Units of the Yugoslav People's Army in the conflict zone. October 1991

Thousands of people died during the fighting on Croatian territory. A large number of cities suffered from the destruction; once fertile lands in the countryside were devastated. The war in Croatia claimed about 30 thousand human lives. Refugees and displaced persons amounted to about 500 thousand people. The war caused enormous damage to the Croatian economy. Industrial production at the beginning of 1992 fell by a third compared to the previous year, and exports fell by almost half. Many industrial enterprises stopped their work, the number of unemployed was about a third of a million people. The communications system and railway connections were almost completely destroyed in the republic.
The concentration of power in the hands of the narrow leadership of the country and the Croatian Democratic Community, the subordination of all the forces of the republic to a single center, allowed President Franjo Tudjman to carry out his plan for an independent Croatia without hesitation. The activities of most state and public structures were aimed at creating, training, equipping and high combat capability of their own army. The police forces, on the basis of which the Croatian army was created, were strengthened by 1991 and grew several times. Maintenance units were also transferred under republican control. A special unit was created in the Ministry of Internal Affairs - Zbor of the People's Guard (ZNG), or, as they were popularly called by the Zengovites. This formation of police special forces consisted exclusively of professionals. The Zeng troops were led by General Spegel, under whose leadership the ZNG guard held a parade on May 28, 1991 at the Zagreb stadium. For soldiers and officers leaving the JNA, as well as for volunteers, special collection points were created in Dubrovnik, Osijek, Rijeka, Split, Zagreb and Zadar.
However, it is worth recognizing that hostilities on Croatian territory could have been avoided. The Serbian population of the republic, gripped by fear of possible manifestations of genocide and not forgetting the Ustasha atrocities half a century ago, could count on certain concessions from the Croatian government. Providing the Serbs with cultural autonomy, a promise to strictly observe human rights, respect for Serbian culture and religion, ensuring their interests in parliament - the hawks from Zagreb did not take such steps, preferring to clear the territory of Croatia from the Serbs with the help of tanks and aircraft. The categorical, intransigent and hostile attitude of the Croatian authorities left the Croatians no choice but to defend their ancestral lands with arms in hand. However, not everyone in Croatia took an irreconcilable position towards the Serbs of Krajina. Some suggested the need to grant the Serbs autonomy, some believed that the Serbs should be isolated from the Chetnik leaders and then constructively establish ways of mutual existence on a legal basis. The problem was that the most radical position in solving the Serbian problem was taken by President F. Tudjman himself, who sought to create an ethnically pure Croatia. The victory of the line of Tudjman and the HDZ brought the republic into the war.

In June 1991, after Croatia declared independence, mobilization began into units of republican subordination according to the following criteria: Croatian nationality, loyalty to the authorities, hatred of Yugoslavia, readiness to unquestioningly carry out orders. Slogans calling, out of supposed love for the fatherland, to hate the Serbs and defend the country from the Chetniks and the communist army, were beneficially absorbed into the consciousness of young Croatian recruits. At the end of 1991, the Croatian Armed Forces numbered about 200 thousand people, 350 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, 30 agricultural aircraft converted for military purposes. The total number of people who took up arms amounted to 2.3% of the population of the republic. A significant part of the armed forces of the republic were made up of ZNG detachments (70 thousand), troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (30 thousand), TO detachments, as well as paramilitary formations of some parties - the CDU, the Party of Law. It was these formations that began to actively use ethnic cleansing in Slavonia in 1991. The Ustasha legions were allowed to enter the republic, who had been waiting in the wings for many years, training in special military camps in Latin America, Australia, and Germany. They had excellent weapons and ideological hatred of everything Serbian. Mercenaries began to come to the country - Germans, French, British, Romanians and even blacks. The actions of the Ustaše, HDZ-sheep, and also mercenaries were distinguished by special, inhuman, sophisticated cruelty. The American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, W. Zimmerman, especially mentioned the name of Branimir Glavaš, whose specialty was the cleansing of Serbian villages and the murder of Serbian civilians, as well as the Croatian police officers who helped them hide from nonhumans in Ustasha uniforms. Zimmerman called Glavaš a “philosopher of ethnic cleansing.” Croatia was actively involved in providing the people and army with weapons, some of which passed into the hands of the Croats after the fall of the JNA garrisons. In addition, the republic bought weapons from abroad.
The ideological motivation for starting the war, given by the Croatian leadership, quickly found support among the population. The causes of the war were declared to be Serbian aggression, an attempt by the Serbs to dominate part of the territory of Croatia, and the desire to create Greater Serbia. The Croatian soldier had to defend his homeland, ancestors, and children from the supposedly threatened genocide.
Serbian forces in Krajina were organized as rural self-defense units. With weak weapons, poorly connected with each other, they also did not have state support. There was no unified command; the Serbs bought their own weapons. Faith in the JNA, as a defender of the interests of the Serbian population of Croatia, also played a cruel joke on them. Requests to Belgrade to put pressure on Croatia were unsuccessful. Serbia refused to openly support the region's protesters. On May 29, 1991, the first government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina was elected, Milan Babic became Prime Minister and Milan Martic became Minister of Internal Affairs. Babich, without waiting for support from Belgrade, began to implement the idea of ​​​​creating an RSK army. On September 20, the government of Krajina decided to form a unified system of the Krajina Armed Forces based on the logistics forces. M. Martić was appointed commander of the territorial defense forces. A wave of patriotism swept over Serbia and Montenegro (as well as Croatia and Slovenia). A stream of Serbian volunteers poured from Yugoslavia to the RSK. Parties such as the Serbian Renewal Movement, the Serbian Radical Party, etc. created their own armed units to help their fellow tribesmen in Krajina. However, the volunteers from these units did not differ much in morality from similar Croatian formations. The favorite pastimes of such “patriots” were drunkenness, robbery, and abuse of civilians. Among the Serbs, odious figures appeared who made a name for themselves and political (and not only) capital in the war. One of these figures was Captain Dragan (Dragan Vasiljkovic), a citizen of Australia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, representative and co-owner of the American airline Sneden Inc., who passed through the hot spots of the planet (Vietnam, Africa). In 1991, he offered his services to the Serbian Ministry of Defense to train volunteers. At the same time, he began working with Babich and Martic, trained volunteers, and fought in Krajina. His abilities and talents were legendary, but he quarreled with Babic and subsequently created the Captain Dragan Foundation, which helped the wounded and the families of the dead. Vojislav Seselj, under the wing of the Serbian Radical Party (SRP), created special volunteer units. Coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SRP leader had ultra-nationalist views. The legendary Arkan (Zeljko Ražnjatović) also became active in the spring of 1991 in Eastern Slavonia; the base of his “Tigers” detachment was located in Erdut. Arkan, who had previously been convicted in some European countries, was a representative of the criminal world of Yugoslavia, however, at the same time, he was characterized by feelings of high Serbian patriotism. His squad, which was not subordinate to any of the commanders of the regular formations, and consisted, in particular, of fans of the Red Star football club, nevertheless possessed high fighting qualities. For example, by the spring of 1992, the Tigers lost only 9 people killed. At the training camp, Arkan introduced the most severe discipline; his fighters were distinguished by a high level of combat training. Western researchers and journalists also noted Arkan's cruelty towards Croats and Muslims. This odious personality, among other things, managed to amass a large capital for himself during the war, engaging in arms trading and robbery.

Milan Babic - Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina

The goal of the Croatian leadership at the first stage of armed action (spring-summer 1991) was to establish control over the Serbian regions of Krajina and the desire to break their resistance with the help of the police and army. At the same time, an open attack on JNA units was avoided. According to E.Yu. Guskova, the period of military clashes on Croatian territory is divided into two phases. The first is the struggle between the Serbs of Krajina, who tried to create an independent territorial formation and secede from Croatia, and the Croatian authorities, who sought to establish a unified government throughout the territory of the republic and preserve its territorial integrity (late 1990 - August 1991). The second phase was characterized by the participation of the JNA in military operations on Croatian territory (August 1991 - September 1992). It is also worth noting three areas of compact settlement of Serbs - the Knin region (Northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Bania), Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia (Barania and Western Sirmium).
The first clashes in Croatia were associated with an attempt to establish control over specific territories by seizing police stations, which were centers of influence on the situation in the region. The Croatian policemen, thus, sought to establish their authority over the rebel territories, and the Serbs, on the contrary, to protect the lands of their compact residence from the imposition of a republican administration.
Events in the Knin Krajina developed especially dynamically, primarily due to the fact that the initiative to unite all Krajina Serbs came from Knin. Here there was a concentration of the most radical Serbian leaders. Clashes occurred from the second half of 1990 and early 1991. In the path of Croatian police units, local Serbs set up barricades and personally seized police stations, trying to get ahead of the Croats. At the end of March, in the Plitvice Lakes region, the police encountered serious resistance from the TO forces under the leadership of Martic. Two people were killed in the shootout. Some researchers believe that March 31, 1991 should be considered the day the Serbo-Croatian War began. Clashes between the police and the Serbian self-defense forces became widespread in May-September 1991. Armed conflicts took place in the Serbian communities of Topusko, Pakrac, Borovo-Selo, Vinkovci and others. At the same time, the Croats showed rare cruelty towards prisoners and civilians. There are numerous testimonies of participants in those events, witnesses of Ustasha atrocities, including foreign mercenaries in their ranks. The pictures of medieval torture and executions to which residents of Serbian communities were subjected are terrifying. A large number of memories and facts have been preserved, including on video. According to the former executioners themselves, they did not perceive the Serbs as people; there was no mercy for either women or children. It is worth noting the presence of JNA units in the conflict areas, which, however, tried not to interfere in the armed confrontation, acting as a kind of “tampon” to separate the warring parties. However, in general, the Serbs managed to repel the attacks of Croatian units on their communities. The Serbs of the Knin region managed to completely protect their territory from the Croatian police and military units only in the fall of 1991, when the JNA began to help them, and when Ratko Mladic, Slavko Lisica and other Serbian officers were appointed to the Knin Corps.
It should be noted that in Croatia there were camps for Serbs - in Pakracka Poljana, near Gospić and three camps in Sisak. However, as noted by E.Yu. Guskova, the world community calmly watched the events in Croatia. The media of almost all countries affirmed the thesis about the aggression of the Serbs, the atrocities of the JNA and the innocence of the Croatian “liberation-democratic” army.
In Western Slavonia, the systematic forced expulsion of Serbs from their ancestral lands began in early 1991. It is worth noting that in 9 communities of this region there were 251 settlements with an absolute Serbian majority, and 32 with a relative one. Based, apparently, on a single plan, ethnic cleansing of Serbian territories by Croatian special forces began in Western Slavonia at approximately the same time. In Daruvar, the local Croatian authorities compiled a list in the form of a whole book, called “Who is who in Daruvar,” which included the names of more than 6 thousand Serbs, supposedly enemies of the republic. In the communities of Grubishno Polje and Loncarnica, where WNG units entered in August, brutal killings of Serbs took place, and many civilians fled their homes. Croatian commanders Zdravko Popović, Jandre Zagora, Veljko Maric, and Stojan Guština particularly “distinguished themselves” in carrying out ethnic cleansing in these communities.

