On the early stages war, the German leadership had every chance to capture Leningrad. And yet, this did not happen. The fate of the city, in addition to the courage of its inhabitants, was decided by many factors.

Initially, the Barbarossa plan involved the rapid capture of the city on the Neva by the North army group, but there was no unity among the German command: some Wehrmacht generals believed that the city needed to be captured, while others, including the chief of the general staff, Franz Halder, assumed that you can get by with the blockade.

In early July 1941, Halder made the following entry in his diary: "The 4th Panzer Group must set up barriers from the north and south of Lake Peipus and cordon off Leningrad." This record does not yet allow us to say that Halder decided to limit himself to blockade the city, but the mention of the word "cordon" already tells us that he did not plan to take the city right away.

Hitler himself advocated the capture of the city, guided in this case by economic rather than political aspects. The German army needed the possibility of unhindered navigation in the Baltic Gulf.

The Soviet command understood the importance of the defense of Leningrad, after Moscow it was the most important political and economic center of the USSR. The city housed the Kirov Machine-Building Plant, which produced the latest heavy tanks of the KV type, which played an important role in the defense of Leningrad. And the very name - "City of Lenin" - did not allow it to be handed over to the enemy.

So, both sides understood the importance of capturing the Northern capital. The Soviet side began the construction of fortified areas in places of possible attacks by German troops. The most powerful, in the Luga region, included more than six hundred bunkers and bunkers. In the second week of July, the German 4th Panzer Group reached this line of defense and could not immediately overcome it, and here the German plan for the Leningrad blitzkrieg collapsed.

Hitler, unhappy with the delay offensive operation and constant requests for reinforcements from Army Group North, personally visited the front, making it clear to the generals that the city should be taken and as soon as possible.

As a result of the Fuhrer's visit, the Germans regrouped their forces and in early August broke through the Luga line of defense, rapidly capturing Novgorod, Shiimsk, and Chudovo. By the end of the summer, the Wehrmacht achieved maximum success in this sector of the front and blocked the last railway going to Leningrad.

By the beginning of autumn, it seemed that Leningrad was about to be taken, but Hitler, who focused on the plan to capture Moscow and believed that with the capture of the capital, the war against the USSR would be practically won, ordered the transfer of the most combat-ready tank and infantry units from Army Group North. near Moscow. The nature of the battles near Leningrad immediately changed: if earlier the German units sought to break through the defenses and capture the city, now the first task was to destroy industry and infrastructure.

The withdrawal of troops proved to be a fatal mistake for Hitler's plans. The remaining troops for the offensive were not enough, and the encircled Soviet units, having learned about the confusion of the enemy, tried with all their might to break through the blockade. As a result, the Germans had no choice but to go on the defensive, limiting themselves to indiscriminate shelling of the city from distant positions. There was no question of a further offensive, the main task was to preserve the siege ring around the city. In this situation, the German command had three options:

1. Taking the city after the completion of the encirclement;
2. The destruction of the city with the help of artillery and aircraft;
3. An attempt to deplete the resources of Leningrad and force him to surrender.

Hitler initially had the highest hopes for the first option, but he underestimated the importance of Leningrad to the Soviets, as well as the resilience and courage of its inhabitants.

The second option, according to experts, was a failure on its own - the density of air defense systems in some areas of Leningrad (taking into account the funds of the fleet withdrawn to Leningrad from Tallinn and in general from the entire Baltic) was 5-8 times higher than the then air defense density of Berlin and London, and the number of guns used by the Germans did not allow fatal damage to the infrastructure of the city. Although the Germans tried.

Thus, the third option remained Hitler's last hope for taking the city. It resulted in two years and five months of bitter confrontation.

By mid-September 1941, the German army completely surrounded the city. The bombing did not stop: civilian objects became targets: food warehouses, large food industry plants.

From June 1941 to October 1942, many residents of the city were evacuated from Leningrad. At first, however, very reluctantly, because no one believed in a protracted war, and even more so they could not imagine how terrible the blockade and battles for the city on the Neva would be. The children were evacuated to Leningrad region, but not for long - most of these territories were soon captured by the Germans and many children were returned back.

Now the main enemy of the USSR in Leningrad was hunger. It was he, according to Hitler's plans, who was to play a decisive role in the surrender of the city. In an attempt to establish a food supply, the Red Army repeatedly attempted to break through the blockade, organized "partisan convoys" that delivered food to the city right across the front line.

The leadership of Leningrad also made every effort to fight hunger. In November and December 1941, terrible for the population, active construction of enterprises producing food substitutes began. For the first time in history, bread was baked from cellulose and sunflower oil cake, in the production of semi-finished meat products they began to actively use by-products that no one would have thought of using in food production before.

In the winter of 1941, food rations hit a record low: 125 grams of bread per person. The issuance of other products was practically not carried out. The city was on the verge of extinction. The cold also became a severe test, the temperature dropped to -32 Celsius. And the negative temperature kept in Leningrad for 6 months. In the winter of 1941-1942, a quarter of a million people died.

The first months of the siege, the Germans shelled Leningrad from artillery almost without hindrance. They transferred to the city the heaviest guns they had, mounted on railway platforms, these guns were capable of firing at a distance of up to 28 km, with 800-900 kilogram shells. In response to this, the Soviet command began to deploy a counter-battery fight, detachments of reconnaissance and saboteurs were formed, who discovered the location of the Wehrmacht's long-range artillery. Significant assistance in organizing the counter-battery fight was provided by the Baltic Fleet, whose naval artillery hit the German artillery formations from the flanks and rear.

In addition to the Germans, Finns, Swedes, Italian and Spanish units participated in the siege. Spain did not officially participate in the war against Soviet Union, with the exception of the volunteer Blue Division. There are different opinions about her. Some note the steadfastness of its fighters, others - a complete lack of discipline and mass desertion, soldiers often went over to the side of the Red Army. Italy provided torpedo boats, but their land operations were unsuccessful.

The final collapse of the plan to capture Leningrad came on January 12, 1943, it was at that moment that the Soviet command launched Operation Iskra, and after 6 days of fierce fighting, on January 18, the blockade was broken. Immediately after this, a railway was laid to the besieged city, later called the "Road of Victory" and also known as the "Corridor of Death". The road passed so close to the front line that the German units fired cannons at the trains. However, a flood of supplies and food went into the city.

