The irretrievable losses of the Soviet military forces amounted to 126 thousand 875 people. The Finnish army lost 21 thousand. 396 people killed. The total losses of Finnish troops amounted to 20% of their total personnel.
Well, what can you say about this? There is clearly yet another anti-Russian falsification covered by the authority of official historiography and the Minister of Defense himself (now former).

In order to understand the details of this nonsense, you will have to take an excursion to the original source to which everyone who cites this ridiculous figure in their works refers.

G.F. Krivosheev (edited). Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Losses of the armed forces

Dan information about the total number of irretrievable losses of personnel in the war (according to final reports from the troops on March 15, 1940):

• killed and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages 65,384;
• 14,043 were declared dead among the missing;
• died from wounds, concussions and illness in hospitals (as of March 1, 1941) 15,921.
• The total number of irretrievable losses amounted to 95,348 people.

Further, these figures are broken down in detail by categories of personnel, by armies, by branches of the military, etc.

Everything seems clear. But where do 126 thousand people of irreparable losses come from?

In 1949-1951 V As a result of lengthy and painstaking work to clarify the number of losses, the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Headquarters of the Ground Forces compiled personal lists of Red Army military personnel dead, dead and missing in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. In total, they included 126,875 fighters and commanders, workers and employees, who amounted to irretrievable losses. Their main summary indicators, calculated from personal lists, are presented in table 109.

Types of losses	Total number of irrecoverable losses		Exceeding the number of losses
	According to reports from the troops	According to named lists of losses
Killed and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages	65384	71214	5830
Died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals	15921	16292	371
Missing	14043	39369	25326
Total	95348	126875	31527

http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt#w04.htm-008

We read what is written there (quotes from this work are highlighted in green):

The number of irretrievable losses given in table 109 diverges greatly from the final data, which were calculated based on reports from troops received before the end of March 1940 and are contained in table 110.

The reason for the discrepancy that emerged is that the nominal lists included first of all out, unaccounted previously recorded losses of Air Force personnel, as well as military personnel who died in hospitals after March 1940, in Tue. oops, died Border guards and other military personnel who were not part of the Red Army were staying in the same hospitals for wounds and illnesses. In addition, the personal lists of irretrievable losses include a large number of military personnel who did not return home (based on requests from relatives), especially those who were called up in 1939-1940, contact with whom ceased during the Soviet-Finnish War. After searching unsuccessfully for many years, they were classified as missing. Note that these lists were compiled ten years after the Soviet-Finnish war. Ime But this also explains the presence on the lists of an excessively large number of missing persons - 39,369 people, which amounts to 31% of all irretrievable losses in the Soviet-Finnish war. According to reports from the troops, a total of 14,043 military personnel went missing during the fighting.

Thus, we have that the losses of the Red Army in the Finnish War incomprehensibly included more than 25 thousand people. those who disappeared are unclear where, unclear under what circumstances, and generally unclear when. Thus, researchers irrecoverable losses of the Red Army in the Finnish War are overestimated by more than a quarter.
On what basis?
However, inAs the final number of irretrievable human losses of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war, we accepted the number of all dead, missing and died from wounds and diseases, included in the personal lists, that is126,875 people This figure, in our opinion,more fully reflects the demographic irretrievable losses of the country in the war with Finland.
Just like that. To me, the opinion of the authors of this work seems completely unfounded.
firstly, because they do not justify this method of calculating losses in any way
secondly, because they don’t use it anywhere else. For example, to calculate losses in the Polish campaign.
Thirdly, because it is completely unclear on what grounds they actually declare the loss data presented by the headquarters “hotly” unreliable.
However, to justify Krivosheev and his co-authors, it should be noted that they did not insist that their (in a particular case) dubious assessments were the only correct ones and provided data from alternative, more accurate calculations. They can be understood.

But I refuse to understand the authors of the Second Volume of the Official History of the Second World War who present these unreliable data as the ultimate truth.
The most curious thing from my point of view is that they do not consider the figures given by Krivosheev as the ultimate truth. This is what Krivosheev writes about the losses of the Finns
According to Finnish sources, the human losses of Finland in the war of 1939-1940. amounted to 48,243 people. killed, 43 thousand people. wounded

Compare with the above data on the losses of the Finnish army. They differ significantly!! But in the other direction.

So, let's summarize.
what we have?

Data on losses of the Red Army are overstated.
The losses of our opponents are underestimated.

In my opinion, this is pure defeatist propaganda!