Raids on villages with a Serb majority by large groups of armed HDZ activists began in the spring of 1991. The reason used was the hoisting of Croatian banners on community buildings. Poorly armed members of the Serbian TO forces naturally sought to prevent the appearance of “shakhovnitsa” - a symbol of the Ustasha atrocities of the Second World War - on their houses. They tried to seize police buildings, preferably by disarming the Croats. Enraged by the intransigence of the Serbs, Tudjman ordered to establish control over the Serb communities of Western Slavonia at any cost. Clashes between TO forces and Croatian paramilitary forces and police ended in victory for the latter in most cases. Therefore, the main task pursued by the RSK authorities in this region was the withdrawal of as many Serbian civilians as possible from the battle area. Until August 1992, the Croatian military completely cleared 10 urban and 183 rural settlements of the Serbian population.
In Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, events also developed rapidly and dramatically. Almost 90% of Serbs were expelled from the Osijek community alone. On the other hand, the actions of Serbian paramilitary forces and retaliatory acts of brutality against civilians led to flows of Croatian refugees, which were the largest in this area.
The Croats generally fought especially hard for Eastern Slavonia. This area was economically highly developed; the Danube River was an important component of the economy. Corn grown on the fertile Danube lands and Erdut wine were successfully exported to Europe. Both sides, while fighting stubbornly in these places, nevertheless spared the Erdut winery with a rich collection of wines. At the beginning of April 1991, barricades were built in Serbian villages in the Vukovar region. Where the Serbs could not defend themselves, Croatian rule was established, and the local population was expelled or destroyed. At the same time, the armament of both the East Slavonian Serbs, who received weapons from Serbia, across the Danube, began (moreover, the Serbian peasants were forced to purchase them at their own expense, and did not hesitate to use hunting rifles - hunting clubs were highly developed in these places), and the Croats, for whom it issued under the control of republican authorities in Vukovar, Vinkovci, Osijek. Despite the fierceness of the confrontation, there were frequent cases of interaction between Serbs and Croats. Many Croats fought in the Krajina TO forces against the police. On the contrary, the Serbs, when the Croats temporarily left the villages at the insistence of the HDZ and ZNG, looked after their houses and did not allow their property to be stolen. Croats often hid Serbs during ethnic cleansing and warned about the imminent arrival of the Ustashes and Zengovites. Throughout April, there were constant armed clashes in various parts of Eastern Slavonia, the police stormed the barricades, using, in particular, helicopters, and the Serbs created defense headquarters that united the defenders of one community. Attempts, and very successful in some places, to resolve the conflict peacefully ended in vain, since the negotiators on the Croatian side were destroyed by extremist members of the HDZ, led by Branimir Glavaš.
Serbo-Croatian clashes reached a new stage after the events in Borovo Selo on May 2, 1991. They became the reason for the transition of the Serbs to united self-defense not only in Eastern Slavonia, but also in all the Serbian lands of Krajina. On that day, units of the Croatian Municipal Unitary Enterprise (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and police from Vinkovci and Osijek entered the village. They killed a civilian in the central square, after which a shootout ensued, which escalated into a bloody clash. According to Croatian media reports, 12 police officers were killed. In Croatia, these events were presented as a crime of the Serbs in order to incite ethnic hatred, and the death of the policemen was presented as an act of Serbian vandalism. The Serbs claimed that about 600 armed men in police uniforms entered the village on buses, who opened fire and killed a man who was reading a newspaper on the steps of the Local Commonwealth building. In response, armed members of the TO forces, among whom, according to many testimonies, were volunteers from the “Mainland”, blocked the Croatian detachment on both sides, which probably also included mercenaries, in particular from Colombia, Romania, Kosovo, and subjected it heavy crossfire. The police were in the center of Borova Sela, in the open, and therefore, according to some defenders, at least 120 people were killed by the Croatian military. The Croats were saved only by the emerging JNA units, which separated the conflicting parties and then evacuated the surviving and wounded policemen. Again, according to the testimony of the Serbs, the Croats rushed at the soldiers of the Yugoslav army with hugs, many cried.
Be that as it may, the Croatian authorities took advantage of the events in Borovo Selo to begin increasing pressure on the Serbs, primarily in communities with a Croat majority, as well as in large cities, where the persecution of persons of Serb nationality began. In turn, the Serbs realized that they could independently, without relying on the help of the JNA, resist Croatian aggression on their ancestral lands. During May, the clashes took an organized form. Now the Croatian authorities armed not only members of the HDZ, but also everyone who wanted to fight against the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia. Refugees flocked to Borovo Selo, which the Serbs considered the safest place in the region, from places where it was not possible to organize resistance to the Croats. In the village of Tenya on May 29, 1991, mass celebrations took place among the Serbs in honor of the victory of Red Star over Olympique Marseille in the final of the European Champions Cup. On the same day, Croatian police from Osijek arrived there on 10 buses and arrested everyone celebrating the triumph of the Yugoslav club. In response, barricades were placed on the streets. In Dala, Erdut, Osijek, Kruševo, Vukovar, clashes that began in the spring became most violent at the end of summer. There were battles for every Serbian village. It is especially worth noting that there were practically no military specialists in the Serbian territorial defense forces, and they had to fight against actually regular military units of Croatia. At the same time, the Croats used interesting tactics. The night before their attack, the villages were rapidly abandoned by the entire Croatian population, who had been warned, mainly by HDZ activists, of the impending invasion. False rumors were also spread about Serbs carrying out ethnic cleansing in the area. Later, this exodus of population from communities was cleverly used by the Croatian authorities in the issue of refugees. The Serbian village of Belo Brdo, attacked at the end of June 1991, resisted with all possible means for 42 days, blocked by Croatian paramilitary forces, but defended its freedom. The blockade of the village of Mirkovtsi continued for 4.5 months, with frequent attacks on it by police and ZNG detachments. In this village there were units of the JNA, which guarded an important state facility and did not interfere in the confrontation. Here, when attacking the village, the Croats used artillery, then infantry units went on the attack, which were defeated by the defending Serbs. And in this locality, the police were again saved from the complete destruction of part of the Yugoslav army. Under the protection of JNA armored personnel carriers, the surviving Croats were withdrawn from the village.

Vukovar. Autumn 1991

On both sides there was more enthusiasm and patriotism than professionalism in the conduct of hostilities during the summer. The sides were ready to rush at the enemy even with their bare hands; militarily, the preparation of the same Croats was weak, so they suffered heavy losses during attacks on Serbian villages. At the same time, the Serbs in large numbers were hunters, they shot well, and they also fought for their homes, which added strength to them. However, the lack of specialists also affected the organization of community defense. Moreover, only the created authorities of Krajina could not help their fellow tribesmen. The actions of both sides became more professional in the fall, when Croatian officers left the JNA and began to fight in republican paramilitary forces. The same applied to the Serbs from the Yugoslav army. By the fall, the headquarters of the Northern Administrative District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium was created, which systematized the methods of conducting combat operations by TO forces and ensured a more professional defense of their lands. Part of the Serbian armed forces, which consisted of peasants who had commanders and their own weapons, included volunteers from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as fleeing Serbs from territories under Croatian control. At the same time, in the opposite direction - to Serbia - columns of refugees, old people, women, children stretched. Croatian residents were leaving in the other direction. The war turned into a tragedy for the civilian population.
Since the outbreak of the armed conflict in Croatia, the JNA has found itself in a difficult situation. Trying not to participate in the conflict, she was nevertheless subjected to attacks from both sides. Croats and Slovenes in 1991 called the army of the SFRY nothing less than occupation. The Serbs, in turn, accused the military of inaction, that the army was unable to defend the integrity of the federation, and did not defend them during the outbreak of Serbo-Croatian clashes. Finding itself between two fires, the army initially became a separating force, a kind of buffer. Being multinational in its composition, and also aimed at conducting military operations exclusively against an external enemy, in 1991 it tried to carry out exclusively constitutional functions, trying to prevent the collapse of the country. The majority of the officers still retained an internationalist ideology, a belief in “brotherhood-unity.” We should not forget that a large number of leadership positions in the JNA were occupied by Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Muslims. The commander of the Yugoslav Armed Forces was V. Kadievich, half Croatian. His deputies S. Brovet and J. Gregoric were, respectively, a Slovenian and a Croat, the Air Force commander A. Tus was also a Croat. The commander of the Central District is the Macedonian A. Spirovski, and his chief of staff is the Croatian A. Silic. During armed clashes, JNA soldiers maintained neutrality and tried to save civilians from reprisals from both the Croatian and Serbian sides. Without an order to shoot, the military suffered heavy losses, many young soldiers died during attacks by Croatian formations. It is worth noting that in 1991, armies began to be formed on a national basis in Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia. Serbia did not have its own army, there was only the Yugoslav army. Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, Macedonians deserted from this army, Serbs already made up 90% of it, but it continued to remain Yugoslav.
Being well aware that the Serbs in Krajina were poorly armed and poorly organized, the military, in principle, did not exclude the need to come to their defense in the event of a Croatian attack. However, in practice, a neutral position was maintained towards the Serbs and Croats. The JNA began to use force only after it itself came under attack.
After the announcement of secession by Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991, S. Milosevic and V. Kadijevic agreed that the army should protect the future borders of Yugoslavia. In July, it was decided that the army needed to be deployed on the line Karlovac - Plitvice Lakes in the west, Baranja - Osijek - Vinkovci - Savva in the east, Neretva in the south, while releasing all Slovenians and Croats from the JNA. After the ten-day war in Slovenia, some officers decided to defend the unity of Yugoslavia, while others chose to return to their republics.
In June, after the declaration of independence, the actions of the Croats became bolder and were directed primarily against military garrisons. It should be noted that parts of the JNA, in the summer and autumn of 1991, still remained in the republics of the rapidly collapsing SFRY. On June 27, the Croats blocked all entrances to the barracks in Osijek and fired at vehicles leaving there. The paramilitary forces were also supported by the local population. At the end of July, F. Tudjman called the JNA troops located on the territory of the republic occupational and oppressive, helping the Chetniks in their aggression against the Croatian people. The ultimate goal of the policy caused by anti-army propaganda was the withdrawal of the allied army from the territory of the republic, and the JNA military had to leave all their weapons. In the newly proclaimed Republic of Croatia, persecution of military personnel and members of their families began. They were threatened, attacked, beaten, killed. As a result, some garrisons - Čakovec, Rijeka, Pula - handed over their weapons and facilities to the Croatian authorities without much resistance. The remaining garrisons fought back - Karlovac, Vukovar, Osijek, Zadar, etc. The Croats managed to occupy most of the military garrisons and warehouses on the territory of the republic in mid-September 1991. When the barracks in Gospić were surrendered, all the military personnel were killed. The garrisons in Virovitice, Slavonski Brod, and Ploce also fell. The garrison in Djakovo surrendered without a fight. The garrison in Zagreb was blocked, the Croats completely cut off Dalmatia from the routes of communication with the Central District. At that time, only three garrisons continued to hold out in Croatia - Koprivnica, Bjelovar and Varazdin. The rest were already in Croatian hands. In the second half of September, the 32nd Varazdin Corps of the JNA, an elite corps located in the garrisons of Varazdin, Zagreb, Dugo Selo, Koprivica, Čakovec, fell. A lot of weapons fell into the hands of the Croats. A fierce firefight continued for 15 days, including heavy weapons, between the defenders and the attackers at the Vinkovci barracks. As a result, on September 25, the Croats, who themselves initiated the negotiations, allowed a column of wounded soldiers to be released from the barracks. However, this column was stopped; the wounded JNA fighters were stripped of their bandages and beaten. On September 26, the full complement of the Vinkovtsi garrison, taking all weapons and equipment, left for Serbia. The successful operation of the Croatian troops to blockade the army garrisons paralyzed the JNA and forced it to withdraw its troops, leaving a lot of equipment in the republic.
However, in the fall of 1991, the position of the JNA changed. If earlier she attempted to separate the warring parties in the Serbo-Croatian conflict, now, after the attack of the Croatian police and guard forces on her, she took the path of armed struggle against the paramilitary forces of the Republic of Croatia. The decision to begin the release of the barracks led to the intensification of JNA military operations in the direction of Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, Zadar, Sibenik, Karlovets and Osijek. The army actually supported the Krajina Serbs and took an anti-Croatian position. This made it possible for Western politicians and journalists to characterize such actions of the JNA as “aggression” of communist, Serbian forces, with the help of the Yugoslav army, against an independent, “democratic” Croatia. In Zagreb they were only happy about this; anti-Serbian hysteria in the republic reached its peak. The HDZ called on the entire Croatian population to unite in the fight against the Serbian “Chetnic-communist” (the term itself sounds incorrect - S.I.’s note) invaders. In Serbia, the mobilization of volunteers and reservists to help the border guards was carried out with great difficulty. Some conscripts did not want to fight, others refused to do so for ideological reasons, that is, to fight with a star on their cap, and others deserted. There was a shortage of equipment and equipment, a large amount of which remained in the besieged garrisons or was abandoned during the withdrawal from the republics. Motivation was also bad. Many young conscripts did not want to serve outside of Serbia.