The blockade continued for almost a year, but the crisis had already been overcome.

So why didn't the Germans enter Leningrad?

This question has bugged me for a very long time. I remember that in the 1950s I discovered an interesting thing for myself: in the city center there was no destruction from the war, there were only “scratches” on the houses. Those. ALL buildings stood intact. But on the southern outskirts (near the Narva Gates) there were solid ruins, and only residential buildings.

Alexey Kungurov in his article"On Mathematics and Historical Reality" exploring this issue, draws attention to why the Kirov plant worked:
“It is known that the Kirov plant worked all the time of the blockade. The fact is also known - he was 3 (three !!!) kilometers from the front line. For people who did not serve in the army, I will say that a bullet from a Mosin rifle can fly at such a distance if you shoot in the right direction (I just keep quiet about larger-caliber artillery pieces).
From the area of ​​the Kirov factoryevacuated residents , but the plant continued to work under the very noses of the German command, and it was never destroyed.
Now, on the former front line, there is a T-34 tank on a pedestal. It is very close to Avtovo metro station built in 1955. I don’t know if the Kirov Plant was bombed or not, but here’s the shipbuilding plant named after. Marty (on Repin Square) was not bombed, but they were constantly shelled. Workers in the workshop were killed by shrapnel right at the machines. The plant then did not build new ships, only repaired crippled ones.
The Germans had no order to occupy Leningrad. Von Leib, commander of the Army of the North, was a competent and experienced commander. He had up to 40 divisions under his command (including tank divisions).Front in front of Leningrad was 70 km long. The density of troops reached the level of 2-5 km per division in the direction of the main attack.
In such a situation, only historians who do not understand anything in military affairs can say that in these conditions he could not take the city. We have repeatedly seen in feature films about the defense of Leningrad how German tankers enter the suburbs, crush and shoot a tram. The front was broken, and there was no one ahead of them. In their memoirs, Von Leib and many other commanders of the German army claimed that they were forbidden to take the city, they were ordered to withdraw from advantageous positions ...
And at the same time there is a struggle for the mastery of the city of Murmansk. Here the German troops bombed from the heart. So why was Hitler so determined to capture Murmansk? After all, he did not reckon with any losses. And even, in the most difficult periods of the war for him, he preferred to transfer troops from Africa, but did not remove them from the Murmansk direction.
Tens of thousands of people died in the Murmansk direction and in the city itself. Why, then, did the Soviet command send their soldiers to the death with such persistence, did not take into account any losses, protecting the bare hills? What was defended - the Kola Bay? But the allied convoys were also unloaded in Arkhangelsk (only with lesser losses).
These are questions to which official history does not and will not give answers.
Contrary to all Soviet propaganda, Hitler was not a fool, and there were pretty good reasons for all these actions of his army. Everyone already knows his desire to know the origins of the Aryan race and obtain evidence that it is the Germans who are their descendants. He needed evidence of this and artifacts. He was looking for traces of Hyperborea and not only traces, but also technologies.
Of course, he was well acquainted with the results of the Barchenko expedition, he probably knew that the NKVD had “staken out” a large area of ​​​​the territory, fencing with barbed wire and establishing a serious guard. So that's where you should be looking. This is where the persistence in the fight for Murmansk came from.
In Murmansk, rocks and all possible artifacts are stored in the rocks. Therefore, it was possible to safely bomb the city without fear of destroying the archives of Hyperborea. But with Peter, everything is much more complicated.
So why didn't Hitler give the order to enter the city?
And all because Hitler knew very well that what he needed was very well and reliably guarded, and not only by people. It was the same as in Murmansk, i.e. ancient artifacts. Under St. Petersburg there are many ancient tunnels built by the real builders of the city, many entrances. One entrance was under the Winter Palace. The tunnel went under the Neva to the Peter and Paul Fortress, and the Romanovs often used it, riding in a carriage.
Unknown subway of the Romanov family

For many years, from generation to generation, the inhabitants of Tsarskoye Selo have been passing on stories about mysterious dungeons and tunnels. Members of the royal family used underground passages for secret business meetings and secret rendezvous with lovers, and during the time of Nicholas 2, secret construction of the Imperial Metro was carried out in Tsarskoye Selo.

In the palace parks today they find bars that enclose nothing, doors that cannot be opened, stairs leading to nowhere. Perhaps this is the passage to the underground railway...

For the first time the idea of ​​building a subway was expressed in Russia during the reign of Catherine II. The underground passages dug in Tsarskoye Selo, connecting the Catherine Palace with a number of buildings in the city, allowed Her Majesty, without advertising her visits, to appear at any end of Tsarskoye Selo at any time of the day or night. The idea of ​​creating underground conveyors and elevators was also in the air. She seemed bulky, but the Empress liked her very much.
Naturally, these tunnels were made by the ancient builders of St. Petersburg and are most likely part of a large branched system of underground structures. What was "discovered" in Tsarskoye Selo was the clearing of ready-made tunnels, their restoration and modernization with the laying of a railroad.

Abandoned storm well in the landscape part of the Alexander Park. There is another, if you draw a direct direction to the village of Aleksandrovka. Photo 2004

