The complete destruction of the economic and financial system of imperial Russia after the First World War and the subsequent October Revolution led to a drop in production, acute food shortages and epidemics among the population. Due to the catastrophic reduction in production among the population of large cities in the winter of 1916-1917. mass famine began. These circumstances forced the government to introduce the strictest distributive system of war communism against the backdrop of spontaneous, uncontrolled and hidden barter. The policy of war communism was carried out in the conditions of the suppression of civil rights and religion, the expropriation of private property, housing, land, bread and other products, while an uncompromising civil war was going on between, on the one hand, the "red" Bolsheviks and, on the other, the "white" who were supported by external military intervention after the proclamation by the Bolsheviks of non-recognition of the external debts of the tsarist government.
The so-called surplus appropriation was introduced administratively, or expropriation on behalf of the state in the private sector of food for redistribution among that part of the population that belonged to the working class, the poor and other needy sections of society. However, this measure achieved a very short-lived expected result, as it led to the curtailment of voluntary production and to huge hyperinflation in its scale. The emergence of rigid barter (without cash payments) and the use of distribution coupons actually returned the country back to the pre-capitalist barter economy, and at the same time, in 1918, a rigid state monopoly on foreign trade was introduced. This essentially appeared initial stage building "real" socialism in a country with an intensified class irreconcilable communist philosophy of its leaders.
A one-sided emphasis was placed on the revitalization and modernization of the economy through two key components - the production and provision of electricity and rail transport. In 1920, the first plan for the restoration and development of the national economy based on electrification (GOELRO) was adopted for a period of 10-15 years. The plan began to be effectively implemented thanks to the availability of highly qualified engineering and scientific personnel, who, unlike philosophers or social scientists who left the country, were in demand by the Bolsheviks. Also, back in 1920, the largest deal was concluded with the Swedish company "NOHAB" for the manufacture and supply of 1000 locomotives to Russia in barter exchange for an officially unknown and never announced amount of gold in bullion. In Sweden, the largest consortium of locomotive manufacturers was created to fulfill the contract.
When examining the monetary aspects of the economic transformations in Russia after the First World War, which led to a rigidly centrally planned economy, questions involuntarily arise, what were the theoretical aspects and the roots of these reforms. The end of capitalism throughout the world, in accordance with the general Marxist doctrine, which found artificial application in the conditions of war communism, would mean the curtailment of commodity production, and with it the exchange of commodities through the instrument of money in its capitalist incarnation. And this concept was hardwired into the chaotic and scarce post-war economy of a single, very large, but fragmented country, under the pressure of an internal armed conflict and in a war with foreign intervention, provoked by the refusal of the debts of the tsarist government of the Bolsheviks.
The foregoing, however, cannot in any way detract from the thorough and broad analysis of wild capitalism in Russia, which was carried out by V.I. Lenin in his early work The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899) and in other publications that exposed the capitalism of that time and the backwardness of the life of workers and peasants that accompanied it. This was done under the strong influence of the founder of the Marxist movement in Russia, G.V. Plekhanov (1856-1918), whose circle included V.I. Lenin.
G. V. Plekhanov was a supporter of evolutionary progress and subsequently opposed the October Revolution of 1917.
Unable to evolve into a more just society, the country, led by the Bolshevik leaders and their understanding of the ways out of the impending deep crisis, was forced to plunge into post-war and post-revolutionary economic and monetary confusion and chaos, where money is like important tool economic policy, which had such a high status after the reform of S.Yu. Witte, almost completely officially (but still continuing to work on the "black market") have lost their stable value and value. At the same time, the nationalization of all banks in order to obtain direct access to money and gold, starting with the State Bank of Russia, was carried out by force with unprecedented speed and immediately, one might say overnight, after the October Revolution. The former qualified bank employees were categorically ordered to submit to the new management personnel from the workers' and peasants' councils and train them, or in case of disobedience to such orders, to immediately dismiss them with threats of harsh reprisals. Thus, the banking system has lost many skilled workers and has essentially turned into settlement cash desks.
At that time, there were some other theoretical justifications for such a development of events. The Austro-German Social Democrats, led by Otto Bauer, saw War Communism as a necessary and clearly defined form of command and control system in which money would play no significant role in an economy with a rigidly balanced distribution system based on voluntary incentives to work and very militant communist ideology.
The ideologists of building a moneyless non-market economy, which was eventually subjected to sharp criticism along with the abolition of war communism, were convinced that before the onset of the world revolution, all economic exchanges with Western countries should be carried out directly by the socialist state through authorized bodies, which would apply in its calculations of gold and currency values acceptable in foreign markets. In accordance with these provisions, during the first post-revolutionary years, government decrees were adopted and implemented aimed at achieving three main goals, namely, the establishment of an absolute state monopoly in foreign economic relations, placing monopoly at the forefront. foreign trade, for the revision and confiscation of gold and other valuables from the private sector, for the concentration of all foreign exchange transactions in the public sector. Emergency civil war, foreign intervention, internal economic disruption and foreign blockade served as strong justifications in favor of this model of foreign trade regulation, especially since during the “war communism” the sphere of monetary relations with foreign countries was significantly reduced. Annual exports reached only less than 30 million rubles. in pre-war prices, despite the fact that imports amounted to 350 million rubles, which was covered with great difficulty by selling gold. There was only one way to sell gold through Reval to a mint in Stockholm, where gold bars were made with the stamps of the Stockholm Mint, after which such bars entered the open market. The state monopoly of foreign trade, introduced by the Decree of April 22, 1918, remained for a long time until the 1990s the backbone of the state's foreign economic activity with physical, mainly, planning of both production and consumption.
In the early 1920s, in the conditions of the most difficult economic situation and chaos, lack of raw materials and fuel, income from nationalized state enterprises covered hardly about 15% of budget expenditures. The remaining share of government spending was covered by the issuance of paper banknotes or so-called sovznaks. “The issue of paper money of sovznaks increased in 1918-1921. from 27.3 to 1168.6 billion rubles.” Prices on the open market "flyed" a thousandfold, indicating hyperinflation.
As noted in the memoirs of the Minister of Finance from 1938 to 1960, A.G. Zvereva, while still a young man, he rode a train in one of the central regions in Russia in 1921 and bought himself something to eat. The whole meal, which consisted of a glass of tea, a piece of black bread and six raisins, cost 6 million Soviet signs (!). The speed with which prices were rising created, paradoxically, given the round-the-clock operation of money printing presses, an acute shortage of cash. About 14,000 to 15,000 workers were constantly employed at the state monetary and printing enterprises in Moscow, Leningrad, Penza, Perm, and Rostov-on-Don, issuing tons of paper money. The printing of paper money was simplified to such a level that making counterfeit money was not a problem. Increasingly larger digital denominations were affixed to banknotes, but despite all this, attempts to keep up with the issuance of rapidly rising prices were unsuccessful.