Nevertheless, the actions of the JNA in the Knin - Sinj - Split direction were quite successful. The first major clash between army units and Croatian police took place in the village of Kiev, near Knin. The village, defended by 300 Croats, was taken by units of the Yugoslav army in just a few hours, using tanks and artillery. One of the commanders of the operation was Colonel Ratko Mladic. The soldiers actively helped the Serbian TO forces organize defense, trained them in military affairs, and rescued civilians hiding from Croatian raids. Here the military first encountered Ustasha atrocities. Already in September, the military, which controlled almost the entire territory of the Knin region, approached Sibenik and surrounded Zadar. The JNA's actions in Western Slavonia were less effective, here they controlled only a small area near Pakrac. After the capture of barracks and warehouses in Virovitica, Bjelovar, Daruvar and Varazdin, a huge amount of weapons ended up in the hands of the Croats. They managed to put serious pressure on the Yugoslav units, which were forced to leave Western Slavonia. On November 1, 1991, a massive offensive of the Croatian army began in the area of ​​Bjelovar and Grubishno Polje. The Serbian population was expelled from their homes, and the acts of the Ustasha Blackshirts could not be compared with the crimes of their ancestors in the Second World War. People had their arms, legs, heads, and genitals cut off, their eyes gouged out, their skin torn off, and their dismembered corpses were thrown in the street. The result of these brutalities were 18 villages completely cleared of Serbs. There was no salvation for people even in the forests, which were set on fire by the Croats to drive out the unfortunate refugees. Everything that belonged to the Serbs was compared to the ground. Those who remained in the territories controlled by the Croats were subjected to pressure, intimidated, houses set on fire, arrested, and killed. After the truce declared on November 23, the Croats who violated it launched another massive attack on the Serbian communities of Western Slavonia. The civilian population and TO fighters, about 70 thousand people in total, retreated to the south. With the departure of the Serb paramilitary forces, the number of civilian casualties of Serbian nationality increased. There is much evidence of atrocities committed by Croatian guards against defenseless people. The original Ustashe method of killing Serbs was used, by cutting off the victim’s head with a special “Serbosek” knife. On the territory of Western Slavonia, Orthodox churches were also destroyed and clergy were killed. In October 1991, the number of refugees from these areas to Serbia amounted to more than 125 thousand people.
On the other hand, the JNA actively helped the Serbian military units with weapons and coordinated their actions during counterattacks on Croatian villages. From the territory of BiH, the Yugoslav military carried out artillery shelling of Croatian cities and economic facilities. About 180 thousand civilians of Croatian nationality were also forced to leave their homes. The authorities in Zagreb, as well as the president of the now virtually non-existent SFRY Stipe Mesic (Croat by nationality), blamed soldiers and officers of the JNA for all the atrocities committed against Croatian civilians. However, the high command of the Yugoslav army rejected these accusations. The Yugoslav Ministry of Defense in October 1991 developed an action plan for the JNA in Croatia. Instead of the policy of separating the warring parties, it was now assumed that the military would take control of crisis areas, protect the peaceful Serbian population of Krajina from destruction, as well as liberate the besieged garrisons on the territory of the Croatian Republic. By blockading Croatia from sea and air, it was intended to link the offensive plan with establishing control over Serbian territories, as well as the capture of Eastern Slavonia. From there, units of the JNA were to move to join forces in Western Slavonia. At the same time, the command in Belgrade hoped to block Dubrovnik from the mountains with a strike from bases in BiH and thereby help the forces advancing on Split. After this, the task was set to secure the border of the RSK, then to withdraw JNA troops from Slovenia, and finally, to withdraw partially army units from Croatia. However, as a result of weak mobilization in Serbia and Montenegro, as well as due to the intervention of politicians, this plan could not be fully implemented.
The largest operations of the JNA in the fall of 1991 in Croatia were the liberation of Vukovar and the fighting on the Southern Front in the Dubrovnik region.
Vukovar has become a symbol of ethnic clashes in Croatia. The Yugoslav army got stuck near this settlement in Eastern Slavonia and fired at it with all types of heavy weapons. In Croatia, Vukovar is considered a symbol of resistance to “communist aggression”. Having detained the JNA for almost three months at their walls, the defenders of Vukovar, according to the Croats, saved Zagreb. The bloody battle for this city lasted 86 days, the city was completely destroyed, and on its streets, in its basements and hospitals there remained a large amount of evidence of grave crimes on both sides of the conflict - killed civilians. In the fight for Vukovar, 11 JNA army brigades were involved, of which seven mechanized and two infantry. It is worth noting that Vukovar, from a national point of view, was a mixed city. Serbs, Croats, and other peoples have always lived on the territory of the community. Moreover, Serbs predominated in the community, and in the city itself there were equal numbers of them and Croats. The HDZ failed to win in these places; moreover, on July 17, 1990, the Vukovar Assembly refused to accept amendments to the Croatian Constitution, which, according to the majority, infringed on the rights of the Serbian people. Zagreb took retaliatory measures. Weapons began to be imported into the city, which were used to arm the police and CDU activists. The decision to ethnically cleanse the Vukovar community was made in February 1991 by Croatian parliamentarians V. Šeks, I. Vekic, B. Glavas and T. Merčep. They planned to first remove the Serbs from leadership positions in the community, then use intimidation to induce them to leave, and ultimately, begin physical liquidation. Consignments of weapons began to be imported into the city at an accelerated pace. On March 31, the leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) in Vukovar, G. Hadzic and B. Slavic, were arrested, whose arrest, for provocative purposes, was filmed and shown on Zagreb television. The Serbs began to prepare for defense, erecting barricades and placing guards in the villages. In July-August, a wave of murders of the Serbian population swept through the community. Special groups of armed Croatian militants under the leadership of Mercep, Glavaš, Dudakovich, Kapular, Miljkovic and others took people from their homes, tortured them, and then killed them in the most savage way. Over five months, about 4 thousand people were killed. In the city itself, Serbian houses were shelled, people were woken up with threatening calls at night, and forced to flee the city. Serbian restaurants and public buildings were blown up. The police broke into houses and carried out pogroms in search of weapons. Many people were arrested right on the street, they were tortured in the dungeons of makeshift prisons. In order not to leave traces, the dead Serbs were thrown into the Danube. In the summer of 1991, almost the entire Serbian population, about 14 thousand people, left Vukovar. The HDZ sheep hastily evacuated the Croats – old people, women and children – from the city. In June, T. Merchep began to form the defense of the city, arming the police and volunteers, introducing a permit system, and control over entry and exit from the city. At the same time, units of the Croatian army entered Vukovar. On August 25, the Croats blocked the JNA barracks and began shelling them. The blockade actually lasted until November 18, 1991. On September 14, the Croatian leadership decided to launch a simultaneous attack on JNA barracks throughout Croatia. The JNA command in Belgrade began to liberate the blocked barracks in Vukovar, Osijek and Vinkovci (they were the last to hold out) with forces that were ten times larger than the Croat forces. The army launched an attack on Vukovar on the 20th of August. Since August 25, the city was surrounded, and artillery shelling began at the same time. The number of JNA besieging the city was about 40 thousand people. Vukovar was defended by 6-8 thousand Croatian soldiers. The military took the city with difficulty. Each major attack caused many casualties. Croatian guards fought desperately for every house, the streets of Vukovar turned into battlefields. The tenacity of the defenders and the persistence of the attackers turned the already destroyed city into a pile of concrete, stones and human flesh. The actions of the advancing JNA soldiers were complicated by the fact that the Croats used underground communications that were dug under the sewer system as bunkers and communication passages. Then the command of the Yugoslav army decided to concrete them. The city was taken street by street, the actions were complicated by Croatian snipers, because of whose actions many soldiers and volunteers died. Some soldiers and militias left their positions and deserted, tired of fighting.
Croatian soldiers left the city on November 16-18, 1991, making their way into Croatian territory as best they could. The army that entered Vukovar offered residents who came out of the basements the right to choose: to go either to Serbia or Croatia. At the same time, 600 Croatian guards were arrested. But the worst thing was revealed to both the soldiers who liberated the city and foreign journalists immediately after the end of hostilities. During the retreat, the Croatian military left behind the corpses of brutally murdered civilians of Serbian nationality. In particular, the Italian journalist Milena Iole Gobaneli, who entered the city along with Yugoslav soldiers, during a speech on Italian television, said that she saw forty kids murdered by gangsters in one of the kindergartens in the suburbs of Vukovar. Reuters journalists witnessed 189 cases of brutal murders of Serbs, whose entire families were exterminated. Also, Russian journalists, A. Kondrashova and M. Ovcharenko, saw the corpses of savagely tortured people in the courtyard of the city hospital, on whose bodies traces of martyrdom were clearly visible - severed limbs, gouged out eyes. It is worth noting that, succumbing to revanchist sentiments and unable to bear the images of the massacre of their fellow tribesmen, Serbian soldiers also committed a number of serious crimes against the civilian Croatian population of Vukovar. Subsequently, the military accused irregular Serbian paramilitary forces, in particular Arkan’s Tigers, of reprisals against the Croats. Some political figures, in particular from Russia, also managed to warm their hands from the terrible tragedy of the storming of Vukovar. Thus, the scandalous writer and provocateur Eduard Limonov, indeed, participated in the storming of the city, which gave him the opportunity to flaunt this fact already in his homeland.
It is difficult to find exact data on those killed in Vukovar, but if we use Serbian data, we can state that during the siege of the city from September 25 to November 18, 1991, 1 thousand Croatian guardsmen and 1800 Serbian soldiers and officers died there. The leadership of Yugoslavia was confident that with the fall of Vukovar, Croatia would also fall. But Belgrade received a completely destroyed city, and Croatia was able to survive. Moreover, the whole world supported Croatia and condemned Yugoslavia. Having sacrificed Vukovar, Zagreb was able to take time to gather its strength and also enlist the support of Western states.
In the fall of 1991, heavy fighting broke out in Southern Dalmatia. The city of Dubrovnik was of particular importance for the JNA. The army sought to push back armed Croatian forces from the Prevlaka peninsula, which is of great strategic importance for Montenegro and Yugoslavia. Next, it was planned to occupy part of the territory important for Croatia, in order to then be able to exchange it for Prevlaka, which, according to the maps, was Croatian territory. At the same time, the blockade of Dubrovnik by the JNA was supposed to force Zagreb to make concessions on the issue of the withdrawal of encircled military garrisons from Croatia. There were also related tasks, for example, the possible declaration of autonomy for Dubrovnik and the annexation of some tourist centers to Montenegro. The leadership of Montenegro, in particular its President M. Bulatovich, received information about the advance of a 30,000-strong Croatian army towards the Prevlaka and Herceg Novi peninsulas. In Montenegro, mobilization was carried out and the Fifth Montenegrin Brigade was formed. The war between Montenegro and Croatia for Prevlaka began.

