An outstanding commander and ideologist of the partisan movement during the Patriotic War of 1812, lieutenant general of the Russian army, hussar and poet. He was brave, reckless and unthinkably lucky on the battlefield, striking with charm and wit ... The man is a symbol of 1812.

Battles and victories

Russian commander and statesman, Field Marshal General, Count of Erivan, His Serene Highness Prince of Warsaw. Paskevich was perhaps the most prominent military leader of the reign of Nicholas I.
Using the emperor's unlimited confidence, for a quarter of a century - from the Polish campaign to the Crimean War - he was the complete master of the Russian armed forces. The emperor called him “father commander” all his life, and the opinion of Ivan Fedorovich in the eyes of Nicholas I was decisive.

Battles and victories

Russian emperor, the winner of Napoleon. Alexander I gracefully declined the official command of the Russian troops: “All people are ambitious; I confess frankly that I am no less ambitious ... But when I think about how little I am experienced in the art of war ... despite my ambition, I am ready to willingly sacrifice my glory for the good of the army. And after the victory over Bonaparte, he summed up: "God sent me power and victory so that I could bring peace and tranquility to the universe."
Not as a commander, but as the initiator of a steady, inexorable struggle and the organizer of victory over the greatest commander of the era - this is how Alexander I strove to go down in history.

Battles and victories

An outstanding Russian military leader and statesman, a participant in many wars of the Russian Empire. Unlike many friends of his contemporaries, General Yermolov was not just a soldier of the empire. In this role, he was cramped. He was the bearer of the imperial spirit and became a legendary figure for his contemporaries.

Battles and victories

Russian infantry general (1809), participant in Suvorov's campaigns, the war of 1812, the military governor of St. Petersburg, a man of great personal courage, holder of many Russian and European orders.

Combat General Miloradovich forever remained an example of selfless service to Russia, and his unexpected death at the hands of the Decembrists became a bitter reproach to the Russians for internal strife.

Battles and victories

Russian commander, hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, cavalry general (1813).
« A witness of the Catherine's century, a monument of the twelfth year, a man without prejudices, with a strong character and sensitive, he involuntarily attracts anyone who is only worthy to understand and appreciate his high qualities. Pushkin said about him. In the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg in 1819, the creation of the "Military Gallery" began, where portraits of over three hundred generals, participants in the Patriotic War of 1812 are placed. They were painted by the English artist Dow and his assistants. A. S. Pushkin spoke about her in the following lines:

Battles and victories

Great Russian commander. Count, Most Serene Prince of Smolensk. Field Marshal General. Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army during the Patriotic War of 1812.
His life was spent in battles. Personal courage brought him not only many awards, but also two wounds to the head - both were considered fatal. The fact that he survived both times and returned to duty seemed like a sign: Golenishchev-Kutuzov was destined for something great. The answer to the expectations of contemporaries was the victory over Napoleon, the glorification of which by descendants elevated the figure of the commander to epic proportions.

Battles and victories

An outstanding Russian commander, minister of war, field marshal general, commander of the Russian army at the initial stage of the Patriotic War of 1812 and commander of the combined Russian-Prussian army in the foreign campaign of 1813-1814. His strategy was appreciated by descendants, but did not find understanding among contemporaries. Under Borodino, Barclay de Tolly commanded the right flank of the Russian army, and his desire was to die on the battlefield ...

Museums section publications

Generals of 1812 and their lovely wives

On the anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, we remember the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812, look at their portraits from the Hermitage Military Gallery, and also study what beautiful ladies were their life companions. Sofia Bagdasarova reports.

Kutuzovs

Unknown artist. Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov in his youth. 1777

George Doe. Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov.1829. State Hermitage

Unknown artist. Ekaterina Ilyinichna Golenishcheva-Kutuzova. 1777. GIM

The great commander Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov is painted in full length in Dow's portrait from the Military Gallery. There are few such large canvases in the hall - Emperor Alexander I, his brother Constantine, the Austrian emperor and the Prussian king, and only Barclay de Tolly and Briton Lord Wellington were awarded such an honor.

Kutuzov's wife's name was Ekaterina Ilyinichna, nee Bibikova. In paired portraits commissioned in 1777 in honor of the wedding, Kutuzov is hardly recognizable - he is young, he has both eyes. The bride is powdered and rouged in the fashion of the 18th century. In family life, the spouses adhered to the mores of the same frivolous century: Kutuzov drove women of dubious behavior in the convoy, his wife had fun in the capital. This did not prevent them from tenderly loving each other and their five daughters.

Bagrations

George Doe (workshop). Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. 1st half of the 19th century. State Hermitage

Jean Guerin. Wounding of Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration in the Battle of Borodino. 1816

Jean-Baptiste Isabey. Ekaterina Pavlovna Bagration. 1810s Army Museum, Paris

The famous military leader Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration was seriously wounded on the Borodino field: the cannonball crushed his leg. He was taken out of the battle in his arms, but the doctors did not help - after 17 days he died. When, in 1819, the English painter George Doe undertook a huge order - the creation of the Military Gallery, the appearance of the dead heroes, including Bagration, he had to recreate from the works of other masters. In this case, engravings and pencil portraits came in handy.

In family life, Bagration was unhappy. Emperor Pavel, wishing him only the best, in 1800 married him to the beautiful, heiress of the Potemkin millions, Ekaterina Pavlovna Skavronskaya. The frivolous blonde left her husband and left for Europe, where she walked in translucent muslin, indecently fitting her figure, spent huge sums and shone in the light. Among her lovers was the Austrian Chancellor Metternich, to whom she gave birth to a daughter. The death of her husband did not affect her lifestyle.

Raevsky

George Doe. Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky. 1st half of the 19th century. State Hermitage

Nikolay Samokish-Sudkovsky. The feat of Raevsky's soldiers near Saltanovka. 1912

Vladimir Borovikovsky. Sofia Alekseevna Raevskaya. 1813. State Museum of A.S. Pushkin

Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky, who raised a regiment on the offensive near the village of Saltanovka (according to legend, his two sons, 17 and 11 years old, went into battle next to him), survived the battle. Dow most likely painted it from nature. In general, there are more than 300 portraits in the Military Gallery, and although the English artist "signed" them all, the main array depicting ordinary generals was created by his Russian assistants - Alexander Polyakov and Wilhelm Golike. However, Dow still portrayed the most important generals himself.

Raevsky had a large loving family (Pushkin recalled for a long time his journey through the Crimea with them). He was married to Sofya Alekseevna Konstantinova, the granddaughter of Lomonosov, together with his adored wife, they experienced many misfortunes, including disgrace and an investigation into the Decembrist uprising. Then Raevsky himself and both of his sons were under suspicion, but later their name was cleared. His daughter Maria Volkonskaya followed her husband into exile. Surprisingly, all the Raevsky children inherited a huge great-grandfather Lomonosov's forehead - however, the girls preferred to hide it behind curls.

Tuchkovs

George Doe (workshop). Alexander Alekseevich Tuchkov. 1st half of the 19th century. State Hermitage

Nikolay Matveev. The widow of General Tuchkov on the Borodino field. State Tretyakov Gallery

Unknown artist. Margarita Tuchkova. 1st half of the 19th century. GMZ "Borodino field"

Alexander Alekseevich Tuchkov is one of those who inspired Tsvetaeva to write poetry, which later turned into Nastya's beautiful romance in the film "Say a Word About the Poor Hussar". He died in the Battle of Borodino, and his body was never found. Dow, creating his posthumous portrait, copied a very successful image by Alexander Warneck.

The picture shows how handsome Tuchkov was. His wife Margarita Mikhailovna, nee Naryshkina, adored her husband. When the news of her husband's death was delivered to her, she went to the battlefield - the approximate place of death was known. Margarita searched for Tuchkov for a long time among the mountains of dead bodies, but the search turned out to be fruitless. For a long time after these terrible searches, she was not herself, her relatives feared for her mind. Later, she erected a church on the indicated place, then a convent, of which she became the first abbess, having taken tonsure after a new tragedy - the sudden death of her teenage son.

Young generals of the Russian Empire who participated in the hostilities against the Napoleonic troops in 1812-1814 in the rank of general, or promoted to general shortly after the end of the war for distinction shown in battle.

The Military Gallery is one of the galleries of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. The gallery consists of 332 portraits of Russian generals who participated in the Patriotic War of 1812. The portraits were painted by George Dow and his assistants A. V. Polyakov and V. A. Golicke (German: Wilhelm August Golicke).

Emperor Alexander I himself personally approved the lists of generals whose portraits were to be placed in the Military Gallery. A portrait of an officer could be placed in the Military Gallery only on condition that he either participated in the hostilities against the Napoleonic troops in 1812-1814 in the rank of general, or was promoted to general shortly after the end of the war for distinction shown in battle.

The Inspectorate Department of the General Staff of the Russian Empire compiled preliminary lists of generals who could be awarded the right to enter the Military Gallery. In December 1819, these lists were submitted to a committee specially created in August 1814 to evaluate generals worthy of inclusion in the Military Gallery. This committee continued its work until August 1820. However, by no means all the generals who meet the criteria for inclusion in the Military Gallery have been awarded the right to be represented in it. The Emperor and the General Staff settled on 349 heroes of the war of 1812 and foreign campaigns of 1813-1814.

Russian generals in the wars with Napoleonic France in 1812-1815.

Detailed list of names, surnames, awards and biographies.