Construction management was entrusted to Senator N.P. Garin, who for some time replaced the Minister of War and oversaw military-technical programs in the Ministry of War.
Construction began with the fact that in May 1905 the public was strictly forbidden to freely visit the Alexander and Farmer parks in Tsarskoye Selo. Solid wire fences and outposts were installed around the park arrays. The Okhrana spread rumors that colossal construction work was underway in the parks in connection with preparations for the tercentenary of the reigning Romanov dynasty.
For eight years, in conditions of strict secrecy, 120 trucks removed hundreds of tons of soil per day from here. Four hundred carts brought food at night and took out workers, for whose accommodation two-story barracks were erected in the village of Aleksandrovskaya. The lion's share of the excavated soil was taken out by a freight single-track, later the soil began to be taken out to the right bank of the Kuzminka River near Aleksandrovskaya station.
In 1912, security measures were strengthened and a second strip of barbed wire was put into operation, through which current was passed. A month before the commissioning of the facility, unprecedented work was launched on the surface to cover up traces. Alexander Park was actually rebuilt.
And eight years later, during the celebration on the territory of the imperial parks, distinguished guests did not find any traces of the work being done here in 1905. The strange top-secret facility in Tsarskoye Selo, worth 15 million gold rubles, remained the most secret in the world. Russian Empire until March 1917.
On March 19, 1917, a group of warrant officers of the Tsarskoye Selo garrison discovered a pit leading to a deep dungeon. What they saw shocked the imagination of the ensigns. At a depth of eight meters, a wide single-track was laid in the belly of a three-meter-high concrete tunnel. In a small depot, an electric trolley with two trailed carriages for twenty seats, according to the number of members, rusted. royal family and retinues.
Electric cables were visible everywhere along the walls, small searchlights in the side aisles illuminated the entire underground space from the cellars of the Catherine Palace to the village of Alexandrovskaya, where an electric trolley lift with its contents was mounted. The total width of the central tunnel with side passages was 12 meters.
To supply electricity in Tsarskoye Selo, the so-called palace power plant was built. The electrical engineer A.P. Smorodin.
The station was built with a huge reserve of power for purposes far from the power supply of Tsarskoye Selo palaces, the city and the garrison. The two-story Moorish-style building at the corner of Tserkovnaya and Malaya streets was placed in such a way as to power not only the already open tunnels, but also new ones planned within the city limits and under the military camp of the Tsarskoye Selo garrison troops.
The secret object began with a strange house number 14 on Pushkinskaya Street (in those days, Kolpinskaya). A two-story wooden house has long attracted attention with a strange brick extension with one window along the main facade and a narrow tower from the courtyard, which had communication only with the second floor of the building. During the time of Catherine II, her secret chambers were located here. Through the underground passage, the empress could reach this house without being noticed by anyone. Here she conducted especially secret, confidential negotiations.

The system of side tunnels of the royal subway turned it into an underground hub with its own gold storage, a network of wide tunnels capable of accommodating troops to suppress the revolutionary elements and save the royal family. Every hundred meters of the tunnel there were round brick columns - kingstones, so that, if necessary, water from the ponds of Alexander Park could flood everything in a matter of minutes.
By May 1, 1917, all the side tunnels of the most secret object in Russia were explored and looted, including the gold depository of the Romanov House near Parnassus and under the building of the Chinese Theater. While the royal family was kept under house arrest in the Alexander Palace, she had some, if not great, chance to escape through the subway tunnels. Alas, the secret of the Tsarskoye Selo metro ceased to be a secret before the escape of the Romanovs was planned.
Engineer L. B. Krasin, who was appointed director of the Tsarskoye Selo palace power plant in the name of the revolution, spoke about the attempt to free the royal family to V. I. Lenin.

- Someday we will take a swing and build a subway under the Moscow Kremlin, Ilyich dropped with a devilish gleam in his eyes and explained that the Germans demanded the transfer of the Russian capital to Moscow.
And again the question arises: why did they need it?
Tsarskoye Selo was occupied by the Nazi troops, completely looted and destroyed.

6. Hitler's barbaric plan to destroy Leningrad and its inhabitants

On July 8, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces F. Halder wrote in his diary: “The Fuhrer’s decision to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground is unshakable in order to completely get rid of the population of these cities, which otherwise we will then be forced to feed during the winter . The task of destroying these cities must be carried out by aviation. Tanks should not be used for this. This will be a “people's disaster” that will deprive not only Bolshevism of centers, but also Muscovites (Russians) in general.” However, then Hitler constantly demanded from his subordinates to capture Leningrad as soon as possible and even appointed specific dates for its capture. But when the defenders of Leningrad stopped the German troops advancing on the city, the Nazi command was confused. Not only the command of Army Group North was confused, but the entire high command of the Wehrmacht. Having failed to fulfill Hitler's order to capture Leningrad, but being on the outskirts of the city, it did not know what to do. Lacking instructions from Hitler, it did not know how to deal with a city of millions that could be seen through binoculars. He was especially worried about what to do if a proposal was received from Leningrad to surrender the city. Here is what is recorded in the combat log of Army Group North:

September 15th. The commander of the Army Group "North" Leeb asks the command of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht "what to do in the event of a proposal to surrender Leningrad."

September 17th. “What should be done with the city itself: should its surrender be accepted, should it be completely destroyed, or should it starve to death? On this score, unfortunately, there is still no decision of the Fuhrer.

September 18th. Keitel, who arrived at Army Group North, said: “What to do with Leningrad in the event of its surrender - the Fuhrer reserves. It will only become known after we enter it! Colonel General Halder recommends equipping the entire blockade line with all means of protection against breakthrough attempts (mines, setting up barriers), since stubborn attempts to break through should definitely be reckoned with. The surrender of Leningrad should in no case be accepted without discussion with the OKH. How will the offer to surrender, it is only necessary to establish: who applies, what does he ask for, what powers does he have? Based on this, a decision by the OKH (OKW) should be made quickly.”

September 20th. “With regard to the city of Leningrad, the same principle remains that we do not enter the city and that we cannot feed the city.”

On September 21, the Wehrmacht’s defense department issued abstracts for a report on the blockade of Leningrad, which outlined various options for possible actions in relation to Leningrad: 1) take the city, but do not take responsibility for the food supply of the population; 2) surround the city with a wire fence, launching electricity and shooting him with machine guns. The disadvantage of this decision was that out of 2 million inhabitants, the weak would die of starvation and an epidemic would arise, the danger of which could spread to the German troops; 3) take women, children and the elderly outside the blockade ring, and starve the rest. Negative side this option, not to mention the fact that the evacuation beyond the river. Volkhov could be carried out only theoretically, it was believed that the rest of the starving population of Leningrad would be the focus of the epidemic; 4) move back across the Neva and provide the area north of this section at the disposal of the Finns. But Finland unofficially stated, the theses say, that she would like her state border to run along the Neva, not including Leningrad.