In the economy on the territory of the former Russian Empire, in principle, there could no longer be a single monetary system. On the early stage The existence of Soviet Russia officially put into circulation at least 10 different types of banknotes and a rather small number of securities. Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm had their own issues of Soviet signs. Tsarist money was in circulation, including chervonets, Duma money or "Kerenki" (the name was given by the name of the Chairman of the Provisional Government A.F. Kerensky). In total, more than 2,000 types of banknotes were simultaneously circulating on the territory of the country by that time, and on the outskirts of the country, US dollars, pounds sterling, Japanese yen and royal "chervonets" were in circulation. Many of the banknotes were put into circulation by various institutions outside the Soviet government. In circulation were the means of exchange, released into circulation on the orders of the "white" generals and commanders, such as A.V. Kolchak, A.I. Denikin, M.V. Rodzianko, N.N. Yudenich, N.P. Wrangel, and even foreign military leaders: Vandamme, Avaloff-Bermondt (in Belarus), etc. In the border and coastal provinces, in particular, such as the North European part of Russia, Siberia, the Far East, Ukraine, the Caucasian republics, as well as Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Finland and elsewhere issued their own means of exchange and payment. Of particular interest from the point of view of understanding the colonial intentions of the British interventionists is the issuance of the so-called "northern" rubles for use in the northern Russian territories occupied by British troops in the period from December 1, 1918 to November 15, 1919. For these purposes, a plan was developed and implemented with the participation of J. Keynes to create a Currency Board (“Currency Board”) based on the formation of reserves in British pounds sterling. "Northern" rubles were pegged to the British pound sterling at a ratio of 40:1. For the Emission Office in London, a special reserve fund was deposited with the Bank of England, consisting of gold and foreign currency for a total amount of 750 thousand pounds sterling, or about 30 million "northern" rubles, while the allowable fiduciary issue was fixed at the level of Uz this reserve
From August 1918, Krestinsky held the post of People's Commissar for Finance of the RSFSR (until the end of 1922). His appointment marked the beginning of the VC policy. The leadership of Krestinsky fell on the Civil War. The VC period was characterized by almost complete disregard for eq. the laws of the development of society and the role of money devalued millions of times as a result of inflation (monetary terms appear - a piece (a thousand rubles), a lemon, a lemonard. The general collapse of the economy, the need for strict centralization of supply, the struggle of the state against private trade were accompanied by the naturalization of relations. A feature of financial policy VC were "extraordinary taxes" on the exploiting classes.
A one-time emergency tax of ten billion dollars was established for the bourgeois classes. the total collection in May 1919 did not reach even a billion rubles.
Other taxes (income and trade) also did not produce results. The excise form of taxation (nationalization, centralization) lost its significance and was abolished. In 1920, the People's Bank was liquidated, so there was no credit and banks in Russia for 2 years.
The most important material source in that period was the surplus appraisal. Significant masses of commodities circulated on semi-legal markets, and the state sought to extract these resources for its own purposes. Through emission. The entire amount of withdrawals through the issue amounted to 1163 million pre-war rubles, and withdrawals through the surplus appraisal amounted to 931 million pre-war rubles. The Soviet government wanted to destroy money and replace it with a labor unit.
Thus, the emission, surplus appropriation and cash taxes provided the material resources of the state. transformation during the Civil War.
Despite the extreme unpopularity among the population, the policy of the VC allowed the communists to stay in power. However, by the beginning of 1921, the VK had exhausted itself, and in February 1921 all monetary taxes were abolished, emission was stopped, and the surplus appraisal was replaced by a tax in kind. radical transformations and the restoration of financial mechanisms began.
27. Financial transformations during the NEP period
By the beginning of the 1920s. Russia found itself in a state of political, economic, financial crisis, to overcome which the NEP was adopted, the resuscitation of the market began, and commodity-money relations began to develop. The task was to recreate credit institutions. In the autumn of 1921, the State Bank was established, and a monetary reform was soon carried out, which stabilized the country's financial system. 1922 was headed by Sokolnikov. The main merit of the People's Commissar Kerensky is ( 1922–1924) monetary reform, the result of which was the withdrawal from circulation of 886.5 quadrillion old rubles and the creation of a solid national currency - the gold chervonets. Transformations followed: the introduction of an extensive system of taxes, loans and credit operations. As a result, in 1924, after the famine of 1921, thanks to the NEP, the country not only fed its population, but also sold 180 million poods of grain abroad. Established the State bank. Thus was laid the foundation of the den-th economy of Soviet Russia. The nationalized industry began to reorganize itself on new self-supporting principles. Lending to industrial and trade enterprises on a commercial basis has begun. Until the stabilization of the ruble, State. the bank issued loans at high interest rates: from 8 to 12% per month, but the interest rate gradually decreased. At the end of 1922, a number of banks appeared: Prombank for financing industry, Electrobank for electrification, Vneshtorgbank for foreign trade, and savings banks were established to mobilize the population's savings. A decree was issued on the establishment of a state labor savings banks. In the summer of 1922, a subscription was opened for the first state. a grain loan for a total amount of 10 million poods of rye grain. In 1922, stock exchanges were organized to carry out transactions with the Central Bank. There was a "black exchange", or "American". She was unofficially recognized by the authorities. They sold any currency, gold, valuable furs. In the same place, the purchase of canceled securities took place. As a result, stocks and bonds, which in 1919-1920. met like a wrapper, disappeared and ended up abroad. Simultaneously with the monetary reform, tax reform was also carried out. The transition from taxation in kind to cash. taxes were imposed on tobacco, liquor, beer, matches, and honey. Already at the end of 1923 the main source of income for the state. budget began deductions from the profits of enterprises, not taxes from the population. The main result of the tax reform was to overcome the budget deficit in 1924.
§ 121. Money and the withering away of the monetary system
Communist society will not know money. In it, each worker will prepare products for the common boiler and will not receive any evidence that he has handed over the product to society, that is, he will not receive money. In the same way, he will not pay any money to the society when he needs to get something from the common boiler. Another thing is under the socialist system, which should be a transitional system from capitalism to communism. Money inevitably arises and plays its role in the commodity economy. When I, a shoemaker, want a jacket, I first convert my commodity, i.e. boots, into money, i.e. into a commodity through which, in exchange for which, I can get any other commodity, in this case the jacket that interests me . This is what every manufacturer does. And in a socialist society commodity economy will still partly exist.
Suppose we have successfully crushed the resistance of the bourgeoisie and turned the former ruling classes into working people. We still have a peasantry that does not work for the common cauldron. Each peasant will try to resell his surplus to the state, to exchange it for the industrial product he needs. The peasant will remain a commodity producer. And for settling accounts with its neighbor and for settling accounts with the state, money will still be needed for him, just as the state will need them for settling accounts with all members of society who have not yet entered the common productive commune. It was all the more impossible to immediately destroy money, since private trade is still practiced on an enormous scale, which the Soviet government is not yet able to completely replace with socialist distribution. Finally, it is not profitable to destroy money all at once, since the issuance of paper money replaces taxes and makes it possible for the proletarian state to hold out in incredibly difficult conditions.
But socialism is communism in construction, communism unfinished. As construction progresses, money must fall into disuse, and the state may at some point have to stifle the moribund circulation of money. This is especially important for the actual destruction of the remnants of the bourgeois classes, which continue to use hidden money to consume the values created by the working classes in the very society where the commandment is proclaimed: "Let not the unworking one eat."