Combat forces of the parties:

1. Finnish army:

A. Human reserves

By the end of November 1939, Finland concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.

The land army cooperated and was supported by the Finnish Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, the following were added to the army's roster of 337 thousand people as a military force:

Paramilitary formations of Shutskor and Lotta Svyard - 110 thousand people.

Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.

The total number of manpower involved in the war on the part of Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.

A 150,000-strong Anglo-French expeditionary force was also being prepared and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - beginning of March 1940 to help Finland, whose arrival only disrupted the conclusion of peace.

B. Armament

The Finnish army was well armed and had everything it needed. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 naval warships.

During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent it weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, and Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million cartridges.

90% of financial assistance came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavian countries.

B. Fortifications

The basis of Finland's military power was its unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its front, main and rear lines and defense nodes.

The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bed) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, canals) of Finland in combination with highly technical engineering structures to create a defense line capable of multi-layered fire at the advancing enemy (at different levels and from different angles) along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.

The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, rubble, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and ceilings of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. Forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.

On all three stripes of the “Mannerheim Line” there were over 1000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.

The space between the fortification lines, as well as the forefield in front of the entire “Mannerheim Line”, was literally covered with continuous military engineering structures.

The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for each square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire fences, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete obstacles. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, and all roads were prepared for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were built - craters 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 minutes were set for each linear kilometer. Forest debris reached 250 m in depth.

D. Finnish war plan:

Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the arrival of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the White Sea - Onega Sea lake

D. Directions of combat operations and command of the Finnish army:

1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: on the “Mannerheim Line” itself and in its forefield stood the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).

2. To the north, on the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Käkisalmi) - Sortavala - Laimola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.

3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later replaced by E. Heglund).

4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.

5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.

Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed commander-in-chief of the active army of Finland.

The Chief of Staff of Headquarters is Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.

The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is Swedish Army General Ernst Linder.

II.Soviet army:

In combat operations along the entire 1,500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, during the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.

Established number of ground forces: 916 thousand people. They consist of: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal troops and engineers.

The ground forces were supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.

The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.

Thus, up to 1 million personnel of the Red Army and Navy took part in the Soviet-Finnish war, and taking into account the necessary reinforcements during the war to replace the killed and wounded - over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:

11266 guns and mortars,

2998 tanks,

3253 combat aircraft.

A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:

1. Arctic:

14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three D-type boats, seven Shch-type boats, six M-type boats). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.

2. Karelia:

a) Northern and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).

Army commander - corps commander M.P. Dukhanov.

b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.

3. Karelian Isthmus:

7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).

The commander of the 7th Army is Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.

The 7th Army was supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.

The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.

Nevertheless, the fortifications and deep-echeloned defense of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not only insufficient to break through them, but even to destroy during combat operations a deep and extremely complex fortified and, as a rule, completely mined forefield.

As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they were unable to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally expected, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.

Another factor complicating the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely harsh winter of 1939/40 with its frosts of up to 30-40 degrees.

The lack of experience in warfare in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army's actions.

Progress of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. military operations until the Mannerheim Line was broken.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. military operations to break through the Mannerheim Line itself.

In the first period, the most successful advance was in the north and Karelia.

1. Troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea.

2. The troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into enemy defenses in Northern and Central Karelia, i.e. insignificantly, but still went beyond the state border. Further advancement could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.

3. Troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia penetrated up to 80 km into enemy territory, but were also forced to pause the offensive because some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well familiar with the terrain.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of military operations:

5. Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.

At the beginning of December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of Corps Commander V.D. Grendal for a breakthrough across the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.

Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a group of corps commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of troop control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from subordination to the Leningrad Military District and came directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (formation date: January 7, 1940).

Front Commander: Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Tymoshenko.

Chief of Front Staff: Army Commander 2nd Rank I.V. Smorodinov.

Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.

Commander of the 7th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov (from December 26, 1939).

Commander of the 8th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern.

Commander of the 9th Army: Corps Commander V.I. Chuikov.

Commander of the 13th Army: Corporal Commander V.D. Grendal (from March 2, 1940 - corps commander F.A. Parusinov).

Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.

Commander of the 15th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank M.P. Kovalev (from February 12, 1940).

8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and strengthened:

a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 10 air regiments).

b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).

9. The main task during this period was to actively prepare the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as to prepare the command of the troops for the best conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.

In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day.

Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy's front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.

10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budyonnovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves.

In the near rear, troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.

11. The front troops were given the task: to break through the “Mannerheim Line”, defeat the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.