Napoleon I Bonaparte

Emperor of France in 1804-1815, the great French commander and statesman who laid the foundations of the modern French state. Napoleone Bonaparte (as his name was pronounced until about 1800) began his professional military service in 1785 with the rank of second lieutenant of artillery; advanced during the French Revolution, reaching the rank of brigade under the Directory (after the capture of Toulon on December 17, 1793, the appointment took place on January 14, 1794), and then the divisional general and the post of commander of the rear military forces (after the defeat of the rebellion of 13 Vendemière, 1795), and then the commander of the Italian army (the appointment took place on February 23, 1796). The crisis of power in Paris reached its climax by 1799, when Bonaparte was with troops in Egypt. The corrupt Directory was unable to secure the gains of the revolution. In Italy, the Russian-Austrian troops under the command of Field Marshal A.V. Suvorov liquidated all the acquisitions of Napoleon, and even there was a threat of their invasion of France. Under these conditions, the popular general, who returned from Egypt, with the help of Joseph Fouche, relying on the army loyal to him, dispersed the representative bodies and the Directory and proclaimed the regime of the consulate (November 9, 1799). According to the new constitution, legislative power was divided between the State Council, the Tribunate, the Legislative Corps and the Senate, which made it helpless and clumsy. The executive power, on the contrary, was gathered into one fist of the first consul, that is, Bonaparte. The second and third consuls had only advisory votes. The constitution was approved by the people in a plebiscite (about 3 million votes against 1.5 thousand) (1800). Later, Napoleon passed a decree on the lifetime of his powers (1802) through the Senate, and then proclaimed himself emperor of the French (1804). Contrary to popular belief, Napoleon was not a dwarf, his height was 169 cm, above the average height of a French grenadier.

Louis Nicolas Davout

Duke of Auerstedt, Prince of Eckmuhl (fr. duc d "Auerstaedt, prince d" Eckmühl), Marshal of France. He had the nickname "iron marshal". The only marshal of Napoleon who did not lose a single battle. Born in the Burgundian town of Anna in a noble family, he was the eldest of the children of the cavalry lieutenant Jean-Francois d'Avu.

He was educated at the Brienne military school at the same time as Napoleon. True to family tradition, in 1788 he entered the service in the cavalry regiment, where his grandfather, father and uncle had previously served. He commanded a battalion under the command of Dumouriez, participated in the campaigns of 1793-1795.

During the Egyptian expedition, he contributed a lot to the victory at Aboukir.

In 1805, Davout was already a marshal and took an outstanding part both in the Ulm operation and in the battle of Austerlitz. In the last battle, it was the corps of Marshal Davout who withstood the main blow of the Russian troops, practically ensuring the victory in the battle for the Great Army.

In 1806, leading a corps of 26 thousand people, Davout inflicted a crushing defeat on twice the strongest army of the Duke of Brunswick at Auerstedt, for which he received the ducal title.

In 1809, he contributed to the defeat of the Austrians at Eckmuhl and Wagram, for which he received the princely title.

In 1812, Davout was wounded in the Battle of Borodino.

In 1813, after the battle of Leipzig, he locked himself in Hamburg and surrendered it only after the deposition of Napoleon.

During the first restoration, Davout remained out of work. He turned out to be the only Napoleonic marshal who did not renounce the exile. Upon the return of Napoleon from the island of Elba, he was appointed minister of war and commanded troops near Paris.

Nicolas Charles Oudinot

(1767 — 1847)

He served in the royal army, but soon left it. The revolution made him a soldier again. In 1794 he was already a general.

As chief of staff, Massena became famous for the defense of Genoa (1800).

In the campaigns of 1805-1807 he commanded a grenadier corps; participated in the battles of Ostroleka, Danzig and Friedland. In 1809 he was at the head of the 2nd Army Corps; for the battle of Wagram he received a marshal's baton, and shortly thereafter the title of duke.

In 1812, at the head of the 2nd Army Corps, Oudinot fought with the Russian General Count P. H. Wittgenstein; On August 17, seriously wounded in the first battle near Polotsk, he surrendered command to Guvion Saint-Cyr, from whom he took him back 2 months later. During the crossing of the Berezina, he helped Napoleon escape, but he himself was seriously wounded. Having not yet recovered from his wounds, he took command of the 12th Army Corps, fought near Bautzen and was defeated at Lukau on June 4, 1813.

After the armistice, Oudinot was given command of the army, which was intended to operate against the capital of Prussia. Defeated on August 23 at Grosbeeren, he was placed under the command of Marshal Ney and, together with the latter, was again defeated at Dennewitz (September 6). In 1814 he fought at Bar-sur-Aube, then defended Paris against Schwarzenberg and covered the retreat of the emperor.

Arriving at Fontainebleau with Napoleon, Oudinot persuaded him to abdicate and, when the Bourbons were restored, joined them. He did not take any part in the events of the Hundred Days (1815). In 1823 he commanded a corps during the Spanish expedition; after the July Revolution he joined Louis Philippe.

Michelle Ney

Michel Ney was born on 10 January 1769 in the predominantly German-speaking French enclave of Saarlouis. He became the second son of the cooper Pierre Ney (1738-1826) and Margaret Grevelinger. After graduating from college, he worked as a clerk at a notary, then as a supervisor at a foundry.

In 1788, he joined a hussar regiment as a private, participated in the revolutionary wars of France, and was wounded during the siege of Mainz.

In August 1796 he became a brigadier general in the cavalry. April 17, 1797 Ney in the battle of Neuwied was captured by the Austrians and in May of the same year he returned to the army as a result of an exchange for an Austrian general.

In March 1799 he was promoted to divisional general. Later that year, sent to reinforce Massena in Switzerland, he was severely wounded in the thigh and hand near Winterthur.

In 1800 he distinguished himself at Hohenlinden. After the Peace of Luneville, Bonaparte appointed him inspector general of the cavalry. In 1802, Ney was ambassador to Switzerland, where he held a peace treaty and mediation acts on February 19, 1803.

In the Russian campaign of 1812 he commanded a corps and received the title of Prince of Moscow for the Battle of Borodino. After the occupation of Moscow, Bogorodsk occupied, and its sidings reached the Dubna River.

During the retreat from Russia, after the battle of Vyazma, he stood at the head of the rearguard, replacing the corps of Marshal Davout. After the retreat of the main forces of the Great Army from Smolensk, he covered its retreat and ordered the preparation of the fortifications of Smolensk for undermining. Delaying his retreat, he was cut off from Napoleon by Russian troops under the command of Miloradovich; he tried to break through, but, having suffered heavy losses, could not carry out his intention, selected the best parts of the corps, numbering about 3 thousand soldiers, and with them crossed the Dnieper to the north, near the village of Syrokorene, abandoning most of his troops (including all artillery), which capitulated the next day. At Syrokorenye, Ney's troops crossed the Dnieper on thin ice; boards were thrown into areas of open water. A significant part of the soldiers drowned when crossing the river, so that when Ney joined the main forces at Orsha, only about 500 people remained in his detachment. With iron severity he maintained discipline, and when crossing the Berezina he saved the remnants of the army. During the retreat of the remnants of the Great Army, he led the defense of Vilna and Kovno.

During the retreat from Russia, he became the hero of a famous incident. On December 15, 1812, in Gumbinnen, a tramp in torn clothes, matted hair, a beard covering his face, entered a restaurant where French senior officers were dining, dirty, scary, and before they could throw him onto the pavement, raising his hand, loudly declared : "Take your time! Don't you recognize me, gentlemen? I am the rearguard of the "great army". I am Michelle Ney!”

Prince Eugene Rose (Eugene) de Beauharnais

Viceroy of Italy, divisional general. Stepson of Napoleon. The only son of Napoleon's first wife, Josephine Beauharnais. His father, Viscount Alexandre de Beauharnais, was a general in the revolutionary army. During the Terror, he was undeservedly accused of treason and executed.

Eugene became the de facto ruler of Italy (Napoleon himself held the title of king) when he was only 24 years old. But he managed to rule the country quite firmly: he enacted the Civil Code, reorganized the army, equipped the country with canals, fortifications and schools, and managed to earn the love and respect of his people.

In 1805, Eugene received the Grand Cross of the Order of the Iron Crown and the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Hubert of Bavaria. On December 23, 1805, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the corps blockading Venice, on January 3, 1806, commander-in-chief of the Italian army, and on January 12, 1806, governor-general of Venice.

The coronation ceremony of the Viceroy of Italy, prepared by Count Louis-Philippe Segur, took place in Milan Cathedral on May 26, 1805. Green and white were chosen for the coronation robes. In the portraits, the artists A. Appiani and F. Gerard captured these luxurious robes. The combination of elegant cut and virtuoso work suggests that the costume was made in the workshop of the court embroiderer Pico, who carried out orders for the production of the coronation costumes of Napoleon I, using models proposed by the artist Jean-Baptiste Isabey and approved by the Emperor himself. The cloak is embroidered with the stars of the Legion of Honor and the Iron Crown. (The small coronation costume is exhibited in the State Hermitage Museum. It came to Russia as a family heirloom along with a collection of weapons brought by the youngest son of Eugene Beauharnais - Maximilian, Duke of Leuchtenberg, husband of the daughter of Emperor Nicholas I Maria Nikolaevna).

After the first abdication of Napoleon, Eugene Beauharnais was seriously considered by Alexander I as a candidate for the French throne. For the renunciation of his Italian possessions, he received 5,000,000 francs, which he transferred to his father-in-law, King Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria, for which he was “pardoned” and granted the titles of Landgrave of Leuchtenberg and Prince of Eichstet (according to other sources, he bought them in 1817).

Having given his word not to support Napoleon anymore, he did not take part (unlike his sister Hortense) in his restoration during the Hundred Days, and in June 1815 he was granted the title of peer of France by Louis XVIII.

Until his death, he lived in his Bavarian lands and did not take an active part in European affairs.