Gradually, money loses its meaning from the very beginning socialist revolution. All nationalized enterprises, like the enterprise of one big owner (in this case, the proletarian state), have a common cash desk, and they do not have to sell or buy from each other for money. Gradually introduced non-monetary settlement. As a result, money is being squeezed out of a vast area of the national economy. In relation to the peasantry, money also loses its significance more and more, and commodity exchange comes to the fore. Even in private trade with the peasants, more and more, money recedes into the background, and the buyer can only get bread for some kind of natural products, such as clothes, cloth, dishes, furniture, etc. The gradual destruction of money is also facilitated by the huge issue of paper money by the state, with a huge reduction in the exchange of goods caused by the breakdown of industry. The ever-increasing depreciation of money is, in essence, their spontaneous annulment.
But the most severe blow will be dealt to the existence of money by the introduction of budget books and the payment of workers for their labor in food. The workbook will record how much it worked, i.e. how much he has for the state / And according to the same book he will receive food in a consumer shop. Under this system, the unemployed cannot receive anything for money. But this can only exist when the state is able to concentrate in its hands such a quantity of consumer products as is sufficient to supply all the working members of socialist society. Without the restoration of the destroyed industry and without its expansion, this is not feasible.
In general, the process of the destruction of monetary circulation is currently looming in this form. First, money is expelled from the area of product exchange within the nationalized enterprises (factories, railways, Soviet economy, etc.). Then money disappears from the sphere of settlements between the state and the workers of the socialist state (that is, between the Soviet government and the employees and workers of Soviet enterprises). Further, money disappears, being replaced by commodity exchange, in turnover between the state and small-scale production (peasants, handicraftsmen). Then money disappears in the exchange of commodities within small farming, perhaps it will finally disappear only together with small farming itself.
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lt; § 1. "War Communism" and the breaking of the monetary system. - § 2. The collapse of the monetary system and the gap in prices. - § 3. Naturalization of the economy and the course towards the elimination of money. - § 4. Theory and practice of the withering away of money. - The problem of economic accounting under socialism. - Projects of non-monetary economic accounting. - § 5. The development of commodity exchange and the emergence of local equivalents. - Expanded form of value. - General reform of value. - § 6. Soviet signs as substitutes for local goods-money. - § 7. Reasons for the "survivability" of the Soviet sign.
In October 1917, the proletariat inherited from the bourgeoisie a fundamentally disordered monetary system. All the cream of the emission tax had already been withdrawn by the tsarist and provisional governments, which in total were pumped out of the population by means of inflation of commodity values for more than 7 billion gold rubles. Having broken the resistance of the officials of the State Bank with armed force, the Soviet government took possession of the emission apparatus and used it to finance the "expenses of the revolution."
§ 1. The printing press served the proletariat as a means of fighting the bourgeoisie, along with firearms.
The period from mid-1918 to April 1921 is commonly referred to as the period of "war communism". During the period of war communism, everything was mobilized to fight against the internal and external bourgeoisie.
“Our entire economy, both as a whole and in separate parts, was thoroughly imbued with wartime conditions. Taking us into account, we had to make it our task to collect a certain amount of food, completely disregarding what place this would take in the general economic turnover ”(Lenin). Such a policy was a necessity in the face of a bitter civil war. “In the conditions of the war in which we were placed, this policy was correct. We had no other possibility than the maximum use of an immediate monopoly, up to the withdrawal of all surpluses, even without any compensation ... This was a merci, caused by conditions not economic, but prescribed to us to a large extent by military conditions ”(Lenin). Insofar as "war communism" "was forced by war and ruin", "it was not and is not mine to be a policy that meets the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure" (Lenin).
The introduction of surplus appropriation and numerous and universal labor duties, the nationalization of all production down to the smallest enterprises, centralized (through the so-called "headquarters", that is, the main departments of individual branches of industry) management of all industry, the abolition of the free market and the centralized supply of the population and the Red army products - these are the characteristic features of this period. All these measures led to the fact that the sphere of market exchange was extremely narrowed: meanwhile, paper-money emission continued to grow; but its real value was falling due to the continuous increase in the rate of depreciation of the soviet marks.
§ 2. The following table shows the growth of the money supply and the fall of its real value.
Real price
An extraordinary reduction in the sphere of market exchange, a catastrophic increase in the velocity of money circulation with a continuous increase in emission, these are the reasons for such a sharp depreciation of the national funds. The rate of depreciation constantly (except for the 2nd half of 1920) overtook the rate of issue, as can be seen from diagram No. 5 on page 172.
But the paper money flow during this period was not exhausted by one centralized issue of Soviet signs by the Soviet government. Since the spring of 1919, local issues of banknotes have become extremely widespread in connection with the fragmentation of the entire present territory of the USSR into many politically or economically isolated regions and districts, and even individual cities, up to districts.
§ 2. The period of "war communism" is a period of unprecedented in the history of paper-money chaos. The disintegration of the unity of the monetary system reflected the deepest disintegration of the economic ties of the previously integral economic organism and, in turn, exacerbated the general economic degradation (decline). Prices not only grew from day to day, even from hour to hour, but most importantly, the single price disappeared. Over the same period, for the same product - rye flour - the prices in Sovznaks in Leningrad were 23.8 times higher than in Saratov, and 15 times higher than in Ulyanovsk. Each area set its own prices, and the more one area was separated from another, the greater the price gap. No less sharp was the gap in the prices of goods in the same market. For example, in the Moscow market in October 1920 the prices of butter, sugar, millet and herring increased by more than 10,000 times in comparison with 1913;
Diagram No. b
The ratio of the rate of increase in the money supply and price growth in percent from 1918 to 1921 in the USSR
| 1 1 masses - Rising prices | ||||||
| (NOAH | ||||||
| (In pro | cents) | |||||
| gt; one | ||||||
| I » | ||||||
| »--V | to | |||||
| # # # | G\\ | |||||
| і # # # | ||||||
| 1 ^ | / # G | |||||
| 1 # 1 # | h | |||||
| 1 \" / / 1 i | ||||||
| 1/ 1# | - | |||||
1918 1918
II
n ¦ o
1919
I
1919
II
1920
1
’920
II
1921
I
and
1921
II
I
400
80
60
40
20
300
80
60
40
20
200
80
60
40
20
100
80
60
40
20
0
It is significant that the rise in prices in the second half of each year, due to the sale of the harvest, slows down significantly, even with an increase in the rate of emission, as, for example, in the second half of 1919 and 1920. This slowdown in the depreciation of money in the second half of 1920 was so significant that the percentage increase in the issue turned out to be even somewhat larger than the depreciation of the Soviet mark.
prices for meat, milk and eggs from 5 thousand to 10 thousand times, and for cabbage and fresh fish - less than 5 thousand times. Food prices as a whole have risen many times over; more than the price of luxury goods. The market in general was driven underground, and although it actually existed everywhere during the period of "war communism", the sphere of market commodity circulation and, consequently, the sphere of money circulation turned out to be very narrowed. This, along with the greatly increased velocity of money circulation, explains why by July 1, 1921, the commodity circulation of the entire Union was satisfied with the money supply, the real value of which was only 29 million rubles.
§ 3. Monetary-market trade turnover was more and more supplanted, on the one hand, by the state, free supply of products in kind, and, on the other hand, by illegal private economic exchange of goods.