Republic of Serbian Krajina. 1991

Dubrovnik was difficult to defend and easy to attack, as it was located on a narrow strip of land in the southernmost part of Croatia. Behind this piece of Croatian territory, literally a few kilometers away, the lands of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina begin. The Trebinj-Herzegovina group of the JNA received the task of taking Prevlaka. The offensive of Yugoslav troops began on the night of September 23-24, 1991. The small forces of Croatian defencists near the city simply fled. The city was surrounded and encircled, and on September 27, the commander of the JNA army group, Pavle Strupar, presented an ultimatum to the Croats, demanding the surrender of the city. At the same time, units of the Yugoslav army, which came close to Dubrovnik, began shelling its suburbs with artillery weapons. Immediately, the Western media launched a campaign accusing the JNA of shelling the city center and destroying its historical part. Yugoslav Defense Minister V. Kadievich tried to reject the accusations, stating that the army was not shelling the city, and in general, military operations were being conducted at a distance no closer than 5 km from Dubrovnik. He suggested that Tudjman demilitarize the city, withdraw all Croatian troops from there, and invite foreign diplomats to visit the city with an inspection. Diplomats from the United States, Great Britain, Holland, India and Greece visited Dubrovnik on October 3 and made sure that it was safe. However, in the West they preferred to believe rumors rather than what they saw with their own eyes. On October 26, 1991, the EU criticized the JNA for the destruction of the old part of the city. In the following months, the shelling of Dubrovnik continued. Although the JNA tried to spare the historical center of the city, shells fell on the port, numerous parks, hotels, private houses, warehouses, and hospitals. At the end of November, 14 people were killed in the city and 52 were injured. The confrontation on the Southern Front continued in the first half of 1992. Until April, the situation in the Dubrovnik area was stable, until General Jan Bobetko was appointed to this section of the Croatian defense. Since the long defense exhausted the Croats, and the initiative was in the hands of the JNA, Bobetko tried to turn the situation around by launching sabotage attacks against the enemy, destroying tanks and artillery, and shelling troop concentrations. There were already four brigades under his command. Units of the JNA retreated deeper into the territory, but at the end of April 1992 they launched a new offensive, which, however, the Croats managed to stop on this section of the front. Having launched a counter-offensive, the Croats were able to break through the blockade of Dubrovnik on May 26, 1992. On the Croatian side there were 15 killed and 40 wounded, while the Serbs lost 150 killed and 200 wounded. On August 20, a truce was signed, and on September 24, an agreement was concluded between Yugoslavia and Croatia on the complete withdrawal of all JNA units from the territory of Dubrovnik. This agreement was signed in accordance with the Vance-Owen plan and the presence of peacekeepers on Croatian territory. A zone under the protection of blue helmets was created on the territory of Prevlaka. 65 JNA facilities located on this peninsula were transferred to peacekeepers.
It should be noted that the JNA in Croatia failed to fulfill the tasks set by the General Staff in Belgrade. However, an armed conflict was already beginning in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so in this region Serbian and Croatian forces tried to unite against Muslims. This forced the JNA to quickly complete the operation to capture Dubrovnik and Prevlaka.
In the RSK in 1991, 2,700 people died in hostilities, 5,800 were injured. According to the Croatian government, during the Yugoslav “aggression” on the republic, 15 thousand people died or were killed, 18 thousand were missing or were in captivity, and about 50 thousand people were injured. In 1991, the Yugoslav Red Cross noted 250 thousand refugees of Serbian nationality from Croatian territory. In the Republic of Khabarovsk itself, 120 thousand Serbs were fired from their jobs on the basis of their nationality, about 600 maternity shops and shops were destroyed and ruined, thousands of apartments and dachas were destroyed. In total, 242 Orthodox churches, one monastery and 96 church sites were destroyed in Croatia. According to Croatian data, 63 Catholic churches and church sites were destroyed in the republic and more than 500 were damaged.
At the beginning of 1992, the situation in Croatia increasingly resonated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatian volunteers in the army of the republic made up the majority of the dead, wounded, and prisoners. Croatia, in addition, actively armed its fellow tribesmen, as well as Muslims in BiH. The Bosnian Serbs were in great tension due to this. A full-scale war was on the horizon between Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims.

When writing the article, materials from the works of the head of the Center for the Study of the Modern Balkan Crisis of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences E.Yu. Guskova, were widely used.
The text of the article contains quotes from books:
1) Guskova E.Yu. History of the Yugoslav crisis (1990-2000). M., 2000
2)Yugoslavia is on fire. Documents, facts, comments. M., 1992.
3) Vasilyeva N., Gavrilov V. Balkan deadlock?... (Historical fate of Yugoslavia in the 20th century). M., 2000

Ivanovsky Sergey

Collapse of Yugoslavia. Causes of the Serbo-Croatian conflict

Naturally, enmity between the Serbs did not arise on its own; Serbs have lived compactly on the territory of modern Croatia since the beginning of the 14th century. The sharp increase in the number of Serbs in these territories was caused by the settlement here of Serbian refugees from the territories occupied by the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Military Border by the Austrian Habsburgs. After the abolition of the “military border” and the inclusion of the “krajina” into the Croatian and Hungarian lands, interethnic strife began to grow, especially between Serbs and Croats, and soon the chauvinistic movement of the “Frankivts” (after their founder Frank) appeared. Since 1918, Croatia has been part of Yugoslavia, although during the Second World War there was an Independent State of Croatia, which collaborated with Nazi Germany and carried out the genocide of the Serbs. The Serbian question was resolved according to the principle: “destroy a third of the Serbs, expel a third, baptize a third.” All this led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Serbs, the vast majority of whom died not at the hands of foreign occupiers, but from the Croatian-Muslim troops of the NDH (primarily in the NDH camps in the largest of which - Jasenovac - several hundred thousand Serbs were killed by the Ustashes all over villages and towns of the NDH) At the same time, the detachments of Serbian nationalist Chetniks, created in May 1941, in a number of cases acted on the side of the Third Reich and were engaged in ethnic cleansing of Balkan Muslims and Croats.

Against the backdrop of worsening interethnic relations, changes were made to the Constitution of Croatia, according to which “Croatia is the state of the Croatian people.” In response to this, the Serbs living within the administrative borders of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, fearing a repetition of the genocide of 1941-1945, are planning to create a Serbian Autonomous Region - SAO (Srpska autonomna oblast). It was created under the leadership of Milan Babic - SDS Krajina. In April 1991, the Krajina Serbs decided to secede from Croatia and join the Republika Srpska, which was later confirmed in a referendum held in Krajina (August 19). Serbian National Assembly of the Serbian Krajina - creates a resolution on “disarmament” with Croatia and remaining part of the SFRY. On September 30, this autonomy was proclaimed, and on December 21, its status as SAO (Serbian Autonomous Region) - Krajina, with its center in Knin, was approved. On January 4, the SAO Krajina creates its own department of internal affairs, while the Croatian government dismisses all police officers subordinate to it.

The mutual intensification of passions and persecution of the Serbian Orthodox Church caused the first wave of refugees - 40 thousand Serbs were forced to leave their homes. In July, general mobilization was announced in Croatia and by the end of the year the number of Croatian armed forces reached 110 thousand people. Ethnic cleansing began in Western Slavonia. The Serbs were completely expelled from 10 cities and 183 villages, and partially expelled from 87 villages.

