At all times, trophies (including captured enemy soldiers and officers) were a very significant indicator of the effectiveness of a particular army, and in the case of a coalition war, the weight of the contribution of the army of a coalition member country to the overall victory of the bloc. It seems to us extremely interesting to trace how things stood with this issue on the Russian front of the World War.
The heroism of Russian soldiers during the World War had its own characteristics. Firstly, at the beginning of the war there was no ideological motivation associated with a large-scale enemy invasion of Russian territory (as in 1812 or 1941). Secondly, the war was not yet total, fierce, as in 1941 - 1945. There was no confrontation of systems, no deliberate destruction of prisoners of war. The Russian soldier, surrendering, understood that he was getting rid of the hardships of the war and would very likely live to see its end.
What made Russian soldiers die when they could have surrendered, preferring the interests of their army and Motherland to their own? What made the fighters in one of the battles refuse to surrender and burn alive in the house they defended, set on fire by the Germans? What attracted the soldiers of the 20th Army Corps in the Augustow Forests to make a breakthrough in a virtually hopeless situation of multiple enemy superiority in firepower and numbers? There is only one answer - love for the Fatherland and loyalty to the oath and military duty.
But the situation often developed in such a way that large masses of Russian soldiers and officers were captured by the enemy - as was the case in East Prussia in August - September 1914 and in January - February 1915 for the armies of the North-Western Front and for almost all armies during the Great Retreat in May - August 1915. Many were captured in a hopeless situation or after being wounded. During the battles in the “cauldrons”, during the withdrawal and rearguard battles, timely evacuation of the wounded to the rear was practically impossible - and masses of the wounded, both on the battlefields and in field hospitals, became prisoners of war.
The Russian army suffered its largest losses of prisoners in the difficult situation of the Great Retreat.
Archival data [RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 426. L. 99, 100] reproduce the following number of missing persons in a given period of time. The Southwestern Front lost officers: 544 (May), 448 (June), 101 (July), 150 (August); lower ranks: 65943 (May), 110697 (June), 17350 (July), 24224 (August). The Northwestern Front lost officers: 170 (May), 167 (June), 624 (July), 383 (August); lower ranks: 36692 (May), 45670 (June), 134048 (July), 80507 (August). In total - up to 515,000 people. The figures of E. Falkenhain are close (up to 750,000 prisoners during 3 months of summer) [Falkenhain E. von. The Supreme Command 1914-1916 in its most important decisions. M., 1923. P. 122], Reichsarchiv (850,000 captured in 3.5 months) and N. N. Golovin (976,000 captured in the period May 1 - November 1) [Golovin N. N. Russia in the First World War. M., 2006. P. 182].
What are the total losses of prisoners of the Russian Active Army in 1914 - 1917? The headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for June 1917 gave the figure of 2,044,000 people [Commission to survey the sanitary consequences of the war of 1914-1918. M.-Pg., 1923. P. 159]. Materials from official bodies and calculations by specialists determined their number at 2,550,000 [Frunze M. World War in results and figures. P. 75], 2889000 (in the latter case, counting those exchanged, those who died and those who escaped from captivity) [Sysin A.N. Refugees and prisoners of war during the imperialist war // News of the People's Commissariat of Health. 1925. No. 1. P. 9] people.
N.N. Golovin, having carefully analyzed the issue, points to the figure of 2,417,000 people [Golovin N.N. Decree. op. P. 173]. This figure is also recognized by domestic historical science [Stepanov A.I. The price of war: sacrifices and losses / World wars of the 20th century. Book 1. First World War. M.: Nauka, 2002. P. 629] Of this amount, 1,400,000 were in Germany, 1,000,000 in Austria-Hungary and up to 20,000 in Turkey and Bulgaria.
Russian prisoners. German photo album 1915
The living conditions and living conditions of Russian prisoners of war were the most difficult compared to prisoners of other allied armies (primarily in terms of food) - up to 40 thousand military personnel died in captivity. More than 25% of the prisoners found use in agriculture. On average, prisoners of war worked 12 hours a day. Up to 6% of prisoners of war were involved in front-line work (“under fire,” which was prohibited by international treaties). Prisoners of war were subjected to physical and moral torture, and attempts were made to indoctrinate them. Of every 10,000 former prisoners of war who returned from Germany, more than 6,700 people were sick [Vasilieva S.N. Prisoners of war in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia during the First World War. M., 1999. P. 36].
Russian prisoners at agricultural work
Torture of Russian prisoners
Punishments applied during forced labor in Austria:
Shackling of the left leg and right arm
Hanging from a pole
How many prisoners did the Russian army take?
By mid-September 1914, the Southwestern Front alone captured up to 3,000 officers and lower ranks of German military personnel (as well as 425 military personnel) [RGVIA. F.2003. Op. 2. D. 543. L. 2.]. By December 1 of the same year, there were up to 13,500 German soldiers and officers in Russian captivity [RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 426. L. 10]. At the same time, the Reichsarchive at the end of October reports 15,000 Germans in Russian captivity (another 2,000 were added in November and December).
According to Russian archival data, by December 1914, more than 162,000 Austrian military personnel were captured [RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 426. L. 10]. The Reichsarchive already at the end of October estimates their number at 200,000 people (another 60,000 were added in November and December).
The situation with prisoners during the first half of the world war looked like this [RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 426. L. 25]. By February 1915, the Northwestern Front captured 439 officers and 48,400 privates, and the Southwestern Front captured 4,026 officers and 357,602 privates. Including 181 German officers and 18,309 soldiers of the German army (the rest were Austrians).
During the Carpathian operation in January-April 1915, the Germans and Austrians suffered a total loss of 800,000 people [Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914 -1918. Bd. II. Wien, 1931. S. 270]. Of these, 150,000 were prisoners (including only in the period February 20 - March 19, up to 59,000) [Ivanov F.K. The Great War. M., 1915. Part 2. P. 205-206].
From the Przemysl garrison, which surrendered on March 9, 1915, the following number of healthy prisoners of war was sent to Russia: 9 generals, more than 2,300 officers, almost 114,000 non-commissioned officers and privates. There are still up to 6,800 wounded and sick left in medical institutions [In Przemysl // Niva. 1915. No. 17. P. 4].
In mid-February 1915, more than 18,000 Turkish prisoners of war were sent deep into Russia (including 4 pashas, 337 officers and 17,765 lower ranks [Enemy losses on our southern and southwestern fronts // Niva. 1915. No. 10. P. 4 ].
As a result, by December 1915, there were the following number of prisoners of war in Russia: German - 1,193 officers and 67,361 soldiers; Austrian - 16,558 officers and 852,356 soldiers. Together with the prisoners who remained in the front line (excluding the Turks), the number of prisoners rose to 1,200,000 people [Lemke M.K. 250 days at Tsar’s Headquarters. Pb., 1920. P. 328].
The Germans lost up to 5000, up to 1500, up to 4000 and 1000 prisoners during positional battles: operations on Strypa on December 14, 1915 - January 6, 1916, Naroch operation on March 5-17, 1916, operations at Baranovichi on May 30 - 16 July 1916 and the Mitau operation on December 23 – 29, 1916, respectively.
During the Offensive of the Southwestern Front in 1916, Austrian troops lost up to 417,000 prisoners (almost 9,000 officers and 408,000 soldiers) [Strategic outline of the war of 1914-1918. Part 5. M., 1920. P. 108]. The Germans also suffered seriously - for example, the South German Army of A. von Linsingen lost over 82,000 people (51% of the original strength) in the May battles of this year alone.
The Turkish army lost more than 20,000 people as prisoners in the Erzurum operation, 17,000 people as prisoners in the Erzincan operation, etc.
The largest flows of prisoners of war on the Austro-German front moved deep into Russia through Kyiv and Minsk. In particular, during the first 17 months of the war, prisoners passed through Minsk: 3,373 officers and 222,465 non-commissioned officers [Prisoners // Kuban Cossack Herald. 1915. No. 51-52. P. 31].
Captured soldiers and officers
Austrian
Russian soldiers and Austrian prisoners - in a moment of rest
Germanic
Turkish
prisoner count
In total, at the end of 1917, 2,100,000 soldiers and officers of the German bloc were captured (up to 200,000 Germans, more than 1,800,000 Austrians, up to 100,000 Turks and Bulgarians) [Kamensky L. S., Novoselsky S. A. Losses in past wars. M., 1947; Vasilyeva S. N. Prisoners of war of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia during the First World War. M., 1999]. During the same period, the French captured 160,000, the Italians 110,000, the British 90,000 prisoners [Budberg A.P. Armed forces of the Russian Empire in the performance of all-Union tasks and responsibilities during the war of 1914-1917. Paris, 1939. P. 30].