12. The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification center. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.

13. Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system of flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies advanced in the direction of Laimola,

Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice could still withstand tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.

By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.

16. At this time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, still hoping that Western help would arrive in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position forced the war to continue until the last minute and led to huge losses on both the Soviet and Finnish sides.

Losses of the parties*:

A. Losses of Soviet troops:

From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter,
What happened in the forties
Killed on ice in Finland.

It lay somehow awkwardly
Childishly small body.
The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew far away.
It seemed that the boy was not lying down,
And he was still running,
Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...

Among the great cruel war,
Why, I can’t imagine, -
I feel sorry for that distant fate
Like dead, alone,
It's like I'm lying there
Broken, small, killed,
In that unknown war,
Forgotten, small, lying.

Alexander Tvardovsky

Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.

Of these, 65,384 people were killed.

Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.

Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.

Prisoners - 5567 people.

Total: the total loss of troops during the period of hostilities was 391.8 thousand people. or, in round numbers, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!

B. Losses of Finnish troops:

Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).

(The Finnish Blue and White Book of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)

Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.

Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war was 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called up or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.e. 20%, while Soviet losses amount to 40% of those involved in operations or, in other words, in percentage terms 2 times higher.

Note:

* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and in journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and decrease in Finnish. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryagi, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later, - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Pharmacists in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while data from Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.

Baryshnikov V.N. From a cool world to a winter war: Finland’s eastern policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state univ. - St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.

Winter War 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ross. acad. Sciences, Institute of General Sciences. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history / Rep. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehviläinen. - 381s.

["Winter War" 1939-1940]: Selection of materials //Motherland. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons of a forgotten war / V. Prokhorov // New time. - 2005. - N 10.- P. 29-31

Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: according to doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541 p. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Name. decree: p. 517 - 528.

Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [transl. from English V. D. Kaydalova]. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.

Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa: talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla: , 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: pp. 109 - 184

Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.

Materials used from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Materials used from the book: Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–40 (another name is Winter War) took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

The formal cause of hostilities was the so-called Mainila incident - artillery shelling from Finnish territory of Soviet border guards in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, which, according to the Soviet side, occurred on November 26, 1939. The Finnish side categorically denied any involvement in the shelling. Two days later, on November 28, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact concluded in 1932, and on November 30 began hostilities.

The underlying causes of the conflict were based on a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact that in 1918-22 Finland twice attacked the territory of the RSFSR. As a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Moscow Agreement on taking measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border of 1922 between the governments of the RSFSR and Finland, the original Russian Pecheneg region (Petsamo) and part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas were transferred to Finland.

Despite the fact that a Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Finland and the USSR in 1932, relations between the two countries were quite tense. In Finland they feared that sooner or later the Soviet Union, which had strengthened many times since 1922, would want to return its territories, and in the USSR they were afraid that Finland, as in 1919 (when British torpedo boats attacked Kronstadt from Finnish ports), might give its territory to another unfriendly country to attack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the second most important city of the USSR, Leningrad, was only 32 kilometers from the Soviet-Finnish border.

During this period, the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland and secret consultations were held with the governments of Poland and the Baltic countries on joint actions in the event of war with the USSR. In 1939, the USSR signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In accordance with the secret protocols to it, Finland moves into the zone of interests of the Soviet Union.

In 1938-39, during lengthy negotiations with Finland, the USSR tried to achieve the exchange of part of the Karelian Isthmus for twice the area, but less suitable for agricultural use, in Karelia, as well as the transfer of several islands and parts of the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for military bases. Finland, firstly, did not agree with the size of the territories being given to it (not least because of its reluctance to part with the line of defensive fortifications built in the 30s, also known as the Mannerheim Line (see. And ), and secondly, she tried to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the right to armament of the demilitarized Åland Islands.

The negotiations were very difficult and were accompanied by mutual reproaches and accusations (see: ). The last attempt was the USSR's proposal on October 5, 1939 to conclude a Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland.

Negotiations dragged on and reached a dead end. The parties began to prepare for war.

On October 13-14, 1939, general mobilization was announced in Finland. And two weeks later, on November 3, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to begin preparations for military operations. Newspaper article "Is it true" on the same day reported that the Soviet Union intends to ensure its security at any cost. A massive anti-Finnish campaign began in the Soviet press, to which the opposite side immediately responded.

There was less than a month left before the Maynila incident, which served as a formal reason for the war.

