» Convention on the regime of the Black Sea straits. Conventions are not written for American destroyers. Bypassing the laws

Convention on the regime of the Black Sea straits. Conventions are not written for American destroyers. Bypassing the laws

Adopted at the Conference on the regime of the Black Sea straits, held June 22 - July 21, 1936 in Montreux (Switzerland). In doing so, Turkey has pledged to comply with the principles of international maritime law.

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The conference on the regime of the Black Sea straits was held on June 22 - July 21, 1936 in Montreux (Switzerland) with the participation of the USSR, Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Australia and Japan. The conference was convened at the suggestion of Turkey in order to revise the convention on the regime of the Black Sea straits, adopted at the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23. Italy refused to participate in the conference, as the participating countries supported international sanctions against Italy in connection with the situation in Ethiopia. At the Montreux Conference, Great Britain came up with a proposal to equalize the rights of the Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers to the passage of their warships through the straits, which would lead to a restriction of the rights of passage of the ships of the Soviet Navy. Ultimately, the conference was not disrupted and led to the development of agreed decisions. On July 20, the participating countries signed a new convention on the regime of the straits, on the basis of which Turkey received the right to remilitarize the straits zone.

Main provisions of the convention

The Montreux Convention preserves for the merchant ships of all countries the freedom of passage through the straits both in peacetime and in wartime. However, the regime for the passage of warships is different in relation to the Black Sea and non-Black Sea states. Subject to prior notice to the Turkish authorities, the Black Sea powers can pass through the straits in peacetime their warships of any class. Significant restrictions on class (only small surface ships pass) and on tonnage have been introduced for warships of non-Black Sea powers. The total tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea states in the Black Sea should not exceed 30 thousand tons (with the possibility of increasing this maximum to 45 thousand tons in the event of an increase in the naval forces of the Black Sea countries) with a stay of no more than 21 days. In the event of Turkey's participation in the war, and also if Turkey considers that it is directly threatened by war, it has the right to allow or prohibit the passage through the straits of any warships. During a war in which Turkey is not involved, the straits must be closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power. The convention abolished the international commission on the straits provided for by the Lausanne Convention with the transfer of its functions to the government of Turkey.

  • Black Sea powers (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, USSR until 1991, Russia since 1991, Ukraine since 1991, Georgia since 1991)

Significance of the convention

The decisions adopted at the conference in Montreux became for their time a step forward towards recognizing the rights of the Black Sea countries in the issue of the status of the straits. Italy joined the Montreux Convention in 1938.

Question about the passage of aircraft carriers

One of the controversial issues in relation to the convention is the possibility of aircraft carriers passing through the straits. Article 10 stipulates:

In peacetime, light surface ships, small warships and auxiliaries, whether they belong to the Black Sea Powers or not, whatever their flag, will enjoy the right of freedom of passage through the Straits, without any fees or charges, insofar as they enter there by day and under the conditions provided for in Articles 13 et seq. below. Warships other than those falling under the classes referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be entitled to passage only under the special conditions provided for in Articles 11 and 12.

At the same time, Article 11 stipulates the right of passage for battleships, Article 12 - the rule for the passage of submarines. Annex II paragraph B of the convention defines the classes of battleships, light warships, small combat and auxiliary vessels, submarines and, separately, aircraft carriers:

Aircraft carriers are surface warships which, whatever their displacement, are intended or constructed primarily for the transport and commissioning of aircraft at sea. If a warship was not intended or arranged primarily for the transport and commissioning of aircraft at sea, then the arrangement on this ship of a deck for launching or taking off will not have the consequence of including it (the ship) in the class of aircraft carriers.

Thus, formally, aircraft carriers do not have the right to pass through the straits, since Article 10 stipulates the conditions for passage only for light surface, small and auxiliary ships, and specifically stipulates that, apart from them, only battleships (Article 11) and submarines (Article 12) have the right of passage ). Aircraft carriers are de facto excluded from the number of ships entitled to the passage of the straits. An exception is the situation in which Turkey is a belligerent or considers itself under a direct military threat - in this case, according to Articles 20 and 21, Turkey has the right to regulate the passage of ships at its discretion.

Despite the formal absence of rules for the passage of aircraft carriers of the straits, the USSR did not experience significant difficulties with the withdrawal of its aircraft-carrying cruisers built in Nikolaev through the straits. Periodically, assumptions are made that the presence of powerful strike weapons on Soviet aircraft-carrying ships was connected precisely with the desire to avoid the formal classification of these ships as aircraft carriers - that is, designed or arranged primarily for the carriage and commissioning of aircraft at sea.

Significant cases in the context of the convention with the USA

However, it should be noted that according to Article 21:

In the event that Turkey would consider itself threatened by an imminent military danger, it would have the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 of this Convention. If the Turkish Government uses the facilities afforded to it by the first paragraph above, it will notify the High Contracting Parties, as well as the Secretary General of the League of Nations. If the Council of the League of Nations decides by a two-thirds majority that the measures thus taken by Turkey are not justified, and if such is the opinion of the majority of the High Contracting Parties signatory to the present Convention, then the Turkish Government undertakes to cancel these measures, as well as those would be accepted by virtue of Article 6 of this Convention.