An important circumstance is that the prisoners captured by the Russians were taken during the heavy fighting of the campaigns of 1914 - 1916, while the bulk of the prisoners captured by the Anglo-French-American allies of Russia were taken later - in 1918, during the the collapse of the armies of the countries of the German bloc (for example, German soldiers, the so-called “strikebreakers”, began to surrender en masse in August 1918 - during the post-Amiens demoralization of the army).
What conclusions can be drawn from the above figures?
Firstly, the Russian army captured almost as many prisoners as it lost itself. Secondly, the Russian army captured most of the prisoners of the German bloc. Thirdly, in 1917, the Russian army captured almost as many Germans alone as the British and French combined. It makes no sense to compare the Austrians captured by the Italian and Russian armies.
Even if we touch upon the issue of the losses of only the German army during the entire war, we should remember that a total of 1,000,000 German soldiers were captured [World War in numbers. M.-L., 1934. P. 22]: 450,000 in 1914-1917. (200,000 in Russian and 250,000 in Anglo-French captivity) and 550,000 in 1918 - mainly in August - November. That is, the Russian army, even at the end of the war (in which it did not fight for the last year), captured a fifth of all German prisoners - and all its prisoners were captured not by surrender, but in battle.
Many Russian prisoners of war did not accept their situation. 100,000 soldiers and officers (that is, 4% of prisoners) managed to escape from captivity: more than 60,000 escaped from German camps, and about 40,000 from Austrian camps. These are the lucky ones. A large percentage of prisoners escaped but were recaptured. So, only 418 officers and 199,530 lower ranks escaped from German camps, but were caught [Budberg A.P. Decree. op. P. 32]. Considering the strict regime for keeping prisoners and the difficulty of moving through a hostile foreign-speaking country, this says a lot. Thus, the chief of Austrian counterintelligence M. Ronge wrote that Russian prisoners of war who escaped from the camps became a real disaster. And “although not all of them, like General L. G. Kornilov,” managed to reach their homeland, they kept the Austrian law enforcement agencies in constant fear of sabotage attacks [M. Ronge. Intelligence and counterintelligence. St. Petersburg, 2004. P. 222].
Such a significant percentage of escapes convincingly refutes the existing opinion about the underdeveloped sense of patriotism and love for one’s homeland among the Russian masses during this period.
The prisoners fled to the nearest territories of the Allied powers.
Thus, according to the recollection of a Russian military agent in France, Colonel Count A. A. Ignatiev, in the summer of 1915, a big man in a tunic jumped into a French trench in Alsace at night, shouting the word: “Rus!” And all of France started talking about the feat of a Russian prisoner of war, a simple village guy who overcame barbed wire fences to break out to the allies. The soldier was honored, photographed, and was nominated for the St. George Medal. And a few days later, the flight of Russian prisoners to French territory “became a common occurrence” [Ignatiev A.A. 50 years in service. Petrozavodsk, 1964. P. 157]. Newspapers and magazines of the war years cited a number of facts of heroic escape from captivity and photographs of heroes. The escape was a real feat, and Russian soldiers often showed miracles of ingenuity during their escape.
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Books
- Under the protection of Russian generosity. Prisoners of war of the First World War in the Saratov Volga region (1914-1922)
- Under the protection of Russian generosity. Prisoners of war of the First World War in the Saratov Volga region, Alexandra Viktorovna Kalyakina. Alexandra Kalyakina’s book tells in detail about the stay of prisoners of war during the First World War in the Saratov Volga region, comprehensively and holistically covering many pressing issues of this...
- Under the protection of Russian generosity Prisoners of war of the First World War in the Saratov Volga region 1914-1922, Kalyakina A.. The book by Alexandra Kalyakina tells in detail about the stay of prisoners of war during the First World War in the Saratov Volga region, comprehensively and holistically covering many pressing issues of this...
More on the topic of prisoners of war in WWI and
Surrender to mercy
Prisoners of the First World War - gentlemanliness, bestiality and a humanitarian disaster
During the First World War, a total of about 8 million soldiers and officers were in enemy captivity - slightly less than the number who died on the battlefields. And it was the maintenance of prisoners of war that became, perhaps, the first unexpected problem that the countries that entered the war faced. Already from the first weeks of hostilities, the number of prisoners taken on both sides reached tens and hundreds of thousands, and the question arose - where to keep them, what to feed them and what to do with them.
~~~~~~~~~~~
Russian prisoners of war in East Prussia. 1914
Of course, they have taken prisoners before. For example, as a result of the defeat of France in 1871, 120 thousand soldiers surrendered to Prussia. However, previously such cases marked the end of wars, and the victors usually sent prisoners home. This same war, as it became clear almost immediately, would not end quickly, and the prisoners kept coming and coming.
They solved the problem of prisoners in different countries in different ways, but in general, when compared with the experience of the future Second World War, it was quite humane. Of course, the life of the prisoners was by no means “sugar”; it was not without cruelties and atrocities, but these were rather exceptions to the rule. Moreover, almost everywhere, the fact of being captured was by no means equated with betrayal - it was taken for granted that soldiers left without ammunition surrounded by the enemy had the right to surrender to his mercy, instead of dying in vain. At least in order to later try to return and benefit the homeland. At the same time, it must be admitted that the most irreconcilable position towards their prisoners was taken by the Russian leadership, which fundamentally refused to provide assistance to them. So Stalin, who later equated all his compatriots who were captured as state criminals, by and large, was not a pioneer.
Every seventh
During the entire First World War, about 13% of soldiers and officers were captured on both sides - approximately every seventh or eighth. The majority were Russians (2.4 million), Austria-Hungary was in second place in the number of prisoners (2.2 million), Germany was in third (about 1 million), then Italy (600 thousand), France (more 500 thousand), Turkey (250 thousand), Great Britain (170 thousand), Serbia (150 thousand). A total of more than 4 million people were captured by the Central Powers, and 3.5 million by the Entente countries.
The first large groups of prisoners, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, appeared already in the first months of the war. Soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army (especially those mobilized from among the Slavic peoples - Czechs, Slovaks and Serbs) laid down their arms in front of the Russians in Galicia by the tens of thousands. The Germans, in turn, captured tens of thousands of Russian soldiers during the defeat of General Samsonov’s army in August 1914 in East Prussia, and no less than the French during the capture of the Maubeuge fortress, which in the very first days of the war found itself in a German “cauldron” in Northern France. But even highly developed Germany turned out to be absolutely unprepared for such a turn.
In the first weeks of the war, there were still cases of “gentlemanly” attitude towards a captured enemy. Thus, on August 13, 1914, the 26th Mogilev Infantry Regiment, during an offensive in Galicia, freed a number of Russian soldiers previously captured by the Austrians, and they said that the Austrians even gave them warm blankets from the hospital. But very soon, when it became clear that there was a shortage of not only blankets, but also many other things necessary in everyday life, especially for their own soldiers, the attitude towards the prisoners changed.
In more or less tolerable conditions in Germany, as a rule, only captured officers were kept in fortresses (the most famous are Ingolstadt, Königstein). At best, soldiers were housed, and then at first, in empty barracks, and more often in dugouts, which they dug for themselves in the fields and forests. Only towards the middle of the war were some semblances of barracks built in Germany.
For the captured Russian soldiers, it was the initial period of the war that turned out to be the most difficult. On the one hand, the Germans and Austrians were not yet so embittered by the horrors of war; Germany had not yet been gripped by a food crisis. But on the other hand, the logistics of supply and medical care for hundreds of thousands of additional “mouths” had not yet been built, even for the meager rations. As a result, a humanitarian catastrophe soon broke out.
Winter 1914-1915 A terrible epidemic of typhus swept among prisoners in Germany, the methods of combating which German doctors imagined very vaguely. In Germany, there was almost no incidence of this disease for a long time, and local doctors simply did not have enough experience. Sometimes their nerves could not stand it - prisoners died “like flies,” hundreds a day, and some doctors simply ran away from this horror. Even worse was the fate of the Russian soldiers who found themselves in Turkish captivity (fortunately, there were few of them, since the Russian army acted mostly successfully on the Caucasian front) - nothing is known about the vast majority.
Captivity - shameful and honorable
It aggravated the moral and physical situation of the Russian prisoners and the attitude of their command towards them. In fact, it was not Stalin who came up with the thesis that “all prisoners are traitors”; approximately the same attitude towards them dominated the General Staff during the First World War. Of course, it was not so radical: if a soldier was captured, wounded, unconscious, or even simply in a hopeless situation (having wasted all the ammunition), and then managed to escape from captivity, this was treated with understanding. But at the same time, already at the beginning of the war, the Russian leadership made a fundamental decision - not to send food to Germany for prisoners, as Western European governments began to practice. Formally, it was explained by fears that the food for the Russian prisoners would be taken away and eaten by German soldiers, and it would turn out that we would help the enemy.
