The most important characteristic of knowledge is its dynamics, i.e. its growth, change, development, etc. This idea, not so new, was already expressed in ancient philosophy, and Hegel formulated it in the position that "truth is a process" and not "a finished result." This problem was actively studied by the founders and representatives of dialectical-materialist philosophy, especially from the methodological positions of the materialist understanding of history and materialist dialectics, taking into account the socio-cultural conditioning of this process.

However, in Western philosophy and methodology of science of the XX century. in fact - especially during the years of the "triumphant march" of logical positivism (and it, indeed, had considerable success) - scientific knowledge was studied without taking into account its growth, change.

The fact is that logical positivism as a whole was characterized by a) absolutization of formal logical and linguistic problems; b) hypertrophy of artificially constructed formalized languages ​​(to the detriment of natural ones); c) concentration of research efforts on the structure of "ready" knowledge that has become knowledge without regard to its genesis and evolution; d) reduction of philosophy to particular scientific knowledge, and the latter to a formal analysis of the language of science; e) ignoring the socio-cultural context of knowledge analysis, etc.

The development of knowledge is a complex dialectical process that has certain qualitatively different stages. Thus, this process can be viewed as a movement from myth to logos, from logos to "pre-science", from "pre-science" to science, from classical science to non-classical and further to post-non-classical, etc., from ignorance to knowledge, from shallow incomplete to deeper and more perfect knowledge, etc.

In modern Western philosophy, the problem of the growth and development of knowledge is central to the philosophy of science, which is presented especially brightly in such currents as evolutionary (genetic) epistemology and postpositivism. Evolutionary epistemology is a direction in Western philosophical and epistemological thought, the main task of which is to identify the genesis and stages of the development of knowledge, its forms and mechanisms in an evolutionary key and, in particular, to build on this basis the theory of the evolution of science. Evolutionary epistemology seeks to create a generalized theory of the development of science, based on the principle of historicism.

One of the well-known and productive variants of the considered form of epistemology is the genetic epistemology of the Swiss psychologist and philosopher J. Piaget. It is based on the principle of increasing the invariance of knowledge under the influence of changes in the conditions of experience. Piaget, in particular, believed that epistemology is a theory of reliable knowledge, which is always a process, not a state. Piaget singled out four main stages in cognitive (intellectual) development, which is characterized by a strict sequence of formation: sensorimotor, intuitive (pre-operational), concrete-operational and formal-operational. One of the first rules of genetic epistemology is, according to Piaget, the "rule of cooperation". Studying how our knowledge grows (grows, increases), in each specific case it unites philosophers, psychologists, logicians, representatives of mathematics, cybernetics, synergetics and others, including social sciences and the humanities.

Especially actively the problem of growth (development, change) of knowledge was developed, starting from the 60s. XX century supporters of postpositivism - K. Popper, T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, P. Feyerabend, St. Tulmin et al. Turning to history, the development of science, and not just to a formal analysis of its "frozen" structure, representatives of postpositivism began to build various models of this development, considering them as special cases of general evolutionary changes taking place in the world. They believed that there is a close analogy between the growth of knowledge and biological growth, i.e. evolution of plants and animals.

In postpositivism, there is a significant change in the problems of philosophical research: if logical positivism focused on the analysis of the structure of scientific knowledge, then postpositivism makes its main problem understanding the growth and development of knowledge. In this regard, representatives of postpositivism were forced to turn to the study of the history of the emergence, development and change of scientific ideas and theories.

The first such concept was the concept of knowledge growth by K. Popper.

Popper considers knowledge (in any of its forms) not only as a ready-made system that has become, but also as a changing, developing system. He presented this aspect of the analysis of science in the form of the concept of the growth of scientific knowledge. In his concept, Popper formulates three basic requirements for the growth of knowledge. First, the new theory must start from a simple, new, fruitful, and unifying idea. Second, it must be independently verifiable, i.e. lead to the presentation of phenomena that have not yet been observed. In other words, the new theory should be more fruitful as a research tool. Third, a good theory must withstand some new and rigorous tests.

In the 1950s, it became clear that the "revolution in philosophy" proclaimed by neo-positivism did not justify the hopes that had been placed in it. The classical problems that neopositivism promised to overcome and remove were reproduced in a new form in the course of its own evolution. The very concept of neo-positivism is increasingly being supplanted by the concept of "analytic philosophy". In the 60-70s in the West. philosophy of science develops a course of postpositivism. Post-positivists (Popper, Moon, Lakatos, Feirabenb, Polanyi) criticized the positivist ideal of fact, introducing a historical, sociological and cultural dimension into the analysis of science. The main thesis of postpositivism is that science is a historical phenomenon, science is developing. Not only its theories and knowledge are changing, but the criteria and principles and even the mechanisms of its functioning. Post-positivism is a general name used in the philosophy of science to refer to a variety of methodological concepts that have replaced those that were inherent in the methodology of logical positivism. His offensive was marked by the release in 1959 of the English. version of Popper's main methodological work - "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", as well as in 1963 Kuhn's book - "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions". Feature postpositivist stage - a significant variety of methodological concepts and their mutual criticism. These are Popper's falsificationism and Kuhn's concept of scientific revolutions, and the methodology of Lakatos' research programs, and Polanyi's concept of implicit knowledge. The authors and defenders of these concepts create very different images of science and its development. However, there are common features inherent in postpositivism:

1) Postpositivism moves away from the orientation towards symbolic logic and turns to the history of science. Those. we are talking about the correspondence of scientific constructions to real scientific knowledge and its history.

2) In postpositivism, there is a significant change in the problems of methodological research. In logical positivism, there is an analysis of the structure of scientific knowledge, in postpositivism - an understanding of the development of scientific knowledge.

3) Post-positivism is characterized by the rejection of rigid dividing lines, in contrast to positivism. Postpositivism speaks of the interpenetration of the empirical and the theoretical, of a smooth transition.

4) Post-positivism is gradually moving away from the ideology of demarcationism professed by logical positivism. The latter believed that it was possible and necessary to establish a clear demarcation line between science and non-science.