In view of the dissolution of the League of Nations, the right to apply Article 20

Recently, the third US warship, the destroyer "Donald Cook", and the French military intelligence ship "Dupuy de Lome" entered the Black Sea through the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Shortly before this, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced a violation by Turkey and the United States of the international convention of Montreux (1936), which regulates the period of presence and tonnage of foreign warships in the Black Sea basin. But the American and Turkish sides ignore Moscow's position. The West is clearly showing military force in connection with the situation in Ukraine and the reunification of Crimea with Russia.


The well-known Turkish political scientist Fatih Er actually confirmed that these (NATO) "invasions" are addressed primarily to Russia.

In view of the increasingly frequent “visits” of NATO warships to the Black Sea, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that “the extension of the stay of US Navy ships in the Black Sea often exceeded the deadlines set by the International Montreux Convention.”

S. Lavrov clarified: “According to the Montreux Convention on the Status of the Straits, warships of countries that do not have access to the Black Sea can stay in its waters for no more than 21 days, and significant restrictions on the class and tonnage of the vessel have been introduced for them.”

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, “the US Navy frigate USS Taylor entered the Black Sea on February 5 and departed for the Mediterranean on March 9 of this year, which exceeded the maximum allowable period by 11 days and, accordingly, is a violation of the Convention. At the same time, the Turkish side did not inform us about this delay in a timely manner. For our part, our concerns have been brought to the attention of the American and Turkish sides in the form of notes verbale.”

Recall that since Russia's access to the Black Sea and the expansion of its Black Sea territories, ensuring their security has always rested on Turkish policy on military navigation through the Dardanelles - the Sea of ​​Marmara - the Bosphorus.

Russian proposals to ban military vessels from non-Black Sea countries from entering this artery between the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean have always been rejected by the European powers and Turkey, and after the First World War, by the United States.

For example, the Crimean War (1853-1856) of the Western coalition against Russia became possible due to the free access of European naval forces through the same straits. During the intervention of the Entente in Russia in 1918-1919. the Western fleet also passed through these straits without hindrance, not only to the Black Sea, but also to the Azov and Danube ports of Russia. It is worth recalling that Russia's allies categorically objected to the Russian naval operation in the Bosphorus and the Sea of ​​Marmara during the First World War, which would have quickly taken Turkey out of the war.

In 1915, the Entente wanted to capture Constantinople and thereby close the Bosphorus and the Sea of ​​Marmara from Russia, but in vain! That was the unsuccessful Gallipoli operation of 1915, carried out without the participation of Russian troops. However, during the previous Russian-Turkish wars, the European powers threatened Russia with almost a collective invasion of its territory if the Russian troops "dared" to enter Constantinople and seize the Bosphorus. On the other hand, the many years and numerous bloody battles of the troops of Russia and Turkey in the Balkans and in the Eastern Turkish mountains, including in 1914-1917, did not cause discontent among the powers of Europe: let Russians and Turks kill each other more. And although after 1918 until the mid-1930s there was a thaw in Soviet-Turkish relations, Ankara did not agree with Moscow's proposal for the indefinite demilitarization of the straits and for bilateral Soviet-Turkish military security.

Under pressure from London, Paris and Washington, on July 24, 1923 in Lausanne (Switzerland) the International Convention on the Regime of the Straits was signed. It was signed by Great Britain, France, the USSR, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The convention provided for the demilitarization of the straits zone, but allowed free passage through the Bosphorus, the Sea of ​​Marmara and the Dardanelles not only for merchant and passenger ships, but also for military ships of any country. Therefore, the USSR did not ratify the Convention. As follows from the statement of the Soviet NKID, "... due to the lack of proper security conditions for the straits, the Black Sea basin as a whole and, accordingly, the southern borders of the USSR." In the future, the Soviet side was able to achieve a partial revision of the regime for the straits.

In the Swiss city of Montreux, on July 21, 1936, the Convention on the Status of the Straits, which is still in force today, was signed. It was signed and ratified by the USSR, Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Japan.

The document preserves for merchant ships of all countries the freedom of passage through the straits in peacetime and wartime. But the mode of passage of warships is different for the Black Sea and non-Black Sea states. With prior notification of the Turkish authorities, the Black Sea countries can conduct their warships of any class in peacetime. And for military ships of non-Black Sea states, restrictions on class and tonnage have been introduced. Only small and auxiliary surface ships can pass here, and the total tonnage of military vessels of non-Black Sea countries in the Black Sea should not exceed 30 thousand tons, although this volume may increase to 45 thousand tons if the Black Sea countries increase their navies in the region. The term of stay of "non-Black Sea" military courts was limited to 21 days (Moscow insisted on 14 days, but the British achieved more).

As for Turkey's policy in the straits, the Convention introduced the following rules: in the event of Turkey's participation in the war, and if Turkey considers that it is threatened by war, the Turkish side is granted the right to allow / prohibit the passage of military ships of any countries through the straits. And during a war in which Turkey does not participate, the straits are closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power.

In addition, the Montreux Convention abolished the international commission on the straits established by the Lausanne Convention, its functions, and with them sovereignty in this region, were transferred to Turkey.

But during the Great Patriotic War the Turkish straits were used by Germany and its allies for operations against the USSR. In an effort to smooth out such a hostile policy along the straits, Turkey at the end of February 1945 declared war on Germany and Japan. And from mid-April 1945, it allowed the delivery of allied cargo to Soviet ports through the Dardanelles, the Sea of ​​Marmara and the Bosphorus. The total volume of these deliveries to the Black Sea ports of the USSR in 1945 amounted to 681 thousand tons, which approximately corresponds to 5% of all allied deliveries to the USSR. Over 300 thousand tons arrived in Batumi, up to 100 thousand tons - in Poti, the rest of the cargo was received by the ports of Sukhumi and Tuapse. Nevertheless, on March 19, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Turkish Treaty "On Friendship and Neutrality" (December 1925).