Russian prisoners of war in dugouts in Stettin
Although, according to only official data, more than half of the Russian soldiers and officers were captured, finding themselves in hopeless situations - either being wounded or shell-shocked, or as part of platoons, companies and entire regiments, being completely surrounded and without ammunition and seeing how the Germans They are shot with artillery from a safe distance. They said: “We were brought not to fight, but to be slaughtered.” In such cases of mass surrender, by the way, the white flag was often thrown out on the direct orders of officers who understood their responsibility for the lives of their subordinates.
As a rule, the command had no complaints about such prisoners, and if someone escaped from captivity and returned to duty, he could be considered a real hero. Among these fugitives, some of whom managed to reach their homeland only on the fourth or fifth attempt, after going through severe trials, there were quite a few famous figures, including, for example, General Lavr Kornilov and Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who later became Marshal of the Soviet Union. By the way, in one of the German fortresses, along with Tukhachevsky, the future President of France Charles de Gaulle, whom he personally met, was also captured. De Gaulle tried to escape six times, but was unsuccessful each time. And then it never occurred to anyone to reproach him for being in German captivity.
In Russia, in April 1915, a resolution was adopted ordering the deprivation of food allowances for the mobilized breadwinner to the families of the then “enemies of the people” - “those who voluntarily surrendered to the enemy and deserters.” The military command sent lists of “traitors” to the governors, and locally they were made public and publicly disgraced.
Due to traditional Russian confusion, such persons often included “missing people,” among whom were many who died “for the faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland.” A little later, an order was issued requiring that anyone who ran towards the enemy with their hands raised be shot on the spot, and this was to be done by fellow soldiers. It is clear that this order was carried out reluctantly, and in November 1915, the first semblances of the notorious barrier detachments began to appear in the Russian army. But cases of surrender, sometimes by entire regiments, continued, even despite stories about German atrocities against prisoners actively spread by propaganda.
“They were transported in wagons designed for transporting livestock.”
Atrocities in the First World War were not as massive as in the Second by the Nazis, but they also took place. The Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry, for example, in June 1915 published a report prepared on the basis of the testimony of Russian soldiers who managed to escape from German or Austrian captivity. In particular, it provided the following data:
“German soldiers and even officers usually took away overcoats, boots and everything valuable from those captured, even pectoral crosses... During the campaign, which sometimes lasted several days, the prisoners were not given any food, and they were forced to eat raw potatoes, rutabaga and carrots, tearing vegetables out of the fields they passed by, being subjected to blows from the guards for this. Senior non-commissioned officer of the Siberian regiment Rafail Kochurovsky witnessed how a German soldier outright killed a prisoner with a rifle shot because the latter, having fallen out of formation, rushed to pick up a half-rotten rutabaga lying on the road...
The prisoners were transported in wagons designed for transporting livestock, dirty, smelly, the floor of which was covered with a thick layer of manure. From 80 to 90 prisoners were placed in such a carriage. The overcrowding caused such crowding that there was no way to sit or lie down. The prisoners were forced to stand throughout the journey, supporting each other. Before the train departed, the carriage was tightly locked, and natural needs were sent right there in the carriage, using caps, which were then thrown out through a small window, which at the same time served as the only ventilation. The air in the carriage, according to the unanimous testimony of all the prisoners who returned to their homeland, was terrible. People suffocated, fainted, and many died.
Cleaning the cesspools and latrines in the camp was the exclusive responsibility of the Russians. Prisoners, in groups of several hundred people, were forced to dig ditches to drain swamps, cut down forests, carry logs, dig trenches, etc.
When performing field work, prisoners, with the help of special devices, were harnessed to plows and harrows in groups of 14-16, and they spent the whole day, replacing draft animals, plowing and leveling the fields. Private Ivangorod Regiment Pyotr Lopukhov told with tears in his eyes how he, along with other prisoners, was harnessed to a plow, and the German walking behind the plow urged him on with a long belt whip...
A tired prisoner who had sat down to rest was roused by a German guard to work again with blows of a stick, a butt, and often a bayonet. Those who did not want to do this or that work were beaten until they lost consciousness, and sometimes to death... Private 23rd Infantry Regiment Anton Snotalsky was an eyewitness to how in the Schneidemülle camp a German soldier outright killed a prisoner who, due to weakness, could not go to work, was shot from a gun. .
Not to mention the rubber sticks, sinew whips and whips that were abundantly supplied to the German sergeants, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who were watching the prisoners, a whole series of cruel punishments were applied in the camps, imposed for the most insignificant offenses, and sometimes without any reason. Prisoners were deprived of hot food for very long periods; they were forced to stand for several hours in a row with their hands raised up, with 4-5 bricks placed in each of them; they put their bare knees on broken bricks, they were forced to aimlessly, until their strength was completely exhausted, to drag heavy things around the barracks, etc., but the favorite and most frequently used punishments were reminiscent of medieval torture.
The offender was tied [by his hands tied behind his back] to a pole driven into the ground so high that his feet barely touched the ground. The suspended person was left in this position for two, three and even four hours; after 20-25 minutes the blood rushed to the head, profuse bleeding began from the nose, mouth and ears, the unfortunate man gradually weakened and lost consciousness...”
Torture of a Russian prisoner of war in an Austrian camp
In addition to publishing such reports, the Russian authorities used methods of “popular agitation.” Chairman of the State Duma Rodzianko proposed using fugitives from enemy captivity to tell stories about horrors on trams and trains, and since there were not enough fugitives, professional beggars - crippled disabled people - were released onto the streets of St. Petersburg with stories and songs accompanied by an accordion about the troubles in German dungeons.
Morbidity and mortality among Russian prisoners was indeed twice as high as among British, French and Belgian prisoners. They survived the hungry winter of 1914-15. mainly due to parcels from home sent through the Red Cross, and the Russians received only crumbs from charitable organizations. But if these same figures are compared with the Serbs, who received nothing at all from philanthropists, then their mortality rate was even higher, just like that of the Italians and Romanians who later entered the war. But still, despite all the suffering, of the total number of Russian military personnel in captivity, only 6% died - even taking into account the raging epidemics, and among them only 294 officers.
The most dangerous moment for someone captured was the moment of capture. The German commander of the 33rd ersatz battalion wrote to his wife on August 21, 1914: “My people were so embittered that they did not give mercy, because the Russians often show that they are surrendering, they raise their hands up, and if you approach them, they raise their guns again and shoot, and as a result - heavy losses.”
At the same time, as follows from the memoirs of Russian soldiers, most often in such situations there was no treachery. In conditions of loss of control, one officer, deciding that further resistance was useless, could shout “We surrender!” - and the soldiers raised their hands. And a few seconds later, one of the other officers - simply uncompromising or having his own plan for further actions - ordered to fight further, and the same soldiers who were already ready to surrender, following the order, began to shoot again.
Highly qualified prisoners
But the fate of the German and Austrian soldiers captured by Russians was even worse. Among them, at least a quarter eventually died from starvation and typhoid epidemics. In Russian prisoner camps, a humanitarian catastrophe even more terrible than in Germany broke out at the end of the war, after the 1917 revolution. In conditions of almost complete anarchy and anarchy, no one cared about the prisoners at all, and they stopped feeding and providing any care. A significant part of the survivors, by the way, were Czechs and Slovaks, from whom by 1917 the Czechoslovak Corps was formed, which was supposed to fight on the side of the Entente. This episode entered Soviet historiography as the “revolt of the White Czechs.”
And before the revolution, prisoners of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, among whom there were many skilled workers, were treated in Russia not only with tolerance, but sometimes with interest, trying to use their skills in production. Thus, during the First World War, more than 40 thousand prisoners worked in the mines and factories of Donbass and they were even paid a reasonable salary - up to 1 ruble 25 kopecks per day, in addition to providing clothes, shoes and linen.
Prisoners awaiting transfer to the rear
Moscow University professor and historian Sergei Melgunov noted in the summer of 1916 that “prisoners, especially Hungarians and Germans, are treated too leniently, there is a rumor about special protection for the Germans and about our dependence on the “internal Germans” (meaning a large number of ethnic Germans, moved to Russia back in the 17th-18th centuries and mostly German blood in the ruling dynasty - RP).” Special instructions even prescribed that prisoners of war used in industrial enterprises be fed meat. The jingoistic patriots complained most about this instruction, because “even peasants do not eat meat every day.” The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, also believed that there was no need to mess around with prisoners: “The slightest manifestation of insolence or defiance should be punished by immediately transferring them to the position of prisoners, and in further cases of such behavior, prisoners should be handcuffed, etc. "
Prisoners working in production in Russia had relative freedom and, although they lived in barracks at the plant, they could also get out of the territory of the improvised “camp”. Something similar towards the end of the war, as historian Maxim Oskin notes, was observed in Austria-Hungary - prisoners at night went straight through the camp gates into neighboring villages, and the sentries indifferently turned away. And in Germany, in the camps of Russian prisoners, in addition to the official administration, by the end of the war, self-government bodies, camp committees were already formed, which contacted the commandant’s offices and resolved humanitarian issues - from the distribution of charitable aid to the organization of correspondence with relatives and camp leisure (in model camps usually there were theater clubs, German language courses, etc.).