5) A common feature of post-positivist concepts is their desire to rely on the history of science.

6) Post-positivism recognized that significant, revolutionary transformations are inevitable in the history of science, when a significant part of previously recognized and substantiated knowledge is revised - not only theories, but also facts, methods, fundamental worldview ideas.

Among the most important problems considered by postpositivism, one can note: a) the problem of falsification (Popper) - a fact that contradicts a scientific theory, falsifies it and forces scientists to abandon it, but the process of falsification is not so simple; b) the problem of the plausibility of scientific theories (Popper); c) the problem of commensurability of scientific theories (Kuhn and Feyrabend) - the incommensurability of competing scientific theories; d) the problem of rationality - a narrow understanding of rationality was replaced by a more vague one; e) the problem of understanding; f) the problem of the sociology of knowledge.
Kuhn and Feyerabend put forward the thesis about the incommensurability of competing scientific theories, about the absence of common standards for comparison. This thesis caused a lot of controversy.

T. Kuhn, raising the question of supplementing the consensus model, believed that competing theories are radically incommensurable, hence the impossibility for those who represent them to communicate with each other. T. Kuhn, coming close to the problem of disagreement, essentially gave a description of the inter-paradigm disagreements that fill the ocean of the history of science. As an example, T. Kuhn takes the one set forth in his famous work "The Copernican Revolution". L. Laudan, analyzing T. Kuhn's view of the problem of scientific disagreements, sees the main postulates of Kuhn's point of view as follows: the period of the scientific revolution includes competing paradigms, but the latter are "chronically incomplete" (T. Kuhn's term), and this incompleteness is the result incommensurability of paradigms, although opponents sometimes use the same terminology. Any of the competing paradigms cannot be translated into another. The model proposed by T. Kuhn has two central ideas: the idea of ​​disagreement (incommensurability) and the idea of ​​maintaining agreement (normal science), although T. Kuhn tries to explain the transition from "normal" science to "crisis", the transition from agreement to disagreement. In his work “Perfect Tension”, T. Kuhn showed that this impossibility of translation is explained and conditioned by the fact that opponents in the debate honor different methodological standards, different cognitive values. On this basis, it is concluded that the knowledge used as an attribute of the theory for the enemy acts as an obstacle to the justification of his point of view, the content of theories, standards of comparison act as a prerequisite for dissensus. Moreover, T. Kuhn was able to show that the dialogue within different paradigms is incomplete due to adherence to different methodological standards, and therefore dissensus is a state of science that is difficult to translate into a consensus stage, dissensus is a constant characteristic of the life of the scientific community. The model proposed by T. Kuhn, however, is not able to resolve the question: how the stage of dissensus passes into the opposite stage, the stage of agreement, how scientists accept a single paradigm.

Underdetermination of the theory by empirical data. scientific rules and evaluative criteria do not make it possible to unambiguously prefer one of the theories. In substantiation of this point of view, various arguments theses are put forward. Among the latter is the thesis of Duhem-Quine, the essence of which is that a theory cannot be accepted or rejected, focusing only on empirical evidence; the Wittgenstein-Goodman thesis, the meaning of which is that the rules of scientific inference (both inductive and deductive) are vague, they can be followed different ways, often radically incompatible. The criteria for choosing a theory used by scientists are also vague, which prevents their use when choosing a theory, and, therefore, science is not a sphere that is governed by rules, norms, and standards.

A special place in the philosophy of science of the XX century. takes the concept of the American philosopher and historian of science Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1929-1996). In his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn expressed a rather original idea of ​​the nature of science, general patterns its functioning and progress, noting that "his aim is to outline, at least schematically, a completely different conception of science, which emerges from a historical approach to the study of scientific activity itself."

In contrast to the positivist tradition, Kuhn comes to the conclusion that the path to creating a genuine theory of science lies through the study of the history of science, and its development itself does not proceed by smoothly building up new knowledge on old ones, but through a radical transformation and change of leading ideas, i.e. through periodic scientific revolutions.

New in Kuhn's interpretation of the scientific revolution is the concept of a paradigm, which he defines as "generally recognized scientific achievements that, over time, provide the scientific community with a model for posing problems and solving them." In other words, a paradigm is a set of the most general ideas and methodological guidelines in science, recognized by the entire scientific community and guiding scientific research in a certain period of time. Examples of such theories are Aristotle's physics, Newton's mechanics and optics, Maxwell's electrodynamics, Einstein's theory of relativity, and a number of other theories.

Paradigm, according to Kuhn, or, as he proposed to call it in the future, the "disciplinary matrix" has a certain structure.

First, the structure of the paradigm includes "symbolic generalizations" - those expressions that are used by members of the scientific group without doubts and disagreements and which can be clothed in logical form, are easily formalized or expressed in words, for example: "elements are combined in constant mass proportions" or "action is equal to reaction". These generalizations outwardly resemble the laws of nature (for example, the Joule-Lenz law or Ohm's law).

Secondly, in the structure of the disciplinary matrix, Kuhn includes "metaphysical parts of paradigms" - universally recognized prescriptions such as "heat is the kinetic energy of the parts that make up the body." They, in his opinion, "provide the scientific group with preferred and acceptable analogies and metaphors and help determine what should be accepted as a solution to the puzzle and as an explanation. And, conversely, they allow you to refine the list of unsolved puzzles, contributing to the assessment of the significance of each of them. ".

Thirdly, the structure of the paradigm includes values, "and, if possible, these values ​​should be simple, not self-contradictory and plausible, i.e. compatible with other, parallel and independently developed theories ... To a much greater extent than other types of components disciplinary matrix, values ​​can be shared by people who at the same time apply them in different ways.

Fourth, an element of the disciplinary matrix is ​​Kuhn's generally recognized "samples" - a set of generally accepted standards - schemes for solving certain specific problems. So, "all physicists start by studying the same samples: problems - an inclined plane, a conical pendulum, Keplerian orbits; instruments - a vernier, a calorimeter, a Wheatstone bridge." Mastering these classical examples, the scientist deeper comprehends the foundations of his science, learns to apply them in specific situations and masters a special technique for studying those phenomena that form the subject of this study. scientific discipline and become the basis of their activities during periods of "normal science".