And then, on June 7, 1945, V.M. Molotov told Turkish Ambassador to the USSR S. Sarper that “the desirable conditions for concluding a new agreement are a regime of exclusively Soviet-Turkish control in the Black Sea straits and their demilitarization. With the placement of a Soviet naval base in this area under a long-term lease "(similar to the Soviet bases of Porkkalla-Udd in Finland or Dalny in China in 1945-1955). But Ankara rejected these projects.

At the beginning of the Potsdam Conference, Molotov repeated these proposals, adding that "... we have repeatedly stated to our allies that the USSR cannot consider the Montreux Convention correct."

Then the problem was discussed with the participation of Stalin himself, who refuted the thesis about the threat to Turkey from the USSR. Noting that “the Turks in the region of Constantinople have over 20 divisions, perhaps 23 or 24 divisions. And, owning the Straits, a small state, supported by England, holds a large state by the throat and does not give it a pass.

Great Britain and the United States vigorously stood up for Turkey and for the Montreux Convention. But under pressure from the USSR, and taking into account the pro-Soviet position on this issue of Greece, close to the straits, in section XVI “Black Sea Straits” of the final protocol of the conference it was said: “The Convention on the Straits, concluded in Montreux, should be revised as not meeting the conditions of the present. We agreed that as a next step, this issue will be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.”

But Moscow decided to “squeeze” Ankara on its own. On August 7, 1946, the government of the USSR issued a note in which the above-mentioned demands were repeated. However, this time the United States and Great Britain expressed unequivocal support for Turkey. Already in the late 1940s, US military and intelligence bases appeared in Turkey, including some of its Black Sea regions, and in February 1952, Turkey and Greece joined NATO. Thus, the navies of the NATO countries in the Black Sea received carte blanche. Moreover, the Montreux Convention, we repeat, does not forbid the presence of "non-Black Sea" navies in this basin.

And on May 30, 1953, the Soviet government officially abandoned Stalin's demands, and in the future the USSR never raised the issue of the regime of the straits. Even during the period Caribbean Crisis(October 1962). Moscow feared to “put pressure” on Ankara again, which could provoke an increase in the military presence of the United States and, in general, NATO in the Black Sea region. At the same time, according to available data, NATO, including Turkey, in the 1960s-1980s. violated the military terms of the Montreux Convention at least 30 times. There is a version that NATO naval intelligence had a hand - again through the straits - in the destruction of the battleship Novorossiysk in 1955 near Sevastopol ...

During the preparation and holding of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (early-mid-1970s), the United States, Great Britain and Turkey made it clear that they were not inclined to change anything in the Convention and that a return to this issue could delay the signing of the final Act . Moscow chose not to extend these terms. And in 1991-1992. Russia, Ukraine and Georgia joined the Convention instead of the USSR.

Today it is obvious that the Montreux Convention, having retained the possibility for direct and indirect military-political provocations against Russia, suits the West quite well.

Especially given the current openly hostile attitude of the Kyiv junta towards Russia, as it was, say, during the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008. Therefore, it is hardly possible for the signatory countries of the Montreux Convention to create, for example, a commission to verify the implementation of all the rules of this document or to clarify them.

By the way, in the second half of the 1940s - early 1950s, the USSR repeatedly proposed the creation of such a commission. The idea was supported by Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece. Western countries and Turkey did not respond to such proposals. But if the provisions of this Convention can be violated even by non-Black Sea countries, and without consequences, then Russia will have to look for symmetrical answers. Instead of appealing more to the Montreux Convention, which is not respected by other signatory countries located, we note, distant lands from the Black Sea ...

In Montreux (Switzerland). At the same time, Turkey undertook to comply with the principles of international maritime law.

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The conference on the regime of the Black Sea straits was held on June 22 - July 21, 1936 in Montreux (Switzerland) with the participation of the USSR, Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Australia and Japan. The conference was convened at the suggestion of Turkey in order to revise the convention on the regime of the Black Sea straits adopted at the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23. Italy refused to participate in the conference, as the participating countries supported international sanctions against Italy in connection with the situation in Ethiopia. At the Montreux Conference, Great Britain came up with a proposal to equalize the rights of the Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers to the passage of their warships through the straits, which would lead to a restriction of the rights of passage of the ships of the Soviet Navy. Ultimately, the conference was not disrupted and led to the development of agreed decisions. On July 20, the participating countries signed a new convention on the regime of the straits, on the basis of which Turkey received the right to remilitarize the straits zone.

Main provisions of the convention

The Montreux Convention preserves for the merchant ships of all countries the freedom of passage through the straits both in peacetime and in wartime. However, the regime for the passage of warships is different in relation to the Black Sea and non-Black Sea states. Subject to prior notice to the Turkish authorities, the Black Sea powers can pass through the straits in peacetime their warships of any class. Significant restrictions on class (only small surface ships pass) and on tonnage have been introduced for warships of non-Black Sea powers. The total tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea states in the Black Sea should not exceed 30 thousand tons (with the possibility of increasing this maximum to 45 thousand tons in the event of an increase in the naval forces of the Black Sea countries) with a stay of no more than 21 days. In the event of Turkey's participation in the war, and also if Turkey considers that it is directly threatened by war, it has the right to allow or prohibit the passage through the straits of any warships. During a war in which Turkey is not involved, the straits must be closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power. The convention abolished the international commission on the straits provided for by the Lausanne Convention with the transfer of its functions to the government of Turkey.