Most Western and a number of Russian researchers believe that the shelling was a fiction - either it did not happen at all, but there were only unsubstantiated statements by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, or the shelling was a provocation. There are no documents confirming this or that version. Finland proposed a joint investigation of the incident, but the Soviet side harshly rejected the proposal.

Immediately after the start of the war, official relations with the Ryti government were terminated, and on December 2, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with the so-called "The People's Government of Finland", formed from communists and headed by Otto Kuusinen. At the same time, in the USSR, on the basis of the 106th Mountain Rifle Division, the "Finnish People's Army" from Finns and Karelians. However, it did not take part in the hostilities and was eventually disbanded, like the Kuusinen government.

The Soviet Union planned to launch military operations in two main directions - the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line of fortifications from the north), the Red Army was able to make maximum use of its advantage in manpower and its overwhelming advantage in technology. According to the timeframe, the operation should have taken place within a period of two weeks to a month. The Finnish command, in turn, counted on stabilizing the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern sector, believing that the army would be able to independently hold off the enemy for up to six months and then wait for help from Western countries. Both plans turned out to be an illusion: the Soviet Union underestimated Finland's strength, while Finland relied too much on the help of foreign powers and on the reliability of its fortifications.

As already mentioned, by the beginning of hostilities in Finland there was a general mobilization. The USSR decided to confine itself to parts of the Leningrad Military District, believing that additional involvement of forces would not be required. At the start of the war, the USSR concentrated 425,640 personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft for the operation. They were opposed by 265,000 people, 834 guns, 64 tanks and 270 aircraft.

As part of the Red Army, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies attacked Finland. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in Karelia, and the 14th Army in the Arctic.

The most favorable situation for the USSR developed at the front of the 14th Army, which, interacting with the Northern Fleet, occupied the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea. The 9th Army penetrated the Finnish defense to a depth of 35-45 km and was stopped (see. ). The 8th Army initially began to advance successfully, but was also stopped, with part of its forces being surrounded and forced to withdraw. The heaviest and bloodiest battles took place in the sector of the 7th Army, which was advancing on the Karelian Isthmus. The army had to storm the Mannerheim Line.

As it turned out later, the Soviet side had fragmentary and extremely meager information about the enemy opposing it on the Karelian Isthmus, and, most importantly, about the line of fortifications. Underestimating the enemy immediately affected the course of hostilities. The forces allocated to break through the Finnish defenses in this area turned out to be insufficient. By December 12, the Red Army units with losses were able to overcome only the support zone of the Mannerheim Line and stopped. Until the end of December, several desperate attempts to break through were made, but they were also unsuccessful. By the end of December it became obvious that attempts at an offensive in this style were pointless. There was relative calm at the front.

Having understood and studied the reasons for the failure in the first period of the war, the Soviet command undertook a serious reorganization of forces and means. Throughout January and early February, there was a significant reinforcement of troops, saturation of them with large-caliber artillery capable of fighting fortifications, replenishment of material reserves, and reorganization of units and formations. Methods of combating defensive structures were developed, mass exercises and training of personnel were carried out, assault groups and detachments were formed, work was carried out to improve the interaction of military branches and to raise morale (see. ).

The USSR learned quickly. To break through the fortified area, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military District Military Council Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies.

Finland at this moment also carried out measures to increase the combat effectiveness of its own troops. Both new equipment and weapons captured in battles and those supplied from abroad entered service, and units received the necessary reinforcements.

Both sides were ready for the second round of the fight.

At the same time, fighting in Karelia did not stop.

The most famous in the historiography of the Soviet-Finnish war during that period was the encirclement of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the 9th Army near Suomussalmi. Since mid-December, the 44th Division had been advancing to help the encircled 163rd Division. In the period from January 3 to January 7, 1940, its units were repeatedly surrounded, but, despite the difficult situation, they continued to fight, having superiority in technical equipment over the Finns. In conditions of constant fighting and a rapidly changing situation, the division command incorrectly assessed the current situation and gave the order to leave the encirclement in groups, leaving behind the heavy equipment. This only made the situation worse. Parts of the division were still able to break out of the encirclement, but with heavy losses... Subsequently, the division commander Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, who left the division at the most difficult moment, were sentenced by a military tribunal to capital punishment and shot in front of the line.

It is also worth noting that since the end of December, the Finns tried to counterattack on the Karelian Isthmus in order to disrupt the preparations for a new Soviet offensive. Counterattacks were unsuccessful and were repulsed.