In Croatia, there was practically a war going on between the Serbs and Croats, whose actual beginning came in the battles for Borovo Selo. This Serbian village became the target of an attack by Croatian forces from Vukovar. The situation for the local Serbs was difficult and they might not receive help from the JNA. Nevertheless, the local Serbian leadership, primarily the head of the TO Vukašin Šoškovčanin, themselves turned to a number of opposition parties SNO and SRS with a request to send volunteers, which for those times was a revolutionary step. For the society of that time, the awareness of some volunteers fighting outside the ranks of the JNA and the police with Croatian forces under the Serbian national banner was a shock, but this was precisely what served as one of the most important factors in the rise of the Serbian national movement. The authorities in Belgrade hastened to abandon the volunteers, and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia called them adventurers, but in reality there was support from the authorities, or rather from the special services. Thus, the volunteer detachment “Stara Srbija”, assembled in Niš under the command of Branislav Vakic, was supplied with uniforms, food and transport by the local mayor Mile Ilic, one of the leading people at that time. SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia), created by Slobodan Milosevic from the republican organization of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia in Serbia, and naturally, the former party in power. These and other groups of volunteers who gathered in Borovoe village, numbering about a hundred people, as well as local Serbian fighters, received weapons through the TO (Territorial Defense) network, which was organizationally part of the JNA and was under the full control of Belgrade, which even managed to partially export TO weapons stocks from purely Croatian territories.

All this, however, did not mean the complete subordination of the volunteers to the Serbian authorities, but only that the latter, having provided them with support, abdicated responsibility for their actions and actually expected a further outcome.

The Croatian forces then, thanks to their own commanders, were practically ambushed by the Serbs, whom they clearly underestimated. At the same time, the Croatian command waited throughout April, when the attention of the Serbian defense of Borovo village would weaken, and indeed some volunteers had already begun to return home. A scenario was prepared for the establishment of Croatian power - the occupation of the village, the murders and arrests of the most irreconcilably disposed Serbs towards Croatian power. On May 2 the offensive began. It turned out to be unsuccessful for the Croats, who immediately came under fire from the Serbs.

At this time, the war began in the “Knin Krajina” (as the Serbs then began to call the regions of Lika, Korduna, Bania and Dalmatia, which were under Serbian rule) with battles on June 26-27 for the town of Glina. This military operation was also unsuccessful for the Croats.

Progress of hostilities

In June-July 1991, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) was involved in a short military action against Slovenia, which ended in failure. After this, she was involved in fighting against the militia and police of the self-proclaimed Croatian state. A large-scale war began in August. The JNA had an overwhelming advantage in armored vehicles, artillery, and an absolute advantage in aviation, but acted generally ineffectively, since it was created to repel external aggression, and not for military operations within the country. The most famous events of this period are the siege of Dubrovnik and the siege of Vukovar. In December, at the height of the war, the independent Republic of Serbian Krajina was proclaimed. Battle of Vukovar On August 20, 1991, Croatian territorial defense units blocked two garrisons of the Yugoslav army in the city. On September 3, the Yugoslav People's Army began an operation to liberate the blocked garrisons, which developed into a siege of the city and protracted fighting. The operation was carried out by units of the Yugoslav People's Army with the support of Serbian paramilitary volunteer forces (for example, the Serbian Volunteer Guard under the command of Zeljko Ražnatović "Arkan") and lasted from September 3 to November 18, 1991, including about a month, from mid-October to mid-November, the city was completely surrounded. The city was defended by units of the Croatian National Guard and Croatian volunteers. Individual armed conflicts in the city flared up periodically since May 1991, even before Croatia declared independence. The regular siege of Vukovar began on September 3. Despite the multiple advantage of the attackers in manpower and equipment, the defenders of Vukovar successfully resisted for almost three months. The city fell on November 18, 1991, and was almost completely destroyed as a result of street fighting, bombing and rocket attacks.

Losses during the battle for the city, according to official Croatian data, amounted to 879 killed and 770 wounded (data from the Croatian Ministry of Defense, published in 2006). The death toll on the JNA side has not been precisely established; unofficial figures from Belgrade military observer Miroslav Lazanski put the death toll at 1,103 killed and 2,500 wounded.

After the end of the fighting for the city, a peace agreement was signed, leaving Vukovar and part of eastern Slavonia to the Serbs. In January 1992, another ceasefire agreement was concluded between the warring parties (the 15th in a row), which finally ended the main hostilities. In March, UN peacekeepers were brought into the country (. As a result of the events of 1991, Croatia defended its independence, but lost territories inhabited by Serbs. Over the next three years, the country intensively strengthened its regular army, participated in the civil war in neighboring Bosnia and held a number of small armed actions against the Serbian Krajina.

In May 1995, the Croatian armed forces took control of western Slavonia during Operation Lightning, which was accompanied by a sharp escalation of hostilities and Serbian rocket attacks on Zagreb. In August, the Croatian army launched Operation Storm and in a matter of days broke through the defenses of the Krajina Serbs. Reasons: The reason for the operation was the breakdown of negotiations known as “Z-4” on the inclusion of the Republic of Serbian Krajina into Croatia as a cultural autonomy. According to the Serbs, the provisions of the proposed treaty did not guarantee the Serbian population protection from oppression based on nationality. Having failed to integrate the territory of the RSK politically, Croatia decided to do it by military means. In the battles, the Croats involved about 200 thousand soldiers and officers in the operation. The Croatian website reports 190 thousand soldiers involved in the operation. Military observer Ionov writes that the four Croatian corps that took part in the operation numbered 100 thousand soldiers and officers. But these figures do not include the Bjelovar and Osijek corps. Overall control of the operation was exercised in Zagreb. The field headquarters, headed by Major General Marjan Marekovich, was located in the city of Ogulin, southeast of Karlovac. Progress of the operation: Progress of the operation.

At 3 am on August 4, the Croats officially notified the UN of the start of the operation. The operation itself began at 5.00. Croatian artillery and aviation launched a massive attack on the Serbian troops, command posts and communications. Then the attack began along almost the entire front line. At the beginning of the operation, Croatian troops captured UN peacekeeper posts, killing and wounding several peacekeepers from Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Nepal. The tactics of the Croatian offensive consisted of breaking through the defense by guard units, which, without getting involved in battles, were supposed to develop the offensive, and were engaged in the elimination of the remaining resistance by the so-called. Domobran regiments. By mid-day, the Serbian defenses had been broken through in many places. At 16:00 the order was given to evacuate the civilian population from Knin, Obrovac and Benkovac. Order for the evacuation of the Serbian population. By the evening of August 4, the 7th Serb Corps was under threat of encirclement, and the Croatian special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the battalion of the 9th Guards Brigade defeated the 9th Motorized Brigade of the 15th Lich Corps and captured the key Mali Alan pass. From here the attack on Gračac was launched. The 7th Corps retreated to Knin. At 19.00, 2 NATO aircraft from the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt attacked Serbian missile positions near Knin. Two more planes from the Italian airbase bombed the Serbian airbase in Udbina. At 23.20, the headquarters of the armed forces of the Serbian Krajina was evacuated to the city of Srb, 35 kilometers from Knin. On the morning of August 5, Croatian troops occupied Knin and Gracac.

On the night of August 5, the forces of the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina entered the battle. The 502nd Mountain Brigade struck the rear of the Serbian 15th Lič Corps northwest of Bihac. At 8.00, having overcome weak Serbian resistance, the 502nd Brigade entered the Plitvice Lakes region. By 11 o'clock, a detachment from the 1st Guards Brigade of the Croatian Army, led by General Marjan Marekovich, came out to join them. Thus, the territory of the Serbian Krajina was cut into two parts. The 501st Brigade of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina captured the radar on Mount Pleševica and approached Korenica. The advance of Croatian troops towards Udbina forced the Serbs to redeploy the remnants of their aviation to the Banja Luka airfield. The Croat offensive in the Medak area made it possible to break up the Serbian defenses in this area and the 15th Corps was divided into three parts: the 50th Brigade in Vrhovina, the remnants of the 18th Brigade in Bunic and the 103rd Light Infantry Brigade in the Donji Lapac-Korenica area. In the north, the Serbian 39th Ban Corps defended Glina and Kostajnica, but under pressure from enemy troops it began to retreat to the south.

At this time, the 505th Brigade of the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina struck the rear of the corps in the direction of Žirovac. During the offensive, the commander of the 505th brigade, Colonel Izet Nanich, was killed. The commander of the 39th Corps, General Torbuk, used his last reserves to repel the attack of the 505th Brigade. The corps continued to retreat. The 21st Kordun Corps continued to defend the city of Slunj and repelled attacks south of Karlovac. On the night of August 5–6, units of the Split Corps of the Croatian Army entered Benkovac and Obrovac. On August 6, the defense of units of the 7th and 15th Corps collapsed and after the unification of the Croats and Bosnians near Korenica, the last centers of Serb resistance in this sector were suppressed. Under attacks from the south and west, the 21st Corps fought a fighting retreat to Karlovac. On the evening of August 6, the Croats occupied Glina, threatening the encirclement of the 21st Corps. Serbian General Mile Novakovic, who led the entire Task Force Spider in the north, requested a truce from the Croatian side in order to evacuate the soldiers of the 21st and 39th Corps and refugees. The truce lasted only one night.

On August 7, units of the 21st and 39th Corps fought back east towards Bosnia to avoid encirclement. In the afternoon, the 505th and 511th brigades of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina linked up with the 2nd Guards Brigade of the Croatian Army, advancing from Petrini. Two Serbian infantry brigades of the 21st Corps and the remnants of the Special Units Corps (about 6,000 people) were surrounded in the city of Topusko. The rearguard of the 39th Corps was driven into Bosnia. After this, units of the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina entered Western Bosnia, occupied its capital Velika Kladusa almost without resistance, expelling Fikret Abdić and thirty thousand of his supporters, who fled to Croatia. At 18.00 on August 7, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Šušak announced the end of Operation Oluja. During the evening of August 7, Croatian troops took control of the last strip of territory along the border with Bosnia - Srb and Donji Lapac. In the north, in the Topusko area, Colonel Chedomir Bulat signed the surrender of the remnants of the 21st Corps. Losses: Croats - According to the Croatian side, 174 soldiers were killed and 1,430 were wounded. Serbs - According to the organization of Krajina Serbs in exile "Veritas", the number of dead and missing civilians in August 1995 (that is, during the operation and immediately after it) is 1042 people, 726 armed forces personnel and 12 police officers. The number of wounded is approximately 2,500 to 3,000 people.