  • Black Sea powers (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, USSR until 1991, Russia since 1991, Ukraine since 1991, Georgia since 1991)

Significance of the convention

The decisions adopted at the conference in Montreux became for their time a step forward towards recognizing the rights of the Black Sea countries in the issue of the status of the straits. Italy acceded to the Montreux Convention in 1938.

Question about the passage of aircraft carriers

One of the controversial issues in relation to the convention is the possibility of aircraft carriers passing through the straits. Article 10 stipulates:

In peacetime, light surface ships, small warships and auxiliaries, whether they belong to the Black Sea Powers or not, whatever their flag, will enjoy the right of freedom of passage through the Straits, without any fees or charges, insofar as they enter there by day and under the conditions provided for in Articles 13 et seq. below. Warships other than those falling under the classes referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be entitled to passage only under the special conditions provided for in Articles 11 and 12.

At the same time, Article 11 stipulates the right of passage for battleships, Article 12 - the rule for the passage of submarines. Annex II paragraph B of the convention defines the classes of battleships, light warships, small combat and auxiliary vessels, submarines and, separately, aircraft carriers:

Aircraft carriers are surface warships which, whatever their displacement, are intended or constructed primarily for the transport and commissioning of aircraft at sea. If a warship was not intended or arranged primarily for the transport and commissioning of aircraft at sea, then the arrangement on this ship of a deck for launching or taking off will not have the consequence of including it (the ship) in the class of aircraft carriers.

Thus, formally, aircraft carriers do not have the right to pass through the straits, since Article 10 stipulates the conditions for passage only for light surface, small and auxiliary ships, and specifically stipulates that, apart from them, only battleships (Article 11) and submarines (Article 12) have the right of passage ). Aircraft carriers are de facto excluded from the number of ships entitled to the passage of the straits. An exception is the situation in which Turkey is a belligerent or considers itself under a direct military threat - in this case, according to Articles 20 and 21, Turkey has the right to regulate the passage of ships at its discretion.

Despite the formal absence of rules for the passage of aircraft carriers of the straits, the USSR did not experience significant difficulties with the withdrawal of its aircraft-carrying cruisers built in Nikolaev through the straits. Periodically, assumptions are made that the presence of powerful strike weapons on Soviet aircraft-carrying ships was connected precisely with the desire to avoid the formal classification of these ships as aircraft carriers - that is, designed or arranged primarily for the carriage and commissioning of aircraft at sea.

Significant cases in the context of the convention with the USA

However, it should be noted that according to Article 21:

In the event that Turkey would consider itself threatened by an imminent military danger, it would have the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 of this Convention. If the Turkish Government uses the facilities afforded to it by the first paragraph above, it will notify the High Contracting Parties, as well as the Secretary General of the League of Nations. If the Council of the League of Nations decides by a two-thirds majority that the measures thus taken by Turkey are not justified, and if such is the opinion of the majority of the High Contracting Parties signatory to the present Convention, then the Turkish Government undertakes to cancel these measures, as well as those would be accepted by virtue of Article 6 of this Convention.

In view of the dissolution of the League of Nations, the right to apply Article 20

In time of war, when Turkey is a belligerent, the provisions of Articles 10 to 18 will not apply; the passage of warships will depend solely on the discretion of the Turkish government.

- is entirely under the jurisdiction of Turkey itself [ ] . Thus, Turkey has the right - if it considers the situation threatening for itself - to regulate the regime of the straits at its own discretion, including allowing warships of non-Black Sea powers to stay in the water area for an unlimited time.

The small Swiss town of Montreux entered the history of international relations 80 years ago, in the summer of 1936, when one of the key issues was resolved here. European politics, which has long served as the cause of many conflicts, is the issue of the Black Sea straits.

View of Montreux

Located on the picturesque shores of Lake Geneva, Montreux has become a favorite vacation spot for Russian writers and composers since late XIX century. came here Pyotr Tchaikovsky and Lev Tolstoy. Last years life, from 1960 to 1977, spent in Montreux Vladimir Nabokov- and was buried there. But the whole world started talking about this town in 1936...

"From the Varangians to the Greeks"

The issue of the Black Sea has become important for Eastern Slavs in the early period of the development of Russian statehood. Already in the treaty of the prince Oleg with the Byzantines, concluded in 907, it was about the terms of trade on the Black Sea: Russian merchants were granted a number of privileges, they were exempted from paying duties to Constantinople. At that time, there was a path "from the Varangians to the Greeks", connecting Northern Europe with Southern Europe, Scandinavia with the Byzantine Empire. Actually Ancient Russia controlled the entire route from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The significance of the route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” began to decline at the beginning of the 13th century, not least because of the sack of the capital of Byzantium by the crusaders in 1204. In addition, a difficult era has come feudal fragmentation in Russia.

Interest in the Black Sea resumed after the unification of the Russian principalities around Moscow. There were several reasons for this, and above all, the existence of a constant threat from the south, from the Crimean Khanate, which regularly raided Russian lands with the aim of plundering and capturing slaves (the fight against it would last for more than one century). The concept of "Moscow - the Third Rome" was also important, according to which Russia claimed succession from Byzantium, which became the ideological justification for the desire to master Constantinople. However, the straits as such had not yet acquired paramount importance at that time.