Russians cannot be exchanged
By the spring of 1915, Germany had already developed regulations on standards of detention: how much food, medical care, etc. should be provided to prisoners. From that time on, they began to be actively involved in work - from digging trenches to producing shells, although the Hague Convention prohibited forcing them to work for the enemy. However, absolutely all countries began to attract prisoners of war to work in difficult wartime conditions and a shortage of labor.
The Germans rarely used Russian prisoners in their factories, since they believed that absolutely all Russians were illiterate hillbillies, unable to master complex production. Therefore, they were most often sent to work in the fields. But every cloud has a silver lining - this was an additional chance to survive, since in agriculture, for obvious reasons, it was easier to obtain food, and the Germans soon began to lack it for themselves.
By the beginning of the First World War, two Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War had already been signed - 1899 and 1907, which included provisions on prisoners of war. But each country interpreted the provisions of the conventions in its own way, and the only thing that really somehow worked in practice was the admission of representatives of the International Committee and national organizations of the Red Cross into prisoner-of-war camps.
This system worked “somehow”, because the Red Cross could not conduct inspections in all camps. In each country, depending on the preferences and imagination of local authorities, there were a variety of types of camps - basic, penal, quarantine, so-called “work teams”, camps in the front line, etc. The list of camps visited by observers was compiled by the receiving parties themselves - usually these were only “exemplary” main camps in the deep rear. However, during the war years, 41 Red Cross delegates managed to visit 524 camps throughout Europe. By the end of the war, the Red Cross had sent more than 20 million letters and messages, 1.9 million parcels, and collected donations amounting to 18 million Swiss francs.
Empress Alexandra Feodorovna (left) with her daughter Tatiana and Tsarevich Alexei (right)
collect donations for the Red Cross. 1914
Also, diplomats from neutral countries - Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and Spain - mediated in resolving issues of monitoring the situation of prisoners of war. It was the Spaniards who were “responsible” for Russian prisoners of war in Germany.
Through the mediation of neutral countries, additional agreements were signed to alleviate the fate of individual prisoners of war. For example, it was possible to ensure that tuberculosis patients and disabled people could travel to a neutral country, where they would become internees and live in more comfortable conditions. There were also periodic mutual exchanges of prisoners of war who were clearly no longer capable of holding weapons. It is curious that the initiators of such humanism were usually the Germans and Austro-Hungarians. Moreover, at the end of the war, the exchange of healthy prisoners began - older soldiers and soldiers with many children. In total, thanks to such actions, about 200 thousand prisoners were able to return to their homeland. Most of them were soldiers who fought on the Western Front, while on the Eastern Front such agreements remained rare until the very end due to the hostile attitude of the Russian command towards their prisoners. Moreover, even the individual exchange line was completely closed to them.
For example, Russian generals and their families who were captured during the war wrote en masse petitions to the highest name asking to exchange them, but the tsarist government remained firm, considering them all traitors, or believing that they should escape on their own. Although most of these generals, according to documents, were captured after finding themselves in hopeless situations through no fault of their own - as a result of complete encirclement, as was the case during the defeat of Samsonov’s army near Tannenberg in East Prussia in August 1914 (there 15 were captured at once generals), in the battle on the border of East Prussia in the forest near Augustow in February 1915 (11 generals) or in the encircled Novogeorgievsk fortress near Warsaw (17 generals).
Slavic prisoners of war in Russia during the First World War
annotation
The article attempts to present the history of the creation by the Russian authorities of national formations from prisoners of war of the Slavs of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies - Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Croats, Serbs, etc., since from more than 2.2 million enemy soldiers and officers taken by the Russians captured by troops, they made up over half, a significant part of them surrendered into Russian captivity voluntarily.
Keywords
World War I; Slavic prisoners of war in Russia; prison camps; national military formations from Slavic prisoners of war
Time scale - century
XX
Bibliographic description:
Bazanov S.N. Slavic prisoners of war in Russia during the First World War // Proceedings of the Institute of Russian History. Vol. 11 / Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Russian History; resp. ed. Yu.A. Petrov, editor-coord. E.N.Rudaya. M., 2013. pp. 171-184.
Article text
S.N. Bazanov
SLAV PRISONERS OF WAR IN RUSSIA DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
In the history of the Second World War, and for our people of the Great Patriotic War, the concept of “Vlasovites” named after Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who surrendered and went into the service of Nazi Germany. On his initiative, the so-called Russian Liberation Army (ROA) was created from Soviet prisoners of war, intended to “liberate the peoples of Russia from the Stalinist regime.”
In the First World War, it was unthinkable that a Russian prisoner of war would fight as part of the German or Austro-Hungarian, and even more so the Turkish army against his compatriots “for the purpose of fighting the autocracy.” Our soldier remained faithful to his oath. But his opponents - the Slavs of the armies of the German bloc, dressed in soldier's overcoats - surrendered en masse into Russian captivity. Many of them, being in captivity, asked our command to enlist them in the Russian army to participate “in the struggle for the liberation of the Slavic peoples from Austro-German enslavement.” Why did this happen?
The First World War was a turning point that radically changed the course and nature of historical processes in Europe and ushered in the subsequent era of wars and social cataclysms. Undoubtedly, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 were a major acute crisis that accelerated its outbreak, which redrew the political map of the Balkan Peninsula. They dramatically changed the balance of power of large and small states in this troubled region and deepened their contradictions to the extreme.
Serbia, whose relations with Austria-Hungary date back to the beginning of the 20th century. were full of conflicts, significantly increased its territory. Having received a common border with Montenegro, Serbia as a result blocked the path for further expansion of Austria-Hungary into the interior of the Balkan Peninsula. The Slavic population of Bosnia, Croatia and Herzegovina, under the rule of Austria-Hungary, counted on Serbia's help in the struggle for their national liberation.
There were great powers behind the Balkan states of Serbia and Montenegro. Naturally, any, even the most insignificant, conflict on the Balkan Peninsula affected their interests. The action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia inevitably led to war with Russia, which was vitally interested in strengthening the position of the fraternal Orthodox state in the Balkans. However, in the war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, if one arose, their allies in the military blocs - the Entente countries and Germany - could not help but intervene.
Thus, any conflict on the Balkan Peninsula inevitably led to a pan-European and global one. As is known, the reason for it was the Sarajevo murder on June 15 (28), 1914, which sharply worsened relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. The latter decided to use this incident to attack Serbia and a month later, incited by the German Emperor Wilhelm II, declared war on it. Wanting to help his Slavic brothers, Russian Emperor Nicholas II announced mobilization. In response to this, Germany presented Russia with an ultimatum, which, as we know, remained unanswered. As a result, on July 19 (August 1), Germany, and July 24 (August 6), Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.
Nicholas II, in the famous Highest Manifestos of July 20 and 26 (August 2 and 8), clearly outlined the reasons for our country’s entry into the war - the defense of the territory of the Fatherland, its honor, dignity, the position of Russia among the great powers, as well as the defense of half-blooded and same-religion Slavic brothers . Thus, the first Supreme Manifesto of Nicholas II solemnly proclaimed:
“Following its historical covenants, Russia, united in faith and blood with the Slavic peoples, has never looked at their fate indifferently. The fraternal feelings of the Russian people towards the Slavs awakened with complete unanimity and special strength in recent days, when Austria-Hungary presented Serbia with demands that were obviously unacceptable for a sovereign state. Disdaining the accommodating and peaceful response of the Serbian government, rejecting the benevolent mediation of Russia, Austria hastily launched an armed attack, launching a bombardment of defenseless Belgrade.
Forced by the existing conditions to take the necessary precautions, We ordered that the army and navy be brought to martial law, but, valuing the blood and property of Our subjects, making every effort to achieve a peaceful outcome of the negotiations that had begun.
In the midst of friendly relations, Germany, an ally of Austria, contrary to Our hopes for centuries of good neighborliness and not heeding Our assurance that the measures taken did not at all have goals hostile to it, began to seek their immediate abolition and, having encountered a refusal of this demand, suddenly declared war on Russia.
Now we no longer have to stand up only for our unjustly offended sister country, but to protect the honor, dignity, integrity of Russia and its position among the great powers.”
The second manifesto was more emotional:
“Now Austria-Hungary, the first instigator of the World Troubles, who drew her sword against the weakest Serbia in the midst of deep peace, has shed her disguise and declared war on Russia, which has saved it more than once.
The enemy's forces are multiplying: both powerful German powers have taken up arms against Russia and the entire Slavs. But the righteous anger of peaceful peoples grows towards them with redoubled force, and with indestructible firmness Russia, summoned to battle, stands before the enemy, faithful to the glorious traditions of its past.