The further, the more for workers * and employees the main source of supply became rations (a firm standard of planned supply established by the state), and not the purchase of goods on the market for state signs. So according to L. Kritzman in the Central Russian budget
state supply of workers in kind was: in 1918 - 41%; in 1919 - 63%; in 1920 - 75%. Also, in the total real state budget, cash income-expenditure by 1920 played an insignificant role. According to S. Golovanov's assumptions, the entire state income for 1920 (including the gross income from the nationalized sectors of the national economy) was equal to 1,726 million gold rubles. Of this amount, according to his calculations, only 126 million rubles, or 7.3 */0, accounted for the share of cash expenses. Of course, these figures are approximate, because there is no data for an exact calculation, but the ratio of the monetary and in-kind parts of the budget should have been approximately the same. Thus, the astronomical figures of the paper-money issue in 1920 actually brought the state a very modest real income. The main pillar of the budget was not emission, but the receipt of products in kind from the peasantry in the order of surplus appropriation and from industry by direct withdrawal of all the products needed by the state and their planned distribution.
§ 4. During this period, practical steps were taken towards replacing money circulation with non-monetary accounting calculations. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 23, 1919 established a certain procedure for settlements between nationalized and municipalized enterprises and institutions under state control. Calculations were to be made, as stated in the decree, "accounting method without the participation of banknotes." By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 6, 1920, these resolutions were extended to cooperation. Finally, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of July 25, 1920, on requisitions and confiscations, it was prescribed for private individuals to deposit all cash in excess of twenty times the minimum tariff rate of a given area per person into current accounts in state treasuries. Thus, the Soviet authorities at that time took measures (which were not limited to the above decrees) to narrow the scope of monetary circulation. Thus, the 2nd session of the VDIK on June 18, 1920, based on the report of the NKF, adopted a resolution in which the activities of the NKF were recognized, expressed "in the desire to establish / non-monetary settlements for the destruction of the monetary system - in general, corresponding to the main tasks of the economic and administrative development of the RSFSR." VDIK instructed to take effective measures to put into practice the new system of economic management.
In connection with the general course towards narrowing the sphere of monetary circulation, the question arose of replacing the old monetary accounting with a new unified method of valuation and accounting economic activity. How to calculate the effect of production work? How can you determine which products are more profitable to produce, if not common unit accounting for labor productivity? And does not the establishment of this or that unit of account again mean a return to money, at least as a measure of value? These questions of the organization of economic accounting in socialist society during this period acquired tremendous practical significance, and it is not surprising that they were discussed in a lively manner in scientific and business circles.
Our economists proposed a number of host projects - “A, XX XVX
A ¦ ¦*
estvennogo accounting and evaluation under socialism. Some proposed introducing direct cost accounting for each type of product separately, while others put forward a single principle for estimating costs for all types of products. On the other hand, among these recent projects, some put forward the principle of tied (ration) distribution of products, others free distribution. In the latter case, each worker would be given a labor voucher, for which he could receive any products of equal "labor value". A significant part of the projects was reduced to the establishment of a single "labor unit" of accounting and distribution, which was called the "trade". According to Kreve's proposal, the basic unit of "labor" value is considered to be "an hour of simple unskilled socially necessary labor."
The most developed project of economic accounting under socialism was proposed by S. G. Strumilin. The problem, in his opinion, "reduces to solving the mathematical problem of what kind of distribution of the country's productive resources can provide maximum satisfaction of needs with a minimum of labor costs." Labor that is expended in accordance with the above principle will be considered socially necessary; as a unit of accounting, Strumilin proposed "accepting the value of the product of labor of one normal worker of the first tariff category if he fulfills the production rate by 100%."
Also, the “working group of the Currency Subcommittee of the NKF” wrote in its draft: “The unit of labor accounting is the average production of one normal day of simple labor with its normal intensity for this type of work. The designated labor unit of accounting is assigned the name "thread". The Council of Labor and Defense is charged with the development and establishment of: 1) rules for reducing complex labor to simple; 2) the norm of the third price list, expressed in threads, of all economic goods and services subject to accounting, and 3) the procedure for the periodic, as necessary, revision of these rules and price lists. But what was "assigned" to the Council of Labor and Defense, and the most important and difficult. Of course, it is possible to take into account more or less exactly how much concrete labor is spent on a particular product (if the costs of raw materials are also expressed in labor units), but how to determine how much socially necessary and simple labor has been spent, how to reduce complex labor to simple? For the central bodies of economic management this would be very difficult, but not. unfeasible business. In the presence of planned accounting for public consumption, on the one hand, and data specifications On the other hand, it would be possible to establish what kind of labor in each branch is socially necessary. It is also quite POSSIBLE to reduce COMPLEX labor to simple labor if the necessary labor input to obtain a particular qualification is precisely established. However, this moment will not play a role in communist society, because, assuming a high development of technology, in this society the principle will be applied: "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." But in the absence of this possibility, i.e., when the conditions of technical development do not yet make it possible to fully satisfy all social needs, it will certainly be necessary to distribute the product taking into account the labor expended by each producer, and consequently it will be necessary here to reduce complex labor to simple.
The most appropriate to the socialist system were the projects for the introduction of universal economic accounting in labor units - threads. These threads seem to be very similar to Owen's "labor bonds" or other similar attempts to directly determine the value of products in terms of labor units (see chapter XVIII). But the essential difference between them is that the projects of our threads had more or less solid ground in the form of nationalization and centralized organization of the entire industry (hence the theoretical possibility of establishing the amount of socially necessary labor spent on products), while Owen wanted to introduce an organized and "fair exchange" by. "labor value" in the presence of private ownership of the means of production and complete anarchy of all production.
But weren't these threads essentially the same money, just named differently? Bourgeois economists usually give a positive answer to this question, but this is completely wrong. “In social production, money capital disappears. Society distributes labor power and means of production among the various branches of labor. Producers may, perhaps, obtain paper certificates by which they withdraw from the public consumer stocks the quantity of products that corresponds to their working hours. These credentials are not money. They do not make conversions” (K. Marx).
§ 5. But the projects for the introduction of universal and unified economic accounting in threads and the distribution of products in "paper certificates", expressed in threads, were not implemented in practice.
The fact is that the obligatory condition under which “money can be liquidated, according to the decision of the VIII Congress of the RCP - “complete organization of communist production and distribution”, could not be realized either in 1918, or in 1919, or in 1920 If large-scale production had already been socialized and organized (and it still is), then many millions of peasant farms still remained a disorganized mass, and the state actually did not have the opportunity, on the one hand, to extract all the grain surpluses, and on the other hand, to supply the peasantry in the required amount of urban products. The implementation of the surplus constantly lagged behind the plans; it was established that the peasantry had significant stocks of grain. All this bread went to the "underground market", the market turnover, despite all the repressions, continued to exist.