On February 11, 1940, after a massive multi-day artillery preparation, the Red Army, together with units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, launched a new offensive. The main blow fell on the Karelian Isthmus. Within three days, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of Finnish defense and brought tank formations into the breach. On February 17, Finnish troops, by order of the command, retreated to the second lane due to the threat of encirclement.

On February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main line north of Muolaa. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive along the entire Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops retreated, putting up fierce resistance. In an attempt to stop the advancing units of the Red Army, the Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, but this did not help: on March 13, Soviet troops entered Vyborg.

In parallel with the fighting, there were battles on the diplomatic front. After the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line and the entry of Soviet troops into the operational space, the Finnish government understood that there was no chance of continuing the struggle. Therefore, it turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was concluded.

As a result of the war, the Karelian Isthmus and the large cities of Vyborg and Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, and part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga became an internal lake of the USSR. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region captured during the fighting was returned to Finland. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

At the same time, the reputation of the Soviet state in the international arena suffered: the USSR was declared an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. Mutual distrust between Western countries and the USSR has reached a critical point.

Recommended reading:
1. Irincheev Bair. Stalin's Forgotten Front. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. (Series: Unknown wars of the 20th century.)
2. Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 / Comp. P. Petrov, V. Stepakov. SP b.: Polygon, 2003. In 2 volumes.
3. Tanner Väinö. Winter War. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939–1940. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
4. “Winter War”: working on mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army to summarize the experience of the Finnish campaign / Responsible. comp. N. S. Tarkhova. SP b., Summer Garden, 2003.

Tatiana Vorontsova

On November 30, 1939, the USSR launched a military operation against Finland, but this war became a stain of shame for the country. So, what were the grounds for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war.

Negotiations 1937-1939

The root of the Soviet-Finnish conflict was laid back in 1936. From that time on, the Soviet and Finnish parties conducted a dialogue about common cooperation and security, but Finland was categorical in its decisions and in every possible way rejected the attempts of the Soviet state to unite to jointly repel the enemy. On October 12, 1939, J.V. Stalin proposed that the Finnish state sign an agreement on mutual assistance. According to its provisions, the USSR presented demands for the lease of the Hanko Peninsula and islands on the territory of Finland, in exchange for part of the lands in Karelia, which far exceeded the territory to be exchanged to the Finnish side. Also, one of the conditions of the USSR was the placement of military bases in the Finnish border zone. The Finns categorically refused to comply with these points.

The main reason for the military clashes was the desire of the USSR to move the borders from Leningrad to the Finnish side and further strengthen them. Finland, in turn, refused to follow the request of the USSR, since on this territory there was the so-called “Mannerheim Line” - a defensive line built by Finland back in the 1920s to possibly deter the attack of the USSR. That is, if these lands were transferred, Finland would lose all its fortifications for strategic border protection. The Finnish leadership could not conclude an agreement with such requirements.
In this situation, Stalin decided to begin the military occupation of Finnish territories. On November 28, 1939, the unilateral denunciation (refusal) of the non-aggression agreements with Finland, concluded back in 1932, was announced.

The goals of the USSR's participation in the war

For the Soviet leadership, the main threat was that Finnish territories could be used as a platform for aggression against the Soviet Union by European states (most likely Germany). It was quite reasonable to move the Finnish borders further from Leningrad. However, Yu. M. Kilin (author of the book “Battles of the Winter War”) believes that moving the borders deeper into the Finnish side for the most part would not have prevented anything; hostilities were inevitable. In turn, obtaining military bases on the Karelian Isthmus would make the position of the Soviet Union virtually invulnerable, but at the same time it would mean the loss of independence of Finland.

Objectives of Finland's participation in the war

The Finnish leadership could not agree to conditions under which they would lose their independence, so their goal was to protect the sovereignty of their state. According to some historians, Western states, with the help of the Soviet-Finnish war, sought confrontation between two harsh totalitarian countries - fascist Germany and the socialist USSR, in order to weaken the pressure on France and England with their help.

Maynila incident

The pretext for the start of the conflict was the so-called episode near the Finnish settlement of Mainila. On November 26, 1939, Finnish artillery shells fired at Soviet soldiers. The Finnish leadership completely rejected this fact in order for the USSR regiments to be pushed back several kilometers from the border. The Soviet government could not allow this, and on November 29, the USSR interrupted diplomatic cooperation with Finland. At the end of the autumn of 1939, the participants in the conflict began large-scale combat maneuvers.