Having outlined these options for reprisals against the population of Leningrad, the country's defense department, summarizing that "there is no satisfactory solution," in turn proposed the following: to America. But, the theses said, “such a proposal, of course, cannot be accepted, but it can be used for propaganda purposes ..., b) first we block Leningrad (hermetically) and destroy the city, if possible, with artillery and aircraft ..., c) when terror and famine will do their job, we will open separate gates and release unarmed people, d) the remnants of the “fortress garrison” will remain there for the winter. In the spring we will penetrate the city ... we will take out everything that remains alive into the depths of Russia or take it prisoner, raze Leningrad to the ground and transfer the area north of the Neva to Finland.

But the hesitation did not last long. Already on September 29, part of the proposals of the country's defense department found a binding wording. In the directive of the naval headquarters " O the future of the city of St. Petersburg" said: "The Fuhrer decided to wipe the city of St. Petersburg from the face of the earth. After the defeat of Soviet Russia, there is no interest in the continued existence of this large settlement ... It is proposed to blockade the city closely and raze it to the ground by shelling from artillery of all calibers and continuous bombing from the air. If, as a result of the situation that has developed in the city, requests for surrender are made, they will be rejected, since the problems of preserving the population and their food cannot and should not be resolved by us. On our part, in this war, which is being waged not for life, but for death, there is no interest in preserving at least part of the population of this large city.

But Hitler's order not to storm Leningrad, but to wipe it off the face of the earth, caused misunderstanding and disappointment in the German troops approaching the city. “... when the troops were already looking forward to the triumph of a well-deserved victory,” Reinhardt, the commander of the 41st tank corps, recalled, “like a cold shower from the headquarters of the tank group, the news came that instead of storming Leningrad there would be a blockade ... At the very last minute, the soldiers who did everything for victory, deprived the crown of the victors. This forced Hitler to repeat his decision, and most importantly, to explain to the officers and the whole world why he refused to storm Leningrad. The directive of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command dated October 7, signed by Jodl, Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Operational Command, stated: “The Führer again decided that the surrender of Leningrad, and later Moscow, should not be accepted even if it were proposed by the enemy.

The moral legitimacy of this event is clear to the whole world. If in Kyiv the explosions of delayed-action mines created the greatest danger for the troops, then this must be taken into account to an even greater extent in Moscow and Leningrad. The fact that Leningrad was mined and would be defended to the last man was reported by Russian radio itself.

Great dangers from epidemics are to be expected. Therefore, no German soldier should enter these cities. Whoever leaves the city against our lines must be driven back by fire.

Small unguarded passages that make it possible for the population to leave one by one for evacuation to the interior of Russia should only be welcomed. And for all other cities, the rule should be that before they are occupied, they should be reduced to ruins by artillery fire and air raids, and the population put to flight.

It is unacceptable to risk the life of a German soldier to save Russian cities from fire, just as it is impossible to feed their population at the expense of the German homeland ...

The chaos in Russia will become all the greater, and our administration and use of the occupied eastern regions the easier, the more the population of the cities of Soviet Russia will flee to the interior regions of Russia.

This will of the Fuhrer must be communicated to all commanders."

It turns out that it was the mined Leningrad and the unwillingness to risk the life of a German soldier that forced Hitler to abandon the capture. In fact, Leningrad was not taken by the German troops, not because it was mined, but because (and this has already been said above) that the German troops were stopped by the defenders of Leningrad. For the same reason, the plan to capture Leningrad failed miserably in 1942, when Hitler, “forgetting” that Leningrad was mined, ordered Field Marshal Manstein, a specialist in taking fortresses, to capture the city.

It is quite clear that the directives of the Hitlerite command of September 29 and October 7 to wipe Leningrad off the face of the earth, reflecting the essence of fascism, are a de facto recognition of the failure of Hitler's plans to capture Leningrad.

But, speaking of Hitler's directives on the destruction of Leningrad, it should be said about what is written about this in the diary notes of Leeb, who was supposed to follow Hitler's instructions. Leeb, as commander of Army Group North, did not personally receive Hitler's directives on the destruction of Leningrad. This is how he learned about the directive of the naval headquarters "On the future of the city of St. Petersburg" of September 29. To the question - “The command of the Navy in its letter to you informs that Hitler decided to wipe Leningrad off the face of the earth. What do you know about this?" - Leeb replied: “Apparently, the command of the Navy was interested in knowing what would happen to the offshore facilities in Leningrad? The command of the Navy asked Hitler about this, having received the answer you voiced, and forwarded this answer to me. It said that Hitler decided to raze Leningrad to the ground. I have never received such an order myself. But even if I had received such an order, I would never have been able to fulfill it, because, firstly, I did not have artillery at all capable of leveling Leningrad to the ground, and secondly, there was even less ammunition for it, and, thirdly, with the available artillery, I could not reach the northern part of the city due to their range of action, and, fourthly, I did not have a single bomber. It was one of Hitler's unrealizable fantasies, even if I had received such an order.

The directive of 7 October, as recorded in the combat log of Army Group North, was transmitted on 12 October. But in connection with some of the requirements of this directive, questions arose at the headquarters of the army group, which Leeb even asked Hitler.

On October 24, the war diary of Army Group North wrote: “The question arises of how to behave if the city of Leningrad offers its surrender, and how to treat the exit of the starving population from the city. One gets the impression that this is a great concern for the troops. The commander of the 58th Infantry Division emphasized that he had issued an order in his division, received from above, which corresponded to the directive given - to shoot in the event of such breakthroughs in order to nip them in the bud. He was of the opinion that the troops would carry out this order. But he doubts their nerves: whether they will shoot again and again at women, children and defenseless old people during repeated breakthroughs. It is worth noting his response that he has no fear for the general situation on his flank near Uritsk, but that the situation in relation to the civilian population always causes fear. And this is not only with him, but also with the troops. The troops are fully aware that the millions of people surrounded in Leningrad cannot be fed by us in such a way that this does not subsequently affect the provision of food for their own country.