The Lord sees that it was not for the sake of warlike plans or vain worldly glory that we raised our weapons, but protecting the dignity and safety of our God-protected Empire, we are fighting for a just cause. In the upcoming war of nations, we are not alone: our valiant allies stood with us, also forced to resort to force of arms in order to finally eliminate the eternal threat of the German powers to general peace and tranquility.
May the Lord Almighty bless our weapons and our allied weapons, and may all Russia rise to a feat of arms with iron in their hands, with a cross in their hearts.”
Soon many states were drawn into the war, and it took on a global character. But the Slavic question was one of the primary factors throughout the war, and at the end of it, it contributed to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
According to the plan of the German-Austrian ruling circles, the outbreak of the First World War was supposed to become a “grave for the Slavic peoples.” There is no doubt that the victory of the German bloc would have consolidated the oppression of both the Slavic peoples of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and Serbia and Montenegro, which they soon occupied, for many years. But the aggressive plans of Austria-Hungary and Germany were not destined to come true. Russia, the only great Orthodox power, thwarted the German plan for a “lightning war.”
The beginning of the First World War, provoked by Germany, touched such a chord in the national self-consciousness of our people that for a time the tsarist regime even received credit from Russian society, especially since only it could organize a rebuff to the enemy. And this happened despite the fact that the not so long ago bloody events of the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 were not forgotten. Russian soldiers felt themselves to be part of the Slavs. They went to defend their Slavic brothers and their land. And they went to the front to the sounds of the new military march “Farewell of the Slavic Woman,” created in 1912 by the Russian bandmaster, staff captain Vasily Agapkin.
Famous military historian and theorist Lieutenant General Professor N.N. Golovin, while in exile, published a number of books in which he tried to recreate the true picture of the beginning of that war. Characterizing the patriotic upsurge that flared up brightly in those fateful July days of 1914, he wrote:
“Anyone who witnessed the war between Russia and Japan cannot be amazed at the huge difference in popular sentiment in 1904 and 1914.
The first incentive that pushed all segments of the Russian population to a heroic feat was the consciousness that Germany itself attacked us. The peaceful tone of the Russian Government towards the Germans was widely known, and therefore doubts similar to those that took place in the Japanese War could not arise anywhere. The threat to Germany awakened the social instinct of self-preservation among the people.
Another incentive for the struggle, which seemed understandable to our common people, was that this struggle began out of the need to defend the right to exist of the same blood and same faith of the Serbian people. This feeling did not at all represent the “pan-Slavism” that Kaiser Wilhelm liked to mention when pushing the Austrians to the final absorption of the Serbs. It was sympathy for the offended younger brother. For centuries, this feeling was cultivated in the Russian people, who fought a long series of wars with the Turks for the liberation of the Slavs. The stories of ordinary participants in various campaigns of this age-old struggle were passed down from generation to generation and served as one of the favorite topics for interviews with village politicians. They instilled a sense of a kind of national chivalry. This feeling of the defender of the offended Slavic peoples found its expression in the word “brother”, which our soldiers christened the Bulgarians and Serbs during the liberation wars, and which passed on to the people. Now, instead of the Turks, the Germans threatened to destroy the Serbs - and the same Germans attacked us. The connection between both of these acts was completely clear to the common sense of our people.”
The very fact that the Germans were the first to declare war on us contributed to the formation of its perception among the masses as a patriotic war, aimed at repelling enemy aggression and protecting our Slavic brothers. Prayers were held throughout the country “for the granting of victory over the treacherous and insidious enemy,” and in the cities there were processions and demonstrations, especially powerful in St. Petersburg and Moscow.
Conducting military operations alone on its huge Eastern Front against Austria-Hungary, Germany, and on October 20 (November 2) also Turkey, Russia, however, already in the first months of the war in the Battle of Galicia inflicted serious defeats on the troops of Austria-Hungary, having advanced deeply to her territory. The Russian army brought liberation from Austrian oppression to the Slavic peoples inhabiting Galicia. And two years after the famous Brusilov breakthrough, Austria-Hungary was already brought to the brink of a military disaster.
The successes of Russian weapons gave hope to the enslaved Slavic peoples. They hoped that the Austro-Hungarian Empire would not withstand the blows of war, that favorable conditions would be created for the creation of independent Slavic states. Therefore, the Slavs - Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Croats, Serbs, Ukrainians, Rusyns, Slovenes, etc., who made up a significant part of the population of Austria-Hungary, began to fight for national independence from the very first days of the war. This struggle took various forms.
Thus, the Czechs and Slovaks tried by all means to avoid mobilization into the Austro-Hungarian army, and unrest broke out in many military units formed from them and sent to the Eastern Front. Naturally, this greatly reduced the combat effectiveness of the Austro-Hungarian army. Let us recall: in its ranks there were 17.5% of Czechs and Slovaks alone, and in general the share of Slavs was 45.2% (10.2% Poles, 7.5% Serbs and Croats, 7.4% Rusyns, 2.6 % Slovenes)
It is deeply symbolic that the first fraternizations on the Eastern Front occurred precisely between Slavic soldiers of the opposing armies. This happened on the biggest Orthodox holiday - Holy Easter in April 1915. Moreover, the Russian command in those days did not interfere with this too much. These first fraternizations, coming from the depths of the Slavic soul, had nothing in common with the politicized fraternizations of 1917, often organized by the Bolsheviks and the Austro-German command and contributing to the fall of discipline, and subsequently the collapse of the Russian army.
At the same time, on the Eastern Front, Czech and Slovak soldiers, not wanting to fight for Austria-Hungary, surrendered in large groups to Russian captivity. Voluntary surrender became so widespread that already in the spring of 1915, as is known, entire military units went over to the Russian side. So, on April 3 (17), during the Carpathian operation, the 28th Prague Regiment voluntarily came over to our side. As noted in the report then received by the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, “28th (Prague. - S.B.) did not fire at our units directed by the chief of staff to the flank - and surrendered entirely, without causing any losses to the Russians.”
In May of the same year, in the area of the river. San there was a mass surrender of over 1,500 soldiers of the 36th Mladoboleslavsky regiment into Russian captivity. This was followed by a massive transition to our side of most of the 21st Chaslavsky, part of the 13th Olomutsky militia regiments. In smaller groups, soldiers from other Czech regiments ran over to the Russians. This forced the command of the Austro-Hungarian army to reorganize all Czech units and distribute Czechs and Slovaks in small parties to other regiments.
Let us recall: of the 2.2-2.3 million enemy soldiers and officers captured by the Russian army (this, by the way, is the most established figure in our reference literature), the Germans, for example, accounted for only about 190 thousand, and the remaining 2 million consisted of military personnel from Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. Of this number, there were about 450 thousand Austrians, over half a million Hungarians, about 63 thousand Turks, the rest of the prisoners of war were Slavs. For example, according to calculations by S.N. Vasilyeva, there were 670-830 thousand people: 200-250 thousand Czechs and Slovaks, approximately the same number of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 150-200 thousand Poles, 120-130 thousand Ukrainians. Thus, every third or fourth prisoner of war was a Slav. And, as already noted, quite a significant part of them surrendered into Russian captivity voluntarily.
Naturally, such a situation, which arose already in the first months of the war, could not help but attract the attention of the tsarist government and military authorities. In addition, the goal of their policy towards Slavic prisoners of war was determined by the ideological justification of the Second Patriotic War (as it was called in official propaganda at that time), i.e. war of liberation, waged against the Austrian and German enslavement of the Slavs. It was also extremely important for the tsarist government to present Russia in the eyes of the Slavic peoples of Austria-Hungary and Germany as a liberator.
So, at first, behind the scenes, such a different attitude developed between the tsarist government, the military authorities, and the population as a whole towards prisoners of war - Slavs and non-Slavs. In this regard, in the first months of the war, it was assumed that they would be territorially distributed based on nationality and citizenship. For example, prisoners of war of the German army had to be sent to the camps of Eastern Siberia, and the Austro-Hungarian army - to Western Siberia and Central Asia, where the climate is milder. It should be noted that this plan had to be abandoned due to difficulties encountered with its implementation. In addition, as already noted, there were 10 times more prisoners of the Austro-Hungarian army than the German army.
It should be especially emphasized: the national principle (Slavs and non-Slavs) was steadily implemented throughout the war. Already at assembly points, Slavic prisoners of war were separated from the Austrians, Hungarians and Germans, the trains with which were heading to the regions of the European, Siberian and Far Eastern North. Representatives of Slavic nationalities were sent to the European part of the country (mainly to the central and southern provinces) and to Western Siberia. However, no camps were created where exclusively Slavic or non-Slavic prisoners of war were kept. As a number of studies have shown, depending on the location of the camp, representatives of one or another nationality prevailed in it. Thus, according to the census conducted in the Omsk Military District in February 1915, 68% of prisoners of war were Slavs, and only about 10% were Germans, Hungarians and Romanians.