From the very beginning of the war, the advantages were on the side of the USSR; the Soviet army was well equipped with military equipment (land, sea) and human resources. But the “Mannerheim Line” was impregnable for 1.5 months, and only on January 15 did Stalin order a massive counter-offensive of the army. Although the defensive line was broken, the Finnish army was not defeated. The Finns managed to maintain their independence.

On March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was adopted in the capital of the USSR, as a result of which a significant plot of land passed to the Soviets, and accordingly, the western border moved several kilometers towards Finland. But was it a victory? Why couldn’t a huge country with a large army resist the tiny Finnish army?
As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the USSR achieved its initial goals, but at what enormous cost? Numerous casualties, poor combat effectiveness of the army, low
the level of training and leadership - all this revealed the weakness and hopelessness of the armed forces, and showed its inability to fight. The shame of defeat in this war significantly undermined the international position of the Soviet Union, especially in front of Germany, which was already closely following it. In addition, on December 14, 1939, the USSR was removed from the League of Nations for starting a war with Finland.

Little-known details of the military campaign that was eclipsed by the Great Patriotic War
This year, November 30, will mark 76 years since the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940, which in our country and beyond its borders is often called the Winter War. Unleashed right on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the Winter War remained in its shadow for a very long time. And not only because memories of it were quickly eclipsed by the tragedies of the Great Patriotic War, but also because of all the wars in which the Soviet Union participated in one way or another, this was the only war started on Moscow’s initiative.

Move the border west

The Winter War became in the literal sense of the word “a continuation of politics by other means.” After all, it began immediately after several rounds of peace negotiations stalled, during which the USSR tried to move the northern border as far as possible from Leningrad and Murmansk, in return offering Finland land in Karelia. The immediate reason for the outbreak of hostilities was the Maynila Incident: an artillery shelling of Soviet troops on the border with Finland on November 26, 1939, which killed four servicemen. Moscow placed responsibility for the incident on Helsinki, although later the guilt of the Finnish side was subject to reasonable doubt.
Four days later, the Red Army crossed the border into Finland, thus beginning the Winter War. Its first stage - from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 - was extremely unsuccessful for the Soviet Union. Despite all efforts, Soviet troops failed to break through the Finnish defense line, which by that time was already being called the Mannerheim Line. In addition, during this period, the shortcomings of the existing system of organization of the Red Army most clearly manifested themselves: poor controllability at the level of middle and junior echelons and lack of initiative among commanders at this level, poor communication between units, types and branches of the military.

The second stage of the war, which began on February 11, 1940 after a massive ten-day preparation, ended in victory. By the end of February, the Red Army managed to reach all those lines that it had planned to reach before the new year, and push the Finns back to the second line of defense, constantly creating the threat of encirclement of their troops. On March 7, 1940, the Finnish government sent a delegation to Moscow to participate in peace negotiations, which ended with the conclusion of a peace treaty on March 12. It stipulated that all territorial claims of the USSR (the same ones that were discussed during the negotiations on the eve of the war) would be satisfied. As a result, the border on the Karelian Isthmus moved away from Leningrad by 120–130 kilometers, the Soviet Union received the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and the peninsula Hanko and the maritime area around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years.

For the Red Army, victory in the Winter War came at a high price: irrevocable losses, according to various sources, ranged from 95 to 167 thousand people, and another 200–300 thousand people were wounded and frostbitten. In addition, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses in equipment, primarily in tanks: of the almost 2,300 tanks that went into battle at the beginning of the war, about 650 were completely destroyed and 1,500 were knocked out. In addition, the moral losses were also heavy: both the army command and the entire country, despite massive propaganda, understood that the military power of the USSR was in urgent need of modernization. It began during the Winter War, but, alas, was never completed until June 22, 1941.

Between truth and fiction

The history and details of the Winter War, which quickly faded in the light of the events of the Great Patriotic War, have since been revised and rewritten, clarified and double-checked more than once. As happens with any major historical events, the Russian-Finnish war of 1939–1940 also became the object of political speculation both in the Soviet Union and beyond its borders - and remains so to this day. After the collapse of the USSR, it became fashionable to review the results of all key events in the history of the Soviet Union, and the Winter War was no exception. In post-Soviet historiography, the figures for the losses of the Red Army and the number of destroyed tanks and aircraft increased significantly, while the Finnish losses, on the contrary, were significantly downplayed (contrary to even the official data of the Finnish side, which against this background remained practically unchanged).

