in military operations against the USSR, which were used in battles until mid-1942.

Shooting time: summer 1941

SS soldiers at the destroyed bunker on the "Stalin Line". The defensive structures located on the “old” (as of 1939) border of the USSR were mothballed, however, after the invasion of German troops, some fortified areas were used by the Red Army for defense.

Shooting time: 1941

Soviet railway station after the German bombardment, on the tracks there is an echelon with BT tanks.

German columns pass by a cart with a Red Army soldier, who had previously come under fire.

The dead Soviet tankers and tank landing soldiers at the gates of the border outpost. Tank - T-26.

Shooting time: June 1941

Refugees in the Pskov region.

Shooting time: July 1941

German soldiers finish off a wounded Soviet sniper.

Shooting time: summer 1941

The dead Soviet soldiers, as well as civilians - women and children. The bodies are dumped in a roadside ditch, like household garbage; dense columns of German troops are calmly moving past along the road.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A cart with the bodies of dead Red Army soldiers.

Soviet symbols in the captured city of Kobrin (Brest region, Belarus) - the T-26 tank and the monument to V.I. Lenin.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A column of German troops. Ukraine, July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

Red Army soldiers inspect a German fighter Bf.109F2 (from Squadron 3/JG3) hit by anti-aircraft fire and made an emergency landing. West of Kyiv, July 1941

Shooting time: July 1941

The banner of the 132nd NKVD escort battalion captured by the Germans. Photo from the personal album of one of the Wehrmacht soldiers.

"Brest Fortress. The defense was held for two months by border guards and the 132nd separate battalion of escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR. The city of Brest was hastily abandoned by the Red Army at 8:00 am on 06/22/1941 after a battle with enemy infantry that had crossed the Bug River in boats. In Soviet times, everyone remembered the inscription of one of the defenders of the Brest Fortress: “I am dying, but I do not give up! Farewell Motherland! 20.VII.41”, but few people knew that it was made on the wall of the barracks of the 132nd separate battalion of escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR.”

A slow river flows at dawn.

Sleep creeps, trying to close the eyelids.

Fog washed away nearby haystacks ...

Stop this moment forever!

Seconds fly like bullets into eternity,

While the light of the rocket is bleeding on the coast.

Another moment will pass - and the projectile

Will overwhelm a sixth of the planet with war.

The outpost was raised by an explosion at the gate.

The crushing of heels on the washed steps.

Dew trail. Coastal break.

Alien oars foam our water.

An obedient hand will send a cartridge,

Fury will hit the trilinear on the shoulder.

... He took the fight, and for him the river

So forever the border remained.

In the victorious May, the path lay from here,

Crowned with unfading fireworks,

And he was the first to make a breakthrough into this distance

A soldier who fought for three minutes.

What happened on June 22, 1941? Let us turn to the events of that day and begin with the picture that German sources paint for us.

"June 22, 1941. 3.20 am. A little more - and the rising sun will dry up the dew ... on the wings of fighters of the 23rd Air Force Division, lined up at the airfield near Rovno ... Suddenly, a dull roar of engines broke the silence. ... slipped out from the west three planes, crossed the border of the airfield at a strafing flight and rushed to the long lines of fighters.A second later ... a shower of two-kilogram fragmentation bombs gushed out of their belly, ... bombs with a whistle fell down and exploded among the standing fighters. Red-hot fragments crashed into the wings and fuselages, pierced gas tanks... Streams of burning gasoline flooded one fighter after another.A thick cloud of oily smoke swirled and grew over the airfield.

Three Heinkel-111s of the 53rd Bombardment Squadron... turned around and passed over the airfield once more, pouring machine-gun fire over the flaming wreckage. Then, having completed their task, they went west, while the stunned pilots jumped out of their beds. In less than 2 minutes, the 23rd Air Force Division as a combat unit ceased to exist, without having had time to fire a single shot in its defense. The division commander, Colonel Vanyushkin, stood among the rubble and wept. ... By noon on June 22, the Soviet Air Force lost 1200 aircraft: 300 were shot down in air battles, and 900 were destroyed at airfields ... "(Military pilots, pp. 58-59).