By the beginning of 1917, more than 400 prisoner of war camps had been created in Russia. Geographically they were distributed as follows. Within the Moscow Military District there were 128 camps (where 321 thousand people were kept), Kazan - 113 (285 thousand people), Omsk - 28 (199 thousand people), Turkestan - 37 (155 thousand people), Priamursky - 5 (50 thousand people). In the camps of the Minsk Military District there were 78 thousand prisoners of war, in the Kyiv - 406 thousand, in the Caucasus - 80 thousand, in Odessa - 217 thousand, in the Don Army Region - 76 thousand. At the same time, in the European part of Russia there were numerous small camps in which from 2 to 10 thousand people were kept, in Siberia - large ones, where up to 35 thousand prisoners of war were simultaneously held.
As can be seen from the above figures, the placement of prisoners of war throughout the country was uneven. And if at the end of 1914 - beginning of 1915 they were sent mainly to Western Siberia and the Far East, then from the end of 1915 they began to be deployed in European Russia. This was explained by the rapid increase in the number of prisoners of war and the need to use them in agricultural work. Let us note that throughout the war, prisoner of war camps were subordinate to one department - the Main Directorate of the General Staff, located in Petrograd.
As already noted, Slavic prisoners of war, unlike non-Slavs, enjoyed significant benefits. They mainly tried to place the Slavs in the central and southern provinces with favorable climatic conditions and sent them to agricultural work, while non-Slavs were sent to mines, construction, road work, etc. Prisoner-of-war Slavic officers were given free time, and soldiers were given the opportunity to take Sunday walks. All of them could also communicate with their compatriots. Let us recall: in those years in Russia, with the permission of the authorities, numerous Slavic societies and fraternities were active, whose representatives often visited prisoner of war camps, distributed their brochures, newspapers and leaflets, conducted anti-German and anti-Austrian agitation, and also engaged in charitable activities.
All this significantly influenced the attitude of Slavic prisoners of war towards the war. Many of them expressed a desire to defend the independence of their homeland with arms in hand. Let us emphasize: only true patriots could take such a step. After all, if they were captured, what awaited them was not a prisoner of war camp, but a tribunal with all the ensuing consequences. And although the use of such volunteers at the front was a gross violation of the principles of the Hague Convention of 1907, the military authorities met them halfway, since in the eyes of Russian society this gave the ongoing war a liberating character.
At the very beginning of the war, special national units began to be formed within the Russian army. Thus, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General N.N. On August 14 (27), 1914, Yanushkevich, explaining the purpose of creating the Czech squad, wrote to the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, artillery general N.N. Ivanov: this “is carried out mainly for political reasons, bearing in mind that when our troops operate within Austria, these units will split into separate parties in order to become the head of the Czech movement against Austria.”
It should be clarified here that initially the Czech squad was formed from volunteers of Czechs and Slovaks living in Russia. According to various estimates, the Czech-Slovak diaspora in our country on the eve of the First World War ranged from 70 to 100 thousand people. However, these were people mainly of civilian professions, and many were not suitable for combat service at all. Therefore, already in the fall of 1914, the military command raised the question of replenishing the Czech squad with volunteer prisoners of war of Czech and Slovak nationalities.
On September 17 (30), from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General N.N. Yanushkevich received a telegram, which emphasized that, as the front-line command found out, “on the part of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, there were objections to the admission of Czech prisoners of war (Czech squad. - S.B.) I inform you that His Imperial Highness sees no obstacles to the said reception.”
Soon, on December 2 (15), an order was received from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the Younger), allowing “the entry [into] the Czech squad formed in Kyiv, also willing Czech prisoners of war, and such a reception is recognized as possible to allow immediately after the capture of captivity." After this order, volunteer prisoners of war of Czech and Slovak nationalities became the main source of replenishment for this military unit.
The next largest contingent of Slavic prisoners of war were Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc.) - soldiers and officers of the Austro-Hungarian army, captured or voluntarily surrendered to the Russians, since they did not want, like the Czechs and Slovaks, to fight for the interests of the Habsburg monarchy.
Yugoslav prisoners of war found themselves scattered throughout almost the entire territory of the Russian Empire. Along with other Austro-Hungarian military personnel, they were in camps located both in European Russia and in Western Siberia and Central Asia. Let us emphasize: a fairly large number of Yugoslav prisoners of war ended up on the territory of Ukraine, especially in the Odessa region, where the formation of Serbian volunteer units (Serbian detachment) began. Initially, the registration of volunteers from among them was aimed at replenishing the thinned ranks of the Serbian army after heavy battles with Austria-Hungary, but already from the end of 1915, after the defeat of the Serbian army and the occupation of Serbia by Austro-Hungarian troops, the formation of volunteer units from Yugoslav prisoners of war began with the goal their use as part of the Russian army. At the request of the Serbian government in exile, these military formations began to be called Serbian, although they also included Croats, Slovenes and representatives of other Yugoslav peoples.
It should be noted that in the first years of the war the creation of such national formations proceeded rather slowly. Russia has not yet experienced the need for human resources for the front. Their shortage began to show itself after the bloody battles of 1915, when the German bloc transferred its main efforts to the Eastern Front in order to withdraw Russia from the war.
April 8 (21), 1916, who replaced N.N. Yanushkevich, the new chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General M.V. Alekseev turned to Nicholas II with a written report, where he noted: the board of the Union of Czech-Slovak Societies petitions the military authorities for the release of prisoners of war of Czechs and Slovaks, “who have proven their devotion to the Slavic idea and have the guarantee of the Czech-Slovak organization,” with a view to broader and more expedient using them mainly for the needs of the active army. According to M.V. Alekseev, initially it was necessary to release former soldiers of the 28th Prague and 36th Mladoboleslavsky regiments who voluntarily surrendered into Russian captivity, as well as Slavic refugees from Austria-Hungary who left with the retreating units of the Russian army in 1915, as well as other Slavs, Slavic societies and communities will vouch for whose loyalty. To all of the above, M.V. The tsar responded to Alekseev with “agreement in principle.”
Soon, on June 5 (18) of the same year, Minister of War General of Infantry D.S. Shuvaev also addressed Nicholas II with a written report, where, referring to the positive resolution of the monarch on the report of M.V. Alekseev, raised the issue of the release of Slavic prisoners of war, “whose complete loyalty to Russia is guaranteed by the Slavic societies legalized in our country.” The project developed by that time by the military authorities provided for their transfer to the category of “employees”, involvement in work without the right to leave and mandatory supervision over them. All these issues were entirely within the competence of the military authorities, and the wages of the Slavic prisoners of war released under such conditions were to be established by the tsarist government. However, any participation of Slavic societies was completely excluded here.
On July 27 (August 9), Nicholas II for the second time expressed agreement with the project, which was submitted for consideration to the “Special meeting to unite all efforts to supply the army and navy and organize the rear,” and then to a special meeting at the Main Directorate of the General Staff, to whom, as already noted , were subordinated to prisoner of war camps. Let us note that this project, although constantly being refined, was never approved.
After the February Revolution, the Provisional Government that came to power continued the policy of the tsarist authorities towards Slavic prisoners of war. June 30 (July 13), 1917, Minister of War and Navy of the Provisional Government A.F. Kerensky approved the “Rules establishing special benefits for prisoners of war of Czechs, Slovaks and Poles.” The rules allowed correspondence with prisoners of war in other camps, Czech-Slovak and Polish public organizations and individuals, provision of work in their specialty, obtaining literature in their native language, the creation of mutual aid funds and libraries, and the presence of brothers and other relatives together in the same camp. Officers and volunteers were even allowed to marry Russian women and live in private apartments.
The Provisional Government also very actively promoted the creation of national military formations from Slavic prisoners of war, which began, as previously noted, with the tsarist authorities. Thus, the above-mentioned Czech squad, formed in 1914, was transformed into a rifle regiment in February 1916, then into a brigade, in June 1917 into a division, and in September into the Separate Czech-Slovak Corps with about 45 thousand soldiers. and officers. In October, Russian Major General V.N. was appointed its commander. Shokorov, and the commissioner was the deputy chairman of the Russian branch of the Czechoslovak National Council P. Max.
In January 1917, the Polish reserve rifle regiment of about 16 thousand people was formed in Belgorod. At the same time, the 1st Polish Rifle Division was created on the Southwestern Front. Subsequently, it was replenished by soldiers of the Polish Reserve Rifle Regiment. July 23 (August 5) Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General L.G. Kornilov appointed Lieutenant General I.R. Dovbor-Musnitsky commander of the 1st Polish Legionnaire Corps, the basis of which was the 1st Polish Rifle Division. The corps headquarters was located in Bykhov, Mogilev province. By October, the corps already included three infantry divisions, cavalry units and artillery, and its total strength reached almost 25 thousand soldiers and officers.