Unfortunately, the further the Winter War moves away from us in time, the less likely it is that we will ever know the whole truth about it. The last direct participants and eyewitnesses pass away, to please the political winds, documents and material evidence are shuffled and disappeared, or even new ones, often false, appear. But some facts about the Winter War are already so firmly fixed in world history that they cannot be changed for any reason. We will discuss the ten most notable of them below.

Mannerheim Line

Under this name, a strip of fortifications erected by Finland along a 135-kilometer stretch along the border with the USSR went down in history. The flanks of this line abutted the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. At the same time, the Mannerheim line had a depth of 95 kilometers and consisted of three consecutive defense lines. Since the line, despite its name, began to be built long before Baron Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim became commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, its main components were old single-aspect long-term firing points (pillboxes), capable of conducting only frontal fire. There were about seven dozen of these in the line. Another fifty bunkers were more modern and could fire on the flanks of the attacking troops. In addition, obstacle lines and anti-tank structures were actively used. In particular, in the support zone there were 220 km of wire barriers in several dozen rows, 80 km of anti-tank granite obstacles, as well as anti-tank ditches, walls and minefields. Official historiography on both sides of the conflict emphasized that Mannerheim's line was practically irresistible. However, after the command system of the Red Army was rebuilt, and the tactics of storming the fortifications were revised and linked to preliminary artillery preparation and tank support, it took only three days to break through.

The day after the start of the Winter War, Moscow radio announced the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic in the city of Terijoki on the Karelian Isthmus. It lasted as long as the war itself: until March 12, 1940. During this time, only three countries in the world agreed to recognize the newly formed state: Mongolia, Tuva (at that time not yet part of the Soviet Union) and the USSR itself. Actually, the government of the new state was formed from its citizens and Finnish emigrants living on Soviet territory. It was headed, and at the same time became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, by one of the leaders of the Third Communist International, a member of the Communist Party of Finland, Otto Kuusinen. On the second day of its existence, the Finnish Democratic Republic concluded a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship with the USSR. Among its main points, all the territorial demands of the Soviet Union, which became the cause of the war with Finland, were taken into account.

Sabotage war

Since the Finnish army entered the war, although mobilized, but clearly losing to the Red Army both in numbers and technical equipment, the Finns relied on defense. And its essential element was the so-called mine warfare - more precisely, the technology of continuous mining. As Soviet soldiers and officers who participated in the Winter War recalled, they could not even imagine that almost everything that the human eye could see could be mined. “Stairs and thresholds of houses, wells, forest clearings and edges, roadsides were literally strewn with mines. Here and there, abandoned as if in a hurry, bicycles, suitcases, gramophones, watches, wallets, and cigarette cases were lying around. As soon as they were moved, there was an explosion,” this is how they describe their impressions. The actions of the Finnish saboteurs were so successful and demonstrative that many of their techniques were promptly adopted by the Soviet military and intelligence services. It can be said that the partisan and sabotage war that unfolded a year and a half later in the occupied territory of the USSR was, to a large extent, conducted according to the Finnish model.

Baptism of fire for heavy KV tanks

Single-turret heavy tanks of a new generation appeared shortly before the start of the Winter War. The first copy, which was actually a smaller version of the SMK heavy tank - "Sergei Mironovich Kirov" - and differed from it by the presence of only one turret, was manufactured in August 1939. It was this tank that ended up in the Winter War in order to be tested in a real battle, which it entered on December 17 during the breakthrough of the Khottinensky fortified area of ​​the Mannerheim Line. It is noteworthy that of the six crew members of the first KV, three were testers at the Kirov Plant, which was producing new tanks. The tests were considered successful, the tank showed its best performance, but the 76-mm cannon with which it was armed was not enough to combat pillboxes. As a result, the KV-2 tank was hastily developed, armed with a 152-mm howitzer, which no longer managed to take part in the Winter War, but forever entered the history of world tank building.

How England and France prepared to fight the USSR

London and Paris supported Helsinki from the very beginning, although they did not go beyond military-technical assistance. In total, England and France, together with other countries, transferred 350 combat aircraft, approximately 500 field guns, over 150 thousand firearms, ammunition and other ammunition to Finland. In addition, volunteers from Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, France and Sweden fought on the Finnish side. When, at the end of February, the Red Army finally broke the resistance of the Finnish army and began to develop an offensive deep into the country, Paris began to openly prepare for direct participation in the war. On March 2, France announced its readiness to send an expeditionary force of 50 thousand soldiers and 100 bombers to Finland. After this, Britain also announced its readiness to send its expeditionary force of 50 bombers to the Finns. A meeting on this issue was scheduled for March 12 - but did not take place, since on the same day Moscow and Helsinki signed a peace treaty.