Everything changed with the conclusion in 1774 of the Kyuchuk-Kaynarji peace, which ended the next Russian-Turkish war. According to the peace treaty, Russia received not only full access to the Black Sea, but also the right to have its own navy on it, as well as the possibility of free passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Russian merchant ships were equalized in rights with English and French. Since that time, Russia began not only to win back the Black Sea lands from Turkey, which until then was the sovereign owner of the Black Sea (in fact, it was its inland sea), but also to defend its interests in the strait zone on a par with the European powers.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk - First President of Turkey

At the same time, the famous "Greek project" appeared. Catherine II, according to which Byzantium, headed by the grandson of the Empress, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, was to be recreated on the lands of the Balkan Peninsula liberated from the Turks. In 1787, during a visit to the Crimea, Catherine II ordered to decorate the gates of the Sevastopol fortress under construction with the inscription: "Road to Constantinople." It was an unambiguous manifesto of the new Eastern policy of the Russian Empire.

However, it would be wrong to say that Russian-Turkish relations on the issue of the Black Sea straits were limited exclusively to confrontation - Russian diplomacy made a number of unsuccessful attempts to conclude a military-political agreement with the Turks. So, in 1799, in the conditions of the Napoleonic Wars, Russia, being a member of the anti-French coalition, went for rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire. The latter, we note, rather needed it, since it turned out to be unable to independently protect the straits due to significant losses suffered by it in the confrontation with Napoleon in Egypt. According to the agreement, the Turks recognized the special rights of Russia in the Black Sea and granted the right of unimpeded passage through the straits to its merchant and military ships. True, soon the vector of the Russian foreign policy changed again: in connection with the reorientation of St. Petersburg towards an alliance with Napoleon, which was marked by the conclusion of the Tilsit peace, the alliance with the Ottoman Empire did not last long.

G.V. Chicherin - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR (later the USSR) from 1918 to 1930

In 1806 a new Russian-Turkish war, which brought Russia privileges regarding the use of the straits in accordance with the Bucharest Peace Treaty signed in 1812. The next war, 1828-1829, ended with the peace of Adrianople, also beneficial for Russia. And in 1833, in the town of Unkar-Iskelesi near Istanbul, an agreement was signed between the Russian and Ottoman empires, which formalized their military alliance. Among other things, it provided that in the event of an attack on Russia by a third party, the sultan was obliged to close the straits to any foreign warships, thereby guaranteeing the security of Russia's southern borders. As for the idea of ​​conquering Constantinople, Emperor Nicholas I at that time abandoned it, believing that a weak Turkey was more beneficial for Russia than its division.

However, this alliance did not last long: the traditional contradictions between the two powers turned out to be stronger. The dissatisfaction of Great Britain and France, which lost the most from the Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty, also played a role. In 1841, after the expiration of its validity, the London Straits Convention was concluded, which was much more in line with English interests than Russian ones. The security of the southern borders of Russia was now not at all guaranteed, since the Sultan could open the straits to foreign allies in the event of a military conflict.

This is exactly what happened during Crimean War, the result of which for the Russian and Ottoman empires, in particular, was the ban on having a navy on the Black Sea (first of all, this hit Russia, since Turkey retained the right to keep naval forces in the neighboring Marmara and Mediterranean Seas). Another result of this war was the closure of the straits for warships in peacetime. Russia will restore the Black Sea Fleet, having received the appropriate right in 1871, but the issue of the straits will remain acute for several more decades.

KINYAPINA N.S. The Balkans and Straits in Russia's Foreign Policy at the End of the 19th Century (1878–1898). M., 1994;
***
A. V. Ignatiev, L. N. Nezhinsky and others. Russia and the Black Sea Straits (XVIII-XX centuries) / M., 1999.

Long way to compromise

Defeat in the First World War brought Turkey to the brink of extinction as an independent state. In 1920, she was forced to conclude with the Entente allies (among whom there was no Russia, which was being shaken at that time by the Civil War), the Treaty of Sevres on extremely unfavorable conditions for herself. Almost the entire territory of the former Ottoman Empire, the size of the Turkish army was strictly limited, a foreign protectorate was actually established over the country, but most importantly, Constantinople and the straits were declared an international demilitarized zone, the management of which was entrusted to the great powers. Thus, it was supposed to put an end to the issue of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, excluding any participation of Turkey in deciding their fate.

However, the Treaty of Sevres was not even ratified by the Turkish government: indignation over its conditions reached such a limit in the country that the Civil War flared up in full force. The official sultan's government was opposed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (this is how the Turkish parliament is called today), headed by General Mustafa Kemal, disagreeing with the terms of peace with the Entente. By the way, Soviet Russia provided considerable support to him, one of the first in the world to recognize the government of Kemal in Ankara, providing the rebels with weapons, ammunition, shells and gold, and, under the Moscow Treaty of 1921, also transferring the territory of the Kars region. In the autumn of 1922, it became clear that Kemal's troops were winning. The Entente signed an armistice that ended hostilities and canceled a number of clauses of the Treaty of Sevres until a new agreement was concluded. Sultan soon Mehmed VI left the country, and Turkey finally became a republic.