"... thanks to extensive photographic reconnaissance, carried out mainly by Colonel Rovel's Aufklaringsgruppe in the previous months, all air force bases were discovered. They came under attack by Ju-88 and He-111, while Bf-110 and carrying Bf-109 bombs.The few Soviet fighters that took to the air were easily destroyed.On this day, with the loss of only 32 aircraft, the Luftwaffe destroyed 1811 Soviet aircraft, almost all of them, except 322, were destroyed on the ground.

On the central and southern fronts, from June 22 to June 28, 1570 and 1360 Soviet aircraft were destroyed. The 1st Air Fleet (Army Group North, HQ Insterburg, East Prussia) announced 1,211 air and 487 ground kills from June 22 to July 13, 1941. ...these claims were no doubt exaggerated, but there is no doubt that Soviet losses were enormous (Hitler's Luftwaffe, p. 41).

"As a result of these unexpected strikes, the air forces of the western districts lost about 1,200 aircraft on the first day of the war, including 800 that were destroyed on airfields." The editor writes in a footnote: "The Germans claimed (for the entire front) 322 aircraft destroyed in the air and 1489 on the ground. Part of this discrepancy in the number of aircraft destroyed on the ground is due to the fact that some of the aircraft could be considered repairable, but many of them were lost when the German troops captured the airfields.

The airfields (Tarnovo and Dolyubovo) located right on the border were fired upon by German long-range artillery (Luftwaffe, p. 239).

... "It was early Sunday morning and many soldiers were on leave," said Colonel Vanyushkin, commander of the 23rd Air Division, later taken prisoner [That Vanyushkin again! - E.K.]. With Russian proverbial nonchalance ... both old and new types stood together in uncamouflaged rows..." (Becker, p. 312-313).

The effect of the surprise attack on Soviet airfields was devastating. ... 4-pound fragmentation bombs ....

..."We could hardly believe our eyes," reported Captain Hans von Hahn, commander of I/JG3 operating in the Lvov area. "Row after row of scouts, bombers and fighters stood in lines as if on parade. We were surprised at the number of airfields and aircraft that the Russians were preparing against us" (Becker, p. 313).

In the sector of the 2nd Air Fleet near Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet squadron, which was trying to take off, was bombed at the moment of takeoff. Later it turned out that the perimeter of the airfield was littered with burnt debris (Becker, p. 314).

..."SD2 - fragmentation bombs, nicknamed the "devil's egg", which were on the secret list, are now dropped for the first time in large quantities. Only 4 pounds in weight, they were equipped with small stabilizers and were originally intended to attack infantry from the air With fuses triggered either on impact with the ground or above the ground, the result of the explosion was the scattering of 50 large and 250 smaller fragments of shrapnel at a distance of 12-13 meters (ibid.).

1811 aircraft destroyed: 322 in the air: 1489 - on the ground. ...for Goering, commander of the Luftwaffe, the results seemed so incredible that he ordered them to be secretly checked. For several days, officers of his headquarters traveled through the captured airfields, counting the burned-out wreckage of Russian aircraft. The result was even more stunning, the total number exceeded 2000. ... in the Western District sector, 528 vehicles were destroyed on the ground and 210 in the air (Becker, p. 317).

The German pilot Heinz Knock tells about his first sortie on June 22, after the war he wrote a book of memoirs "I flew for the Fuhrer" based on his diary entries. (The commenter apologizes to readers for quoting this rather odious document without cuts). Although this excerpt tells of a raid on the headquarters of one of the armies of the Baltic district, there can hardly be any doubt that the same thing happened that day over the airfields:

04:00: Alert to all staffers. The airport is bustling with life. All night I hear the distant hum of tanks and vehicles. We are located just a few kilometers from the border.