There is no escape from the “cuckoos”?

The Winter War was the first campaign in which snipers participated en masse. Moreover, one might say, only on one side - the Finnish one. It was the Finns in the winter of 1939–1940 who demonstrated how effective snipers could be in modern warfare. The exact number of snipers remains unknown to this day: they will begin to be identified as a separate military specialty only after the start of the Great Patriotic War, and even then not in all armies. However, we can say with confidence that the number of sharp shooters on the Finnish side was in the hundreds. True, not all of them used special rifles with a sniper scope. Thus, the most successful sniper of the Finnish army, Corporal Simo Häyhä, who in just three months of hostilities brought the number of his victims to five hundred, used an ordinary rifle with open sights. As for the “cuckoos” - snipers shooting from the crowns of trees, about which there are an incredible number of myths, their existence is not confirmed by documents from either the Finnish or Soviet side. Although there were many stories in the Red Army about “cuckoos” tied or chained to trees and freezing there with rifles in their hands.

The first Soviet submachine guns of the Degtyarev system - PPD - were put into service in 1934. However, they did not have time to seriously develop their production. On the one hand, for a long time the command of the Red Army seriously considered this type of firearm to be useful only in police operations or as an auxiliary weapon, and on the other hand, the first Soviet submachine gun was distinguished by its complexity of design and difficulty in manufacturing. As a result, the plan to produce PPD for 1939 was withdrawn, and all already produced copies were transferred to warehouses. And only after, during the Winter War, the Red Army encountered Finnish Suomi submachine guns, of which there were almost three hundred in each Finnish division, did the Soviet military quickly begin to return weapons so useful in close combat.

Marshal Mannerheim: who served Russia and fought with it

The successful opposition to the Soviet Union in the Winter War in Finland was and is considered primarily the merit of the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Field Marshal Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim. Meanwhile, until October 1917, this outstanding military leader held the rank of lieutenant general of the Russian Imperial Army and was one of the most prominent division commanders of the Russian army during the First World War. By this time, Baron Mannerheim, a graduate of the Nicholas Cavalry School and the Officer Cavalry School, had participated in the Russo-Japanese War and organized a unique expedition to Asia in 1906–1908, which made him a member of the Russian Geographical Society - and one of the most prominent Russians intelligence officers of the early twentieth century. After the October Revolution, Baron Mannerheim, maintaining his oath to Emperor Nicholas II, whose portrait, by the way, hung on the wall of his office all his life, resigned and moved to Finland, in whose history he played such an outstanding role. It is noteworthy that Mannerheim retained his political influence both after the Winter War and after Finland's exit from World War II, becoming the country's first president from 1944 to 1946.

Where was the Molotov cocktail invented?

The Molotov cocktail became one of the symbols of the heroic resistance of the Soviet people to the fascist armies at the first stage of the Great Patriotic War. But we must admit that such a simple and effective anti-tank weapon was not invented in Russia. Alas, the Soviet soldiers, who so successfully used this remedy in 1941–1942, had the opportunity to first test it on themselves. The Finnish army, which did not have a sufficient supply of anti-tank grenades, when faced with tank companies and battalions of the Red Army, was simply forced to resort to Molotov cocktails. During the Winter War, the Finnish army received more than 500 thousand bottles of the mixture, which the Finns themselves called the “Molotov cocktail,” hinting that it was this dish they prepared for one of the leaders of the USSR, who, in a polemical frenzy, promised that the very next day after the start of the war he would dine in Helsinki.

Who fought against their own

During the Russian-Finnish War of 1939–1940, both sides - the Soviet Union and Finland - used units in which collaborators served as part of their troops. On the Soviet side, the Finnish People's Army took part in the battles - the armed force of the Finnish Democratic Republic, recruited from Finns and Karelians living on the territory of the USSR and serving in the troops of the Leningrad Military District. By February 1940, its number reached 25 thousand people, who, according to the plan of the USSR leadership, were supposed to replace the occupation forces on Finnish territory. And on the side of Finland, Russian volunteers fought, the selection and training of whom was carried out by the white émigré organization “Russian All-Military Union” (EMRO), created by Baron Peter Wrangel. In total, six detachments with a total number of about 200 people were formed from Russian emigrants and some of the captured Red Army soldiers who expressed a desire to fight against their former comrades, but only one of them, in which 30 people served, for several days at the very end of the Winter war participated in hostilities.