Jozef Poniatowski

Polish prince and general, marshal of France, nephew of the King of the Commonwealth Stanislav August Poniatowski. Initially served in the Austrian army. Since 1789, he was engaged in the organization of the Polish army, and during the Russian-Polish war of 1792 he was the commander of the Polish army corps operating in Ukraine. He distinguished himself in the battle of Zelentsy - the first victorious battle of the Polish army since the time of Jan Sobieski. The victory gave rise to the establishment of the Virtuti Militari order. The first recipients were Józef Poniatowski and Tadeusz Kościuszko.

After the defeat of Poland in the war with Russia, he emigrated, then returned to his homeland again and served under the command of Kosciuszko during the Polish uprising of 1794. After the suppression of the uprising, he remained for some time in Warsaw. His estates were confiscated. Refusing to accept a place in the Russian army, he received an order to leave Poland and left for Vienna.

Paul I returned the estates to Poniatowski and tried to recruit him into the Russian service. In 1798, Poniatowski came to St. Petersburg for his uncle's funeral and stayed for several months to settle property and inheritance matters. From St. Petersburg he went to Warsaw, by that time occupied by Prussia.

In the autumn of 1806, when the Prussian troops were preparing to leave Warsaw, Poniatowski accepted the offer of King Friedrich Wilhelm III to head the city militia.

With the arrival of Murat's troops, after negotiations with him, Poniatowski went to the service of Napoleon. In 1807 he participated in the organization of the provisional government and became Minister of War of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

In 1809 he defeated the Austrian troops who invaded the Duchy of Warsaw.

Participated in Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1812, commanding the Polish corps.

In 1813, he distinguished himself at the Battle of Leipzig and, the only foreigner in the service of the emperor, received the title of Marshal of France. However, after 3 days, covering the retreat of the French army from Leipzig, he was wounded and drowned in the Weisse-Elster River. His ashes were transferred to Warsaw in 1814, and in 1819 to Wawel.

On the island of St. Helena, Napoleon said that he considered Poniatowski born for the throne: “The real king of Poland was Poniatowski, he had all the titles and all the talents for this ... He was a noble and brave man, a man of honor. If I had succeeded in the Russian campaign, I would have made him king of the Poles.

A memorial plate in memory of Poniatowski is installed on the monument to the Battle of the Nations. A monument to Poniatowski was erected in Warsaw (sculptor Bertel Thorvaldsen). Among the sculptures that adorn the facade of the Louvre, there is a statue of Poniatowski.

Laurent de Gouvion Saint-Cyr

He entered the service during the revolution, in 1794 he already had the rank of divisional general; participated with honors in the revolutionary wars; in 1804 he was appointed French ambassador to the Madrid court.

In 1808, during the war on the Iberian Peninsula, he commanded a corps, but was deprived of command for indecision during the siege of Girona.

In the Russian campaign of 1812, Saint-Cyr commanded the 6th corps (Bavarian troops) and was promoted to the rank of marshal for actions against Wittgenstein. In 1813, he formed the 14th Corps, with which he was left in Dresden, when Napoleon himself with the main army retreated from the Elbe. Having learned about the outcome of the battle near Leipzig, Saint-Cyr tried to connect with the troops of Davout, who occupied Hamburg, but this attempt failed, and he was forced to surrender.

From 1817 to 1819 he was Minister of War of France. He had a high education and remarkable strategic abilities. He was buried in the Pere Lachaise cemetery.

Jean Louis Ebenezer Renier

Born January 14, 1771 in Lausanne in the family of a famous doctor. His father wanted to make an architect out of him, and therefore Renier devoted his studies to mathematical sciences; to improve them, he went to Paris in 1792.

Fascinated by the revolutionary spirit then prevailing in France, Renier decided to enter military service as a simple gunner and participated in a campaign in Champagne, after which Dumouriez appointed him to the general staff. The excellent abilities and service of the young Rainier in the rank of Adjutant General of Pichegru in Belgium and during the conquest of Holland delivered him in 1795 the rank of brigadier general. In 1798 he was given command of a division in the army sent to Egypt. During the capture of Malta, he commanded the army landed on the island of Gozzo and was severely shell-shocked on this occasion. His division distinguished itself at Shebreiss, in the battle of the Pyramids and in the pursuit of Ibrahim Bey to Cairo. After the capture of this city, Rainier was entrusted with the command of the province of Karki. In the Syrian expedition, his division was the vanguard; On February 9 she stormed El Arish, on February 13 she captured a large transport of supplies sent there from Saint-Champ d'Acre, and thereby facilitated the provision of food to the main French army, which arrived at El Arish two days after this successful deed.

In the campaign of 1809 against Austria, Renier distinguished himself in the battle of Wagram, then arrived in Vienna and was made, instead of Marshal Bernadotte, the head of the Saxon corps, located in Hungary.

Then he was sent to Spain, where in 1810 he commanded the 2nd corps of the Portuguese army, under the leadership of Massena. He participated in the battle of Busaco on October 27 and in the movement to Torres Vedras, and in 1811, during the retreat of Massena to Spain, he followed separately from the rest of the troops. After many rather successful cases with the enemy, exceeding his strength, especially on April 3 at Sabugal, Renier's corps again connected with the main army, and at Fuentes de Onoro, on May 5, fought with excellent courage, but without success. After the battle, Renier went to meet the Almeida garrison, who had made their way through the British, and brought him out of a very dangerous situation.

When Massena left the main command of the army in Spain, Renier, in order not to obey the junior general, without the permission of Napoleon, retired to France, which, however, did not have unpleasant consequences for him.

Napoleon called him into the army assembled against Russia, and appointed him head of the 7th Corps, which consisted of 20,000 Saxon troops and the French division of Durutt. The purpose of this corps in the campaign of 1812 was to hold on the extreme right wing, in Lithuania and Volhynia, the offensive operations of the Russian 3rd Western Army under the command of General Tormasov.

Immediately after the opening of hostilities, on July 15, the Saxon Klengel brigade was taken prisoner at Kobrin; Rainier tried to come to the aid of Klengel with a forced march, but he was too late and retreated to Slonim. This prompted Napoleon to reinforce the Saxons with the Austrians and to subordinate Rainier to the command of Prince Schwarzenberg. Both of them defeated Tormasov at Gorodechno and moved to the Styra River; but when in September the arrival of Admiral Chichagov strengthened the Russian army to 60,000 men, the Austrian-Saxon corps had to withdraw beyond the Bug.

At the end of October, Chichagov, with half of his troops, went to the Berezina, pursued by Schwarzenberg; General Osten-Saken, having taken command of the Russian army that remained in Volhynia, stopped the Austrians with a bold attack on the Renier corps at Volkovysk, and although he was defeated, by depriving Napoleon of the assistance of numerous and fresh troops, he contributed a lot to the complete defeat of the French.

Claude Victor Perrin

Marshal of France (1807), Duke de Belluno (1808-1841). For an unclear reason, he is known not as Marshal Perrin, but as Marshal Victor.

Son of a notary. He entered the service at the age of 15, becoming a drummer in the Grenoble Artillery Regiment in 1781. In October, he became a volunteer of the 3rd battalion of the Drôme department.

He quickly made a career in the Republican army, having gone from a non-commissioned officer (beginning in 1792) to a brigadier general (assigned on December 20, 1793).

Participated in the capture of Toulon (1793), where he met Napoleon (then still only a captain).

During the Italian campaign of 1796-1797, he captured Ancona.

In 1797 he was awarded the rank of divisional general.

In subsequent wars, he contributed to victories at Montebello (1800), Marengo, Jena and Friedland. For this last battle, Perrin received a marshal's baton.

In 1800-1804 he was appointed commander of the troops of the Batavian Republic. Then in the diplomatic service - the French ambassador to Denmark.

In 1806, again in the army, he was appointed chief of staff of the 5th corps. Besieged Danzig.

In 1808, acting in Spain, he won victories at Ucles and Medellin.

In 1812 he participated in a campaign in Russia.

In 1813 he distinguished himself in the battles of Dresden, Leipzig and Hanau.

In the campaign of 1814 he was seriously wounded.

Due to the delay in the battle of Montreaux, he was removed from the command of the corps by Napoleon and replaced by Gerard.

After the Peace of Paris, Perrin went over to the side of the Bourbons.

During the so-called Hundred Days, he followed Louis XVIII to Ghent, and on his return from there he was made a peer of France.

In 1821 he received the post of Minister of War, but left this post at the beginning of the Spanish campaign (1823) and followed the Duke of Angoulême to Spain.

After his death, the memoirs Extraits des mémoires inédits du duc de Bellune (Par., 1836) were published.

Dominique Joseph Rene Vandam

French divisional general, participant in the Napoleonic wars. He was a brutal soldier, known for robbery and insubordination. Napoleon once said of him “If I lost Vandam, I don’t know what I would give to get him back; but if I had two, I would be forced to order one to be shot.”

By the start of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1793, he was a brigadier general. Soon he was convicted by the tribunal for robberies and removed from office. Having recovered, he fought at Stockach on March 25, 1799, but due to disagreement with General Moreau, he was sent to the occupying troops in Holland.

In the Battle of Austerlitz, he commanded a division that broke through the center of the Allied position and captured the Pracen Heights.

In the campaign of 1809 he fought at Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmuhl and Wagram, where he was wounded.

At the beginning of the campaign in Russia in 1812, Vandam was appointed deputy commander of the 8th Westphalian Corps, Jerome Bonaparte. However, since the inexperienced Jerome Bonaparte commanded a group of corps operating against Bagration, Vandamme turned out to be the actual commander of the corps. However, at the very beginning of the campaign in Grodno, Vandam was removed from command of the corps by Jerome due to sharp disagreements.