And if there is a market, then, as we already know, there must be both prices and money. We know further that only one particular commodity, for example, gold, is real money. What kind of commodity was money on the "underground market" in the era of "war communism", what was the measure of value here? To answer this question, we must recall what was said in Chapter I, namely, the four forms of value. In the "underground market" during the period of "war communism" relations developed that can be summed up both under a simple and detailed form, and under a general form. When the urban population was experiencing a real famine, and rural population- an acute need for a number of products, such as bread, textiles, etc., then there could be no \" and there was no question of gold being the general commodity equivalent. Gold itself turned into an ordinary commodity and, moreover, much less valuable than before war, as opposed to, for example, such goods as bread or salt.Already in 1918, gold could buy goods according to the index 10 times less than before the war, i.e., the gold ruble in goods was worth only a dime.
The market, driven underground, besides deprived of money, was therefore a defective market. But since the market existed, and market relations, even if in an ugly form and to a limited extent, developed, new money had to be created as well. And this process of development of new types of goods-money is exactly what we are observing during this period.
Sellers and buyers traded "from under the floor", i.e. illegally, in each individual case, establishing random exchange equivalents, since there was no universal equivalent.
Here is an example of the establishment in the city of Kaluga in January 1919, according to F. Termitin, of exchange proportions corresponding, according to Marx's theory, to the expanded form of value (since one commodity did not figure here as a universal equivalent):
1 lb. soap = 2 lb. millet,
22 lb. kerosene = 15 lb. peas,
1 overcoat = 101/2 FU3- groats, 3 lb. salt = 30 lb. oats,
1 pair of boots = 30 ft. buckwheat, U2 FUN * shag = 1 lb. pork fat.
Insofar as simple exchange relations were simultaneously established in the market over a long row of commodities, these relations may be called the expanded form of value, as, for example: poly (proportion taken from Weisberg's book "Money and Prices"). Such proportions were established in all markets, and this was inevitable, as soon as market relations existed.
The most salable and most valuable commodities become universal equivalents. Usually, not only in different areas, but even in the same area, there were several equivalents. These commodity equivalents constantly waged a struggle with each other for the position of a monetary, i.e., universal and single equivalent. So in Moscow in 1920 the strongest contenders for the "monetary throne" vacated after the "deposition" of gold were salt and baked bread. “We have all the data to consider,” Weisberg says, “salt for Moscow in 1920 as a price scale, an instrument of circulation and a means of accumulation.” There were other contenders elsewhere. Going to the village for groceries, he always found out beforehand “what they change for in this village”, for example, salt or bread or kerosene, and in accordance with this he took with him a certain amount of this equivalent.
In this way the expanded form of value is transformed for each individual region into a general form.
flour.
Here is an example of this universal form of value (also taken from life), in which rye flour is the universal equivalent:
30 lb. kerosene 10 lb. soap 3 lb. shag 10 ars. chintz
“If,” said Marx, “all commodities expressed their value in terms of silver, wheat or copper, then silver, wheat or copper would be measures of value, hence universal equivalents.”
However, inasmuch as in this period the "equivalent form" nowhere firmly merged with the natural form" of any particular commodity, we essentially did not yet have real, fully developed money. The universal form of value has not yet been transformed into the money form of value. Since there was no single equivalent for the entire economic system of the USSR in the "underground market", it means that in the USSR there were no valid, fully developed money during this period.
§ 6. But along with these equivalents - underdeveloped money - there was something that we all called "money", namely, Soviet signs. Paper money is not money, but only substitutes or representatives of money. As soon as gold ceased to be real money, paper money had to find some other point of support, but there was no such single point. Hence the complete instability of the Soviet signs and the greatest confusion in prices. In one area, they said: “A shirt costs 10 pounds. flour, but in Soviet signs. Today it costs 20 billion rubles.” and the shirt seller received 20 billion rubles, with which he could buy 10 pounds. flour. In that. the same day in another district they said: “A shirt costs 5 pounds. salt, and today it costs 10 billion rubles in the Soviet Union.” And it turned out that the same shirt here costs 20 billion rubles, and there 10 billion rubles. Since different equivalents appeared in different regions, the Soviet signs had to replace salt, flour, chintz, etc. .
If real and fully developed money - gold, i.e., a universal and single equivalent, functioned as a measure of value and a means of accumulation, then such a situation could not exist: state signs would depreciate more evenly.
But just because of the severance of economic ties, profound shifts in production and consumption, the illegal state of the market, disruption of transport, etc., each region established its own equivalents, and each region established in its own way the value of a given commodity. equivalent - "half money" replace the state signs in circulation. In this absence of a single commodity-money basis, the Soviet signs have all the originality of the situation in the "underground market". Soviet signs were deprived of a solid, unified, established monetary basis for the entire society - a measure of value. lt;
§ 7. If equivalents developed in some regions, "at least temporarily performing the functions of money (a measure of value, a means of circulation \" and payment and instruments of accumulation), then one wonders why, nevertheless, the market did not completely annul locally, co-workers. and did not replace them entirely with flour or salt as a medium of exchange?
¦ This is due to the fact that these equivalents were \" і_sklfchielyo local equivalents that were valid only within the narrow limits of these areas. However, there is a completely economic connection between:
12 3. Atlas. Money and credit
separate markets never broke, and this relationship could only be expressed in monetary form. If in a given region the equivalent was corn, and in another region it was salt, then it is obvious that a person who had at his disposal a known amount of the equivalent in this region could not use it as a means of purchasing in another region where he was another equivalent.It was also necessary to establish a certain value proportion between local equivalents.And these proportions could only be established in such a way that all local equivalents were expressed in a certain (albeit changing from day to day) number of universal and mandatory for admission throughout the territory of Soviet power paper money - substitutes for all local equivalents.
Thus, thanks to the existence of Soviet signs, a certain unity was introduced into inter-district market relations. All goods in local markets were expressed in a certain number of units of local equivalents, and these latter - in a certain amount of banknotes, and thus the equivalents of all regions received a single form of expression in co-packs.
In addition, it should also be taken into account that the "commodity form" of local equivalents, such as flour and salt, is not fully adapted to perform all monetary functions. How could you, for example, pay with flour for one box of matches, etc.? Flattering equivalents did not possess the necessary qualities of a monetary commodity - portability, high value in a small volume *, different quality, etc., which gold possesses under normal conditions.
Consequently, despite the continuously falling value of Soviet signs, which presented enormous inconvenience to commodity circulation, operating Soviet signs on the "underground market" was an economic necessity.
So, while discussions were going on in our institutions on the nonodu of threads as methods of socialist accounting and distribution, in the economic system of the USSR there was a process of formation of "underground", illegal and therefore unregulated "monetary systems
Literature.
- Weisberg, Money and prices. 3VL 1925.
- Prof. J.I. Yurovsky, Monetary policy of the Soviet government. M. 1928,
- Prof. 3. S. Zhatsenelenbaum, Money circulation in Russia 1914-1924.
- Prof. SA Falkner, Problems of the theory and practice of emission economy. M. 3924.
- Collection "Our monetary circulation", ed. L. Yurovskaya. M "1926.
- E. A. Preobrazhensky. Paper money. Gis. 1920.
- L. Zhritsman, The Heroic Period of the Russian Revolution, ed. 2. M. .1. 1926.
- Describe the state of monetary circulation and the process of naturalization! farming during the period of war communism.
- What projects of economic accounting were put forward during this, t period under the social-kmach?