Closely related to the concept of paradigm scientific community concept. In a sense, these concepts are synonymous. "A paradigm is what unites the members of the scientific community, and, conversely, the scientific community consists of people who accept the paradigm." Representatives of the scientific community, as a rule, have a certain scientific specialty, have received similar education and professional skills. Each scientific community has its own subject of study. Most research scientists, according to Kuhn, immediately decide whether they belong to one or another scientific community, all members of which adhere to a certain paradigm. If you don't share a belief in a paradigm, you are left out of the scientific community.

After the publication of Kuhn's book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", the concept of the scientific community became firmly established in all areas of science, and science itself began to be thought of not as a system of knowledge, but primarily as an activity of scientific communities. However, Kuhn notes some shortcomings in the activities of scientific communities, because "since the attention of various scientific communities is concentrated on various subjects of research, professional communications between isolated scientific groups are sometimes difficult; the result is misunderstanding, and in the future it can lead to significant and unforeseen discrepancies" . Representatives of different scientific communities often speak "different languages" and do not understand each other.

Considering the history of the development of science, Kuhn identifies, first of all, the pre-paradigm period, which, in his opinion, is characteristic of the birth of any science before this science develops its first theory recognized by all, in other words, a paradigm. Pre-paradigm science is being replaced by mature science, which is characterized by the fact that in this moment it has at most one paradigm. In its development, it goes through several successive stages - from "normal science" (when the paradigm accepted by the scientific community dominates) to the period of the collapse of the paradigm, called the scientific revolution.

"Normal science", in Kuhn's view, "means research firmly based on one or more past scientific achievements, which for some time have been recognized by a certain scientific community as the basis for its further practical activity." Scientists, scientific activity which are built on the basis of the same paradigms, are based on the same rules and standards of scientific practice. This commonality of attitudes, and the apparent coherence they provide, are the prerequisites for the genesis of "normal science."

Unlike popper, who believed that scientists constantly think about how to refute existing and recognized theories, and for this purpose strive to set up refuting experiments, Kuhn is convinced that "... scientists in the mainstream of normal science do not set themselves the goal of creating new theories, usually besides, they are intolerant of the creation of such theories by others. On the contrary, research in normal science is directed to the development of those phenomena and theories, the existence of which the paradigm presupposes."

Thus, "normal science" practically does not focus on major discoveries. It provides only the continuity of the traditions of one direction or another, accumulating information, clarifying known facts. "Normal science" appears in Kuhn as "solving puzzles". There is a sample solution, there are rules of the game, it is known that the problem is solvable, and the scientist has the opportunity to try his personal ingenuity under given conditions. This explains the attraction of normal science to the scientist. As long as puzzle solving is successful, the paradigm is a reliable tool for learning. But it may well turn out that some puzzles, despite the best efforts of scientists, cannot be solved. Trust in the paradigm is declining. There comes a state that Kuhn calls a crisis. Under the growing crisis, he understands the constant inability of "normal science" to solve its puzzles to the extent that it should do it, and even more so the anomalies that arise in science, which gives rise to a pronounced professional uncertainty in the scientific community. Normal exploration freezes. Science essentially ceases to function.

The period of crisis ends only when one of the proposed hypotheses proves its ability to cope with existing problems, explain incomprehensible facts and, thanks to this, attracts the majority of scientists to its side. Kuhn calls this change of paradigms, the transition to a new paradigm, the scientific revolution. "The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new paradigm from which a new tradition of 'normal science' may be born is a process far from cumulative and not one that could be brought about by a clearer development or extension of the old paradigm. This process is more like a reconstruction of the field on new grounds, a reconstruction that changes some of the most elementary theoretical generalizations in the field, as well as many of the methods and applications of the paradigm."

Each scientific revolution changes the existing picture of the world and opens up new patterns that cannot be understood within the framework of previous prescriptions. “Therefore,” notes Kuhn, “during a revolution, when the normal scientific tradition begins to change, the scientist must learn to re-perceive the world around him.” The scientific revolution significantly changes the historical perspective of research and affects the structure of scientific papers and textbooks. It affects the style of thinking and may, in its consequences, go beyond the area where it occurred.

Thus, the scientific revolution as a paradigm shift is not subject to a rational-logical explanation, because the essence of the matter is in the professional well-being of the scientific community: either the community has the means to solve the puzzle, or not, and then the community creates them. The scientific revolution leads to the rejection of everything that was obtained at the previous stage, the work of science begins, as it were, anew, from scratch.

Kuhn's book aroused interest in the problem of explaining the mechanism of changing ideas in science, that is, in essence, in the problem of the movement of scientific knowledge ... it has largely stimulated and continues to stimulate research in this direction.

Literature:

1) Buchilo N.F. Philosophy electronic textbook. M Knorus, 2009

2) Gaidenko P.P. History of Greek philosophy and its connection with science. Librocon 2009

3) Ilyin V.V. Philosophy and History of Science MSU 2004

4) Kuhn T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions AST 2004

5) Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivin. 2004.

N.F. Buchilo A.N. Chumakov, Philosophy Textbook. M., 2001

Buchilo N.F. Philosophy electronic textbook. M Knorus, 2009

Lenin V.I. Materialism and Empiriocriticism, vol. 18, ch. v.

Popper K. Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge. M., 1989.

Kuhn T. Structure of scientific revolutions. AST 2004

associated with the name of the French mathematician Poincare - formulated at the beginning of the 20th century. Today, not a single concept of science can do without taking into account conventionalism. Conventionalism is a trend that considers an agreement between scientists as the basis of scientific theory. Agreements between scientists are due to considerations of convenience and simplicity and are not directly related to the criteria for the truth of scientific knowledge. The emergence of conventionalism was facilitated by the existence of various systems of geometry: Euclid, Lobachevsky and Riemann. Each of the systems is consistent with experience, but which one is true? Within the framework of conventionalism, the following answer has been proposed: they have come to believe that the laws of geometry are not statements about the real world, but are only agreements on how to use scientific terms. Within the framework of conventionalism, there is a rethinking of the concept of scientific law. A scientific law from the point of view of conventionalism is a convention (agreement) necessary for the most convenient description of the relevant phenomena. Within the framework of conventionalism, therefore, it was realized that scientific theories are not direct generalizations of experimental data. And in this sense, such conventional elements cannot be removed from science. In addition, within the framework of conventionalism, the thesis about the incommensurability of scientific theories is formulated. From the point of view of this thesis, all scientific theories use different methods, and therefore their comparison (more precisely, rational comparison) is impossible. The scientist does not choose this or that scientific theory because he is convinced by rational arguments. The choice of scientific theory is based on worldview and socio-psychological preferences.