For this reason, the German soldier will prevent such breakthroughs with the use of weapons. The command and troops are stubbornly striving to find another solution to this issue, but have not yet found any suitable way. On October 27, the combat journal of Army Group North recorded: “At 1715, a telegram from the commander of the group to the 18th Army ... The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces proposed creating minefields in front of his positions in order to save the troops from a direct fight with the civilian population. If the "Red" troops surrender in the region of Leningrad and Kronstadt, and their weapons are collected, the commander of the army group sees no more reason to continue the blockade of the city. The troops should then be transferred to the barracks. Also in this case, most of the population will die, but at least not before our eyes.

In addition, the possibility of withdrawing part of the population from the city along the road to Volkhovstroy should be considered.

And at the twelfth trial of the fifth American military tribunal in the case of the Supreme High Command of the Nazi Wehrmacht, which took place in Nuremberg in 1948, at which Leeb was tried, Leeb's tapped telephone conversation with Hitler was voiced. Leeb asked Hitler: "What should happen if one day women begin to accumulate in front of the barbed wire, lifting children in their arms?" Hitler replied: "In this case, fire will be opened." Leeb said: “It may happen once, but it won't happen again. German soldiers do not shoot women and children. For the first time, a precedent will be set when the troops will refuse to obey and there will be a crisis of discipline with dire consequences.

The fact that one could not count on any indulgence of the Nazis is evidenced by the words of Hitler, expressed by him on September 16, 1941: “The nest of infection Petersburg, from which poison poured into the Baltic Sea for so long, must disappear from the earth. The city is already blocked, there is still a little bit left to destroy it with artillery and from the air ... Asians and Bolsheviks must be expelled from Europe, the episode of 250 years of Asiaticism ends. To his closest confidants, Hitler stated with complete frankness the criminal nature of his intention.

“Probably,” he said, “some people will grab their heads with both hands and ask how the Fuhrer could destroy a city like St. Petersburg? Basically, I'm a different type. I'd rather not hurt anyone. But if I see that a biological species is in danger, then the feeling of cold rationality leaves me.

As for Leeb, despite his doubts about the possibility of carrying out Hitler's order to destroy Leningrad and his statement at the same trial of the American military tribunal in Nuremberg in 1948 that "there was something supernatural in what was immediately behind the line front there was a millionth city, and concern, of course, was due to the following factor: does this millionth city have a supply of food or is the population on the verge of starvation? near Leningrad and, subjecting the city to daily artillery shelling and aerial bombardment, sought to fulfill Hitler's order to destroy the Leningraders and raze the city to the ground.

Hitler's intention was exactly assimilated by the commanders of the German formations and units operating near Leningrad. For example, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, Colonel-General Gepner, back in May 1941, declared that the war should be waged as "the ancient struggle of the Germans against the Slavs, the protection of European culture from the Moscow-Asian flood, the defense against Jewish Bolshevism." The defense of European culture should "have as its goal the destruction of today's Russia and therefore be carried out with unheard-of cruelty."

For the destruction of Leningraders, in addition to shells and bombs, the Nazi command repeatedly intended to use chemical weapons. So, in December 1941, as F. Halder wrote in his diary, the task was given "to draw up a calculation for the use of chemical weapons against Leningrad." The second time the Nazis were going to use chemical weapons against Leningrad in 1943, after breaking through the blockade of the city. A special operation was planned, which was to begin on April 1. In its course, 1350 thousand artillery shells equipped with toxic substances were to be used, which would destroy all life inside the blockade ring. However, apparently fearing a retaliatory chemical attack by the allied anti-fascist countries, the Nazi command did not dare to use chemical weapons.

Thus, in their desire to destroy the population of Leningrad, which was part of the extermination strategy Soviet people, the Nazis proceeded from their racial theory.

In the light of all that has been said, the statement of the writer V. Astafiev that it would be better to surrender Leningrad to the enemy cannot but surprise and cause protest. “A million lives for the city, for boxes ... People preferred to kill other people for a stone,” Astafyev said. Of course, the hardships and sacrifices of Leningrad are immeasurable. But the surrender of Leningrad would not mean the salvation of its inhabitants. It is not difficult to imagine what would have happened to the Leningraders if the Soviet command, counting on the "humanity" of the Nazis, declared Leningrad an open city. In addition, Astafiev's statement is blasphemy over the graves of the dead. It turns out that their feat was in vain.

But the surrender of Leningrad, in addition to the death of its entire population, the loss of a major industrial center and the death of the Baltic Fleet, would lead to a sharp change in the situation on the Soviet-German front in favor of the German troops. The fascist forces released from Leningrad would have been turned to reinforce the Army Group Center, which was advancing on Moscow.

From the book History. General history. Grade 10. Basic and advanced levels author Volobuev Oleg Vladimirovich

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On December 18, 1940, Hitler, in his infamous "Directive No. 21", consolidated the main provisions of the Barbarossa plan, an attack on the Soviet Union. It listed the "occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt" as the central condition for the continuation of the "offensive operation to take the important transport and military center, Moscow." This task was transferred to the ground forces, which were to conduct an offensive between the Pripyat swamps in the south and the Baltic Sea towards the Baltic.

Nine months later, in the first days of September 1941, the troops of Army Group North approached the suburbs of Leningrad. But it was no longer about the rapid capture of the city. Instead, Hitler ordered the city to be cut off from the outside world and left in his own care. What this meant specifically - starvation for three million inhabitants (of which 400 thousand children) and about 500 thousand soldiers of the Red Army who defended the city. The blockade lasted almost 900 days, until the end of January 1944. It claimed the lives of one million people among the civilian population.

With the change in the directive for Army Group North, it became clear that the course of the operation had taken a different turn. On the other hand, it unequivocally showed that the main motive of the offensive remained unchanged - to destroy the Soviet Union as a means of the "Jewish-Bolshevik worldwide conspiracy" through racial-ideological genocide on an unprecedented scale.

Of the three army groups that attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the North group was the weakest. It had only the so-called tank group (tank army) at its disposal, which, moreover, had fewer weapons than the Army Group Center, which was supposed to advance on Moscow.

The troops of Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb very quickly realized what it meant to wage war in the expanses of the East. The supply routes stretched to the very outskirts, and some divisions were faced with the impossible task of controlling a front line one hundred kilometers wide.