- What kind of money was real money, i.e., was the measure of value under war communism and at the beginning of the NEP?
- Were Soviet signs substitutes for any particular type of real money?
- What are the reasons for the "survivability" of the Soviet sign?
More on the topic CHAPTER XV. MONEY CIRCULATION IN THE PERIOD OF WAR COMMUNISM:
- 5. Soviet \r\nmodel of economy and Soviet \r\neconomic science
- CHAPTER XII. MAIN POINTS FROM THE HISTORY OF MONETARY CIRCULATION AND MONETARY THEORIES.
- CHAPTER XV. MONETARY CIRCULATION IN THE PERIOD OF WAR COMMUNISM
- CHAPTER XVI. MONETARY CIRCULATION UNDER THE NEP BEFORE THE MONEY REFORM OF 1924
The years of the Civil War are a continuation of a protracted black streak for Russia that began in the summer of 1914. Millions of people died on the battlefields, in the class struggle of the poor against the rich, from white and red terror, from famine and epidemics. The Russian economy was set back decades in terms of key macroeconomic indicators. Instead of feudalism and capitalism, socialism began to be created, moreover, not as good and rich as it was described by Thomas More in his Utopia (1516), as well as in the 19th century. in the works of K. Marx and F. Engels. It was, in fact, from the very beginning, tough state socialism, with the most centralized management of socio-economic processes.
L. D. Trotsky spoke about this most frankly: “All our hopes for the development of a socialist economy are based on four elements: the dictatorship of the party, the Red Army, the nationalization of the means of production and the monopoly of foreign trade.” Note that he is not talking about the dictatorship of the proletariat, not about people's power and democracy, but about the dictatorship of the party.
It seemed to other writers and orators of those revolutionary years that world revolution and communism is just around the corner, it's time to abolish money and the market. They started thinking about how to do it. One of the theorists of the “war communism” system, N. I. Bukharin, wrote in his book “Economics in Transition”: “During the transition period, in the process of destroying the commodity system as such, the process of “self-negation” of money takes place. It is expressed in the so-called depreciation of money.
Professor V. Ya. Zheleznov: “The value of money has fallen to extraordinary proportions and continues to fall, threatening complete depreciation - it doesn’t matter, you can do without them and even should, because money is a fetish that blinds the ignorant and inert masses and retains its charm among people infected with old social prejudices. You can transfer the entire economy to natural payments, distribute everything that anyone needs from public stores, and everyone's needs will be satisfied no worse than before.
The authors of such a “theory” were divorced from practice; they had little idea of what would happen after the abolition of money. Nevertheless, it was precisely from here that a whole trend of Soviet political economists began - "non-commodity workers", "anti-market people". This department was especially distinguished political economy Faculty of Economics, Moscow State University (Professor N.V. Hessin and his students). They discussed these issues furiously in the 1960s and 1970s. and later until the beginning of the XXI century. It never occurred to them to question many of the provisions of K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin concerning the “bright future” (non-commodity and penniless, but abundant, fair, humane) - communism. Some of them still see "real sprouts of non-market, non-capitalist relations in the modern global world economy." So, Professor of Moscow State University A. Buzgalin writes: “A market economy is nothing more than a historically limited economic system that has not only a beginning, but also an end.” Indeed, dogmatism has lived, dogmatism is alive, dogmatism will live.
Many monetary circulation experts wrote in the 1920s that monetary policy changed dramatically in the second half of 1918. G. Ya. direct distribution of produced values”. However, G. Ya. Sokolnikov himself, in his own words, never shared the point of view associated with the annulment of money through their depreciation.
The main generator of ideas then was V. I. Lenin, at least until the stroke in 1922. In this regard, in vain, many modern authors do not remember him at all, forgetting the main thing - in these years he turned from a theoretician into a practice. It was he who, having enormous power, determined the economic policy of the country. During the years of “war communism”, V. I. Lenin wrote and spoke a lot about non-monetary commodity exchange. Even during the First World War, money was greatly depreciated, the peasants began to refuse to sell their products for unstable means of circulation. This problem worsened after the revolution.
That is why, on December 25, 1918, V. I. Lenin said: “The peasants demand an exchange of goods, they demand fairly, refusing to give bread for depreciated papers.” He repeated this again on January 17, 1919: “Without barter, the peasants say: No, we won’t give you anything for Kerenki.”
Anarchic commodity exchange took place in the bazaars: the peasants exchanged their products for clothes and other things they needed. V. I. Lenin wanted to establish this process at the state level. On November 26, 1918, a decree of the Supreme Economic Council and the People's Commissariat for Food was published on the state's trade monopoly on all textile products, including threads, as well as on factory-made shoes, sugar, salt, matches, kerosene, petroleum lubricating oils, candles, soap, all agricultural implements factory production, nails, horseshoes, tea, confectionery and tobacco products. All these industrial products came to the disposal of the People's Commissariat for Food, and he organized their exchange for agricultural products. As V. I. Lenin and his supporters believed, this was the way to the socialization of agriculture, to solving the problems of its connection with industry.
The first decree on commodity exchange was issued on April 2, 1918. At first, it was based on a voluntary basis. Textiles were exchanged for bread. The textile industry was still in private hands. The state nationalized all wholesale warehouses along with their contents. However, the first experience was unsuccessful, because the fixed prices for bread established even before the October Revolution were too low.
At the beginning of August 1918, fixed prices for bread were tripled (20 times compared to pre-war levels). Barter became obligatory for the peasants.
The difficult food situation of the country, the need to supply half-starved cities gave rise to a decree on food dictatorship (May 13, 1918). Its main point was formulated by V.I. Lenin: “Declare all owners of grain who have surpluses and do not take them out to bulk points, as well as all those who squander grain stocks for moonshine, enemies of the people.” In fact, it was about surplus appropriation, a phenomenon not new. She appeared in Russia at the end of 1916, and before that - in Germany. It was the state grain monopoly.
A more detailed decree on the surplus appeared in the newspapers on January 11, 1919. This decree clarified the concept of “surplus” as grain in excess of the personal consumption of a peasant family, as well as fodder in excess of what is necessary to feed the owner’s livestock.
After the transition to surplus appropriation, manufactured goods began to be exchanged at fixed prices upon presentation of a receipt for the full surrender of “surplus” grain to state collection points. The surplus appraisal was abolished in the middle of 1921, more precisely, it was replaced by a tax in kind during the transition to the NEP. But the state, being a monopoly on manufactured goods, continued to exchange them for bread, i.e., the product exchange continued.
S. A. Dalin gives interesting data on state grain procurements in the order of apportionment and commodity exchange (in poods). The agricultural year then began in October:
- 1916/17-323 089 877;
- 1917/18-47 539 128;
- 1918/19-107 922 507;
- 1919/20-212 507 408;
- 1920/21-283 375 145.
Bread was distributed according to cards - to the Red Army, workers and employees, owners of private enterprises ("bourgeoisie"). The latter were supposed to be the least. An extensive network of state canteens was organized. So, at the end of 1920, out of 35 million citizens who received food cards, 21,261 thousand people. ate in canteens, at first - at fixed prices, and then - for free. S. A. Dalin wrote about this: “In April 1920, payment for labor food rations was abolished throughout the country, and on December 4 of the same year, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars, free delivery of all food products was established. On December 17, free supplies were extended to all industrial goods sold to the population. Thus, a penniless, communist system of industrial production and distribution, as well as public catering, took shape. It spread to the cities and only barely affected the village. This communist system was based not on an abundance of food, but on their acute shortage, on a half-starved existence, but this society was not divided into well-fed and hungry.