The principle of incommensurability, which states that theories cannot be compared with each other, in terms of the truth of scientific knowledge.

Feyerabend believes that the creation of clear universal standards in the separation of true knowledge from false is artificial and adversely affects the development of knowledge.

This principle echoes the principle of incommensurability of paradigms by Thomas Kuhn (it is revealed in T. Kuhn's work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions") Scientific textbooks present the development of science as a linear process of accumulation of knowledge and a gradual transition from weak or erroneous theories to more and more complete and true. In fact, Kuhn argues, the history of science is a more complex system. In his opinion, in the history of science there are a number of successive changes in scientific paradigms that the scientific community adheres to. A paradigm is a kind of "philosophy" shared by scientists, a certain approach to scientific research, a common set of symbolic designations, etc.

Science can be in two “states”: the “period of normal science” - when a fixed paradigm develops, solutions to problems within this paradigm are sought, or the period of the “scientific revolution” - when the old paradigm becomes obsolete and a new paradigm is chosen from a variety of proposed approaches. In the period of "normal science" theories can be compared with each other in terms of their suitability for solving the problems set by the paradigm. However, different paradigms are not comparable with each other.

Unlike Kuhn, Feyerabend generally does not allow for the existence of any criteria for comparing theories or a point in time when they can be compared. Kuhn's two "states" of science for Feyerabend are only two opposite tendencies - towards preservation and change. In his opinion, microrevolutions in science occur constantly, namely, when some brave scientist decides to move away from the old proven methods of scientific research or creates a theory that is absolutely incompatible with the old ones and opens up new horizons of knowledge.

Thus, there are no rules by which one can separate true knowledge from false or find out which of the theories is better or worse. Developing this idea, Feyerabend comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to assert that scientific knowledge is more correct and justified than religious or mythological. They are equal ways of knowing reality, and to reject any of them will be a loss, not a gain.

INCOMmensurability of theories(in the philosophy of science) - the thesis according to which it is impossible to determine rational criteria for comparing, comparing different theories related to the same empirical field. The concept of incommensurability is borrowed from Greek mathematics, where it meant the absence of a common measure. Segments of a certain length were considered commensurable if there is a certain common measure of their comparison. Not all segments are commensurate: the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with its side. In the philosophy of science, the concept of incommensurability of theories was introduced at the beginning. 70s T. Kuhn and P. Feyerabend. The authors of the thesis about the incommensurability of theories drew attention to the fact that successive fundamental scientific theories, describing the same range of empirical data, proceed from different ontological assumptions, operate with the same name, but different in meaning, concepts, put at the center of research activity different problems. At the same time, adherents of the old and new paradigms use different criteria for evaluating and selecting theories (these criteria turn out to be paradigmally dependent), which raises the question: is it possible (and if so, how) to compare and choose between theories?

Two formulations of the thesis about the incommensurability of theories that differ in strength and content (respectively, TH1 and TH2) can be distinguished. According to TH1, there is no common basis for comparing them that is preserved during the transition from one theory to another. According to TH2, there are no absolute estimates on the basis of which one could make an unambiguous choice between theories.

TN1 is based on the belief that traditional philosophy of science ideas about comparing successive theories are simplified and do not correspond to real scientific practice. The "traditional" ideas about comparing theories were as follows. Let there be two competing theories T1 and T2. From T1 follows E1, from T2 - E2, where E1 and E2 are consequences of theories T1 and T2. Let it be possible to carry out an experiment confirming E1 and not confirming E2. Based on the result of this experiment, T1 is considered to be correct and T2 is not correct, and the former is preferred.

Proponents of TH1 argue that traditional beliefs are based on two incorrect assumptions. One of them consists in the assumption that the meaning of the terms common to two theories is preserved when passing from one theory to another. The other consists in the assumption that there exists, if not theoretically free, then at least a language of observation that is neutral with respect to the theories being compared.

Rejecting the first assumption, TN1 supporters argue that the meaning of terms does not remain unchanged when fundamental theories change. At the same time, they refer to such examples as changing the meaning of the concepts "mass", "length", "time interval", etc. during the transition from classical mechanics to the special theory of relativity (SRT) or a change in the meaning of such fundamental concepts of classical physics as "coordinate", "momentum", etc., during the transition to quantum. In SRT, the concept of mass acquires a property that the corresponding concept did not have in classical physics: dependence on velocity; concepts of coordinate and momentum in quantum mechanics are so different from similar concepts in classical mechanics that they can be consistently applied only in an additional way.

Changing the meaning of concepts gives rise to problems of two kinds. One of them belongs to the field of psychology of science. The non-invariance of the meaning of the same (by name) terms makes it difficult to understand between adherents of different paradigms, and therefore the question of communication between them becomes non-trivial. Another problem is epistemological and concerns the comparison of theories, the impossibility of which is precisely stated in TN1. Many researchers have noted, however, that contrary to the opinion of TN1 supporters, the change in the meaning of concepts is not an obstacle to comparing theories. If, following G. Frege, a distinction is made between the meaning (intensionality) and referentiality (extensionality) of a term, the problem becomes solvable. In establishing the relation of contradiction between the consequences of theories, which is required for the choice between theories, the stability of meaning is not necessary. If two theories have overlapping areas of applicability (in the case of two successive theories, this condition is satisfied), then, despite the change in the meaning of common terms, the consequences of these theories can be compared due to the fact that the terms have a common referentiality. Another difficulty is the absence of a language of observation neutral with respect to successive theories, which is really real in connection with the fact that these theories are used in the interpretation of the experimental result, which is intended to play the role of a test in relation to them. In a number of works, however, it was shown that in cognition there is a layer of empirical data, which, being theoretically loaded, nevertheless turns out to be neutral with respect to the compared theories, since other theories different from the compared theories participate in its interpretation. It is capable of playing the role of a language of observation that is neutral with respect to the theories being compared.