Results of the war. Dayton Agreement

The fall of the Serbian Krajina caused a mass exodus of Serbs. Having achieved success on their territory, Croatian troops entered Bosnia and, together with the Muslims, launched an offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. NATO intervention led to a ceasefire in October, and on December 14, 1995, the Dayton Accords were signed, ending hostilities in the former Yugoslavia.

The Dayton Agreement is an agreement on a ceasefire, the separation of warring parties and the separation of territories, which put an end to the civil war in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1992-1995. Agreed to in November 1995 at the US military base in Dayton (Ohio), signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris by Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

US initiative. Peace negotiations took place with the active participation of the United States, which many believe took an anti-Serbian position. [source not specified 28 days the United States proposed the creation of a Bosnian-Croat federation. The Treaty to end the Croatian-Bosnian conflict and create the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed in Washington and Vienna in March 1994 by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Haris Silajdzic, the Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and the President of Herzeg-Bosnia Krešimir Zubak. The Bosnian Serbs refused to join this treaty. Immediately before the signing of the Dayton Agreement, in August-September 1995, NATO aircraft conducted Operation Deliberate Force against the Bosnian Serbs, which played a role in stopping the Serbian offensive and somewhat changing the military situation in favor of the Bosnian-Croat forces. Negotiations in Dayton took place with the participation of guarantor countries: the USA, Russia, Germany, Great Britain and France.

The essence of the agreement: The agreement consisted of a general part and eleven annexes. A contingent of NATO troops was introduced into the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - 60 thousand soldiers, half of whom were Americans. It was envisaged that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina should consist of two parts - the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Sarajevo remains the capital. A resident of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be a citizen of both the united republic and one of the two entities. The Serbs received 49% of the territory, the Bosniaks and Croats - 51%. Gorazde went to the Bosnians, it was connected to Sarajevo by a corridor controlled by international forces. Sarajevo and the surrounding Serbian areas were transferred to the Bosnian part. The exact location of the border inside the Brcko region was to be determined by the Arbitration Commission. The agreement prohibited those accused by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia from holding public office in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, Dario Kordic and other leaders of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were removed from power.

The functions of the head of state were transferred to the Presidium, consisting of three people - one from each nation. Legislative power was to belong to the Parliamentary Assembly, consisting of the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. A third of the deputies are elected from the Republika Srpska, two thirds from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, the “veto of the people” was introduced: if the majority of deputies elected from one of the three peoples voted against one or another proposal, it was considered rejected, despite the position of the other two peoples. In general, the powers of the central authorities, by agreement, were very limited. Real power was transferred to the bodies of the Federation and Republika Srpska. The entire system was to operate under the supervision of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

More than 26 thousand people died during the war. The number of refugees on both sides was large - hundreds of thousands of people. Almost the entire Croatian population - about 160 thousand people - was expelled from the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in 1991-1995. In 1991, the Yugoslav Red Cross counted 250 thousand Serb refugees from Croatian territory. Croatian troops carried out ethnic cleansing in Western Slavonia and the Knin region in 1995, as a result of which another 230-250 thousand Serbs left the region.



The parade of sovereignties turned into genocide

Early 90s. The Republic of Yugoslavia has only a few days left on the international stage, and the authorities are having a hard time containing the growth of nationalist sentiment. Right-wing parties are gaining unprecedented popularity. Serbs living in Croatia defend the rights to their culture and language. The result is sad: famous public figures end up behind bars, Serbian poets disappear from the school curriculum, and Orthodox clergy are regularly attacked.

Memories of the Serb genocide during World War II are still alive in society. Then they were burned, shot, thrown into rivers and mountain gorges. These memories do not at all contribute to the reconciliation of the Balkan peoples. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, meanwhile, the ideas of Islam are flourishing, which is professed by almost half of the inhabitants. Cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states promises mountains of gold for the Bosnians. New mosques are being built in the country, young people are being sent to study in the east. Bosnian Muslims, fueled by their allies, advocate maintaining the integrity of their state. When war breaks out, their ranks will be swelled by Islamic extremists from abroad. Blinded by faith, they will not spare their opponents.

The region has always been considered explosive due to its national diversity, but in Yugoslavia it was possible to maintain peace thanks to effective controls. Paradoxically, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was considered the most “calm” in terms of ethnic conflicts. Now the idea of ​​national unity is seriously taking hold of the minds of the Balkan peoples. The Serbs demand unification within one state, and the Croats are seeking the same. These claims involve the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats live side by side.

Sarajevo was shelled every day for 44 months

A little more, and the ideas of nationalism will result in bloody ethnic cleansing. Events are developing rapidly: on March 1, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was declared an independent republic following a referendum. The Serbs living in the country do not recognize this decision and create the Republika Srpska on its territory with autonomous governing bodies. Radovan Karadzic becomes President of the Republic: he will subsequently be accused of genocide and sentenced to 40 years in prison.

Croats on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaim the Republic of Herzeg-Bosna. The country turns out to be fragmented.

44 months of fear

On March 1, 1992, the residents of Sarajevo met in high spirits: the weather was beautiful, independence had just been gained. A luxurious wedding procession is driving along the central streets, with the Serbian flag on the cars. Suddenly the participants of the celebration are attacked by armed Bosnian Muslims. The groom's father is killed and the city is in turmoil.

One of the most tragic pages of the Bosnian war begins - the siege of Sarajevo, which lasted 44 months. Bosnian Serbs are leaving townspeople without water and electricity. Those who go beyond Sarajevo in the hope of getting food are dealt with. The city has been shelled every day for 44 months. Schools, markets, hospitals - snipers consider any target suitable, as long as there are as many casualties as possible.

Citizens walk along the street, which is under constant fire/photo istpravda.ru

The war is quickly spreading beyond Sarajevo. Entire villages are being slaughtered. Women are raped by representatives of all warring parties. They are often kept in military camps for months, forced to “serve” soldiers. A resident of Serbia, who wished to remain anonymous, told the site that young women were often subjected to forced sterilization. “And the most terrible symbol of this war for all of us was the death of the 11-year-old boy Slobodan Stojanovic. Fearing persecution, his family left their home. Once safe, the child remembered that he forgot to pick up his dog. He rushed back and fell into the hands of an Albanian woman who lived next door. She mutilated his body with a knife and then shot him in the temple. The prosecutor’s office of Bosnia and Herzegovina has opened a case against this woman, but she has not yet appeared in court,” the site’s interlocutor noted.

There is evidence that young women were sterilized

The warring parties, apparently inspired by the example of the Third Reich, are opening concentration camps. Bosnian Muslims were imprisoned in Serbian camps, and Serbs in Muslim camps. The Croats also had a concentration camp. The prisoners were treated extremely cruelly.

Prisoners of the Serbian Trnopolje camp/materials of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

The war is dragging on because the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines was initially a difficult idea to implement. However, the parties to the conflict do not lose hope and periodically enter into alliances with each other. So, in 1994, Bosnian Muslims and Croats unite against the Serbs. But the war continues, by 1995 about 100 thousand people became its victims. For the small states of the Balkan Peninsula, this is an unthinkable figure. For example, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 (including the autonomous regions) was only 5 million more than the population of Moscow today. In addition to human losses, the war completely paralyzed the state's economy.

Associated Press photo

In July 1995, an event occurred that radically changed the world community's attitude towards the Bosnian Serbs. This is the Srebrenica massacre. The city, by the way, was previously recognized by the UN as a security zone. Bosnian Muslims flock here to wait out the terrible war. However, some of them, under the cover of darkness, raid the surrounding area and set fire to Serbian villages. And yet Srebrenica remained an island of calm in a country engulfed in flames. The Serbs attack him.

Inspired by the example of the Third Reich, the belligerents open concentration camps

The city is protected by peacekeepers, but they do not interfere in the conflict. The army of Republika Srpska kills up to 8,000 people in and around the city. General Ratko Mladic, who gives the orders, is confident of his impunity. However, here he miscalculated: his trial is still ongoing. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recognized the events in Srebrenica as genocide.

Meanwhile, the Serbs deny the fact of genocide. As evidence of Mladic’s innocence, they cite documentary footage of the general taking part in the evacuation of civilians, entering buses and asking Bosnians to leave the city:

In response to the Srebrenica massacre and the Sarajevo market bombing, NATO launches a large-scale military operation against the Bosnian Serbs. However, according to a number of historians (including American ones), the West intervened in the war much earlier, providing military equipment to the Bosnian Muslims. This is also stated in the State Duma resolution on Russia’s position on the Bosnian settlement (1995).

The Serbs themselves are convinced that NATO's intervention in the war on the side of Bosnian Muslims means only one thing: the West takes into account the interests of Saudi Arabia in this region. By the way, today Saudi Arabia is the main investor in the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In and around Srebrenica, Bosnian Serbs killed up to 8,000 people

In 1995, the United States initiates peace negotiations, which end with the signing of the Dayton Agreement. To prevent a repetition of the bloody events, peacekeeping forces are being sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The state is divided into the Serbian Republic and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The functions of the head of state are performed by a presidium, which includes one representative each from the Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs. In addition, the post of UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina is being introduced. The Dayton Agreement is still in effect today.

Accused of war crimes committed during the armed conflict on Croatian territory in 1991-1995.

The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s was accompanied by civil wars and ethnic conflicts with the intervention of foreign states. The fighting affected all six republics of the former Yugoslavia to varying degrees and at different times. The total number of victims of conflicts in the Balkans since the early 1990s exceeds 130 thousand people. Material damage amounts to tens of billions of dollars.

Conflict in Slovenia(June 27 - July 7, 1991) became the most transient. The armed conflict, known as the Ten Day War or the Slovenian War of Independence, began after Slovenia declared independence on June 25, 1991.

Units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), which launched the offensive, encountered fierce resistance from local self-defense units. According to the Slovenian side, JNA losses amounted to 45 people killed and 146 wounded. About five thousand military personnel and employees of federal services were captured. The losses of the Slovenian self-defense forces amounted to 19 killed and 182 wounded. 12 foreign citizens also died.

The war ended with the EU-brokered Brijo Agreement signed on July 7, 1991, under which the JNA pledged to cease hostilities on Slovenian territory. Slovenia suspended the entry into force of the declaration of independence for three months.

Conflict in Croatia(1991-1995) is also associated with the declaration of independence by this republic on June 25, 1991. During the armed conflict, which in Croatia is called the Patriotic War, Croatian forces confronted the JNA and local Serb forces supported by the authorities in Belgrade.