Surprisingly, money and the market still existed in parallel to this “communist” system. Half of the bread was given to the cities by the grain procurements, and the other half by the "bags", "speculators" (in the terminology of V. I. Lenin), but in fact - the market.
When the depreciated state marks did not help, the market returned to the ancient form of universal commodity equivalents, in particular to salt. This was taken into account during grain procurement, during the exchange of goods. So, on May 18, 1921, V. I. Lenin gave an order to M. I. Frunze: “Now the main question of all Soviet power, a matter of life and death for us, is to collect 200-300 million poods of grain from Ukraine. For this, the main thing is salt. To take everything away, to surround all the places of production with a triple cordon of troops, not to miss a pound, not to let it be stolen. Put in a military way. Assign exactly responsible persons for each operation. Me their list (All through Glavsol). You are the commander-in-chief of salt. You are responsible for everything.”
V. I. Lenin in February 1919, while working on the draft Program of the RCP (b), wrote: “The bourgeois elements of the population continue to use banknotes remaining in private ownership, these certificates for the right of the exploiters to receive public wealth for the purpose of speculation, profit and robbery working people". V. I. Lenin does not call for the abolition of money in general and immediately. He writes here about something else: “The nationalization of the banks alone is not enough to combat this vestige of bourgeois robbery. The Russian Communist Party will strive to destroy money as quickly as possible...”. And here the quotation is often cut off to show V. I. Lenin as a “non-commodity worker”. However, after a decimal point, he writes: “...first of all, replacing them with savings books, checks, short-term tickets for the right to receive public products, etc., establishing the obligatory keeping of money in banks, etc. In the field of finance, the RCP will carry out progressive income and property tax whenever possible.”
This is not about the destruction of money, but about their binding, state control over the movement of cash, its all-round restriction due to growing inflation, speculation, disorganization, food crisis, etc.
In May 1919, V. I. Lenin clarified this issue: “Even before the socialist revolution, the socialists wrote that money could not be abolished immediately, and we can confirm this with our experience ... We say: as long as money remains and will remain for quite a long time during transitional period from the old capitalist society to the new socialist one. This was the position of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the leader of the Bolshevik Party at that time. But in strategic terms, V. I. Lenin was at one with the “non-commodity workers”. Along with the tasks of replacing private trade with the planned distribution of products throughout the country, the leader of the proletariat and the idol of those years calls for “the destruction of the bank and its transformation into the central accounting department of communist society.” The Party's program formulated the fundamental principle: "Relying on the nationalization of the banks, the RCP is striving to carry out a series of measures that will expand the field of cashless settlements and prepare for the destruction of money."
The policy of drastically restricting commodity-money relations was put into practice; it was no longer a theoretical discussion, but the implementation of the Program of the RCP(b). But even at this time, it was not possible to do without money. Moreover, the issuance of Soviet signs increased because the shortage of goods was supplemented by a shortage of money. Professor S. A. Falkner even developed the theory of the “emission economy”. He believed that there was no limit to the depreciation of money, it was only important to achieve a uniform growth in the mass of money, prices, and incomes. In other words, he did not understand the danger of inflation; on the contrary, it seemed to him that an antidote had been found. The only important thing, he noted, was that there were no other competing money - neither metal nor paper. It was a pure utopia, complete oblivion of the theory of money in general and quantitative theory in particular.
They printed a lot of money, without measure, but they were still not enough to create the Red Army, the state apparatus, to pay wages to workers and employees.
In August 1919, V. I. Lenin demanded that the head of the Narkomfin, N. N. Krestinsky, achieve a productivity of 600 million rubles. per day, offering to transfer the printing houses of Goznak (in the old way - “expeditions”) to three-shift work. As of January 1, 1921, about 14 thousand people were employed in the production of Soviet signs in Moscow, Petrograd, Penza, Perm, Rostov-on-Don.
Sovznaks were still depreciating rapidly: if at the end of 1919 the largest denomination of the banknote was 1,000 rubles, then in 1921 - 100,000 rubles. The obligations of the RSFSR were also issued in denominations of 10 million rubles.
But you can't feed people with paper money.
The "architects" of socialism at that time spoke sharply. The chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Ya. M. Sverdlov, argued that the Bolsheviks should “split the village into two irreconcilable hostile camps, ... kindle a civil war there” in order to get bread from the peasants. The chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs L. D. Trotsky, speaking of the introduction of universal labor service, believed that "the worker should become a serf of the socialist state." He believed that all economic problems of the country should be solved on the basis of military discipline. Paramilitary labor armies (1918-1921) were organized by the method of compulsory mobilization.
By decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 11, 1918, committees of the rural poor (combeds) were created. In a short time (at the beginning of 1919 they were merged with the local Soviets), the Kombeds confiscated almost 50 million hectares of land, cars, livestock, and oil mills from the kulaks. The commanders also helped the food detachments.
In connection with the growth of naturalization in the economy in 1919, free distribution of food rations and consumer goods, fuel and fodder, medicines, tickets for travel in transport was introduced, fees for utilities, mail, telephone, and radio were abolished several times. On this topic, from November 1918 to May 1921, 17 decrees of the Council of People's Commissars were adopted. On January 19, 1920, even a decree “On the abolition of the People's Bank” appeared. Its functions, together with assets and liabilities, were transferred to the budget and settlement department of Narkomfin. The motivation for this unprecedented for the XX century. The event was as follows: “The nationalization of industry subordinated the entire state industry and trade to the general budget order, in connection with which there was no need for the People's Bank.”
In 1920, cash settlements between state enterprises were abolished. Instead of checks, a new form of transfer of material assets within the state sector of the economy was established through the so-called non-monetary transfers that registered the movement of raw materials, materials, and finished products in kind. A new decree of 15 July 1920 forbade payments in cash, checks and direct appropriations. On August 16 of the same year, payment for the transportation of goods by rail was abolished, and on December 23, 1920, the decree of the Council of People's Commissars abolished payment for any kind of fuel provided to state enterprises and institutions. There were other similar measures to abolish money.
And yet, despite the harsh laws of wartime, trade was carried out throughout the country, there was an exchange of food for manufactured goods. At the largest Moscow market, Sukharevka, it was possible to buy or exchange almost any necessary product - from a pin to a cow. It was also possible to exchange Soviet money for foreign currency here, although officially this was strictly prohibited. Prices kept rising.
According to the Market Research Institute at the Narkomfin (headed by Professor N. D. Kondratiev), the free price index in Moscow showed in January 1921, compared with 1913, an increase of 27 thousand times. Prices for foodstuffs increased by 34 thousand times, non-food - by 22 thousand times. In 1920 alone, prices increased more than 10 times. The variation in the rise in prices of individual commodities was very large. The price of salt increased the most - by 143 thousand times, vegetable oil - by 71 thousand times, sugar - by 65 thousand times, bread products - by 42 thousand times. Of the non-food items, the price of soap increased the most - 50,000 times, threads - 34,000 times.