Thus, TH1 is too strong to correspond to the real process of cognition. Contrary to the assertions of the supporters of TN1, it is possible to compare theories already on an experimental basis. The incompleteness and ambiguity of such a comparison is partly compensated by the use of various non-empirical considerations, for example. comparative simplicity or various aesthetic considerations.

TH2 is a weaker version of TH1: the existence of only absolute criteria and evaluations is denied. And if TH1 is inadequate to scientific practice, then ΤΗ2 is justified with some reservations: there really are no absolute criteria and evaluations of theories. It makes no sense to raise the question which of the successive theories is "better", if we use this word in the sense of a greater correspondence of the "best" theory to some abstract, ahistorical standard for evaluating theories. The new theory is a more in-depth, accurate and specialized reconstruction of reality, and with this in mind, one can speak of progress in the development of scientific knowledge. But, remaining within the framework of scientific knowledge itself, it is impossible to indicate an unambiguous criterion of progress - for this, it is necessary to enter the area of ​​the relationship between theories and practical activities of people taken in their historical development.

Supporters of the thesis about the incommensurability of theories consider not only TH2, but also TH1 to be fair. Characteristic in this regard is the position of P. Feyerabend. Recognition as a fair TH1 serves as a basis for him to search for non-empirical standards for evaluating theories. P. Feyrabend points to a number of formal and informal criteria for comparing theories. However, he believes that these claims are largely subjective. Asserting on this basis the inevitability of the transformation of the evaluation and selection of theories from a routine procedure into a complex solution based on the struggle of opinions, preferences, etc., Feyerabend concludes that it is impossible to rationally reconstruct the process of changing fundamental scientific theories. In modern literature, this conclusion is subjected to thorough criticism.

Literature:

1. Kuhn T. The structure of scientific revolutions. M., 1975;

2. Porus V.N. Actual problems of the analysis of "scientific revolutions". - In the book: Analytical reviews foreign literature. M., 1983, p. 7–40;

3. Feyerabend P.K. Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism. – Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Explanation, Space and Time. Minneapolis, 1962, vol. 3, p. 28–97;

4. Putnam H. Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambr., 1979.

PSYCHOLOGY

Mazilov Vladimir Alexandrovich

Doctor of Psychology, Professor Yaroslavl State Pedagogical University named after I.I. K.D. Ushinsky

y. mazilo [email protected] org

PRINCIPLE OF COMPARABILITY OF THEORIES IN PSYCHOLOGY*

The article discusses the issue of the crisis of psychology, offers a level interpretation of the crisis. The subject of discussion is the question: is there a modern psychology the incommensurability of theories, as suggested by the public consciousness of modern domestic psychologists and believed by Thomas Kuhn. The principle of commensurability of theories is affirmed, a new interpretation of the subject of psychology is proposed.

Key words: psychology, methodology, subject of psychology, incommensurability, principle of theories commensurability.

Apparently, the great Carl Jung was right when he asserted that the time for global theories in psychology had not yet come. Although more than half a century has passed since then, the situation has not fundamentally changed. Perhaps, scientific psychologists should change the orientation of their developments - instead of trying to create a global "supertheory", move on to "normal" work on streamlining, correlating already obtained knowledge. It appears that scientific psychology has not yet fully realized the real extent of the wealth that has been accumulated by previous generations of scientific psychologists and really exists. True, in order to realize this, it is necessary to change the attitude.

In psychology, a huge amount of scientific material has indeed been accumulated, many hypotheses and theories have been put forward, and many concepts have been formulated. The main problem is the lack of real mutual correlation of different approaches and theories. It is especially important to emphasize that the point is not only in the "unwillingness" of psychologists to engage in scientific communication (which, we note, is also a considerable problem), but also in the absence of a real methodological apparatus that allows such a correlation to be made. We will talk about the development of the apparatus a little later, but for now let's turn to the problem of the attitude of psychologists to the work of colleagues.

We conducted a study that showed that in this regard, not everything is going well. It was revealed, in particular, that researchers are dominated by attitudes towards obtaining a new, original scientific product. Real integrative attitudes are minimally expressed. The most valuable in the works of their colleagues (in the eyes of the researchers themselves) are positive references to their own work and the use of the results obtained by other scientists. Interestingly, although really integrative attitudes are minimally expressed, at the level of declarations

The processes of integration in psychology are assessed extremely positively by psychologists themselves.

Thus, there are significant psychological obstacles on the way of integration, which are rooted in the ideas of research psychologists. The main thing is, strictly speaking, the need to change the methodological attitudes of the psychologists themselves. Implicit, often not realized by the researchers themselves, ideas about the development of psychological science work against integration. Let's explain this. According to widespread ideas, the development of science (in our case, psychology) proceeds from a particular theory to the construction of a more general one. Thus, the “more developed” concept “cancels” (“removes”, as psychologists-researchers often express it in their reports) the previous one (in our studies, in which well-known psychologists took part, interviewees give convincing examples that characterize their scientific worldview: theory Einstein "generalized" Newtonian physics, there are often references to the Hegelian model of development through negation, etc.). As a result, the scientific psychologist aims to create a common "universal" theory. Vygotsky's well-known description of the five stages of the "development of explanatory ideas" (for all its caricature) turns out to be quite adequate for today's science as well. Modern psychology is dominated by the “searching for differences” attitude (note that it is effectively supported by existing scientific norms: even from term paper(not to mention dissertations) scientific novelty is required, as a result of which the word “for the first time” is very easily used, which to a large extent contributes to purely “verbal” creativity (remember Goethe: “The buildings of theories are erected from naked words, furious and arguing. .."). Psychologists are accustomed to consider the work of others only as a precursor to the implementation of "their own" synthesis. So that what has been described does not seem like an exaggeration of colors, we will give a fragment from

* The work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, grant 12-06-00320.

another article by A.V. Yurevich. The past of psychology “usually appears as a collection of errors, a heap of artifacts, a web of dead-end lines of research, or, at best, as a disorderly accumulation of phenomenology, which is called upon to play the same preparatory role in relation to the psychology of the future that philosophy has played in relation to science. It is precisely because of this attitude to the past that psychological knowledge is not cumulative, and any new direction of psychological thought confidently sweeps aside all the previous ones, seeing in them only “cemeteries of phenomenology”, a background for emphasizing one’s own merits and illustrating the mistakes of others.