In 1813, Vandam was finally appointed corps commander, but near Kulm, Vandam's corps was surrounded by the allies and captured. When Vandam was introduced to Alexander I, in response to accusations of robberies and requisitions, he replied: “At least they cannot accuse me of killing my father” (a hint at the murder of Paul I).

During the Hundred Days, he commanded the 3rd Corps under the command of Pear. Participated in the Battle of Wavre.

After the restoration of Louis XVIII, Vandamme fled to America, but in 1819 he was allowed to return.

Etienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald

Descended from a Scottish Jacobite family who moved to France after the Glorious Revolution.

Distinguished himself in the battle of Jemappe (November 6, 1792); in 1798 he commanded the French troops in Rome and the Church area; in 1799, having lost the battle on the Trebbia River (see Suvorov's Italian campaign), he was recalled to Paris.

In 1800 and 1801, Macdonald commanded in Switzerland and Grisons, from where he ousted the Austrians.

For several years he was under the disgrace of Napoleon, due to the zeal with which he defended his former colleague, General Moreau. Only in 1809 he was again called to serve in Italy, where he commanded a corps. For the battle of Wagram he was granted a marshal.

In the wars of 1810, 1811 (in Spain), 1812-1814. he also took an outstanding part.

During Napoleon's invasion of Russia, he commanded the X Prussian-French Corps, which covered the left flank of the Great Army. Having occupied Courland, MacDonald spent the entire campaign near Riga and joined the remnants of the Napoleonic army during its retreat.

After Napoleon's abdication, he was created a peer of France; during the Hundred Days, he retired to his estates so as not to violate the oath and not to oppose Napoleon.

After the second occupation of Paris by the allied forces, MacDonald was entrusted with a heavy task - to disband the Napoleonic army that had retreated beyond the Loire.

Pierre Francois Charles Augereau

He received a very poor education. At the age of 17, he entered the French royal army as a soldier, then served in the armies of Prussia, Saxony, and Naples. In 1792 he joined the battalion of volunteers of the French revolutionary army. He distinguished himself in the suppression of the counter-revolutionary uprising in the Vendée.

In June 1793 he received the rank of captain of the 11th Hussars. In the same year he received the ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel. And on December 23, 1793, he was immediately promoted to divisional generals.

During the Italian campaign of 1796-97, Augereau especially distinguished himself in the battles of Loano, Montenotte, Millesimo, Lodi, Castiglione, Arcola, successfully commanding a division.

For example, at Arcola, he led a column and won an almost lost battle. At the battle of Castiglion, according to Stendhal, Pierre Augereau "was a great commander, which never happened to him again."

In 1797, he led the troops in Paris and, at the direction of the Directory, on September 4, crushed the royalist rebellion. From September 23, 1797 - commander of the Sambro-Meuse and Rhine-Moselle armies. In 1799, being a member of the Council of Five Hundred, Augereau at first opposed the plans of Bonaparte, but soon got along with him and was appointed commander of the Batavian army (since September 28, 1799) in Holland, in which position he remained until 1803. Invaded southern Germany, but achieved no results. He actively opposed the signing of the concordat between France and the Pope, saying: “A beautiful ceremony. It is only a pity that one hundred thousand killed were not present at it in order to prevent such ceremonies from taking place. After that, he was ordered to retire to his estate La Usse. August 29, 1803 appointed commander of the Bayonne military camp. May 19, 1804 received the title of Marshal of the Empire.

Participated in the campaigns of 1805, 1806 and 1807. On May 30, 1805, he headed the 7th Corps, which provided the right flank of the Great Army. In November of the same year, he overtook the troops of General Elachich, who had broken through from Ulm, and forced him to surrender at Feldkirch. During the Battle of Preussisch-Eylau (February 7-8, 1807), Augereau's corps went astray and entered the Russian artillery, suffered huge losses and was actually defeated. And the marshal himself was wounded.

In February 1809, by his second marriage (his first wife Gabriela Grasch died in 1806), he married Adelaide Augustine Bourlon de Chavange (1789-1869), nicknamed "The Beautiful Castiglione". On March 30, 1809, he was appointed commander of the 8th Corps of the Great Army in Germany, but on June 1 he was transferred to Spain to the post of commander of the 7th Corps. From February 8, 1810 - commander of the Catalan army. His actions in Spain were not marked by anything outstanding, and after a series of failures, Augereau was replaced by Marshal MacDonald.

Augereau stood out among the generals of the Grand Army by bribery and the desire for personal enrichment. Already during the campaign in Russia on July 4, 1812, Augereau was appointed commander of the 11th Corps, which was located in Prussia and served as the nearest reserve of the Great Army. The corps did not participate in hostilities in Russia, and Augereau never left Berlin. After the flight of Napoleon's army from Russia, Augereau, who barely escaped from Berlin, received the 9th Corps on June 18, 1813. Participated in the battle of Leipzig, but did not show any activity. On January 5, 1814, he led the Rhone army, assembled from units that came to hand in the south of France, led its actions in the battle of Saint-Georges. He was entrusted with the defense of Lyon; unable to withstand the attacks of the enemy, Augereau surrendered the city on March 21. “The name of the winner at Castillon may remain dear to France, but she rejected the memory of the Lyon traitor,” wrote Napoleon.

The slowness of Augereau affected the fact that the French troops could not take Geneva. After that, Augereau withdrew his troops to the south and retired from active operations. In 1814, he was one of the first to go over to the side of the Bourbons, sending a declaration to the troops on April 16, welcoming the restoration of the Bourbons. On June 6, 1814, he became governor of the 19th military district. During the "Hundred Days" he unsuccessfully tried to earn the trust of Napoleon, but faced an extremely cold attitude towards himself, was called "the main culprit in the loss of the 1814 campaign" and on April 10, 1815 was excluded from the list of marshals of France. After the 2nd Restoration, he did not receive any posts and on December 12, 1815 he was dismissed, although the peer title was retained for him. Died of "chest dropsy". In 1854 he was reburied at the Pere Lachaise cemetery (Paris).

Edouard Adolf Casimir Mortier

Entered service in 1791. In 1804 he was made a marshal. Until 1811, Mortier commanded a corps in the Iberian Peninsula, and in 1812 he was entrusted with command of the young guard. Upon the occupation of Moscow, he was appointed its governor, and after the French left from there, he blew up part of the Kremlin walls on the orders of Napoleon.

In 1814, Mortier, commanding the Imperial Guard, participated in the defense and surrender of Paris.

After the fall of the Empire, Mortier was appointed a peer of France, but in 1815 he went over to the side of Napoleon, for which, and most importantly, for declaring the sentence against Marshal Ney illegal, he was deprived of his peerage by the Second Restoration (it was returned to him in 1819).

In 1830-1832 Mortier was ambassador to the Russian court; in 1834 he was appointed minister of war and prime minister (he lost his last post shortly before his death); in 1835, he was killed by the "infernal machine" during Fieschi's attempt on the life of King Louis Philippe.

Joachim Murat

Napoleonic Marshal, Grand Duke of Berga in 1806-1808, King of the Kingdom of Naples in 1808-1815.

He was married to Napoleon's sister. For military successes and outstanding courage, Napoleon rewarded Murat in 1808 with the Neapolitan crown. In December 1812, Murat was appointed commander-in-chief of the French troops in Germany by Napoleon, but arbitrarily left the post at the beginning of 1813. In the campaign of 1813, Murat took part in a number of battles as a marshal of Napoleon, after the defeat in the battle of Leipzig he returned to his kingdom in southern Italy, and then in January 1814 went over to the side of Napoleon's opponents. During Napoleon's triumphant return to power in 1815, Murat wanted to return to Napoleon as an ally, but the emperor refused his services. This attempt cost Murat the crown. In the autumn of 1815, according to investigators, he tried to regain the Kingdom of Naples by force, was arrested by the authorities of Naples and shot.

Napoleon about Murat: "There was no more decisive, fearless and brilliant cavalry commander." “He was my right hand, but left to himself, he lost all his energy. In the face of the enemy, Murat surpassed everyone in the world in courage, in the field he was a real knight, in the office - a braggart without mind and determination.

Napoleon seized power in France as first consul while still retaining nominal co-rulers.

On January 20, 1800, Murat became related to Napoleon, taking his 18-year-old sister Caroline as his wife.

In 1804 he served as governor of Paris.

Since August 1805, he was commander of Napoleon's reserve cavalry, an operational unit within the Grand Army, designed to deliver concentrated cavalry strikes.

In September 1805, Austria, in alliance with Russia, launched a campaign against Napoleon, in the first battles of which it suffered a series of defeats. Murat distinguished himself by the daring capture of the only intact bridge across the Danube in Vienna. He personally convinced the Austrian general guarding the bridge about the beginning of a truce, then with a surprise attack he prevented the Austrians from blowing up the bridge, thanks to which the French troops crossed to the left bank of the Danube in mid-November 1805 and found themselves on the line of retreat of Kutuzov's army. However, Murat himself fell for the trick of the Russian commander, who managed to convince the marshal of the conclusion of peace. While Murat was checking the message of the Russians, only one day was enough for Kutuzov to withdraw his army from the trap. Later, the Russian army was defeated in the battle of Austerlitz. However, after this serious defeat, Russia refused to sign the peace.

On March 15, 1806, Napoleon awarded Murat the title of Grand Duke of the German Principality of Berg and Cleve, located on the border with the Netherlands.

In October 1806, a new war began between Napoleon and Prussia and Russia.

In the battle of Preussisch-Eylau on February 8, 1807, Murat showed himself to be a brave massive attack on Russian positions at the head of 8 thousand horsemen (“attack of 80 squadrons”), however, the battle was the first in which Napoleon did not win a decisive victory.