It became clear that the planned blitzkrieg would not be realized within a few weeks, the offensive slowed down. In addition, it became clear that the Red Army, despite huge losses, still had sufficient reserves to give battle to the Wehrmacht and fight for every house. It was the greatest success of the Germans in the first months of the war, the conquest of Kyiv, that was to demonstrate this clearly. In addition, there was the task of supplying hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners, as well as the city, the logistics of which were completely destroyed.

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The fact that German logistics was already practically unable to deliver the most necessary things to the front, and instead identified the conquered territories in the east, the granaries of Ukraine as future food suppliers of the Third Reich, the Nazi regime came to a different solution. The famine was supposed to literally wipe out the second largest city in the Soviet Union, the cradle of the Bolshevik revolution. In this sense, Hitler forbade his soldiers to enter the city even in the event of surrender. Namely - "for economic reasons", because otherwise the Wehrmacht will be "responsible for providing nutrition to the population."

After the allied Finnish army stopped the advance on the line, which until the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. marked the border, Leeb was faced with a lack of funds for a direct attack on the city. Instead of reinforcements, he received an order to send most of his tanks in support of Army Group Center for the planned attack on Moscow.

On September 21, a note from the Wehrmacht High Command was dated, which analyzed the serious consequences for the besiegers. Concerns were expressed about epidemics and waves of refugees, which would further aggravate the supply situation.

But above all, Hitler's headquarters worried about the morale of the Wehrmacht: it is a moot point whether our soldiers would have the courage to start shooting at women and children. In this regard, it was recommended to destroy Leningrad with the help of artillery and aircraft, and thereby drive the unarmed deep into the country. After the winter of 1941/1942, the fortified areas were to be left to their own devices, the survivors were to be sent inland or captured, and the city was to be wiped off the face of the earth by bombing.

These arguments clearly show that the famine strategy no longer had a military goal, the goal was to destroy the city and its inhabitants through genocide. And the fact that the Fuhrer's concern extended only to the moral side of his troops shows the nature of German warfare, says military historian Rohl-Dieter Müller.

The fact that these plans were not realized is due to the courage and readiness to bear the sacrifices of the defenders, as well as to the heartless rigidity of Stalin. He sent General Zhukov, whom he had previously dismissed from the post of Chief of the General Staff due to criticism against him, to the city with instructions to keep him by any means.

In the spirit of Stalin, who forbade any sentimentality, Zhukov explained to the soldiers that the families of all who surrender to the enemy would be shot, just like themselves, if they returned from captivity. Half a million civilians were obliged to participate in the construction of fortifications. At the same time, the NKVD established a terrorist regime in the city that threatened death to anyone who was identified as an enemy agent, defeatist or counter-revolutionary.

Spy mania went so far that food reserves were not distributed, but were stored centrally in warehouses so that they could be better guarded. This made them an easy target for German bombers. The result was a starving winter in which the daily ration was reduced to 125 grams of bread, which was half wood flour and cellulose. People ate bark, rats and cats. There was no electricity, no wood for stoves.

“People were so weak from hunger that they did not resist death, they died as if falling asleep. And the people lying nearby did not notice this. Death became a phenomenon that could be observed at every turn,” wrote the survivor. Only through Lake Ladoga did a minimal amount of supplies enter the besieged city, in which mountains of bodies lay on the streets, because no one had the strength to bury them.

Soldiers of the German 18th Army received military orders to hold the siege. Thus, the German military leadership under Hitler made them complicit in a terrible crime that was in the spirit of the ideology and logic of the war of annihilation.

08:26 25.02.2016

In October 1941, the 7th Army under the command of K. A. Meretskov, after three months of fighting and retreats, stopped the Finns, reinforced by German troops, on the Svir River from the eastern side of Lake Ladoga, preventing them from connecting with German troops and completely closing the encirclement of Leningrad.