04:30: All crews gathered in the operating room for a briefing. Our commander, Captain Woitke, is reading the Führer's Special Order to all armed forces.

05:00: We take off and join the fight. In our staffel, 4 aircraft, including mine, were equipped with bombers, and over the past few weeks I have been intensively practicing bombing. Now under the belly of my good "Emil" (Bf 109E - "Emil") there are mounts for hundreds of 2-kg fragmentation bombs. I will gladly throw them to Ivan under his dirty feet.

Flying low over the wide plains, we spot endless German columns rolling east. Groups of bombers above us and frightening-looking Stuka dive-bombers at the same height as us are flying in the same direction. We have to attack from a strafing flight one of the Russian headquarters, located in the forests to the west of Druskininkai.

On Russian territory, on the contrary, everything seems to be asleep. We find the headquarters and fly over the wooden buildings, but we do not see a single Russian soldier. I swoop down on one of the barracks and press the bomb release button. I distinctly feel how the plane, getting rid of the load, bounces up.

Others are dropping their load too. Huge masses of earth rise into the air in fountains and for some time we cannot see anything because of the smoke and dust.

One of the barracks is burning furiously. The camouflage was torn off the cars standing nearby, and they themselves were overturned by the explosion. Finally, the Ivans woke up. The scene below resembles a torn anthill, below everyone is fussing in confusion. Stalin's stepsons in their underwear seek shelter in the forest. Anti-aircraft gunners start shooting at us. I take aim at one of them and open fire with cannon and machine guns. Ivan, who fired a cannon in only his underwear, falls to the ground.

And now for the next one!

One more turn and I'll treat you to lead. The Russians quickly jump up and fire back. "Well, wait, now it's my turn to have some fun, bastards!"

I turn for a new attack.

I have never shot as accurately as today. I descend to a height of two meters, almost cutting off the tops of the trees. Then I pull the control stick sharply towards me. My Ivans lie prone near their guns. One of them jumps to his feet and rushes towards the trees. The rest continue to lie.

I do five or six more passes. We circle the camp like wasps. Almost all barracks are on fire. I'm shooting at the truck. It lights up after the first turn.

05:56: Flight in formation.

The commander sees our laughing faces during the report.

The spell is finally broken. We have long dreamed of doing something similar to the Bolsheviks. We feel not so much hatred as extreme contempt. It is a real pleasure for us to trample the Bolsheviks into the mud from which they have grown" (Knoke, p.44-46).

Commander of the German bombers, General Werner Baumbach:

"... in 24 hours, 1817 Russian aircraft were destroyed, of which 1498 were on the ground, 322 were shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft fire. Goering refused to believe these figures and sent special units to explore the airfields, which in the meantime had been captured by the army. They counted the wreckage of 2000 Russians airplanes" (Paul, p. 219).

"... in total there are 12,000-15,000 Soviet aircraft, of which 7,000 were concentrated in the western districts and in the occupied territories."

"...according to German intelligence, there are 5,700 aircraft on European territory, of which 2,980 are fighters. This turned out to be a serious underestimation; aircraft in reserve fleets were not taken into account."

"June 22 ... complete surprise ... at many airfields, construction has not yet been completed and the planes were standing wing to wing as if for inspection. It was an incredibly attractive target. The Luftwaffe pilots were sure that the Russians themselves were planning a massive attack. ... When the bombers finished their work, the fighters shot down everything that was left."

"The Luftwaffe claimed 1,489 destroyed on the ground and 322 in the air or by anti-aircraft guns. Official Soviet history admits 1,200 losses, of which 800 were on the ground ... Although the planes on the ground were destroyed, their pilots were not injured, and what was most important .. . this made it easier later on to form new units" (Spick, p.75-78).

"1200 aircraft in the first 8 hours..."