After the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit in July 1807, Murat returned to Paris, and not to his duchy, which he clearly neglected. Then, in order to secure peace, he was awarded by Alexander I the highest Russian order of St. Andrew the First-Called.

In the spring of 1808, Murat, at the head of an army of 80,000, was sent to Spain. On March 23, he occupied Madrid, in which an uprising broke out on May 2 against the French occupying troops, up to 700 French died. Murat resolutely suppressed the uprising in the capital, dispersing the rebels with buckshot and cavalry. He established a military tribunal under the command of General Pear, by the evening of May 2, 120 captured Spaniards were shot, after which Murat stopped the execution of sentences. A week later, Napoleon castling: his brother Joseph Bonaparte resigned the title of Neapolitan king for the crown of Spain, and Joseph was replaced by Murat.

Marie Victor Nicolas de Latour-Maubourg de Fay

On January 12, 1800, Colonel Latour-Maubourg was sent to Egypt with a message to the commander of the French expeditionary army, General J.-B. Kleber. Participated in the battle of Aboukir and in the battle of Cairo. From March 22, 1800, he was a brigade commander in the Eastern Army, from July 22, he temporarily acted as commander of the 22nd Cavalry Chasseur Regiment. He distinguished himself in the battle of Alexandria. March 13, 1801 was seriously wounded by a fragment of an exploding shell. For a long time he was treated for a wound. In July 1802 he was approved as regiment commander.

In 1805, Colonel L.-Maubur was sent to Germany. He distinguished himself at the Battle of Austerlitz and on December 24, 1805 was promoted to brigadier general.

On December 31, 1806, in connection with the appointment of Lassalle as commander of a light cavalry division, he took command of his famous "Hell Brigade" (Fr. Brigade Infernale). From June 1807 he commanded the 1st Dragoon Division under Marshal I. Murat. He distinguished himself in the battle of Heilsberg, was seriously wounded in the battle of Friedland (June 14, 1807). October 14, 1807 he left for treatment in France. On August 5, 1808, he returned to his division and in November of the same year, at the head of it, went to Spain in order to take part in the Spanish-Portuguese campaign of Napoleon. He participated in the following cases of this campaign: the battle of Medellin, the battle of Talavera, the battle of Ocaña, the battle of Badajoz, the battle of Gebor, the battle of Albuera, the battle of Campomayor. In May 1811, he replaced Marshal Mortier as commander of the 5th Corps of the Spanish Army. He won the battle of Elvas on June 23, 1811. Since July, the commander of the cavalry division in Andalusia with Marshal Soult. November 5, 1811 led the entire reserve cavalry of Andalusia. On January 9, 1812, Brigadier General Latour-Maubourg was appointed commander of the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps, but after 3 weeks he was replaced by General E. Grouchy. From February 7, 1812, he commanded the 2nd Cavalry Division, and from March 24, the 4th Cavalry Corps.

As commander of the 4th Cavalry Corps, Divisional General Latour-Maubourg took part in the Russian campaign of 1812. At the start of the campaign, his corps had 8,000 men. On June 30, 1812, his corps moved to the Russian bank of the Neman near Grodno. Latour-Maubourg, commanding Napoleon's cavalry vanguard, was one of the first generals of the Grande Armée to face the enemy in this campaign. Its units clashed with the Cossacks in the battle near the town of Mir and the battle near Romanov. Until the beginning of August 1812, Latour-Maubourg pursued Bagration in order not to allow his army to join the army of Barclay de Tolly. At that time, he carried out cavalry raids deep into Russian territory and reached Bobruisk. In the middle of the Battle of Borodino, together with the cavalry of E. Grushi, he entered into a fierce battle with the Russian cavalry corps of F.K.

An analysis of the biographies and composition of the generals in 1812 is of great interest, since the top military leaders played a huge role in Russia's victory over the Napoleonic army. What was this elite group in quantitative and qualitative terms? What kind of changes took place in it? What was the attitude of the emperor towards his generals, and what was his policy in the selection and placement of personnel based on?

The state and development of modern historiography today makes it possible to consider one of the most little-studied issues of that era - the relationship and balance of power within the Russian generals, professional, social and national characteristics of the highest command staff, as well as the struggle of generals' groups in the most dramatic moments of hostilities.

In the terrible events of 1812, the main role fell to the lot of the Russian army. In crisis conditions, when the Russian empire was in real danger of losing national sovereignty, only the army, as the main instrument for protecting territorial integrity, could save the country. During the period under review, its excessively increased role was determined by a number of other factors. Already in the conditions of preparation for war, the emperor and his highest dignitaries began to pay unflagging attention to the army. Even before the start of the war, awards, new appointments, cash benefits, etc. rained down on the military. The government began to court the main force on whose actions its future depended. In 1812, there was also a sharp militarization of public life, and at the same time state institutions were forced to listen to the voice of society.

In 1812, striking changes also took place in the system of command and control of field troops. At the very beginning of 1812, the "Institution for the Administration of a Large Active Army" was issued, replacing the outdated Charter of 1716 - the most important legal provision, in which, taking into account the significant changes that were then taking place in military affairs, the rights and obligations of persons involved in army administration were regulated in a new way. In any case, a new legal basis was created for the relationship between military leaders of various levels. This legislative act, as subsequent events showed, can be called a progressive document for its time, although some of its provisions turned out to be unfinished (all possible conflicts cannot be foreseen in any charter). It was these circumstances, associated with legal gaps and shortcomings, that created the basis and legal conditions for clashes among the generals in 1812.

But first, let's look at the numbers. Answers to many of the questions posed can be found by using such a rarely used source as the lists of generals by seniority. They were compiled annually by the military department and then published in a typographical way. The generals' surnames were not placed alphabetically, but followed by seniority in the rank from field marshals to major generals. For each, the year, month and date were accurately indicated, from which seniority was counted, most often coinciding with the time of production in the last rank, but sometimes another date was fixed. For example, in cases of receiving a military rank "for distinction" in a specific combat episode, seniority was considered from that date. After returning from retirement, the seniority changed, it shifted to the time spent out of service, and then the general's surname fell to the end of the list of one or another rank. When retiring, a soldier received (as a rule) a rank one class higher, and when he re-entered the service, he (as a rule) returned the rank that he had before retirement.

At the beginning of 1812, there were 333 people in the generals' lists1. Of these, despite the fact that the lion's share of the field troops was concentrated in the theater of operations with Napoleon's Grand Army, only 196 generals (about 60%) took part in the campaigns of 1812-1814. On the eve and during the hostilities, a number of prominent and well-known military leaders returned to the ranks of the field troops: Baron L. L. Bennigsen, Count A. I. Osterman-Tolstoy, princes S. N. Dolgorukov, A. I. Gorchakov, D M. Volkonsky, the brothers B. V. and D. V. Golitsyn, and others. Except for the German Bennigsen, the latter by birth belonged to the top of the Russian aristocracy, to the layer in which the breeding ground for outbreaks of the noble fronde constantly arose.

Just the majority of them had a negative attitude towards the Franco-Russian alliance concluded in Tilsit in 1807, which is why they were retired. In total, during the war, a replenishment of 82 persons came to the top command staff of the army. The vast majority of these were Russian nobles (natives of the Great Russian provinces). Many of them, closely connected by long-term ties with the civilian sphere, were in fact the bearers of the tendencies and thoughts that prevailed in society at that time, and they introduced patriarchal conservative sentiments into the highest army circles. Foreigners admitted to the Russian army in 1812 could be counted on the fingers (F. F. Winzingerode, C. A. Pozzo di Borgo, F. C. Tetenborn).

Moreover, during the war there was a shortage of command personnel, often after intense fighting, not only regiments, but also brigades were led by lieutenant colonels or majors. Moreover, they tried to fill the vacancies not with “old-timer” generals, but by hiring from retirement (37 people) and promoting those who distinguished themselves in battle to the next rank. In 1812, 42 colonels were promoted to major general for military distinctions. But the main general rank production was carried out in 1813-1815 (187 people received the rank of major general). To these must be added 52 generals who joined the militia, 9 - taken from foreign armies, 5 - from the civil service and other departments. In total, about 550 generals of the Russian service took part in the hostilities in 1812-1815, of which 14 people were killed and died of wounds and diseases in 1812; in 1813-1815 - 39 generals. In total - 53 people.

In 1812, an extremely dramatic situation developed: the development of events could follow any scenario. But it was the army, in one form or another, that had to say the final word in the final. The emperor really understood this and, long before the outbreak of hostilities, prepared several options for political games among the generals. Being perhaps the most sophisticated person in Russia in the art of palace intrigues and a master of behind-the-scenes combinations, he foresaw the inevitable clashes among his generals in advance. Forced in the “time of troubles” to call up a large number of professional retirees under the army banners, many of whom were closely associated with the constantly smoldering coals of the aristocratic opposition in the depths of the Russian nobility, Alexander I took a conscious risk.

An analysis of quantitative indicators reveals interesting trends in the policy of Alexander I in relation to the generals. Under his father, Emperor Paul I, (who valued the external side of military affairs), real arbitrariness reigned in relation to the officer corps. A huge number of military officers and generals were fired, and their places were taken by combatants (“fruntomaniacs”), who distinguished themselves not on the battlefields, but on parades and divorces2. Having ascended the throne, Alexander I returned to the service most of the retirees. After the military disasters of 1805 and 1807 at Austerlitz and Friedland, it became quite obvious to him that in order to successfully counter his future potential enemy, the top command staff of the Russian army needed to be updated. It is necessary to note several points that both hampered and contributed to the advancement of young military leaders to different levels of army command. On the one hand, taking into account the inertia of the then chinoproizvodstva, the rapid replacement of construction workers with practitioners was impossible and dangerous. And in real life, the emperor (although he was considered an autocratic ruler) dismissed the generals from service only in case of fault in court or if they filed resignations. On the other hand, the Russian army in 1808-1813 took part in the hostilities with Sweden, Turkey and Persia.