The website of the Zvezda TV channel publishes a series of articles about the Great Patriotic War of 1941– 1945 by the writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book Russkaya Pravda, published in 2011. In his author's materials, Maslovsky, according to him, exposes "the myths invented by Russia's ill-wishers about the events of the Great Patriotic War and shows the greatness of our Victory. The author notes that in his articles he is going to "show the unseemly role of the West in preparing Germany for war with the USSR." In October 1941, the 7th Army under the command of K. A. Meretskov, after three months of fighting and retreats, stopped the Finns, reinforced by German troops, on the Svir River from the eastern side of Lake Ladoga, preventing them from connecting with German troops and completely closing the encirclement of Leningrad. The plans of the German command were thwarted. The Finns and the Germans did not let the Finns and the Germans pass to Vologda from the side of Lake Onega. The German troops could not crush the Red Army and take Leningrad, but the German troops remained under it. Thus, the connection of the city of Leningrad and the Leningrad Front with the country by land was interrupted. The supply through Lake Ladoga was complicated by the fact that a group of German troops crossed the Volkhov River, cut the Tikhvin-Volkhov railway and captured Tikhvin on November 8, 1941. Famine came to Leningrad. The bread ration, which averaged about 800 grams per day, was rapidly declining. From October 1, the bread ration was reduced for the third time: workers and engineers received 400 grams of bread a day, employees, dependents and children - 200 grams each. From November 20 (5th reduction) workers received 250 grams of bread per day. All the rest - 125 grams each. Sick and weak people began to die of hunger and cold, as the amount of food delivered did not meet the needs of the inhabitants of the city, despite the significant number of people evacuated from the city. In total, more than half of the pre-war population was evacuated from Leningrad - 1.7 million people. But for a relatively short time, German troops interrupted the supply of the city along Ladoga. On December 9, our troops liberated Tikhvin and drove the Germans across the Volkhov River, ensuring the movement of trains to the Voybokalo station. Cargoes went to Leningrad in a continuous stream. From December 25, 1941, the norms for issuing products began to increase. At the end of December, the Red Army troops captured several bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. As a result of the Tikhvin offensive operation Soviet troops advanced 100-120 kilometers and liberated a significant territory. A successful military operation allowed the railway workers to lay an additional branch by the end of January 1942 railway to Lake Ladoga itself, and cargo from the wagons began to be unloaded directly into the bodies of trucks that were standing on the ice of the lake. Further along the ice of the lake and roads, cargo was delivered to Leningrad, which made it possible to significantly increase the nutritional standards of the inhabitants of the city and the fighters of the Leningrad Front, as well as improve the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition. and persisted until the blockade was broken.A. M. Vasilevsky wrote that day and night, motor vehicles loaded with food, medicines, fuel, equipment, ammunition went to Leningrad in a continuous stream, and women, children, the elderly, the wounded and sick were taken away on return flights. A. Meretskov pointed out that even before the spring thaw (spring 1942 - L. M.) on Ladoga, more than 300 thousand tons of various cargoes were delivered to Leningrad and about half a million people who needed care and treatment were taken out of there. rivermen in the supply of the city and the Leningrad front is underestimated. As in winter, car drivers, so in navigation rivermen round the clock carried goods to Leningrad and took people out of it, and from the summer of 1942 also the products of industrial enterprises. working in factories and cleaning the streets of the city in the spring of 1942, they do not look haggard, like, for example, prisoners of German concentration camps. Someone really wants to turn the city-hero of Leningrad into a city-concentration camp Leningrad. turning trend Soviet heroes in sacrifice is visible in all liberal writings, and the number of these victims besieged Leningrad , published in the media, is growing from year to year. In reality, the city worked, fought, children went to school, theaters and cinemas worked. Leningrad was defended by the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. The Leningrad Front was under blockade, the Volkhov Front was located on the outer side of the blockade ring and stretched for 250 kilometers along the Volkhov River, grinding the Nazi troops thrown to Leningrad and preventing them from connecting with the Finnish troops stopped north of the Svir River. In this regard, the besieged Leningrad it is unacceptable to consider in isolation from the Leningrad front. The front positions could be reached by tram. Leningrad and the Leningrad Front fought together and represented a single fortress. It was during the evacuation and to the Leningrad Front that the bulk of the inhabitants of Leningrad departed, and did not die of starvation. The soldiers and commanders of the Leningrad Front, the militia are buried along with the dead and dead residents of the city in the cemeteries of Leningrad. To consider Leningrad in isolation from the Leningrad Front means deliberately making a mistake and coming to conclusions that do not correspond to reality. Our troops carried out three operations to break the blockade, and only the last of them was successful. In the period from January 7 to April 30, 1942, the forces of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front carried out the Luban operation in order to unblock Leningrad, but they failed to push the Germans back from Lake Ladoga. Only 16 kilometers separated the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. To break the blockade, these troops had to meet. And on August 19, 1942, the troops of the Leningrad Front, and on August 27, the troops of the Volkhov Front, with the assistance of the forces of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, went on the offensive towards each other. The Sinyavino military operation began, which was also carried out with the aim of deblocking Leningrad. Our troops were confident of victory. Meretskov wrote: “The troops intended for the offensive gave us in the chosen direction more than three times superiority over the enemy in manpower, four times in tanks, and two times in artillery and mortars. So we thought, not knowing about the arrival of Manstein's divisions from the south. ”These divisions of Manstein arrived from near Sevastopol to storm Leningrad as they had experience in storming a large seaside city during the six-month battle for Sevastopol. But they did not have to storm Leningrad. The offensive of our troops disrupted the prepared new German assault on Leningrad. E. Manstein wrote: “And instead of the planned offensive against Leningrad, a battle unfolded south of Lake Ladoga.” When describing the events of the Sinyavino operation, most historians cite Manstein's description of it. But honestly and clearly, it was not E. Manstein who spoke about it, but K. A. Meretskov, who wrote the following about the results of the operation: “The bulk of the troops finished reaching the eastern coast by dawn on September 29. The remaining units left on the night of 30 September. After that active fighting have been discontinued. Our troops, as well as the enemy troops, returned approximately to their old positions. The artillery duel and mutual air raids, as if by inertia, then continued for several days, but no offensive actions were taken. ”Neither the commander of the Volkhov Front K. A. Meretskov, nor the chief of the General Staff A. M. Vasilevsky mention the encirclement of the German or our troops. The Neva Operational Group fought until 6 October. The Nazi command made a lot of efforts to throw the units that crossed the Neva into the water, but the glorious soldiers of the Leningrad Front, thanks to the courage of the fighters and the artillery that fired across the Neva, managed to hold two small footholds. Such was the end of the Sinyavino operation. The Volkhov and Leningrad fronts failed at that time to break the blockade of Leningrad. However, the calculations of the Nazi command to storm Leningrad suffered a complete collapse. In the song “Volkhovskaya Table” there are lines about the Sinyavin operation: “Our bayonets on the heights of Sinyavin, our regiments near Mga will be forever glorified in legends under a machine-gun blizzard.” Losses of German troops killed and captured amounted to about 60 thousand people, and in equipment - 260 aircraft, 200 tanks, 600 guns and mortars. According to the testimonies of the prisoners, in the companies of most divisions, 20 people remained in the ranks. “It is better to visit Sevastopol three times than to stay here,” the prisoners said. The soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, with their counterattacks and two major offensives, defended the inhabitants of the besieged city. Leningrad continued