"... attacks on Soviet air bases led to the collapse of the Russian command, unable to control its units. Desperate calls broadcast in clear text leave the impression of chaos. According to Milch's personal diary: 1800 aircraft were destroyed on the first day, 800 - on June 23, 557 - on the 24th, 351 - on the 25th, 300 - on the 26th The question of whether the Luftwaffe could destroy so many aircraft is not even discussed, ... a catastrophe of colossal proportions ... "(Murray, p.82-83).

"For several days, He-111, Ju-88, Do-17 made four to six sorties every day, Ju-87 from seven to eight, Bf-109 and Bf-110 - from five to eight, depending on the distance Between 22 and 25 June I Corps attacked 77 airfields in 1,600 sorties, the first bombers found enemy vehicles on the ground, unprotected, often standing in long rows, extremely vulnerable to fragmentation bombs, 4-pounder SD-2s, which bombers and fighter-bombers carried in large numbers... on June 22, 1,800 enemy aircraft were destroyed, on June 29, the OKW reported the destruction of 4,017 Soviet aircraft and German losses of 150 vehicles.

"Goering did not believe Kesselring that 2,500 aircraft were destroyed in the central sector alone, and ordered an investigation. His check showed that Kesselring even downplayed the success of his pilots and the true figure was 200-300 more than he reported at the beginning."

"... On June 30, large air battles broke out in the Bobruisk region, when Soviet aircraft tried to prevent the Germans from forcing the Berezina River. 110 Soviet aircraft were shot down."

"In the first 3 days, the 1st Air Fleet shot down 400 enemy aircraft and destroyed 1100 on the ground, in the next three months - the same number ... By August 30, the 2nd Air Fleet shot down 1380 aircraft and destroyed 1280 on the ground." (Cooper, 222-223).

"The first attack ... 31 airfields near the border were attacked, by the end of the day 1800 Russian aircraft had been destroyed. By the end of the week, Goering announced the destruction of 4990 aircraft, the Luftwaffe lost 179 aircraft. On July 9, JG3 shot down 27 Russian bombers trying to attack their airfield, for 15 minutes By July 26, Me-110s made 1,574 sorties, shot down 92 enemy aircraft in the air and destroyed 823 on the ground. The ZG 26 account is 620 Soviet aircraft."

"On August 30, JG3 pilots destroyed the 1,000th Russian aircraft. On August 19, when attacking a Soviet airfield 17 miles southwest of Leningrad, ZG 26 aircraft burned 30 fighters, damaged 15 and shot down 3, increasing their score to 191 in the air and 663 on earth".

"September 8 JG 51 - 2000th air victory. By September 10 - 1357 enemy aircraft in the air, 298 on the ground."

"By November 12, the 2nd Fleet - 40,000 sorties, 2169 Soviet aircraft destroyed in the air, 1657 - on the ground. Probable losses of the enemy - another 281 aircraft destroyed and 811 damaged" (WWII ... p.55-56).

“During the first flight, I notice countless fortifications built along the border. They stretch for many hundreds of kilometers. Some of them are still unfinished. We fly over unfinished airfields: there is a newly built concrete runway, planes are already parked here. For example, along the road on Vitebsk, on which our troops are advancing, there is one of these almost completed airfields with many Martin bombers. They lack either fuel or crews [emphasis mine - E.K.]. Flying over these airfields and fortifications, everyone understands : "We hit just in time..." It looks like the Soviets were making these preparations to set up a base for an invasion against us. Who else in the west would Russia want to attack? If the Russians had completed their preparations, there would be little hope of stopping them." (Rudel, p.21-22).

And now - Soviet sources.