In our opinion, first of all, it is necessary to overcome one significant psychological obstacle. Strange as it may seem, it is connected with the methodological influence that the work of the famous science methodologist Thomas Kuhn had on the minds of many modern psychologists-researchers. We have in mind the wide resonance that the well-known statements of an outstanding historian and philosopher of science about the incommensurability of scientific theories received. (Below will be quotations from the classic work of T. Kuhn. The italics in these quotations are mine - V.M.).

The idea of ​​the incommensurability of theories was adopted and widely used by another philosopher and methodologist of science, Paul Feyerabend, but in the mind modern psychologists it is Kuhn who appears to be the ideologist of the incommensurability of theories. So, let's give the floor to T. Kuhn. We have already considered several different reasons why the defenders of competing paradigms fail to make full contact with the opposing point of view. Taken together, these reasons should be described as the incommensurability of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary normal scientific traditions, and we need only briefly summarize what has already been said here. First of all, advocates of competing paradigms often disagree on a list of problems to be solved by each paradigm candidate. Their standards or definitions of science are not the same." Thomas Kuhn continues: “However, it is about more than the incommensurability of standards. Because new paradigms are born out of old ones, they tend to absorb much of the vocabulary and techniques, both conceptual and experimental, that the traditional paradigm previously used. Within the framework of the new paradigm, old terms, concepts and experiments find themselves in new relationships with each other. The inevitable result is what we must call (although the term is not entirely correct) a misunderstanding between the two competing schools. According to Kuhn, there is also a "third and most

a fundamental aspect of competing paradigms. In a sense, which I am unable to elaborate further, the advocates of competing paradigms carry out their research in different worlds» . T. Kuhn summarizes: “Working in different worlds, two groups of scientists see things differently, although they observe them from the same position and look in the same direction. At the same time, it cannot be said that they can see what they want. Both groups look at the world, and what they look at does not change. But in some areas they see different things, and see them in different relation to each other. That is why a law that cannot even be discovered by one group of scientists sometimes turns out to be intuitively clear to another. For the same reason, before they can hope to fully communicate with each other, one or the other group must experience a metamorphosis, which we have previously called a paradigm shift. Precisely because it is a transition between incompatible structures, the transition between competing paradigms cannot be carried out step by step through logic and neutral experience. Like a gestalt switch, it must happen all at once (although not necessarily in one go) or not at all.

Let us note that usually those psychologists who accepted Kuhn's propositions speak of the incommensurability of theories in general, naively believing that this unconditionally applies to psychology. In our opinion, without sufficient grounds. Of course, the authority of Thomas Kuhn is extremely great, he is an outstanding thinker. Let us try to take a critical look at the extension of the conclusions of Kuhn's theory to psychology. Let us express some considerations, which, in our opinion, cast some doubt on the applicability of the ideas of the classic to the subject area of ​​psychology.

1. T. Kuhn's reasoning is based on examples and generalizations taken from the history of the natural sciences. No one has yet proved that these arguments are so universal that they can adequately represent the situation in the field of scientific psychology.

2. It is usually overlooked that the key moment for T. Kuhn's reasoning is the scientific revolution (remember the title of his work). Kuhn speaks precisely of the incommensurability of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary normal scientific traditions. In psychology, this is most often not the case, since psychology is clearly not a monoparadigm discipline. Therefore, the unconditional transfer of Kuhn's reasoning to the field of psychology is doubtful. (Moreover, if we take into account the inadequacy of the understanding of the subject by modern psychology,

grounds can be found for considering psychology as a pre-paradigm discipline. However, discussion of this issue here would take us away from the main topic, so we will find another place for this).

3. In psychology, we really have different theories of one phenomenon (their number is often in the tens). At the same time, we emphasize that the authors of the new theory do not set themselves the task of refuting other theories. They see the task rather in giving an adequate description and explanation of a psychic phenomenon. In this case, there is no need to talk about revolution. Therefore, we are naturally not talking about a transition between competing paradigms. Thus, in psychology, most often there is simply no task of refuting the old point of view; a new approach is being declared there.

4. Confrontation between paradigms is seen as a conscious process based on logic and neutral experience: the transition between competing paradigms cannot be made gradually step by step through logic and neutral experience. At this point, perhaps, there is a radical divergence between the natural sciences and psychology. The fact is that the number of "degrees of freedom" when considering mental phenomena is much greater than in any of the natural sciences. This is quite natural, if we take into account the complexity of the very object and subject of psychological science. Accordingly, there is a significant more possible aspects of the analysis. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that in the formulation of a theory, the most important role is played by processes unconscious by the researcher himself. We are talking about what will be described below in the framework of this article as a pre-theory - the initial ideas of the scientist. It precedes the research, is often not realized by the researcher at all and acts as an implicit basis for the research. It was revealed that the pre-theory plays a decisive role in conducting scientific research in the field of psychology.

5. As it becomes clear, T. Kuhn considers the confrontation between paradigms as a natural process of development of scientific knowledge. If we use the distinction between spontaneous and purposeful integration introduced above, we can assume that a situation is quite possible in which the work of correlating concepts is performed by a disinterested, neutral person - a methodologist or historian of science, i.e. becomes purposeful. It is logical to assume that in such work it becomes possible that which is inaccessible with spontaneous correlation. Especially if we remember that the procedure involves the identification of grounds that are not recognized by the researchers themselves.