In December 1991, the independent Republic of Serbian Krajina was proclaimed with a population of 480 thousand people (91% Serbs). Thus, Croatia lost a significant part of its territory. Over the next three years, Croatia intensively strengthened its regular army, participated in the civil war in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and conducted limited armed operations against the Serbian Krajina.

In February 1992, the UN Security Council sent the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to Croatia. UNPROFOR was initially seen as a temporary force to create the conditions necessary for negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. In June 1992, after the conflict intensified and spread to BiH, the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR were expanded.

In August 1995, the Croatian army launched a large-scale Operation Storm and in a matter of days broke through the defenses of the Krajina Serbs. The fall of Krajina resulted in the exodus from Croatia of almost the entire Serbian population, which amounted to 12% before the war. Having achieved success on their territory, Croatian troops entered Bosnia and Herzegovina and, together with Bosnian Muslims, launched an offensive against the Bosnian Serbs.

The conflict in Croatia was accompanied by mutual ethnic cleansing of the Serbian and Croatian populations. During this conflict, it is estimated that 20-26 thousand people died (mostly Croats), about 550 thousand became refugees, out of a Croatian population of about 4.7 million people. The territorial integrity of Croatia was finally restored in 1998.

It became the most widespread and fierce war in Bosnia and Herzegovina(1992-1995) with the participation of Muslims (Bosniaks), Serbs and Croats. The escalation of tensions followed the independence referendum held in this republic from February 29 to March 1, 1992, which was boycotted by the majority of Bosnian Serbs. The conflict involved the JNA, the Croatian army, mercenaries from all sides, as well as NATO armed forces.

The conflict ended with the Dayton Agreement, initialed on November 21, 1995 at the US military base in Dayton (Ohio) and signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris by Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. The agreement determined the post-war structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina and provided for the introduction of an international peacekeeping force under NATO command numbering 60 thousand people.

Immediately before the Dayton Agreement was developed, in August-September 1995, NATO aircraft conducted Operation Deliberate Force against the Bosnian Serbs. This operation played a role in changing the military situation in favor of the Muslim-Croat forces, who launched an offensive against the Bosnian Serbs.

The Bosnian War was accompanied by massive ethnic cleansing and massacres of civilians. During this conflict, about 100 thousand people (mostly Muslims) died, another two million became refugees, out of a pre-war population of BiH of 4.4 million people. Before the war, Muslims made up 43.6% of the population, Serbs - 31.4%, Croats - 17.3%.

Damage from the war amounted to tens of billions of dollars. The economy and social sphere of BiH were almost completely destroyed.

Armed conflict in the southern region of Serbia Kosovo and Metohija(1998-1999) was associated with a sharp escalation of contradictions between Belgrade and Kosovo Albanians (now 90-95% of the province’s population). Serbia launched a large-scale military operation against militants of the Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), who were seeking independence from Belgrade. After the failure of an attempt to reach peace agreements in Rambouillet (France), in early 1999, NATO countries led by the United States began massive bombing of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The NATO military operation, undertaken unilaterally, without the sanction of the UN Security Council, lasted from March 24 to June 10, 1999. Large-scale ethnic cleansing was cited as the reason for the intervention of NATO troops.

The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999, ending the hostilities. The resolution provided for the introduction of the UN administration and an international peacekeeping contingent under NATO command (at the initial stage 49.5 thousand people). The document provided for the determination at a later stage of the final status of Kosovo.

During the Kosovo conflict and NATO bombing, it is estimated that about 10 thousand people (mainly Albanians) died. About a million people became refugees and displaced persons from Kosovo's pre-war population of 2 million. Most Albanian refugees, unlike Serb refugees, returned to their homes.

On February 17, 2008, the Kosovo parliament unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. The self-proclaimed state was recognized by 71 countries out of 192 UN member countries.

In 2000-2001 there was a sharp worsening situation in southern Serbia, in the communities of Presevo, Buyanovac and Medveja, the majority of the population of which are Albanians. The clashes in southern Serbia are known as the Presevo Valley conflict.

Albanian fighters from the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveja and Bujanovac fought for the separation of these territories from Serbia. The escalation took place in the 5-kilometer “ground security zone” created in 1999 on the territory of Serbia following the Kosovo conflict in accordance with the Kumanovo military-technical agreement. According to the agreement, the Yugoslav side did not have the right to keep army formations and security forces in the NZB, with the exception of the local police, who were allowed to carry only light small arms.

The situation in southern Serbia stabilized after Belgrade and NATO reached an agreement in May 2001 on the return of the Yugoslav army contingent to the “ground security zone.” Agreements were also reached on an amnesty for militants, the formation of a multinational police force, and the integration of the local population into public structures.

It is estimated that several Serbian soldiers and civilians, as well as several dozen Albanians, died during the crisis in southern Serbia.

In 2001 there was armed conflict in Macedonia with the participation of the Albanian National Liberation Army and the Macedonian regular army.

In the winter of 2001, Albanian militants began military guerrilla operations, seeking independence for the northwestern regions of the country, populated predominantly by Albanians.

The confrontation between the Macedonian authorities and Albanian militants was ended by the active intervention of the European Union and NATO. The Ohrid Agreement was signed, which granted Albanians in Macedonia (20-30% of the population) limited legal and cultural autonomy (official status of the Albanian language, amnesty for militants, Albanian police in Albanian areas).

As a result of the conflict, according to various estimates, more than 70 Macedonian soldiers and from 700 to 800 Albanians were killed.

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti

To a superficial glance, the entire recent history of Serbian-Croatian relations seems to be an endless variation of the same plot. Only the characters and historical scenery change. The drama of two fraternal peoples, as if doomed to a senseless, bloody civil strife, has been going on for more than a century. Irrational nationalism and the clash of real national interests are creating a seemingly hopeless stalemate with far-reaching consequences for the entire region, and possibly Europe as a whole. Nevertheless, the Serbian-Croatian conflict is by no means an immanent state of Serbian-Croatian relations; it has its own background, origins and, most importantly, a root cause.

For many centuries, until the middle of the 19th century, the coexistence of Serbs and Croats was, if not an example of ideal mutual understanding, then at least an example of fairly peaceful cohabitation. The division of churches in 1054 and the conclusion of the Croatian-Hungarian Union in 1102 finally divided the Balkan Peninsula into two cultural and historical zones. The Croats, who were Catholics, found themselves under the cultural, religious and political influence of Western civilization, while the Serbs formed an integral part of the Byzantinized Orthodox world. Divided politically and religiously, Croats and Serbs, however, remained “on the same side of the barricades” for a long time, opposing Turkish expansion in the Balkans. The fight against the Turks was led by the Austrian Habsburgs, who united the peoples of Central Europe within the framework of a multinational monarchy, which included, among others, the Croatian lands. Wanting to secure their Balkan possessions, the devout Catholic Habsburgs strongly encouraged the settlement of the border areas with military settlers from among the Orthodox Serbs who fled from the Turkish yoke. The religious tolerance of the Habsburgs was quite pragmatic: by granting the Serbs cultural and religious autonomy, the monarchy sought to use its Orthodox subjects as a “barrier” against Turkish expansion.

A consequence of migration processes in the Balkans in the XV-XVII centuries. was a sharp change in the demographic situation in the region. Serbs and Croats, who previously developed in their own closed cultural and historical areas, found themselves in a zone of contact, mixed residence. By the middle of the 19th century. The Serbian population of Croatia was about half a million people or approximately 30% of its total inhabitants. In certain border areas, which were part of a special administrative unit (Croatian-Slavonian Military Border), the Serbs even numerically outnumbered the Croats. In general, out of 698 thousand people living in 1880 on the territory of the Croatian-Slavonian Military Border, there were 330 thousand Serbs (47% of the total number of its inhabitants). Throughout the second half of the 19th century. The Serbian population of Croatia, while increasing in absolute size, is steadily declining in percentage terms (1869 - 27.8%, 1880 - 26.3%, 1890 - 26%, 1900 - 25.5%, 1910 - 25%).

Serbo-Croat ethnic stripes were also characteristic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - two former Turkish provinces transferred in 1878 by the decision of the Berlin Congress to the administration of Austria-Hungary. By the beginning of the 20th century. Bosnia and Herzegovina's two largest ethnic communities, Serbian and Muslim, accounted for a total of four-fifths of its population. Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina were clearly outnumbered by both Serbs and Muslims, making up less than 20% of their population. In Dalmatia the situation was reversed: here the Serbs were an ethnic minority, and the Croats and Italians predominated.
Ethnic stripes in themselves were not the cause of the Serbo-Croat conflict, but they created fertile ground for it. In the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the main “generator” of tension in Serbian-Croatian relations was Croatia, where the severity of manifestations of interethnic contradictions was the highest due to the greater intensity of national life and the absence of a “buffer” ethnic layer (in Dalmatia - Italians, in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the Muslim population ).
The origin and development of the Serbian-Croatian conflict is closely related to the “ideologization” of mass consciousness as a result of the penetration of national ideology into the wider social environment. The national self-awareness that arises on this basis is the most important symptom of the “birth of a nation.” The emerging nation seeks to assert its political status and redefine the territorial and political boundaries of the national community so that they coincide with its ethnic territory. At the same time, its interests often collide with the interests of neighboring nations. It is on this basis that many interethnic conflicts arise. The specificity of the situation in Serbian-Croatian relations lies in the fact that both ethnic groups form a single ethno-linguistic area, which includes areas with a mixed population (Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). The latter circumstance was the “aggravating factor” that predetermined the particular severity and chronic nature of the Serbian-Croatian conflict.
The first symptoms of the crisis in Serbian-Croatian relations are quite clearly evident already in the early 1860s. In the 80-90s of the XIX century. The Serbian-Croatian conflict is reaching a critical phase, which was associated, on the one hand, with the increased influence in Croatian society of extreme nationalist forces led by A. Starcevic, and on the other hand, with the ideological and organizational formation of the Serbian national movement in Croatia. The culmination of the Serbian-Croatian confrontation was the anti-Serbian pogroms in Zagreb in September 1902, the reason for which was an anti-Croatian article by N. Stojanovic, published in the Serbian newspaper Srbobran, published in Zagreb.