to live, work and fight. Cargoes continued to be delivered to Leningrad around the clock in a continuous stream by rail and then by road or river transport (depending on the time of year) along 25 kilometers across Lake Ladoga. Not only the city was supplied, but the whole Leningrad front with weapons, shells, bombs, cartridges, spare parts and food. Cars and river boats returned back to the railway with people, and from the summer of 1942 with products manufactured by Leningrad enterprises. protected from enemy aircraft and ground forces. Of course, there were losses, but compared to the amount of cargo delivered, they are insignificant. “In the summer, Leningrad received the first tons of liquid fuel through a 25-kilometer pipeline laid to supply the city and the front along the bottom of Ladoga. Later, current from the partially restored Volkhovskaya hydroelectric station began to flow here again through the submarine cable. This allowed a number of enterprises to resume the production of military products, ”points out K. A. Meretskov. Thus, in 1941-1942, the army and the government did everything possible to supply the city and the Leningrad front, protect the inhabitants of Leningrad and break the blockade by land. Twenty-eighth In December, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the third plan for the operation to break the blockade and gave it the name "Iskra". “The idea of ​​​​this operation was to defeat the enemy grouping in the Shlisselburg-Sinyavino ledge with counter strikes from two fronts - Leningrad and Volkhov, break through the blockade and restore the land connection of Leningrad with the central regions of the country. Our soldiers near Leningrad had to fight in difficult conditions: in the summer a huge number of mosquitoes that do not give the soldiers peace day or night, in winter severe frosts and snow drifts. Around the forests and swamps, through which it is difficult for a person to pass, not to mention the movement of cars, artillery pieces, tanks and other equipment. After careful consideration of all options, it was decided to break through the German fortifications somewhat north of the place where they tried to break the blockade from August 19 to October 10, 1942 during the Sinyavino operation. “This direction was the most difficult due to the presence of extremely powerful enemy fortifications here, but also the shortest. We had to overcome only a 12-kilometer strip between Shlisselburg and Lipki, or six kilometers to each of our two fronts, ”wrote K. A. Meretskov. The Leningrad Front could strike a counterattack only in the place where Volkhovsky’s troops were closest front. The Leningrad Front did not have enough forces for a deeper operation, since all the supply of the front and the city was carried out along the Road of Life, that is, on the ice of Lake Ladoga. The Germans tried to cut the Road of Life, but they were defeated near Sukho Island. Due to the position of the Leningrad Front and the difficulty of moving equipment in the swampy terrain, it was necessary to plan an attack on the area of ​​​​the Shlisselburg-Sinyavino ledge, which was most fortified by the Germans. The Germans' density of troops in this area was twice as high as provided for by their charters. But the Stavka was also able to provide an average of 160 guns and mortars for each kilometer of the front. This allowed our troops to create an extremely high density of fire, sufficient to destroy the German fortifications. All front-line aviation as part of the 14th Air Army, Major General I.P. Zhuravlev, was redirected to the offensive site. The long-range aviation of Colonel-General A.E. Golovanov was also involved in the operation. The offensive of our troops was supported by the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla. On January 12, 1943, aviation and artillery preparation began. Our artillery destroyed the German fortifications for about two hours. Dozens of tons of metal, brought down on the enemy, thoroughly destroyed the German positions and suppressed many firing points. Our troops went on the offensive. The enemy offered maximum resistance in the area of ​​​​the Round Grove. All day there was close combat, which repeatedly turned into hand-to-hand combat. By the evening, the specified node of resistance was taken. The 327th division was renamed the Guards for the accomplished feat. On January 13 and 14, Lipki and Workers' Settlement No. 8 were isolated and cut off. All attempts by fresh German formations to break through to them from Mga were unsuccessful. Only the two most difficult kilometers remained for our fronts to break through the blockade. And they passed. On January 18, 1943, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts met. The blockade of Leningrad, which lasted 500 days and nights (1 year 4 months and 10 days), was broken, the connection between the city and the country overland was restored. It was millions of heroic deeds Soviet people at the front and in the rear ensured our victory. The history of the Great Patriotic War has a great many examples of mass manifestations of heroism. Not a single country and not a single army in the world knew such mass heroism. “When the formations of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts at the end of January 1943 turned south, taking up positions along the Sinyavin line, work was already in full swing in their rear: in the corridor north of Sinyavin, they began to build a railway to Leningrad. The railroad brigades moved behind the advancing troops. The local population came to their aid, and then the fronts allocated a number of military units ... A temporary ice-pile bridge was erected on the Neva, which connected the branch line with the track from the Black River to the village named after Morozov. a long-distance freight train rushed along the 36-kilometer line. The Victory Road, the result of two weeks of heroic labor, was put into operation,” writes K. A. Meretskov, commander of the Volkhov Front. Automobile roads were laid parallel to the railway. The Germans began to shell the constructed section of the railway, but the railway workers laid another branch of the railway in a safer place, and the large-caliber artillery of both our fronts and the guns taken from the ships of the Baltic Fleet destroyed the German batteries, and they fell silent For almost twelve months, the troops of the fronts waged either flaring up or fading hostilities in the direction of the Mga station, trying to expand the strip of liberated land and not allowing the Germans to return the recaptured native land. But our armies did not have forces sufficient to break through the German defenses. And the Headquarters could not allocate additional troops, since the main reserves went to Stalingrad and Kursk, where the fate of the entire war was decided. In the battles after the blockade was broken on January 18, 1943, Soviet artillery and aviation haunted the Germans. A. E. Golovanov writes that the German troops in the Sinyavino area were bombarded by large groups of aircraft massively, which gave the most tangible results. So, in eleven raids on this area, only 1,299 long-range bomber aircraft took part. German troops and front-line aviation massively bombed. It is known that during the attack on Leningrad, the siege of the city and the retreat, not only ours, but also German military units had huge losses. But our historians and politicians are silent about them, thereby presenting our losses near Leningrad as unjustified. Some even write that there was no need to defend the city, but it was necessary to surrender it to the enemy, and then the Leningraders would have avoided starvation, and the soldiers would have avoided bloody fights. And they write and talk about it, knowing that Hitler promised to destroy all the inhabitants of Leningrad. I think they also understand that the fall of Leningrad would mean the death of a huge number of the population of the northwestern part of the USSR and the loss of an enormous amount of material and cultural values. In addition , the released German and Finnish troops could be transferred near Moscow and to other sectors of the Soviet-German front, which in turn could lead to the victory of Germany and the destruction of the entire population of the European part of the Soviet Union. Only haters of Russia can regret that Leningrad was not surrendered to the enemy. Hitler was going to take Leningrad in four weeks, by July 21, 1941, and send the liberated troops to storm Moscow, but he could not take the city by January 1944. Hitler ordered not to accept proposals for the surrender of the city to German troops and wipe the city off the face of the earth, but in fact, these were the German divisions stationed near Leningrad, which were wiped off the face of the earth in January 1944 by the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. Hitler stated that Leningrad would be the first large city captured by the Germans in the Soviet Union, and spared no effort to capture it, but did not take into account that he was fighting not in Europe, but in Soviet Russia. I did not take into account the courage of the Leningraders and the strength of our weapons. To be continued… The opinions expressed in the publications of Leonid Maslovsky are the opinions of the author and may not coincide with the opinions of the editors of the Zvezda TV channel website.