There are no data on the monetary incomes of the population, but it is clear that they were in poverty, fighting for survival. The population of Moscow has decreased by about half compared to the pre-war. This process was also characteristic of other cities; many sought salvation in the villages with relatives, on earth. But even in the countryside, life was hard. Market prices rose faster than the money supply, because the supply of goods under the conditions of devastation was small.
Thus, from October 1917 to June 1921, the money supply increased 120 times, and retail prices almost 8 thousand times (Table 9.1). In comparison with the pre-war 1913 prices increased by almost 81 thousand times. Subsequently, in connection with the famine in 1921-1922. The “times” of inflating the emission and depreciation of state marks were already in the millions and billions.
In a word, there was such a policy of the era of “war communism”, but the market and money, albeit in a dilapidated state, have been preserved. The civil war was largely over by the end of 1920. The situation began to change. As Soviet power began to be established in most of the territory of the former Russian Empire, money circulation began to improve. The following organizational principles were used for this.
- 1. Issues of local Soviet authorities were exchanged for money of the central government, establishing the ratio of exchange according to the real situation.
- 2. The money of the "outlying Soviet republics" remained in circulation parallel to the central money until favorable conditions set in.
- 3. The money of hostile governments and organizations was annulled.
Table 9.1
War communism: money circulation and prices
However, the improvement of the monetary system and the economy as a whole was still far away.
One should not think that only combat commissars with “Mausers” on their sides solved the issues of monetary circulation. Scientists were also involved. An interesting page in the history of money in this regard is the attempt to replace rubles with labor units.
Even then, Russian scientists began to develop a material intersectoral balance (“revolving budget”). They again faced the problem of expressing numerous natural indicators in some generalized accounting units instead of sovznaki unsuitable for this purpose. A new consolidated accounting indicator was needed. Now it was set not only in the aspect of product exchange between the city and the countryside, the naturalization of wages, but also in the macroeconomic aspect.
A commission was set up under the chairmanship of S. G. Strumilin. In October 1920, he wrote in the article “Problems of labor accounting”: “Money accounting for economic goods must give way to non-monetary accounting. This is out of the question... It means that the ruble can no longer serve as a measure of value. But it only follows from this that we must find another measure of value, and not at all that we can abolish this concept altogether and dispense with any evaluations.
Similar ideas were developed by R. Owen, J. Gray, I. Rodbertus, P. Proudhon. The first attempts to put into practice “labor receipts”, “labor money”, certifying the amount of labor time spent on the production of certain products, date back to the first half of the 19th century. I. Rodbertus came up with his project of "working money" in 1842, P. Proudhon - in 1846-1949. R. Owen in 1832-1834 tried to organize in London a "national bazaar of fair exchange."
K. Marx and F. Engels criticized these utopias. The Bolsheviks again and again discussed this problem and did not find a solution. So, N. Kerve wrote: “The legacy of the bourgeois system, completely destroyed - the paper ruble - is living its last days. This is clear to everyone. But what should be next? Is it the absence of any value accounting or something else? Socialism is a subsistence economy that does not require gold and paper money based on gold as a means of accumulation and a means of valuing goods for its development. This is undeniable. But whether the need to abandon value accounting and value comparison of one product of production with another follows from this or not - this is a question that has not yet been solved by everyone in the same way. S. G. Strumilin in 1920 wrote more specifically about this: “As a unit of labor value, I propose to accept the value of the product of labor of one normal day of an employee of the first wage category when he fulfills the production rate of 100%. This normal labor unit, corresponding to work of 100,000 kilogram-meters, will be abbreviated as “tr. unit”, or the word “thread””. The discussion revolved around two questions: 1) about simple or complex labor; 2) on the scope of the “thread”.
K. F. Shmelev, E. S. Varga and other prominent economists and financiers of that time took part in the discussion.
G. Ya. Sokolnikov in his work of 1927 reports that immediately on the eve of the transition to the NEP, the principles of the policy of non-monetary circulation were still being developed and discussed. So, the obligatory surrender of foreign currency was already prescribed by a decree of December 3, 1918. But on January 3, 1921, the law confirmed the obligation for citizens to hand over to the state their precious metals in coins and ingots free of charge. The same law limited the right to own jewelry. It was forbidden to keep at home cash paper money in excess of a small amount - the maximum was ten times the lowest tariff rate. The development of the labor unit of account (“thread”) at the government level also continued. S. G. Strumilin wrote a draft decree on the labor accounting unit in the national economy; it was discussed in May 1921 at the Institute for Economic Research of Narkomfin. This is despite the fact that at the 10th Congress of the CPSU(b) in March 1921, a decision was already made in principle on the transition to the NEP, consequently, to the revival of commodity-money relations. In the said draft decree, it was established that “the unit of labor accounting is taken to be the average output of one normal day of simple labor with its normal intensity for this type of work. The designated labor unit is given the name “thread”. The widespread introduction of the aforementioned accounting unit in its entirety was planned from January 1, 1922. G. Ya. Sokolnikov wrote: “The development of these projects could not be completed. Economic practice turned the other way, and “threads” (practically, a “thread” was supposed to be equal to two pre-war rubles, i.e. 1 dollar) were thoroughly forgotten” .
But even if “trad” were introduced, it would inevitably turn into ordinary paper money. By the way, A. Potyaev wrote on this topic back in 1918: “The work of the expedition for the preparation of government papers will be aimed at making such labor banknotes, which will indicate how much the citizen has worked.” It was possible to change the name of the monetary unit: instead of the ruble, write “thread” or set the number of hours, days, but it would still be banknotes with conditional denominations. Abolishing money nationwide is not so easy. This is not a soldier's barracks, not a prison, not a labor commune of 100-150 people, this is the economy of a huge country.
Thus, the attempt to abolish money and market relations turned out to be unsuccessful, but it also turned out to be difficult to quickly carry out cardinal reforms in the transition from the policy of war communism to the NEP. The post-war devastation was aggravated by the unprecedented famine of 1921-1922, associated with the drought in the Volga region, and also with the fact that the predatory surplus in 1920 - early 1921. has not yet been replaced by a soft tax in kind. Even the seed fund was often confiscated from the peasants to supply the cities and the army. The army, fed by the peasants, suppressed the peasant uprisings, the Kronstadt rebellion. The punitive operations were led by major military leaders - S. Kamenev, M. Tukhachevsky, S. Budyonny, M. Frunze, P. Yakir, I. Uborevich and others. A lot of blood was shed.
As a result of the famine of 1921-1922. about 5 million people died. The unrestrained printing of Soviet signs did not help. Food aid came from the United States, in particular from the American Relief Organization (ARA). Various food committees sent ships with food, organized free canteens. So, in May 1922, the ARA fed about 6 million people, the American Quaker Society - 265 thousand people, the International Union for Helping Children - 260 thousand people, English trade unions - 92 thousand people, the Swedish Red Cross - 87 thousand people. This help was a drop in the ocean, but it was still a lifesaver for many people. Such was the military-political and social background during the transition from the policy of war communism to the new economic policy.