In 1915, on the basis of the Serbian detachment, which was mentioned earlier, two divisions were formed from among prisoners of war, united in 1917 into the Yugoslav Volunteer Corps. Its headquarters were located in Odessa, and Serbian Army General M. Zivkovic was appointed commander. By October 1917, the corps already numbered 30 thousand people, and all three of these corps together - at least 100 thousand. Other, smaller units and units were also created from Slavic prisoners of war. Thus, every seventh or eighth Slavic prisoner of war voluntarily joined military formations as part of the Russian army in order to fight with arms in hand for the independence of their homeland.
The ideological policy towards prisoners of war in the post-October period was fundamentally different from that pursued by the Tsarist and Provisional governments. The Soviet government did not divide them into Slavs and non-Slavs. The national orientation was replaced by a class one, which met both the foreign policy and domestic political goals of the Bolshevik Party.
In addition, the Council of People's Commissars soon prohibited the further creation of national military formations from Slavic prisoners of war, and those already created were to be subject to disbandment and demobilization. Thus, in January 1918, the command of the Separate Czech-Slovak Corps had to ask the French government to officially transfer its military personnel to serve in the French army, and also agree with the Soviet government on the transfer of the corps through Vladivostok to the Western (French) Front. However, as we know, these plans were not destined to come true: on May 25, 1918, there was an armed anti-Bolshevik uprising of units and formations of the corps, the echelons of which stood along the railway line from Penza to Irkutsk, which played a huge role in the Civil War. Only in February 1920, a truce agreement was signed between the government of the RSFSR and the command of the corps, guaranteeing the evacuation of Czechoslovak legionnaires from Soviet Russia. The last units of the corps left for their homeland in September 1920 through Vladivostok.
The further fate of the 1st Polish Legionnaire Corps was no less tragic. Thus, for the refusal of the corps command to implement the decree of the Soviet government on the democratization of the army, the Soviet command of the Western Front, in the rear area of which the corps units and formations were located, issued an order in January 1918 for its disarmament, disbandment and demobilization. However, the corps commander, Lieutenant General I.R. Dovbor-Musnitsky did not obey this order, for which both he and the corps were declared outlaws by the Soviet authorities. After a series of battles with Soviet troops, units of the corps retreated towards Minsk and occupied the city on February 20. The next day, German troops entered Minsk. Polish units, by agreement with the German command, were allowed to temporarily remain on the territory of Belarus, and in May 1918 I.R. Dovbor-Musnitsky, under pressure from the Germans, gave the order to disband the corps.
The Yugoslav Volunteer Corps also suffered severe trials. In the fall of 1917, his headquarters and the 1st division were transferred from Odessa to Arkhangelsk, from where they were partially sent to the Thessaloniki Front, and the units that arrived in Arkhangelsk later remained there until the end of the Civil War. At the end of the year, a group of corps soldiers who remained in Odessa voluntarily joined the 1st International Detachment of the Red Guard, and the reserve battalion of the corps located there also went over to the side of the Soviet regime. At the same time, the 1st Serbian Soviet Revolutionary Regiment was created from part of the soldiers and officers of the corps in Yekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk). The Yugoslav shock battalion stationed in Kyiv at the beginning of 1918 was reorganized into the 1st Yugoslav Communist Regiment. Some units and formations of the former corps participated on the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Civil War in various regions of Russia (Volga region, Siberia, Far East).
The fate of Slavic prisoners of war who did not join national military formations was different. Some of them took part in the Civil War as part of national units of the Red Army, others fought in various anti-Soviet armed formations. The majority of Slavic prisoners of war did not participate in the Civil War and were waiting to return to their homeland. This process began in 1919 and continued until the end of 1922.
FOOTNOTES of the original text
See for example: Keegan, J. First World War: [trans. from English]. - M., 2002. - P. 193, 194; Stepanov, A.I., Utkin, A.I.. The All-Russian Empire and the USSR in the World Wars. - M.; Krasnodar, 2005. - P. 13.
Quote By: Petrov, A.A. Formation of Czech-Slovak units within the Russian army in 1914-1917. // Forgotten war and devoted heroes. - M., 2011. - P. 238.
Participation of Yugoslav workers in the October Revolution and the Civil War in the USSR: collection. documents and materials. - M., 1976. - P. 8.
Lisetsky, A.M.. On the situation of prisoners of war in Russia after the victory of the February Revolution // Participation of working people of foreign countries in the October Revolution. - M., 1967. - P. 117.
The Great October Socialist Revolution: encyclopedia. — 3rd ed., add. — P. 410, 411, 583, 600.
World War I prisoners of war in Siberia
Historical and legal aspects of the problem
The most accurate data seems to be the Central Commission for Prisoners of War and Refugees - Centrifuge, created in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR dated January 1, 2001 and then transformed into Tsentroevak. Centrifuge received more and more new materials from Russian authorities involved in recording prisoners of war. According to the final data of Centrifuge, and then Tsentroevak, summed up for the years, the total number of prisoners of war who belonged to the armies of the Central Powers and registered on the territory of Russia was about 2 people.
In order to imagine the national composition of prisoners of war, it should be noted that during the First World War, among those in active military service in the armed forces of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, about 25% were Austrians and Germans, 23% were Hungarians, 13% were Czechs, 4% - Slovaks, 9% - Serbs and Croats, 2% - Slovenes, 3% - Ukrainians, 7% - Romanians and 1% - Italians.
Placement of prisoners of war by province and rules for their distribution
As already mentioned, according to the Russian General Staff, there were over 2 million soldiers and officers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey in the expanses from the Dnieper to the Pacific Ocean. “Guided by military and political considerations, the tsarist administration intended to place prisoners in places remote from administrative and economic centers.” As the newspaper “Yenisei Thought” reported in one of the April issues of 1915, only in Krasnoyarsk there were 2,300 people, in Kansk, in Achinsk. But besides the Yenisei province there were many other places where involuntary prisoners were sent. This includes the Urals, Turkestan, and, naturally, all of Siberia and the Far East. Here are a few figures taken from a unique publication - the “Siberian Soviet Encyclopedia”, which show how many prisoners of war ended up in the vast territory from the Ural Mountains to Primorye: Tobolsk - 5,000 people, Tyumen and Kurgan - the same amount each, Chelyabinsk - 1,200, Omsk –, Novonikolaevsk –, Barnaul – 2,500, Ust-Kamenogorsk – 1,000, Tomsk – 5,200, Biysk – 3,000, Irkutsk, Nizhneudinsk – 2,200, Troitskoslavsk – 6,700, Verkhneudinsk – 8,500, Berezovka (special military town) –, Chita –, Sretensk –, Nerchinsk – 2,500, Dauria –, Nikolsk-Ussuriysky –, Spasskoye – 8,000, Blagoveshchensk – 5,000, Shkotovo – 3,200, Razdolnoe – 8,300, Krasnaya Rechka – 900, Khabarovsk – 5,000 Moreover, the number of prisoners of war was constantly increasing and, for example, in Krasnoyarsk by 1916 it reached people.
In the ever-increasing number of prisoners, tsarism saw a source of cheap labor capable of replacing the workers and peasants of Russia who were being drafted into the active army. Sharing his delight with the queen about the latest message he received, “On the capture of thousands of enemies,” Nicholas II wrote: “How many new hands to work in our fields and factories!” But if initially it was planned to place prisoners mainly beyond the Urals, then quite soon “the arrival of huge masses of prisoners and the lack of labor prompted the tsarist government already in 1915 to begin placing prisoners throughout the country.”
Germans, Austrians and Hungarians were considered less reliable than prisoners of Slavic nationalities and Romanians, so the tsarist authorities preferred to place them mainly beyond the Urals, while captive Slavs and Romanians were kept in the European part of Russia. Numerous camps (from 2,000 people) were located in European Russia, and larger ones were located in Siberia, in which pre-war prisoners were simultaneously kept.
In relation to Slavic prisoners of war, Russia pursued a special policy. The tsarist government, of course, could not ignore the sympathetic mood of the Russian public towards the captive representatives of fraternal peoples, the influence of the Czechoslovak community and its own geopolitical interests. Since Czech and Slovak prisoners of war were considered trustworthy, the Ministry of War intended to create combat units from them as part of the Russian army. However, the prisoners, only recently snatched from bloody battles, did not want to return to duty, especially under a false flag. Therefore, the position of Czechoslovak prisoners of war in Russia was the most unenviable. Unreliable Germans and Magyars were sent to Siberia and Turkestan, while Czechoslovaks and other Slavs were left in the center of Russia, where they were forced to do hard work in the worst conditions. And since it was noticed that the worse the conditions were, the more volunteers enlisted in the Czechoslovak troops, the conditions of detention and work of Slavic prisoners of war began to worsen as much as possible. As a result, thousands of prisoners died from typhus, scurvy and hunger, and were constantly subjected to cruel punishments and beatings. The result of such “agitation” was that captured Czechoslovaks subsequently began to be recorded everywhere as Germans or Magyars, whom no one touched.