It was this circumstance that helped the emperor not only to produce, but to award ranks to those who distinguished themselves and promote them to key positions in the troops assembled on the western border by 1812, and to move those who had a “non-military” reputation and weak generals to administrative and rear positions. Moreover, the practice of awarding ranks "for distinction" under Alexander I caused criticism even from the advanced officers. So, on December 21, 1812, the duty general of the 2nd Western Army, Colonel S. N. Marin, in a letter to General M. S. Vorontsov, directly condemned this system: “I have always been ... against production for distinction. five bad ones are produced from one decent one, to which all witnesses. It would be much better if it went according to seniority "3. Violation of the traditional receipt of ranks in turn on the basis of the established principle of seniority has become a certain way of squeezing out unwanted ones from the ranks of the generals. Generals bypassed by ranks (in addition to wounded pride, believing that their service was objectionable to the sovereign), they themselves often filed a petition for dismissal, and the emperor in this case was free to accept the resignation or ask the offended person to remain in the service.

The loudest negative resonance among the highest military leaders was caused by the production in 1809 for the distinction from junior lieutenant generals to infantry generals P. I. Bagration and M. B. Barclay de Tolly. For example, the future hero of 1812, D.S. Dokhturov, immediately filed his resignation in hot pursuit. In a letter to the emperor, he did not hide the motives of his behavior: "the production of my peers was very sensitive to me." Only the personal request of the king forced Dokhturov to remain in the army. “The merciful lines of your Majesty revived and consoled my grieving heart, I saw that your favor towards me continues.” he wrote to the emperor.

If we compare the early lists of generals in the first half of the reign of Alexander I, then one can easily notice that just those who were promoted to the ranks of major generals in 1807-1811 made up the most combat-ready personnel who showed themselves perfectly on the battlefields of 1812-1814, and their surnames became an integral part of the cohort of "heroes of 1812". As a result, among the new nominees were many people who later gained fame and fame thanks to their military talents: M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. P. Konovnitsyn, E. F. Saint-Prix, P. A. Shuvalov, P. A Stroganov, K. O. Lambert, V. V. Orlov-Denisov, A. G. Shcherbatov, F. O. Paulucci, K. F. Tol, A. B. Fok, M. S. Vorontsov, I. F. Paskevich, Ya. P. Kulnev, Palena brothers, G. V. Rozen, P. A. and A. A. Tuchkovs, I. V. Sabaneev, A. Ya. Rudzevich, Ya. I. Potemkin, A. Kh Benckendorff, A. I. Chernyshev, A. A. Zakrevsky and others. Another important personnel reserve was a group of guards officers, most of whom the emperor knew personally, which had a positive effect on their careers in the era of the Napoleonic wars. By 1812, the process of updating the generals had just begun to gain momentum when the Russian army began hostilities.

Let us consider one more topic already touched on—the principle of seniority in war, that is, the problem of the professional employment of top military leaders. In 1812, the command faced difficulties associated with the presence of high ranks among a number of generals. It should be noted that in addition to the commanders-in-chief in the troops concentrated on the western border, at the very beginning of the campaign of 1812 there were only four full generals as corps commanders (M. I. Platov, D. S. Dokhturov, S. M. Kamensky and A . F. Langeron). In addition, three generals (L. L. Bennigsen, A. A. Arakcheev, G. M. Armfelt) were with the retinue of Alexander I without certain positions. The ranks of full generals were also held by two commanders in chief in the capitals (S.K. Vyazmitinov and F.V. Rostopchin) and five held the posts of military governors, of which only the last three were in various capacities in the army in the field.

Traditions became an insurmountable obstacle to the use of seniors under the command of juniors in rank. The posts of commanders-in-chief of the 1st and 2nd Western armies were occupied by relatively young full generals M. B. Barclay de Tolly and P. I. Bagration, therefore, persons who were on the list of seniority above them were not assigned to their command. The relationship between the high command and the tsar's brother, Grand Duke Konstantin, who was appointed to head the 5th (Guards) Corps, turned out to be more complicated. Under plausible pretexts, he was twice expelled from the army by Barclay for publicly criticizing the actions of the commander in chief. But such steps, no doubt, were taken only after prior agreement with the emperor.

In addition, when appointing Alexander I, he had to take into account personal relationships among military leaders, so that the load of generals' claims to each other would not lead to a conflict situation during the war. Whenever possible, they tried to "split in different corners" frankly hostile people. But it was impossible to completely avoid clashes among the generals. The strife manifested itself especially clearly during the presence of two Western armies near Smolensk and the emergence of the so-called "Russian Party", when the generals were involved in a confrontation with M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Then, in the Tarutinsky camp, a conflict arose between Kutuzov and a number of top military leaders, the coals of which slowly subsided by the end of the campaign.

In general, they tried to occupy all command posts taking into account seniority, primarily in the brigade-division-corps links. According to this principle, for example, appointments were made in 1812 to the positions of chiefs of engineers and artillery of armies and corps. Certain difficulties arose with the filling of senior staff positions in all three Western armies on the border, which was apparently due to the low assessment by the command of the business qualities of the generals of E. I. V.’s retinue in the quartermaster unit. Therefore, as a rule, the post of chief of the General Staff of the armies (if we exclude intermediate figures) was occupied by major generals (A. P. Ermolov, E. F. Saint-Prix, I. N. Inzov), and the duties of quartermaster generals and duty generals performed by colonels, many of whom then received general ranks "for distinction".

Appointment "based on one seniority" was often detrimental during combat. Especially if it was about generals with "thick" epaulettes, but who did not have a "combat" reputation in army circles. Even the emperor, knowing well the low professional qualities of some military leaders, could not move them or remove them from the troops. Noteworthy in this sense is the secret order of M. B. Barclay de Tolly dated April 17, 1812, sent to P. I. Bagration, where it was about General S. M. Kamensky, who had a “spoiled” reputation.

Let us quote this document in full: “By the Highest Command, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty wishes that the infantry general Count Kamensky, appointed to the army entrusted to you as the corps commander of the 8th corps, was always in Your Excellency’s mind, why the corps entrusted to him, never separate, but always have it where Your Excellency will be present yourself, so that Count Kamensky could not, according to his natural habit, do any whims and unnecessary punishment from his subordinates in the service. Before the war, Kamensky's corps was transferred to the 3rd Observation Army, and Bagration forwarded this order to its commander-in-chief A.P. Tormasov, who acted in accordance with the instructions received. He could not do anything with Kamensky until he himself quarreled with him and, saying he was sick, retired from the army.

Certain frictions in 1812 among the commanders-in-chief also arose with the Don ataman M.I. Platov, who considered himself the “oldest” general in the service, but often received a small number of irregular regiments in command. On this basis, the “vortex-ataman” had conflicts with Bagration, Barclay and Kutuzov.

When distributing posts, no doubt, reputation was taken into account, which caused complaints from the bypassed senior generals. So, for example, at the beginning of the war, Lieutenant General P. M. Kaptsevich, who had seniority from December 3, 1799 and who at one time made a quick career thanks to his service in the Gatchina troops, commanded the 7th Infantry Division, while in the 1st In the th Western Army, all corps commanders, lieutenant generals (with the exception of N. A. Tuchkov) were younger than him in rank. But in the second period of the campaign, his grievances multiplied. In a letter dated October 15, 1812 to A. A. Arakcheev, he frankly complained: “All my comrades are moving forward with big steps, I am left alone behind.” He was especially hurt at first by the appointment of Major General P. A. Stroganov as commander of the 3rd Infantry Corps, and then, after the murder of K. F. Baggovut, the appointment of the corps chief by Lieutenant General Prince S. N. seniority dated December 18, 1799), who had previously been the head of the Russian mission in Naples. “His 2nd corps,” wrote Kaptsevich, “was given to Lieutenant General Prince Dolgorukov, the youngest of me and who has not seen any other fire except diplomatic in his fireplace in his office.”

Other phrases in the letter are also quite remarkable, revealing the motivation for the offended general's behavior: “I do not have to bend to ask me what is due; to leave the service then, as a patriotic war, a sin and ashamed; to report to the sick, as many other servicemen do, and even worse. So I decided to endure and put an end to my patience with the end of the campaign. I no longer have the spirit to bear the title of divisional, while God knows who does not command divisions. If the will of the Sovereign does not deign me to command a corps, then I don’t, as it seems to me, have a place in the army. Why, if I'm superfluous, what should I keep? How unfortunate, count, to serve and not move higher, but on the contrary, still fall, now I remain alone in the army, lieutenant general, who commands the division. In fairness, we point out that Kaptsevich did not retire, since, apparently, under the patronage of Arakcheev, in 1813 he was placed at the head of the 10th Infantry Corps.

We can recall the incident with the Cossack Major General I.K. Krasnov, who had a loud resonance, who during the battles near Smolensk was subordinated to the junior Major General I.G. Shevich. Having received a report from his subordinate, the indignant ataman M. I. Platov made a request to A. P. Yermolov, which was actually drawn up in the form of a complaint: “The insult described by Mr. sensitive ... I ask you to order in such cases, according to the military list, to rectify the seniority of gentlemen of the generals, in order to avoid resentment, from subordinating the elder to the younger felt.