Ante Starčević (23 May 1823 – 28 February 1896)

The clash of national interests of Serbs and Croats was primarily manifested in programmatic and tactical disagreements on the prospects for preserving the Habsburg monarchy. The main priority of all Serbian politics in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. became the idea of ​​uniting all Serbian lands. It began to acquire specific content soon after Serbia gained autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire in 1830. The Serbian national program (“Inscription”) was formulated by one of the leading political leaders of Serbia in the middle of the last century, I. Garasanin, in 1844. Subsequently, only the accents and nuances changed, but regardless of the political situation, the idea of ​​unification always remained the main national priority of the Serbs.
Any of the possible ways of unifying Serbian lands - “Yugoslavic” (creation of a multi-ethnic Yugoslav state) and “Great Serbian” (unification of all lands inhabited by Serbs within a single state) - implied the inevitability of a radical change in the state-political status quo in the Balkans. In the unequal struggle that Serbia dared to challenge its powerful neighbors, its main opponents were Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which watched with concern the strengthening of Serbian influence in the Balkans. However, as the Ottoman Empire weakened, especially after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austro-Hungarian troops in 1878, the conviction began to mature in Serbian ruling circles that Vienna represented the main obstacle to the implementation of the Serbian national program. Fearing for the integrity of the monarchy, the Viennese court went from one extreme to another: either trying in every possible way to “tame” the Belgrade rulers, or unequivocally threatening them. However, both could only have a temporary effect. Belgrade firmly believed that sooner or later the internal struggle would undermine the foundations of the monarchy, which would lead to an all-Balkan cataclysm and, as a consequence, to a new state-territorial demarcation in the Balkans.

Ilya Garashanin (January 16, 1812 - June 16, 1874)

In the fight against the Habsburg monarchy, the natural ally of the Serbs were the separatist-minded Hungarians, and the enemy were those forces in the Croatian national movement that hoped for help from Vienna in solving the “Croatian question”.
Austro-Slavic concepts of federalization of the monarchy, very popular among moderate Croatian politicians, aroused sharp criticism among the Serbs. According to the leader of the Vojvodina Serbs, S. Miletic, any reorganization of the monarchy can only prolong its agony for some time, thereby delaying the prospect of a radical solution to the Yugoslav question: “The Austro-Hungarian or Austro-Hungarian Slavic monarchy is not a country where it is possible to achieve the unity of the South Slavs : Croats, Slovenes and Serbs." The leader of the Croatian Serbs, S. Pribicevic, was also hostile to the idea of ​​a radical reorganization of the monarchy, pointing out the “political naivety” of those who hoped that the ruling circles of the monarchy would ever agree to its federalization or trialization.

Svetozar Pribiћeviћ (26.10.1875 - 15.09.1936)

The reference to the “impracticability” of political plans for a radical state reorganization of the monarchy is only a plausible excuse, and not the true reason for the Serbs’ refusal to support the Croat struggle for the exercise of their national sovereignty. Attempts to resolve the “Croatian issue” within the framework of the Habsburg monarchy objectively contributed to its stabilization, which, according to Serbian politicians, did not correspond to the national interests of Serbia. In addition, the Serbs could not sympathize with the idea of ​​​​creating a “Greater Croatia”, seeing this as a threat to their plans for unifying Serbian lands.
The strategic goal of all Serbian policy was the destabilization and ultimately the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, while for the Croatian national movement the priority task was to strengthen the Croatian statehood within the framework of the monarchy. Manifestations of open separatism were the exception rather than the rule, and in general the Croatian national movement in Austria-Hungary remained completely loyal to the Habsburgs until the very last days of its existence.

Josip Juraj Strossmayer (4 February 1815 – 8 April 1905).

At the end of the 1860s, in the context of a fierce struggle against the system of dualism, the popularity of the idea of ​​a Yugoslav unification within the framework of the Balkan Federation sharply increased in Croatia. Secret contacts of the leader of the Croatian opposition J.Yu. Strossmayer and Serbian Prime Minister I. Garasanin led to the conclusion in April 1897 of a Serbian-Croatian agreement on coordinating efforts in implementing the “Yugoslav action.” The failure of Garasani's "projects" for a pan-Balkan uprising, the strengthening of the Austro-Hungarian system of dualism and the conclusion in 1868 of the Croatian-Hungarian agreement regulating the status of Croatian lands within the Kingdom of Hungary contributed to a sharp weakening of radical sentiments in Croatian society. E. Kvaternik’s desperate attempt to raise a “national revolution” in the Croatian lands of the monarchy ended in failure, discouraging the Croats from such adventures for a long time.

Eugen Kvaternik (31.10.1825 - 11.10.1871)

A new revival of separatism in Croatia was noted during the years of the so-called “New Deal” (mid-1900s), which focused on supporting the Hungarian opposition in its struggle for national independence from Austria-Hungary. The constitutional crisis of the monarchy in 1905-1906, which arose as a result of the victory of the opposition Independence Party in elections to the Hungarian parliament, again revived separatist sentiments in Croatia. However, this time too, the Hungarians, behind the backs of the Croats, managed to come to an agreement with the Austrians. The main protagonist of the “new course,” F. Supilo, who was an active supporter of the “Yugoslav” version of the solution to the “Croatian question,” by the early 1910s found himself pushed “to the margins” of Croatian political life by supporters of an agreement with the ruling circles of the monarchy.

Franjo Supilo (30.11.1870 - 23.05.1917)

To understand the true aspirations of the Croatian national movement in Austria-Hungary, the ideological evolution of that variety of Croatian national ideology, which was based on the views of the founder of Croatian national thought A. Starcevic, is very indicative. Early right-wingism did not recognize any compromises in the struggle for national independence of Croatia. The main political idea of ​​A. Starčević is the idea of ​​fighting on two fronts: against Vienna and against Budapest, which equally threatened the national sovereignty of Croatia (the emphasis could change: depending on the political situation, either Austria or Hungary were the main “enemy” of the Croatian people). In tactical terms, right-wingers relied on a “national revolution” from below, supported or provoked by the action of the great powers (France or Russia) against Austria.
As the system of dualism strengthened, the ideology of right-wingism underwent serious changes. Her radicalism gradually acquired a purely conventional character. In the 1890s, the influence of J. Frank increased in the party, who became the official heir of the elderly A: Starčevich. Never tired of repeating his loyalty to the ideas of the founder of the party, I. Frank gradually prepared the ground for a radical change in the party course. In 1894, the right-wingers recognized the possibility of achieving the sovereignty of Croatia within the framework of the monarchy, which essentially meant the “political death” of the old party, on the ruins of which J. Frank created in 1895 the True Party of Right, which sought to rely on the help of Vienna in solving the “Croatian question"
The ideological evolution of right-wingism reflected a natural phenomenon for the Croatian national movement: awareness of the interdependence of the historical destinies of Croatia and the Habsburg monarchy. The disintegration of Austria-Hungary seemed to Croatian national leaders an unlikely and, moreover, undesirable course of events. If for the Serbs Austria was the main political enemy in the Balkans, while the Hungarians were potential allies in the fight against the monarchy, then for the Croats the situation looked the opposite. The main immediate danger to them was the Hungarians, while the monarchy acted as the guarantor of Croatian autonomy.

Josip Jozua Frank (04/10/1844 - 12/17/1911)

During the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. The main efforts of the Croatian national movement were aimed at strengthening the autonomous status of Croatia within the Kingdom of Hungary. “Extreme” patriots demanded the immediate conclusion of a “personal union,” which was tantamount to the establishment of confederal relations, while more moderate figures limited themselves to demanding financial independence for Croatia. Despite all the nuances in the approaches of individual Croatian politicians, what was common to all of them was the recognition of the need to revise the Croatian-Hungarian agreement of 1868, which provided Croatia with very limited autonomy.
The national aspirations of the Croats met active opposition from the Hungarians, which forced Croatian politicians to seek support from the Viennese ruling circles, who, in turn, were interested in playing the “Croatian card” to curb the exorbitant Hungarian appetites that threatened the integrity of the monarchy.
The pro-Austrian orientation of the Croatian national movement was dictated not only by tactical considerations; it was largely determined by the general geopolitical situation in the Balkans. The Croats were seriously afraid of the political consequences that the collapse of Austria-Hungary would entail. According to the deputy of the Croatian Sabor I. Peršić, the collapse of the monarchy would lead to the division of Croatia between its stronger neighbors. For the Croats, the idea of ​​Greater Serbia was a constant nightmare, and for this reason alone the preservation of the monarchy was justified. With the exception of the “early” A. Starcevic and the “late” F. Supilo, all the main characters of the Croatian political scene were quite loyal to the monarchy. In the political consciousness of Croatian society in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. the idea of ​​national sovereignty was not so much anti-imperial as anti-Hungarian in nature. Due to its anti-Hungarian orientation, the Croatian national movement in Austria-Hungary acted as an integrating factor in the imperial system, which objectively determined the inevitability of a collision with Serbian national interests.
The divergence of the fundamental national interests of the Serbs and Croats, which gave rise to constant tension in their relations, further intensified the mutual rivalry stemming from the desire to play a leading role in the cause of Yugoslav unification. The Croats tried in every possible way to limit the process of such unification within the framework of the monarchy, which completely excluded Belgrade from possible political combinations. At the same time, the “Yugoslav idea” in the Croatian interpretation often acquired a pronounced Great Croatian coloring. According to the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party S. Radić, the Croatian plan for "gathering popular forces" is to unite all the South Slavs of the monarchy under a Croatian name in a single Croatian Kingdom. In the mind of A. Starcevic, the idea of ​​“South Slavic national unity” is just a form of expression of the Croatian national idea, since, in his opinion, all South Slavs are purebred Croats. The followers of A. Starcevic were somewhat more modest in their national ambitions, limiting the territorial scope of “national unity in Croatian style” to the boundaries of the monarchy. In their opinion, Zagreb should play the role of the political center of all the South Slavic lands of the monarchy, and the Serbs and Slovenes were invited to voluntarily recognize themselves as an integral part of the “Croatian political people” (in the name of the same notorious idea of ​​“national unity”).
Claiming to be the spokesmen for the interests of all the southern Slavs of the monarchy, the Croats jealously watched the strengthening of Serbian influence in the Balkans, seeing this as a potential threat to their plans. Realizing that Serbia is in a more advantageous position than Croatia in the struggle for hegemony in the Balkans, Croatian politicians have repeatedly suggested that the Serbs agree on dividing spheres of influence. It was assumed that the Croats would lead the process of Yugoslav unification within the monarchy, and the Serbs would lead the rest of the Balkan Peninsula. A proponent of such a “dualistic” approach to the process of Yugoslav unification was one of the leading Croatian politicians of the beginning of the century, F. Supilo. Soon after the outbreak of the First World War, he found himself in exile, becoming one of the leaders of the Yugoslav Committee, created in 1915 as a representative body of the South Slavic peoples of the monarchy. F. Supilo rejected the attempts of the Serbian government to eliminate the Croats from any active participation in the cause of the Yugoslav unification, which ultimately led him to open conflict with the Serbian Prime Minister N. Pasic and the conciliatory members of the Yugoslav Committee.

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