“In total, in Russia by 1917 there were more than 400 prisoner of war camps, including 15 in the Petrograd Military District, 128 in Moscow, 113 in Kazan, 30 in Irkutsk, and 28 in Omsk.”
According to Art. 50 of the Regulations “On Prisoners of War”, the main management of all prisoners of war on the territory of the Empire belonged to the War Ministry. Civil authorities pledged to provide all possible assistance to the military authorities.
The placement and distribution of prisoners of war was also carried out on the basis of the Regulations “On Prisoners of War”. From the location of the active troops, prisoners of war, formed in parties, were sent to assembly points, where they were under the supervision of district military commanders before being sent to their destination for work (Articles 25-28 of the Regulations). In each assembly point, created under the administration of the district commander, special alphabetical lists were kept in which prisoners of war arriving at assembly points were entered, and the lists also indicated the places where prisoners of war would be sent from the assembly point.
Parties of prisoners of war were formed and sent taking into account the rank of prisoners (for example, senior officers were placed in 1st and 2nd class carriages (Articles 38-41); while the teams were divided into platoons, half-companies, companies, and even larger units, and to command them appointed officers from among prisoners (Article 54 of the Regulations “On Prisoners of War”).
On the ground, prisoners of war were to be housed in free barracks; in the absence of such, in private houses, always in barracks order, guided by the Charter on Zemstvo Duties (Articles 463 and 532 - in relation to meeting the general requirements for residential premises); officers who gave an undertaking on their word of honor that they would not move outside the designated area were given the right to live in private apartments in the area where the unit was located (Articles 56, 58 of the Regulations on Prisoners of War).
For comparison, let us briefly consider the situation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany and its allied states. In total, there were 6 million prisoners in Germany during the First World War. About 3.8 million of them were prisoners of war and interned civilians from Russia.
It should be noted that initially it was not planned to use the labor of prisoners of war in Germany widely, especially in industry and agriculture, due to the fact that there was unemployment in Germany, which remained in a fairly large volume even after the start of the war. It was only at the beginning of 1915 that a labor shortage began to be felt. Therefore, already in December 1914, most of the prisoners of war were transferred to the work teams (Arbeitskommando) and only a few of them remained in the camps. Russian prisoners of war were used mainly in agriculture and hard work, such as in mines. Naturally, prisoners of war regularly attempted to escape. If such attempts failed, the prisoners were returned not to work teams, but to camps, which meant a worsening of their situation. To prevent this from happening, special and penal camps were created in the rear zones and regions of the Reich, where prisoners of war were subjected to a strict regime and were forced to perform the most difficult work. In cases of refusal to perform work, prisoners were put on bread and water, and in the front-line and front-line regions, prisoners of war were arrested, tied to a post and deprived of food. Such data are provided by German researcher Iris Lenzen.
Russian scientists cite much darker facts. In Austria-Hungary in 1917, “physically working” citizens were given 140 g of corn flour per day, those not engaged in physical labor - about 80 g, soldiers - 1 kg of bread for three, prisoners of war - for four, and therefore some of the prisoners died from exhaustion, before reaching the rear. In Germany the situation was no better. The prisoners received 200 g of bread per person per day, and the flour content in it did not exceed 15%, the rest was pine sawdust. All this, as well as working in difficult conditions, led to enormous mortality. In addition, the system of corporal punishment practiced in Germany and Austria-Hungary did not contribute to survival. In Germany, prisoners were often used instead of draft animals, mocked, and beaten; the population was brought up in a spirit of contempt and hatred for prisoners. In Austria-Hungary, in addition to punishment with rods, shackling of hands and feet from several hours to several days, hanging with arms turned backwards, they also used nailing into a coffin for 2-3 hours. In 1916, the Supreme Command of the Russian Army received information that the Austrians crucified dozens of our prisoners of war on trees for refusing to dig trenches, and about 150 people were killed. Moreover, escaping from captivity if the fugitive was caught was punishable by death. In the occupied territory, Austro-Hungarian troops also executed those who provided protection to the fugitives. The punishments were somewhat relaxed only towards the end of 1917.
It is generally accepted that prisoners of war were used in violation of Art. 6 of the Hague Convention, for work for military purposes, however, such violations were committed, perhaps, by all countries participating in the war.
The situation of prisoners of war on Russian territory was somewhat better, but also far from perfect. The supply of prisoners of the lower ranks with food and things was usually carried out according to the lowest category assigned to soldiers. For example, according to orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief No. 000 and No. 000 for 1916, lunch with bread for lower ranks cost 31 kopecks, without bread - 23 kopecks; for prisoners of war at the theater of military operations - 19 kopecks, without bread - 12 kopecks, dinner, respectively - 16 and 12 kopecks. for lower ranks and 10 and 7 kopecks. for prisoners of war. Along with similar categories of Russian soldiers, only sick prisoners and orderlies from prisoners who cared for highly infectious patients were provided with care. The situation was the same with the supply of prisoners of war with things. A telegram to the troops of the commander of the Romanian Front (June 1916) indicates that uniforms and shoes of the poorest quality were distributed to hospitals, workers' squads, prisoners of war, etc.
However, it should be noted that the situation of prisoners of war in Siberia was somewhat better than in most regions of Russia.
As mentioned above, on the territory of Siberia the Main Directorate of the General Staff placed mostly prisoners who were less reliable than the Slavs and Romanians. Thus, about Germans, Austrians and Hungarians entered the territory of Siberia. A significant part of these prisoners of war was placed in two Siberian military districts: Omsk (territory of Western Siberia) and Irkutsk (Eastern Siberia). On the territory of the Irkutsk Military District there were about 30 large concentration camps for prisoners of war, of which the largest was located in Krasnoyarsk.
Accommodation of prisoners of war in Siberia
Prisoners of war arrived in Siberia in separate groups, from small to quite large. Their appearance has always aroused keen interest among the local community.
Thus, the newspaper “Evening Krasnoyarsk” talks about the meeting of the first batch of prisoners of war in Krasnoyarsk on September 18, 1914. Even despite the eight-hour delay of the train, most of those who met patiently waited for the arrival of the prisoners: “About 2 o’clock in the morning a train with prisoners of war approaches the Krasnoyarsk station. Despite the late hour, they do not sleep. Through the open doors one can see gray and black overcoats, gray caps, copper helmets covered with gray canvas. The train proceeds non-stop to a military point. After 5 minutes, prisoners poured out of the carriage... Austrian officers very willingly come into contact with the public, German officers behave arrogantly, ... they are surrounded by our soldiers and Cossacks. There are conversations and questions."
Arriving prisoners of war were placed in the Krasnoyarsk concentration camp. The Krasnoyarsk camp was located in barracks: “4 barracks were located on the banks of the Yenisei opposite the railway bridge. The remaining 4 are in a military camp. Each barracks was surrounded by barbed wire and had 4 security posts.” 12 thousand prisoners of war ended up in the camp, but by 1916 there were 13 thousand of them. So, 5,000 prisoners of war ended up in Kansk, in Achinsk, in Irkutsk.
Labor of prisoners of war and regulations governing it
In September 1914, the Tsar instructed the Council of Ministers to develop a system of measures to attract prisoners of war to work. On October 7, the government approved the Rules “On the procedure for providing prisoners of war for the performance of government and public works at the disposal of the departments interested in this.” On October 10, the Rules “On the admission of prisoners of war to work on the construction of railways by private companies” appeared, and on March 17, 1915 - “On the release of prisoners of war to work in private industrial enterprises.”
Entrepreneurs received freedom of action. Such an order was found in the funds of the state archive of the Novosibirsk region for the Tomsk concentration camp dated August 8, 1915 No. 26: “At the new barracks, prisoners of war from among 300 people sent to agricultural work at the disposal of the manager will be excluded from allowance in their companies from August 8 Altai subdistrict,” it said.
In the autumn of 1914 - winter of 1915, 700 prisoners from the Krasnoyarsk camp “worked to improve roads from Krasnoyarsk to the village of Startsevoy, from Krasnoyarsk to the Znamensky Convent, from the village of Kubekovo to the village of Chastostrovsky.” In the spring and summer of 1915, prisoners of war from the Achinsk and Krasnoyarsk camps worked on the repair of the postal routes Achinsk - Minusinsk and Krasnoyarsk - Yeniseisk.
Averbakh. op. Part 1. P. 340.
Bulletin of the Omsk City Public Administration. 1915. No. 2. P. 9.
See: Internationalists. Workers of foreign countries are participants in the struggle for Soviet power. M.: Nauka, 1967. pp. 24-25.
Bernat J. From the memoirs of a teacher: Hungarian internationalists in the Great October Socialist Revolution. Novosibirsk: Voenizdat. P. 304.
Bulletin of the Omsk City Administration. 1915. No. 2. P. 934.
In the flames of revolution. Irkutsk, 1957. P. 9.
Internationalists in the battles for Soviet power / Ed. . M.: Mysl, 1965. P. 25.