A stable stereotype dominated among the generals that seniority in rank was higher than seniority in position, at least the rank had to correspond to the position. But in practice this has not always been the case. For example, if a junior general in the rank received command of a corps, and the senior remained a divisional commander (and such cases were not uncommon in 1812), then this was perceived as a violation of subordination and established unspoken norms.

Usually, one way or another, researchers interpret the dispute about the seniority of Barclay and Bagration (produced by one order to the rank of infantry general), sometimes citing the most unexpected arguments. It must be clearly indicated that Bagration was older than Barclay in rank. In the decree on production and in the list of seniority, he was ahead, therefore, he could demand the subordination of his junior in rank in cases where there was no highest order to appoint a single commander in chief. He voluntarily submitted to the younger Barclay. Firstly, the 1st Western Army was twice as large as the 2nd Army; secondly, Barclay, as the main developer of the retreat plan (and not just as the minister of war), enjoyed greater confidence in the emperor than Bagration. Legally, this subordination was not fixed in any way. This was only the good will of Bagration, but he could at any moment refuse to carry out the orders of Barclay, and according to the law, no claims would be brought against him.

The legal paradox was that, unlike all previous military regulations, which provided for subordination, based on the principle of seniority, the "Institution for the Management of a Large Active Army" of 1812 endowed them with absolutely equal rights. Everyone in his army was a full owner and was responsible only to the emperor. Bagration repeatedly mentioned this in his correspondence: “Although I am older than the minister and in this service and have to command, the whole army asked for this, but this is not the will of the Sovereign and I cannot proceed without a special command.”

Given this circumstance, the opinion of some historians sounds unsubstantiated that Barclay led the troops, since he was the Minister of War. In this case, there is an attempt to modernize the past by analogy with a modern position. In those days, the minister was just an administrator with economic and inspector functions without the right to give orders to the commanders-in-chief and interfere in the affairs of the field command and control of the troops. So, for example, at the beginning of the war, the commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army, P.V. I will accept."

Even earlier, the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in the war with the Swedes in 1808-1809, Count F.F. Buxgevden, sent a sharp message to the then Minister of War A.A. Arakcheev, who tried to interfere in the management of his army. In it, the author argued the illegality of "invasions into the area of ​​​​the department of the commander in chief" and brilliantly "presented the difference between the commander in chief of the army, to whom the sovereign entrusts the fate of the state, and an insignificant courtier, even if he is called the Minister of War." Later, the letter received handwritten circulation in public circles. Barclay himself never allowed himself to give orders to other commanders-in-chief, and even in the midst of military events, “seeing the need to act in concert,” as he wrote in a letter to the tsar of July 26, “he could only express to General Tormasov in a private letter my desire that he succumb, forward as much as possible."

The practice of campaigns of the Napoleonic era is replete with examples of the "illness" of military leaders, which gives some idea of ​​the behavioral attitudes of the generals. Moreover, it is sometimes difficult for a historian to determine whether there was actually a physical malaise or whether the general “said sick” and thereby demonstrated his protest. In similar ways, the generals tried in a relatively legitimate way to influence the decisions of the higher authorities.

Such actions are well known in the literature. For example, the massive “disease” during the Tarutino period of the commanders of the Don Cossack regiments as a sign of protest due to the removal of M. I. Platov from command15, the departure from the army of the offended M. B. Barclay de Tolly “because of the increased illness in him”. Approximately the same circumstances were dictated at the end of 1812 by the illness of P. Kh. Wittgenstein, who “fell out of favor” for a short time, and a number of generals subordinate to him. Such situations also took place in 1813-1814. So, for example, after the appointment of Wittgenstein as commander-in-chief in 1813, his senior in the rank of A.P. Tormasov asked Alexander I to dismiss him from the army, referring to his state of health. One can also cite the case of F. V. Osten-Saken and the Bavarian Field Marshal K. F. Wrede during the movement of the allied troops to Paris in 1814, described in the memoirs of A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky: “From the beginning of the campaign, it was accepted as a rule that if two generals of different powers come together, then the younger of them in rank enters into the commands of the elder, regardless of the power of the powers to which they belong. On the basis of this rule, Saken, being in the rank of general from infantry, had to appear in the command of Wrede, who had just been promoted to field marshal. But the noble and ambitious Saken, who served in the age of Catherine, knew the difference between himself and the Bavarian field marshal, he said he was sick. All these facts give grounds to speak of them as a manifestation of the same type of professional behavior of generals.

In fairness, it is worth pointing out completely opposite cases. Despite the advanced age of a significant number of generals, many of them participated in battles, being seriously ill. So, for example, Major General P. G. Likhachev, whose division defended the "Raevsky battery" in the Battle of Borodino, could not even walk due to "aching legs" and during the battle he sat on a camp chair in the corner of the redoubt. Therefore, his first biographer, mentioning illnesses, had every reason to write: “A high sense of duty and a noble desire not to be an idle spectator of the battle, which, in the opinion of that time, should have decided the fate of our Fatherland, suppressed bodily illness in him.”

Another no less significant example. During the fighting near Smolensk, D.S. Dokhturov lay sick in bed. When M. B. Barclay de Tolly asked him if he could lead the defense of the city, the general, after reading the note, replied: "It is better to die in the field than on the bed." Then he took command of the troops. Examples of this kind were also not isolated, not to mention the numerous facts when the generals, despite their injuries, refused to leave the battlefield.

There were, although extremely rare, cases of voluntary infringement of their seniority during hostilities. So, on August 24, 1812, near the Kolotsk Monastery, a cavalry led by Lieutenant General F. P. Uvarov (seniority from November 5, 1800 ). And here are the words spoken to Konovnitsyn by eyewitness D. V. Davydov: “Peter Petrovich, this is not the time to be considered seniority; you have been entrusted with the rearguard, I have been sent to help you - give orders.

There is no doubt that the generals could simply be ill or “get sick” (according to the established canons of general etiquette) as an expression of the traditional dissatisfaction of the front line fighters with the headquarters. At the same time, the high command also sometimes used the label "sick", hanging it on the military leader in order to remove him from the active army. So, only on November 15, 1812, M. I. Kutuzov, having received the prior consent of the emperor (rescript dated October 9, 1812), ordered L. L. Bennigsen: “Due to your painful seizures, if you please, your Excellency, with this receipt, go to Kaluga. Naturally, the true reasons for the expulsion of the general were different. Bennigsen himself believed that Kutuzov "took advantage of the time when I was really sick and sent me a uniform order to leave the army for a cure." His adjutant N. D. Durnovo wrote in his diary that the general was ill on November 8, and the next day he "felt a little better." The reasons for the almost month-long delay in the expulsion of the Chief of the General Staff from the army are not yet entirely clear.

The last weighty argument was the emperor's dissatisfaction with the fact that on October 26, 1812, Bennigsen allowed himself to advise to promote Colonel Prince S. S. Golitsyn to adjutant general. This caused extreme irritation of Alexander I, and he demanded in a letter to Kutuzov dated November 5, 1812 to note "to General Bennigsen that I leave it to myself to elect my adjutant generals"26. The highest displeasure gave additional trump cards to Kutuzov, and he decided that the moment had come for the expulsion of Bennigsen. This is evidenced by a simple comparison of dates.

Speaking of generals, it is necessary to consider the social and professional affiliation of its individual groups. The vast majority of generals were considered to come from the nobility. A significant group consisted of representatives of aristocratic families with titles. Of the 550 generals and admirals, 143 people had the title at the end of their lives. In general, the final figure - 26% of the total number of personalities found - is quite impressive. Almost every fourth general was ranked among the titled elite. Of interest is the final alignment of titles among them: 23 barons, 61 counts (24 people were elevated since 1812), 48 princes (9 people were elevated), of which eight were given the title of the most serene princes, one marquis, four dukes, four princes, one grand duke - crown prince, one king of Belgium. Although it is possible to note a small group of those who came from chief officer children, petty officials, or who had parents of free professions. Of course, there were exceptions: one came from the children of soldiers, one was the son of a merchant, two from the families of clergymen.

Among the generals, it is necessary to single out a number of groups related by origin or professional and corporate interests. First of all, this is a group of sovereign German dukes, many of whom were relatives of the Russian emperor, due to which they had great influence. A separate group was represented by the adjutant generals of the emperor - a narrow circle of trusted persons, chosen by him to control the military sphere and carry out special assignments. Before the outbreak of hostilities, there were 19 adjutant generals in the Alexandrov retinue, and 5 generals were with the person of His Imperial Majesty. The generals who served in the guard enjoyed particular influence. In general, 250 generals of 1812 left the guards regiments (as a rule, they began their service).

The military leaders can also be divided according to the types of troops - infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering troops, as well as according to the type of service, for example, the headquarters positions were occupied by the highest officers of the retinue of His Imperial Majesty in the quartermaster unit. Of particular note are the Don generals (28 people), who were traditionally used to command all irregular troops. The vast majority of them came from the Cossack elders, a narrow and almost closed social stratum, relatively recently incorporated into the Russian nobility.

Let us also touch upon the question of the national and religious composition of the Russian generals. The final distribution of national forces among the highest command personnel is already given in one of our published works. He shows that the Russians made up only 60%, although with co-religionists this figure increased to 66.5%. Every third general (33%) had a foreign surname and professed a different religion. If we consider this issue in a historical retrospective, we note several interesting points. In the time of Peter the Great, when the Russian regular army took shape organizationally, according to the staff of 1711, it was established that foreigners could make up only a third of the total number of officers in the regiments. In fact, in the Russian officer corps, their number then did not exceed 13%, that is, it was 2.5 times lower than the established limit. In the last reign, the number of generals with non-Russian surnames ranged from 15 to 20%.