6. Finally, let's pay attention to the fact that T. Kuhn proceeds from a clear analogy between Gestalt studies of perception and the transition from one paradigm to another. Indeed, it is well known, for example, that in the case of "double" images, it is impossible to see both images in the picture at the same time, the transition from one to the other is always sudden. In other words (looking ahead) we note that Thomas Kuhn uses these experiments as a modeling representation. But who said that this is the only and most adequate modeling representation for this case?

Thus, we believe that the fundamental incommensurability of theories and concepts in modern psychology has not been proven. On the contrary, in our opinion, the principle of commensurability of theories is valid. If there is a developed tool of communicative methodology that allows you to correlate theories of the same level, it is possible to correlate theories. We will talk about this below.

Let us repeat that, in our opinion, what is required today from psychologists is a clear understanding of the fact that it is unlikely that universal concepts will be developed. As Jung repeatedly said, the time for universal concepts in psychology has not yet come. Therefore, when creating a scientific theory, it is worth remembering that it must have its own scope, the zone of "adequacy". We need an installation for cooperation, for cooperation. In other words, psychologists must develop tolerance for the views of colleagues, form a mindset not to look for differences, but to find similarities.

We assume that such conclusions will cause accusations of plotting by some colleagues. Assessing the prospects of such an approach (we note that it was formulated much softer than in this text), one of her colleagues compared it with the well-known method of pulling oneself out of the swamp, once proposed by Baron Munchausen. The character is quite nice (especially in the brilliant performance of Oleg Ivanovich Yankovsky in the wonderful television film by Mark Anatolyevich Zakharov), so we will believe and smile. I don’t want to share such pessimism about the change in the mentality of colleagues in the shop, because, according to the well-known statement of Pope Pius VI (on a different occasion, of course), the problem has two solutions: real, if the Lord intervenes, and fantastic, if the parties agree. Dreams sometimes come true. I would like to believe that sooner or later psychologists will understand each other better.

In conclusion, we note that changing the attitudes of members of the psychological community is a long and difficult process. Another way to improve real mutual understanding is seen in the systematic, purposeful work of methodologists and historians of psychology to correlate different approaches,

theories and concepts. Cognitive methodology can serve as a tool for such work.

Let us formulate the essence of our approach. There are various approaches to the study of any phenomenon in the field of psychology. Traditionally, they are considered as incomparable, therefore, at best, we are talking about the coexistence of approaches. We believe that when using a special methodological apparatus, additional “points of contact” can be found and “incomparable” concepts will turn out to be comparable to a much greater extent than is usually imagined.

The task, in our opinion, is feasible if the general scheme of psychological research acts as a basis for comparison. The scheme includes the following structural components: problem, subject of psychology, objectified problem, pre-theory, method (including three levels: ideological, subject and procedural), empirical material, explanation (including an explanatory category, explanation itself, assuming a level structure), theory as research result. We emphasize that this research scheme is “closed”, i.e. theory is the basis for posing a new problem. Thus, the tool for comparing and correlating various psychological concepts is the general cognitive methodology.

The general methodology of psychology is a consistent concept that treats the problems of the subject, method, explanation, theory, etc. in their relationship. Without taking into account such a relationship, in our opinion, no significant further progress can be achieved in the development of these (and many other) most important methodological issues of modern psychology. Such a methodology can be called the integrative cognitive methodology of psychological science.

In our opinion, on this basis it is possible to compare theories, which in reality turn out to be commensurable. Naturally, we are talking about a comparison of theories of the same level and the same phenomenon. A special role in the correlation procedure is assigned to the pre-theory. The fact is that the pre-theory is usually poorly understood by the researcher himself, so its content, as a rule, remains implicit. It is supposed to carry out special methodological procedures explicating the structure and content of the pre-theory. An element-by-element comparison of the content of the pre-theories of the compared concepts, as well as other components presented in the scheme of psychological research, makes it possible to identify "points of contact" and "zones of divergence", which is fundamentally important for correlating the compared concepts.

We believe that the further development of cognitive methodology will contribute to the advancement in the understanding of the psyche and the conduct of new research.

Another problem that I would like to dwell on in the framework of this article is, surprisingly, the problem of the subject of psychology. Let us pay attention to the fact that the main methodological problem is the development of a new understanding of the subject of psychology. This idea needs an explanation. Let's try to do it. It is important to understand the difference between the subject of science and the subject of specific research. With the subject of a particular study, no one has significant difficulties: say, dissertators quite successfully determine it and defend the results of the studies. And with the subject of science - the problem. Both the researcher in the field of psychophysics and the researcher in the field of transpersonal psychology represent one science - psychology. Now one gets the impression that these are representatives of completely different sciences, because. they are all different. Therefore, the understanding of the subject of psychology should be such that there is a place in it for both one and the other. Only such an understanding will make it possible to combine the achievements of psychologists from different schools and directions. Without such an understanding, it is impossible to generalize the vast arrays of knowledge accumulated in psychology. This is a very difficult task. Incidentally, it is common to Russian and world psychology (despite all the differences in approaches to the study of the psyche). Correlation and ordering of the available material on the basis of a new understanding will allow psychology to become fundamental science. In solving this problem, two aspects, or rather, two stages of its solution, can be distinguished. The first stage is a formal description of the subject (what functions it should perform, what criteria it must meet). This work has largely been done. The second stage is the content content of the concept "subject of psychology". Work is already being done in this direction. What exactly will this new item be called? It seems that the most successful is the term "inner world of man". It is he who allows, in our opinion, to carry out meaningful content, accommodating the entire psychic reality in full. Many methodological problems of psychology are generated by the unresolved main thing - the development of a new understanding of the subject.

Bibliographic list

1. Kuhn T. Structure of scientific revolutions // Structure of scientific revolutions. - M.: AST, 2003. - 310 p.

2. Mazilov V.A. On the subject of psychology // Methodology and history of psychology: Scientific journal. - 2006. - T. 1. - Issue. 1. - S. 55-72.

3. Mazilov VA. Actual methodological problems of modern psychology // Yaroslavl Pedagogical Bulletin. - 2013. - V. 2. - No. 2. - S. 149-155.