V.V. Vorovsky, a member of the Soviet delegation at the Lausanne Conference, was killed in Lausanne by a former White Guard officer M. Konradi

However, the urgency of the issue of the straits remained - the need for a full-fledged peace treaty was obvious. A conference specially convened to prepare such a treaty was held in Lausanne from November 20, 1922 to July 24, 1923. Turkey, Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (future Yugoslavia), Japan and the USA became its participants. Representatives of Bulgaria and the RSFSR were also invited to the conference, but their participation, according to the decision of the Entente countries, was limited exclusively to the question of the straits. Despite the stated protest against such discrimination, the Soviet delegation, headed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin nevertheless took part in the conference.

MM. Litvinov - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR from 1930 to 1939

The position of the RSFSR was to defend the territorial integrity of Turkey in accordance with the Moscow Treaty, as well as to support the Turkish government in protesting against the capitulation regime and requesting the cancellation of the country's external debts. As for the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the representatives of the RSFSR advocated their complete opening to merchant ships of all countries and complete closure to military, armed ships and military aviation of all states, with the exception of Turkey itself. Thus, the Soviet side was almost the only ally of Turkey at the Lausanne Conference.

This option did not suit the Western powers, and if there were practically no contradictions in the discussion regarding merchant shipping, then it was difficult for the conference participants to reach an agreement on the issue of military ships in the straits. In particular, Great Britain demanded international control over the straits and their complete demilitarization (destruction of coastal fortifications), seeking to preserve the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres. Other powers (primarily France) advocated a softer option: the passage of military ships of any countries was declared free in peacetime, and in wartime, subject to the neutrality of Turkey (in the case of her participation in the war, free passage was allowed only to ships of neutral states).

The contradictions turned out to be so sharp that in February 1923 it was decided to temporarily suspend the conference. The Soviet side was not officially informed about the resumption of its work at the end of April, so our representatives arrived in Switzerland late. The situation became even more complicated on May 10, when in the same place, in Lausanne, a former White Guard officer Maurice Conradi one of the members of the Soviet delegation was killed Vaclav Vorovsky. At the last stage of the conference, the participation of the Soviet side was seriously limited.

The result of long negotiations was the Lausanne Peace Treaty, which turned out to be much more beneficial for Turkey than the previous one: territorial losses became smaller, the privileges of foreign states and companies provided for earlier by the capitulation regime were canceled, a foreign protectorate did not operate, and the external debt of the Ottoman Empire was reduced. Most of these points of the treaty, which were successful for Turkey, were secured thanks to the position of the Soviet delegation.

Bosphorus

Meanwhile, with regard to the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the solution, designed to become a compromise, turned out to be half-hearted: the convention established free passage through the straits of merchant and military ships of any flag, both in peacetime and in wartime, but under British pressure, a clause on the demilitarization of the straits was included in it , as well as the introduction of restrictions on the number of passing vessels. The established International Commission of the Straits, which included representatives of the countries participating in the conference (except the United States), actually gained control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (despite the fact that nominally they remained Turkish territory). Its mission was to prevent possible conflicts.

The USSR did not ratify this convention, since in practice it significantly infringed on its interests as a Black Sea power and did not protect against possible aggression from non-Black Sea states.

Swiss arrangements

By the beginning of the 1930s, the position that the Lausanne conference had determined was not beneficial to any of the Black Sea countries. The general deterioration of the international situation affected: the intervention of Japan in Manchuria, the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, the attack of fascist Italy on Ethiopia. There was a need to reconsider the regime of the straits, for which, on the initiative of Turkey, a new international meeting was convened in June 1936 - this time in Montreux. It brought together representatives of the same states as in Lausanne thirteen years earlier (with the exception of the United States and Italy), Australia became a new participant in the negotiations.

For the Soviet Union, the complete closure of the straits for the passage of military ships was unprofitable, since this deprived it of the opportunity to transfer its naval forces to the Black Sea from other seas (for example, from the Baltic). At the same time, their full opening meant a weakening of control over the situation in the Black Sea, the deprivation of the USSR of primacy and the emergence of a threat of attack from non-Black Sea powers. Closing the straits for warships of non-Black Sea powers seemed ideal, but this option was categorically rejected by Western countries. Therefore, the most balanced position was required from Soviet diplomats.

As expected, the problem of remilitarization of the straits and the restoration of coastal fortifications did not cause discussion at the conference, the point on the free passage of merchant ships remained unshakable. The issue of military courts turned out to be the most difficult again: the British delegation stubbornly refused to recognize the Black Sea powers (primarily Turkey and the USSR) as having the right to any special conditions, thereby trying to maintain British influence in the region. Soviet delegation led by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov defended the thesis about the special position of our country. So the atmosphere at the conference was very tense, and the main antagonists at it were the USSR and Great Britain.

Despite the tough positions of the parties, the participants in the Montreux conference managed to reach an agreement in just a month. The main requirements of the USSR were accepted: first of all, the Black Sea states were given a more favorable regime than non-Black Sea ones. The International Commission of the Straits was liquidated, and all power over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles passed to Turkey. It was her other Black Sea powers that from now on had to give advance notice of the passage of warships, while their tonnage in peacetime was not limited in any way.

But in relation to non-Black Sea states, restrictions were imposed both on the tonnage of ships, and on their class and time of stay in the Black Sea - no more than 21 days. In the event of a war in which Turkey remains neutral, the straits must be closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power. If Turkey takes part in the war or sees a threat of attack for itself, then the decision to let military ships through the straits should be entirely at its discretion.