The very first reports make it possible to judge the most serious situation in which the Air Force found itself after the start of the German attack. The operational report of the Northwestern Front, signed at 10 pm on June 22, reports that during enemy attacks 56 Soviet aircraft were destroyed in the air and 32 at the airfields themselves (Collection of combat documents ... further - issue 34, unless otherwise indicated , p. 43). Another report, sent next to the NPO, increases the losses to 100 vehicles and admits that the enemy has achieved complete air superiority (Collection of Combat Documents ... p. 44). The reports always raise the problem of lack of communication with aviation units.

On June 26, front commander Kuznetsov reported: "75% of the crews were not injured. Material losses are 80%. I ask you to reinforce the front with three mixed air divisions. First of all, materiel and pilots are needed."

By July 4, the damage done to the aviation of the front becomes clear from the list of what remains: "6th mixed air division ... 69 aircraft, 7th - 26 aircraft, 8th - 29, 57 - 29 aircraft. In 12 days since the beginning of hostilities, out of 887 aircraft of the front, only 153 aircraft remained in stock (Collection of combat documents ... p. 119).

On June 21, 1942, General D. Kondratyuk, commander of the 6th Army, prepared a report on the air operations of the Northwestern Front in the first days of the war. In this report, he wrote about the problems faced by the front. He noted the lack of airfields and the construction of almost all available airfields - 21 permanent and 49 operational. Despite efforts to camouflage aircraft, German reconnaissance flights reduced this work to nil. He highlighted the following problems of the air units of the front: the concentration of aircraft on existing airfields and the lack of airfields in depth, which increased the vulnerability to German attack; proximity of airfields to the border, poor dispersal of aircraft and planning of movements of units; the presence of old aircraft and equipment; the inability of pilots to fly at night and in bad weather; insufficient staff work and lack of interaction between military branches; poor radio and wire communications; extreme lack of aerial reconnaissance; incomplete reform; inadequate mobilization planning of logistic support.

In conclusion, Kondratyuk writes: “The year of the war showed that the air forces of the Red Army did not meet the requirements of the war. ... a regiment based on two or three airfields lost operational control over its constituent units, the headquarters organization did not provide combat control. . ..The frequent reorganization of aviation had a negative effect on the combat effectiveness of the units ... The lack of a plan of action for the air force in the event of war led to the loss of a significant number of aircraft and pilots. Radio control ... was not worked out "(Collection of combat documents ... pp. 179-183).

The air bases of the Western District suffered even more in the first days of the war. The Germans began hostilities with devastating attacks on the entire network of airfields in the Western District, and German sabotage groups cut off land lines of communication. As communications were disrupted, reports of casualties were extremely slow, if at all, and commanders could only imagine the havoc the German air force was wreaking in the air and on the ground. It is clear that the Germans were able to immediately achieve overwhelming air superiority. The commander of the aviation of the front, I. Kopets, having made sure that it no longer exists, committed suicide, thereby avoiding the fate that soon befell the commander of the front, D. Pavlov, who was shot on the orders of Stalin along with the officers of his headquarters.

The first detailed report on the aviation of the Western Front appeared on December 31, 1941. Two sections of the report written by N. Naumenko were devoted to a sober assessment of the state of the Air Force before the war and its participation in hostilities in the first eight days of the war: "By April 1941, the combat readiness of the air force units can be characterized as follows: to conduct air combat, bombers - limited ability, no reconnaissance aviation, since its 8 squadrons received 6 aircraft.313th and 314th reconnaissance regiments: all crews of young pilots are available, but no aircraft ... 314th reconnaissance aviation regiment. .. by the beginning of the war, only 6 crews flew the Yak-4. The 215th assault aviation regiment - 12 pieces of I-15, pilots were being trained on the Il-2, which at that time the district did not yet have "(Collection of combat documents ... p. 127)

Naumenko noted that all air divisions had old aircraft, except for the 9th mixed division, which was equipped with 262 new MiG-1 and MiG-3 aircraft. But only 140 pilots of the division could fly these new aircraft, training was accompanied by serious accidents ... "Interest in training flights on old aircraft fell, everyone wanted to fly on new machines ... an experience...". He writes further: "As a result of the actions of German and White Pole saboteurs from 23:00 on June 21, all wire communications between the district headquarters, headquarters of air divisions and regiments were cut ... each airfield was left to its own devices. Thus began the Great Patriotic War" (Collection of Combat documents ... p. 130).