4. Mazilov V.A. Methodology of Modern Psychology: Actual Problems // Siberian Psychology

chological journal. - 2013. - No. 50. - S. 8-16.

5. Mazilov V.A. Perspectives of paradigm synthesis in modern psychology // Yaroslavl Pedagogical Bulletin. - 2013. - T. 2. - No. 3. -S. 186-194.

UDC 159.9:316.6

Dymova Ekaterina Nikolaevna Kharlamenkova Natalia Evgenievna

Doctor of Psychology, Professor Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow [email protected], [email protected]

AMBIVALENCE OF CONCEPTS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY IN CONDITIONS OF RIGID REGULATION OF SOCIAL ROLES*

The relevance of the study of the problem of psychological security of the individual is to identify specific mechanisms for adapting a person to difficult life circumstances. The purpose of the study is to analyze ideas about psychological safety and social support in the context of strict regulation of social roles.

Key words: psychological safety, representation, ambivalence, social support, conscripts.

In domestic psychology, the problem of the psychological security of the individual has been posed quite recently and continues to be acutely relevant. Social conflicts, terrorism, stress are becoming an almost daily occurrence in the life of a modern person and naturally stimulate research that studies the consequences of the influence of these factors on the mental well-being and security of the individual. It is considered true that the need for security depends on the conditions surrounding a person, circumstances that, however, affect him not directly, but indirectly, refracting through a system of internal factors, personal characteristics.

The need for a systematic study of psychological security is caused by the lack of a precise definition of this phenomenon and the difficulty of isolating this term from a variety of concepts that are close in meaning. In addition, until now, the problem of psychological security has been studied within the framework of individual disciplines, such as, for example, labor psychology, social psychology (family psychology), etc., and it was not possible to construct a general theoretical model of the psychological security of an individual.

Based on the results of our research, a new variable was included in the empirical model of the psychological security of the individual - a change in social status.

tusa (military service), which made it possible to regulate the level of risks of psychological security and observe the change in ideas about it depending on various social conditions, in particular, depending on the rigidity of the regulation of social roles. This study contributes not only to the theory of the psychological safety of the individual, but also to the study of the problem of socio-psychological adaptation of conscripts, making it possible to identify specific mechanisms of adaptation to difficult life circumstances. This is all the more important in light of the trend we found: most of the studies conducted on different samples of conscript soldiers are devoted to the study of mental illness, including schizophrenia, anxiety, depression, as well as such phenomena as bullying and hazing. Of the closest to the present problem, one can note the study of personality traits and coping behavior in stressful situations, as well as work devoted to the study of risk and safety attitudes and their relationship with leadership and group cohesion.

The condition in which conscripts are located can be considered as ambiguous: on the one hand, it can be assessed as stressful, and on the other hand, as mobilizing forces, requiring a person to demonstrate endurance, resilience, and stress resistance. Reveal this ambivalence, show the duality

Scientific revolution is a type of innovation in science, which differs from other types, not only in its characteristics and mechanisms of genesis, but in its significance and consequences for the development of science and culture. There are 2 main features of scientific revisions: 1. N. revisions are associated with the restructuring of the main scientific traditions. 2. N. revisions affect the worldview and methodological foundations of science, changing the style of thinking. Kuhn says that when a scientific revolution takes place, the view of the world changes. N. revolutions go beyond the region where they occurred and have an impact on changing the view of the world as a whole. N. revolutions differ in scale: 1. Global districts that form a completely new view of the world (Ptolemy-Copernicus; Newton-Einstein) 2. Revolutions in individual fundamental sciences that transform their foundations, but do not containing a global world revolution (opening electromagnetic field) 3. Mikrorev-tion - the essence of which is the creation of new theories in scientific. region (psychology, behaviorism, modern humanist psychology). There are 3 types of roars, thanks to which what changes and what opens: 1 kind. construction of new fundamental theories (Copernicus, Newton, Einstein, Freud, etc.) Features of this type are a) central to a given group of theoretical concepts that determine the face of science in a given period. B) this revision concerns not only scientific ideas, but also changes thinking, touches on mental and methodological problems (Darwin's theory turned out to be applicable in biology, sociology, anthropology and even linguistics) 2 kind. The introduction of new methods of research, new methods lead to far-reaching consequences, changing problems, standards of scientific work, opening up new areas of knowledge (the appearance of a microscope, telescope, etc.) 3 kind. Discovery of new worlds (new subject areas) - the world of microorganisms and viruses; atoms and molecules; crystals; radioactivity; unconscious). Understanding what is happening re-tion does not happen immediately (for example, the teachings of Freud). The problem of commensurability of theories. N.rev-tions give rise to the question of the commensurability of old and new knowledge. In the cumulative theory, everything was clear, knowledge accumulates and does not disappear anywhere, they were considered valuable. Kuhn refuted the idea of ​​comparability of theories, the idea of ​​incommensurability of theories, saying that supporters of different paradigms see the world differently, therefore theories are incommensurable, and interpretations of facts cannot be brought to some common basis. Feyerabent also develops the idea of ​​incommensurability, saying that the same concepts have different meanings in different theories. In the modern world, the idea of ​​incommensurability is criticized, because there are cross-cutting problems in science, despite the change of paradigms. A new theory always grows out of old problems, out of its achievements and its failures. Succession of scientific theories are preserved in science at the level of the mathematical apparatus, at the level of concepts and facts. The history of science shows that often the old theory is related to the new one as a special case, but according to the principle of complementarity. does not have a universal solution, the relationship between the new and the old develops its own character. Speaking of succession, we can talk about traditions. Tradition - generally accepted models of production, organization of knowledge, traditions contribute to rapid development science. The succession of the traditions of noun. in 2 types: 1. in the form of texts 2. in the form of systemic scientific values ​​about the production of knowledge, its transfer (how to do science, how). Poloni said that the explicit and implicit knowledge, Traditions can exist in explicit knowledge and in implicit, that the transfer occurs during the live interaction of scientists. Scientific leaders are of tremendous value, being carriers of scientific knowledge and being carriers of techniques.