Potskhveriya B.M. Black Sea straits in Russian-Turkish relations // Russian-Turkish relations: history, state of the art and perspectives. M., 2003

"Don't let him pass"

At first glance, the Soviet delegation might have been celebrating a diplomatic victory. She managed to achieve almost all of her goals: the new convention protected the rights of the Black Sea states and contributed to strengthening peace in the region. Great Britain had to come to terms with the weakening of its influence here.

However, first of all, Turkey was the winner, for the first time after the First World War, it significantly strengthened its position in the region and received the right to independently regulate access control straits in the event of a military threat to it. Moreover, she herself could decide whether such a threat exists or not. And this is an important factor: in the future, as Ankara drew closer to Western countries, Soviet-Turkish relations became more and more cool, which made it possible for Western countries to indirectly influence the situation in the Black Sea region. Joseph Stalin subsequently stated: "... a small state, supported by England, holds a large state by the throat and does not give it a pass."

Already after the war, at the Potsdam Conference, the USSR proposed to revise the existing situation with an eye to creating a naval base in the Dardanelles to ensure freedom of access to the straits, regardless of Turkey. In addition, the Soviet government demanded that Ankara return the territories previously transferred to it under the Moscow Treaty. These attempts were unsuccessful and were abandoned in the early 1950s. In turn, the aspirations of the United States, which sought the right to free passage through the straits and, accordingly, the removal of restrictions for non-Black Sea countries, were also not satisfied. Thus, the status quo was preserved.

Despite some flare-ups of controversy around the problem of the straits that took place in the second half of the twentieth century, Montreux convention continues to operate today. However, over the past years, the situation in the Black Sea region has seriously changed. In particular, since 1936, the tonnage of ships has noticeably increased and the nature of cargo has changed. After the collapse of the USSR, the number of Black Sea states increased. Do not forget that Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania have become NATO members, which means they are bound by a number of military obligations and agreements with non-Black Sea states.

It is known that in 2008, during the conflict in South Ossetia and in 2014, in connection with the events in Ukraine, US Navy ships in the Black Sea exceeded the maximum allowable stay there under the Montreux Convention. Therefore, it is possible that in the future this agreement will still be revised and give way to a new document that is more in line with the times and the international situation.

Nikita Brusilovsky

MONTREUX CONFERENCE 1936

on the regime of the straits - met from 22. VI to 21. VII in Montreux (Switzerland), consisting of representatives of the USSR, England, Australia, France, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia, Japan; drafted a new convention on the regime of the straits, which replaced the Lausanne Convention of 1923 (see para. Lausanne Conference).

Beginning in 1933, when Hitler's seizure of power in Germany created an immediate military threat in Europe, and increased Italian military preparations aroused unrest in the Mediterranean basin, Turkish diplomacy began to probe the possibility of revising the Lausanne Convention of 1923 with the aim of remilitarizing the straits. In March and again in May 1933 the Turkish representatives raised this question in the general committee of the International Conference of 1932-35.

Representative of the USSR V.S. Dovgalevsky(see) recognized Turkey's proposal as "quite correct and fully in line with the interests of peace and common security," but the British delegates withdrew it from discussion. In April 1935, at a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras again pointed out that the articles of the Lausanne Convention, which determine the military status of the straits, are discriminatory and create a situation of inequality for Turkey. Again, Turkey was supported by the Soviet representative, who noted that the USSR "would not put obstacles in the implementation of the wishes" expressed by Aras. But the representative of England, followed by the representatives of France Laval(see) and Italy Aloisi(see) again evaded answering. Finally, in September of the same year, at a meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations, Aras announced that "if there were a change in the situation established by the existing treaties, Turkey would be forced to condition them on changes in the military regime of the straits."

By that time, in connection with the Italo-Ethiopian war and England's interest in Turkish naval bases, there was an Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, accompanied by a progressive departure of the Turkish ruling circles from national politics and friendship with the USSR. At the end of 1935, England involved Turkey in the so-called. Mediterranean Gentlemen's Agreement, securing not only her cooperation in the event of a collision with Italy, but also a general influence on Turkish foreign policy. In exchange, England withdrew its objections to the remilitarization of the Straits.

In the spring of 1936, Turkey officially invited all the participating powers of the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23 to open negotiations in order, as stated in the note of the Turkish government dated 11. IV 1936, "to achieve in a short time the conclusion of agreements designed to regulate the regime of the straits in conditions of security necessary for inviolability Turkish territory, and in the most liberal spirit in the sense of the constant development of merchant shipping between the Mediterranean and Black Seas. With a note dated 16. IV, the Soviet Union, and then other interested powers (some unconditionally, others with reservations) agreed to the Turkish proposal. On this basis, the Moscow Committee was convened. Only Italy did not send its representatives to Montreux. She motivated her refusal by the fact that the participants of the M. to. carry out economic sanctions against Italy. When the sanctions were lifted (July 15, 1936), Italy put forward another pretext - the existence of a Mediterranean agreement. Italy's true motives lay in the fact that she supported Hitler's methods of unilaterally breaking international treaties.