In this series, 1812, which is in the middle in the chronology of the Russian imperial army, stands out sharply for its statistics and does not fit into the general trend. We note one more curious detail: according to the summary information about the Russian officer corps in 1812, generalized by D. G. Tselorungo, the carriers of foreign surnames did not exceed 9-11.1%. The national situation on the army "Olympus" did not correspond to a similar layout in the lower classes. This disparity also needs an explanation.

The presence at that moment of a large number of foreigners and their "home-grown" persons with foreign surnames in the ranks of the generals is explained not only by the primordial sympathy of the Romanov dynasty for the European "condottieri" (especially the "Germans"), but also strategic and purely practical calculations. The recruitment of foreigners (as a rule, from states allied with France and at war with Russia in 1812) had a special political meaning. Russia remained one of the few countries that could harbor anti-Napoleonic elements, so it was simply unwise to reject their services. Of course, during the fighting on Russian territory, often foreign generals were of little use. Due to ignorance of the Russian language (but there were few of them), they could not command and were used as advisers or staff members. So, in this capacity, K. Clausewitz went through the entire campaign in Russia, who in practice was convinced of the impossibility of "being used sensibly without knowing the language." He directly wrote that in 1812 he was "in the position of a deaf-mute."

Still, it was better to keep foreigners in this capacity than in the opposite enemy camp.

There was another aspect as well. Being in a foreign country, these ardent opponents of Napoleon were connected, as a rule, only with the Russian autocrat, therefore they performed the functions of keeping an eye on the Russian generals, sensitively monitoring the mood in the army and could stop negative trends for the emperor. In 1812, the German relatives of the tsar took over this role, and in their disputes the generals very often appealed to them, demanding their intervention in the affairs of the commanders-in-chief under the pretext of violating the will and interests of the monarch.

The practical benefit of the stay of foreigners, in addition to their participation in the creation of the Russian-German Legion from the prisoners, was obtained already at the end of the 1812 campaign of the year, when the Russian "Germans" agreed with the Prussians and signed the Taurogen Convention, as a result of which the entire Prussian corps was neutralized. Even more benefits were derived from the entry of Russian troops into the territory of Western Europe. The explosion of the national anti-Napoleonic movement in Germany was largely due to the activities of the German relatives of the Romanov dynasty and the "Germans" dressed in Russian uniforms. In 1814, with the transfer of hostilities to France, the command was very useful and French emigrants in the Russian service. In addition to contacts with the local administration and public circles, many of them then began to occupy high positions in the state apparatus of the revived French kingdom. Thus, the presence and use of foreigners fully corresponded in general to the justified strategic course of Alexander I, designed for several years of struggle with Napoleon.

It is necessary to note a number of other mundane moments. The carriers of foreign surnames who served in the Russian army had, in comparison with Russian nobles, a higher educational level, which greatly contributed to their career success. For the majority, including the Eastseans, service was the sole or main source of livelihood. In addition to salaries, they, as a rule, did not have any other material support, therefore they appreciated, held on to the service with both hands and sought to earn ranks. The majority of Russians, even petty nobles, having risen to the rank of headquarters officer's epaulettes, resigned or moved into the civil sphere, thereby clearing the way for foreign comrades in arms.

But every medal has a downside. The excessive dominance of foreign elements among the generals was bound to provoke an internal reaction, which happened. Throughout the 18th century, the Russian nobility, despite a persistent prejudice towards foreigners, rooted in the pre-Petrine past, coexisted quite peacefully, although it competed with the "Germans". A peaceful existence was largely helped by the existing contradictions among the ruling class. Thus, the noble society of Moscow constantly played the role of an opposition "front" in relation to the dignitary elite of St. Petersburg. Yes, and in the military and bureaucratic elite there were always opposing factions, which often led to palace coups.

The year 1812, if it did not smooth out social tensions within the Russian nobility, then pushed them into the background. The patriotic upsurge, as well as dissatisfaction with foreign dominance in the upper echelons of the army and the military environment of the tsar, naturally gave rise to an informal grouping in the officers and generals already at the initial stage of the war, which was later called the “Russian” party. In historiography, questions about the composition, activities and ideology of this group have not yet been fully explored, and its name as a term has not yet settled down. Given the predominance of German surnames in the camp of foreigners, the Germans became the main targets for criticism of the patriotic generals.

Alexander I was sure of the inevitability of clashes among the generals in 1812, and in this he was not mistaken. Even from the experience of previous wars, of which there were many in his reign, rarely did a campaign go without personal skirmishes and petty grievances against colleagues among military leaders. There was nothing surprising in this - at any time and in all countries, the general's environment has always been distinguished by increased professional competition and a clash of ambitions. The struggle in the bowels of the generals in 1812 was carried out on several planes and in different directions. It touched upon many aspects, depending on the situation and the urgency of the emerging problems. A tangle of professional, age, social and national contradictions was left a noticeable imprint by the burden of personal claims and displeasure of the generals with each other.

Ordinary service clashes in the military environment in peacetime during the stressful period of hostilities heated up excessively and looked for a way out, which led to the formation of groups of disgruntled generals.

The national, professional and social aspects in the generals' "Fronde" of 1812 acquired specific features and forms of expression as the hostilities developed. Moreover, Alexander I was forced to sacrifice for the sake of the critics of the “German” dominance a number of figures prepared in advance for this case. As a sophisticated politician, he perfectly foresaw the possible negative reaction to the retreat in the first period of the war on the part of the generals and society. Confirmation that the king foresaw the future, we find in his letter to Barclay dated November 24, 1812: “The campaign plan adopted by us,” the emperor wrote after the events, “in my opinion, is the only one that could still have success against such an enemy, like Napoleon ..., however, he was bound to meet with many censures and inappropriate assessments among the people, who ... had to be alarmed by military operations aimed at bringing the enemy into the interior of the country. It was necessary from the very beginning to expect condemnation, and I prepared for this ... "

K. Ful, the author of the scandalous Drissa project, was the first to be slaughtered to satisfy the anger of the Russian military leaders. Barclay, the developer and chief executor of the retreat plan, was prepared second in a row for the general's sacrifice. It is possible that there were other candidates in the reserve. For example, the rapidly rising star F. O. Paulucci. But the staff generals literally “ate” the titled Italian within a few days, and he simply did not have time to become a “scapegoat”. But large-scale national persecution in the generals (and such happened in the history of the Russian army) of the military opposition failed to organize. Although under the veil of the struggle for national purity near Smolensk there was an explosion of spy mania, directed primarily against foreigners in Russian headquarters.

Four royal aide-de-camp wing, Poles by nationality, the head of intelligence of the 2nd Western Army, a French emigrant, Lieutenant Colonel Marquis Moritz de Leather, were expelled from the army, suspicions were also expressed about the espionage activities of a number of Frenchmen in the Russian service, as well as barons L. I. Wolzogen and V. I. Levenshtern. In this case, it was not the Germans who suffered more, but the Poles and the French. To some extent, this incident recalled the long-standing "dispute of the Slavs among themselves", and also came down to the old claims of the Orthodox to the Catholics. Only after the election of M. I. Kutuzov as the unified commander-in-chief, the national aspect lost its former relevance, and general disputes began to be conducted in other planes.

Already the first major clash of general ambitions on professional grounds took place under Kutuzov during the historic military council in Fili, which decided the fate of Moscow. Moreover, the national aspect, so visible until quite recently near Smolensk, did not take place at all, although it was the “Germans” who played all the first roles in the general friction at that moment. A paradoxical fact: the position on Sparrow Hills was chosen and proposed by K.F. Generals with Russian surnames seem to have forgotten about their ethnicity and in a very dramatic situation were forced to join one of the points of view expressed by the "Germans".

Having lost its leader, Bagration, in the Battle of Borodino, the “Russian” party could no longer act in a consolidated manner. Its representatives failed even to formulate their understanding of the situation. For the most part, they (who were admitted to the council) supported Bennigsen's opinion on the need for a new general battle in the name of saving the Mother See. But the very personality of Bennigsen irritated many generals. And this circumstance (apart from common sense) did not allow them to unite and come out in an organized manner against Barclay's retreating idea.

Kutuzov, as a wise politician who initiated the exchange of general opinions, took the most convenient position in those circumstances. He stood over the fight and acted as a judge with the final verdict on the inevitable abandonment of Moscow. Many of the generals who were members of the council subsequently suffered greatly from the "concession" of Moscow, complained, justified themselves or were in a depressed state. A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, who visited P. P. Konovnitsyn at the beginning of 1813, recalled: “A rare day passed without him mentioning this circumstance to me, adding each time: “I did not vote for the surrender of Moscow and in military council suggested to go to the enemy. D. S. Dokhturov, in hot pursuit, wrote in a letter to his wife on September 3: “... I am in despair that they are leaving Moscow. What a horror! ... What a shame for the Russians to leave their homeland without the slightest shot from a rifle and without a fight. I'm furious, but what can I do? ... after all this, nothing will force me to serve.

Summing up, we can say that the generals of the era of 1812 reflected the entire spectrum of national, religious, dynastic and political characteristics of the Russian Empire and its international relations. Its multinational composition was due to the turbulent events of that time. On December 12, 1812, in Vilna, Emperor Alexander I had every reason to declare to the generals gathered there: “You saved more than one Russia, you saved Europe.”38 According to the well-known publicist N. I. Grech, “the case against Napoleon was not Russian, and all-European, common, human, therefore, all noble people became countrymen and brothers in it. ”In this field, they showed themselves in different ways, but, no doubt, left their mark, and their biographies became an integral part of Russian military history.

Many heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812 are immortalized in marble and bronze in Russia, near and far abroad countries.