Then Naumenko proceeds to the results of the first eight days of fighting: "On June 22, during the first attack, the enemy destroyed 538 of our aircraft (out of 1,022 fighters and 887 bombers) and lost 143. After 8 days, our losses amounted to 1,163 aircraft. By June 30, 498 aircraft remained ( Collection of military documents ... pp. 131).

The most powerful units of the Air Force were, as in the case of ground forces, in the Kiev military district. Despite their strength, the aviation units suffered from the same problems. On August 21, Air Force Commander Zhigarev received a report on the aviation of the Kiev district in the pre-war months and the first days of the war.

According to the report's author, Colonel Astakhov, there were 1166 fighters, 587 bombers, 197 attack aircraft and 53 reconnaissance aircraft in 11 district air divisions and 32 regiments. This number included 223 new Mig-3 and Yak fighters, new Pe-2 and Su-2 bombers, and 31 Yak-4 reconnaissance aircraft. Most of the pilots of the old aircraft were well trained to fly under normal conditions, but could not perform more complex tasks. On the other hand, pilots of new types of aircraft had only basic training and could not be considered combat-ready.

Astakhov summarizes the characteristics of the district's aviation combat readiness: "In general, the aviation of the South-Eastern Front was not sufficiently prepared for combat operations for the following reasons:

A. During the re-equipment of the front aviation with new weapons, some of the old, fully formed aviation regiments (the 52nd and 48th short-range aviation regiments) did not have enough new types of aircraft to conduct combat operations, and their old machines were used in new parts. As a result, before the start of the war, these regiments were in a state of low combat readiness ...

C. Some aviation regiments formed in 1940 (224th, 225th, 138th) had only 20-50% of the equipment of the norm, and as a result, their participation in hostilities was insignificant.

D. Divisional and regimental commanders did not make good use of the winter period of 1940-1941 for training, while the airfields were covered with snow and as a result the vast majority of young pilots flew very little in winter ... and the period from May to June did not give them sufficient training for conduct of hostilities.

D. Before the war, the aviation of the Southwestern Front was unable to solve the problem of camouflaging airfields and aircraft and organize air defense. This was due not only to the lack of necessary camouflage and air defense equipment, but also to the fact that commanders at all levels did not pay much attention to these issues.

E. The lack of the necessary organization ... in the actions of front-line aviation in repelling enemy attacks on our airfields in the first three days of the war confirmed that the combat capability of the front's air units is low and during this critical period ... aviation actions do not meet the requirements of NPO order No. 075.

Because of these and other problems," Astakhov wrote further, "the aviation of the Southwestern Front was not ready to repel a surprise enemy attack on 06/22/41." As a result, from June 22 to June 24, the Germans destroyed 237 aircraft at airfields. the training resulted in the loss of another 242 aircraft due to accidents between June 22 and August 10, which is 13% of all losses (1861 aircraft) (Collection of combat documents ... issue 36, pp. 109-116)

And the last. Data on Soviet aircraft captured by the Germans are known. For example, according to German data, (see comments on page 35 of the book "The Soviet Air Force in World War II") by July 8, 1941, the troops of Army Group Center captured 242 Soviet aircraft at airfields, and the total number of captured aircraft in all Western districts could hardly exceed 1000 aircraft, simply because the aviation of the Western District had the most aircraft (after Kiev) and the Germans advanced faster here. The Germans hardly counted the aircraft that were out of order and destroyed during the raids among the captured ones. Why did they have to fix these cars? They most likely referred to the latter only technically sound aircraft, some of which, having received Luftwaffe identification marks, were used in German air units (see section 6).