Immediately after the opening of the M. to. England put forward demands directed against the interests of the Black Sea countries: unlimited admission of any warships to the Black Sea and "equality" of all powers in relation to the passage of their warships through the straits. The position of the British delegation was very shaky. The "international character" of the Black Sea has never enjoyed universal recognition. Even the Lausanne Convention, dictated by England itself and directed against the interests of the Black Sea countries, limited, albeit in an unsatisfactory way, the admission of foreign warships to the Black Sea. The arguments of the British delegation on this subject to M. k. were completely unconvincing and frivolous: the need to send a navy to search for British fishermen if they arbitrarily leave English waters and go fishing in the Black Sea, or simply the desire of England " show your flag" in the Black Sea. The British delegation was unable to give any reasonable justification for its second proposal - on the "equality" of the Black Sea and non-Black Sea countries. All her reasoning on this issue came down to general phrases about the "principle of reciprocity."

However, the Turkish delegation supported English sentences. The Turkish delegation sought to create all sorts of obstacles not only for the passage of Soviet warships through the straits, but also for the development of the Soviet military fleet in the Black Sea. Aras and Menemencioglu repeatedly incited the British delegation to resist the demands Soviet Union and even abandoned their own draft convention in favor of English project, which contained proposals absolutely unacceptable to the USSR.

The Soviet delegation showed firmness. The demands of the USSR were modest. The Soviet government sought to save Moscow from collapse, which would give Hitler an extra trump card in his aggressive policy, based at that time on unilateral violations of international treaties. Therefore, the Soviet government did not insist on a complete ban on the entry of warships into the Black Sea, it agreed to a number of other concessions, but on the obligatory condition that at least the elementary rights and interests of the Black Sea countries would be ensured: limiting the entry of foreign warships into the Black Sea by class, tonnage and terms of stay, as well as providing the Black Sea powers with the opportunity to pass through the straits any of their warships. The Soviet delegation categorically refused to retreat from these minimum requirements.

The British government, fearing the failure of M. K., chose to withdraw its main objections. In turn, the Turkish delegation received relevant instructions from Ankara. After that, the work of M. k. went at a rapid pace, and on 20. VII 1938 the "Convention on the regime of the straits" was signed.

The most important provisions of the convention, consisting of 29 articles, 4 annexes and 1 protocol, are as follows.

It is recognized that the regime of the straits is established in order to ensure freedom of navigation "within the framework of the security of Turkey and the security of the coastal powers in the Black Sea" (preamble). For merchant ships of all countries, freedom of passage through the straits is preserved both in peacetime and in wartime, in compliance with the rules established by the convention (Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and Appendix I). Warships of non-Black Sea countries are limited in peacetime when passing through the straits by class (light surface ships, small combat vessels and auxiliary vessels) and total tonnage at the time of passage (15 thousand tons). t), and in relation to entry into the Black Sea, in addition, the total tonnage of simultaneous stay in the Black Sea (30 thousand m for all non-Black Sea powers taken together, with a corresponding increase in this limit, but not more than 45 thousand tons). t, in the event of an increase in the tonnage of the strongest Black Sea fleet by 10 thousand or more tons) and a three-week stay in the Black Sea (Articles 14 and 18 and Annexes II and IV). The Black Sea powers can also pass their battleships through the straits, even if their displacement exceeds 15 thousand tons. m, a is equal to their submarines, subject to the conditions specified by the convention (Articles 11 and 12). The procedure and terms for warning the Turkish government of any upcoming passage of military ships through the straits are established (Art. 13). In wartime, if Turkey itself is not at war, the passage of ships is subject to the same rules, but the passage of warships of any belligerent power is prohibited (Article 19). (Reservations were made to this and some other provisions of the convention about obligations in relation to the League of Nations; the collapse of the League of Nations deprived these reservations of any meaning.) If Turkey is a belligerent, the passage of warships through the straits is transferred entirely to the discretion of the Turkish government (Art. 20), which has the right to put this provision into effect also if it decides that Turkey is under an immediate threat of war (art. 22). The Straits Commission, established by the Lausanne Convention, is abolished; its functions are assigned to the Turkish government (art. 24). Turkey receives the right to immediately remilitarize the strait zone (protocol, art. 1). The Convention is concluded for a period of 20 years with automatic extension in the absence of denunciation two years before the expiration of this period (Article 28). It comes into force after ratification by 6 participants, including Turkey (art. 26), but the Turkish government is authorized to temporarily put it into effect already on 15. VIII 1936 (protocol, art. 2). Individual articles of the convention, in particular tonnage limits, may be reviewed every five years in compliance with the procedure established in the convention (Article 29). The Convention, upon its entry into force, will be open for accession by the powers participating in the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 (i.e., for Italy) (Article 27).

The convention signed at Montreux entered into force on 9.XI.1936. Italy acceded to it in 1938.

For its time, this convention was a well-known step forward towards recognizing the rights of the Black Sea countries in the issue of the straits. However, further changes in Turkish foreign policy towards Turkey's rapprochement with the aggressive powers revealed a serious danger to the interests of the Black Sea countries, and above all to the USSR, arising from providing Turkey with the opportunity to uncontrollably apply the convention and interpret it at its sole discretion. Second World War showed that the nautical sea does not provide and is not able to provide such a regime of the straits that would really protect the security of the Black Sea. In view of this, in 1946 the Soviet government proposed to the Turkish government that they agree on a revision of the convention (see para. Straits).


Diplomatic Dictionary. - M.: State publishing house of political literature. A. Ya. Vyshinsky, S. A. Lozovsky. 1948 .

See what "MONTREY CONFERENCE 1936" is in other dictionaries:

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