The uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the war for the liberation of Ukraine

The sharp oppression of Ukrainian life that came after the suppression of the Cossack uprisings of the late 16th and early 17th centuries did not in itself promise stability to the new order. The population obeyed them with displeasure, waiting only for the first opportunity to put an end to them. And the registered Cossacks, deprived of self-government and subordinate to the Poles alien to them and hostile to their bosses; and Cossacks scribes, expelled from the army, obliged, along with the peasants, to bear all the hardships of serfdom, obey the lord's servants and still endure all sorts of harassment and abuse from the billeted Polish soldiers; and the Ukrainian peasantry, who were looking for the Bespanian lands, and now, with fear and anger, saw how the heavy yoke of panschina was approaching them; and the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, and the clergy, who lost the help and protection they had in the face of the Cossacks. The whole new order was held together by one thing: peace in Poland, which gave her the opportunity to keep her troops in the Ukraine without needing the help of the Cossacks.

The first war that took place would inevitably undermine these new orders in the Ukraine at the root, since an army would be needed for a war, Cossacks would be needed. It was an exceptional phenomenon that Poland managed to live without war for more than ten years. The gentry firmly held the king in their hands and did not allow him to affect the neighbors. But in the end, so much combustible material gathered in Ukraine that it caught fire without an extraneous spark - from some rumors about the royal plans for war. Vladislav rushed about with plans for a war with Turkey. The Venetian Republic, which fought against the Turks and promised to involve other states in the war, inclined him to this. Knowing the aversion of the Polish gentry to any military enterprises, the king planned to set the Cossacks on Turkey so that they forced her to war, and conducted secret negotiations with the Cossack foreman. But the representatives of the Polish aristocracy, having found out about this, so resolutely opposed these plans that the king was forced to abandon his plans, and the Cossack foreman, for his part, hid the whole incident in his circle. This was in 1646. However, shortly thereafter, an incident occurred that revealed these royal designs.

Khmelnitsky for a long time did not even dare to take up the compilation of the register; then, taking hold of it, he ordered that families of Cossack assistants be assigned to each Cossack family, then he attributed quite a few more Cossacks simply in excess of forty thousand - and yet this was only a miserable patch on the terrifying gap that opened before him. If Khmelnytsky even ever had a sincere desire to make peace on the Zboriv Treaty, he had to make sure that the Ukrainian people and society would not allow him to calm down on this treatise. On the other hand, he saw that there was no sincere attitude towards this agreement on the Polish side either. Some things were not fulfilled from the very beginning: the Metropolitan was not allowed into the Senate, they did not want to cancel the unions, and in other matters, obviously, they were only waiting for a convenient moment to take back the concessions made. And Khmelnitsky and the foreman very soon had to admit that a new war was inevitable, it was necessary to continue to achieve what was not achieved under Zborov.

Although taught by bitter experience with the khan, Khmelnitsky again built his plans on alliances and the help of foreign allies, not counting on relying on his own strength in view of the alienation of the people from him. He again set the khan against Poland and, in addition, through the sultan, under whose power and protection he surrendered himself, he wanted to force the khan to, on the orders of the sultan, go to war with Poland. He tried with all his might to force Moscow to go to war with Poland, and also, in order to seduce Moscow politicians, he promised to give Ukraine under the tsarist hand. He was also in relations with his neighbors, Turkish vassals: the Moldavian ruler and the Prince of Transylvania. He wanted to intermarry with the Moldavian ruler Vasily Lupul: it was agreed that Lupul's daughter would marry the hetman's eldest son, Timosh; and when Lupul began to delay the fulfillment of this promise, Khmelnitsky went on a campaign against Moldavia, brutally devastated the region and the Moldavian capital of Iasi, so that Lupul had to pay off large sums and promised to certainly marry his daughter to Timosh.

Of these relations, Khmelnytsky's negotiations with Moscow were of the greatest importance for Ukrainian politics in the future. The Cossacks had longstanding relationships and scores there. The fight against Crimea was carried out by the common forces of the entire border Ukraine, regardless of the fact that it was cut by the Moscow border. Back in the 1530s. the Crimean khans complained to the Lithuanian government that despite the alliance of Lithuania with the Crimea and the hostile relations of Moscow with Lithuania, the struggle against the Crimea is still being carried out jointly by the Ukrainian Cossacks, both located within the Lithuanian borders and living beyond the Moscow border. Later, Dmitry Vishnevetsky had similar plans: to unite both states in a common struggle against the Crimea, the common enemy of the entire borderland. And then various Cossack leaders carried out the same policy on a smaller scale, presenting it in such a way that they were fighting the horde and the Turks as much in the interests of Moscow as in the interests of Lithuania and Poland; on this basis, on the one hand, they claimed a salary from the king, on the other hand, they demanded a "treasury" from the Moscow government - they served on two sides, as they said in the old days. True, this did not serve as an obstacle to the fact that the same Cossacks, without a twinge of conscience, went to conquer the Moscow lands to the cry of the Polish government: they looked at the war as their trade, and sold their services to the one who paid them (this is what the leaders of the military did). squads of the then Europe); and with the Ukrainian lands of Poland were in close connection and dependence on them, and they had to reckon with the Polish government, willy or not.

Kyiv circles in the 1620s transferred relations to a different ground. Starting negotiations with the Moscow government on the adoption of the Cossack army under the authority and protection of Moscow with all of Ukraine, at least the Dnieper region, they thus planned the separation of Ukrainian lands from Poland and the transition to Moscow possession, as the Ukrainian conspirators of the XV-XVI once planned centuries There is no doubt that later such plans and plans arose both in Kyiv and in Cossack circles. Khmelnitsky, relying at the very beginning on Crimean assistance, also after that entered into negotiations with the Moscow government, asked to help the Cossacks and take them and "all of Russia" under his protection.

Muscovite politicians did not understand this plan otherwise than that Ukrainian Rus, as a long-standing possession of the Vladimir family, should join the Muscovite kingdom and recognize the Muscovite tsar as the heir to the Kyiv dynasty and its rights. Therefore, Khmelnitsky, trying to get into their tone, put the question through his ambassadors. In general, according to the old Cossack custom, he was cunning and, trying to gather as many allies as possible for her struggle against Poland, told everyone what he was pleased to hear, if only to persuade him to participate in his enterprises. So he declared to the Moscow tsar that he would like to have him tsar and autocrat, in accordance with what the Moscow ambassadors dictated to him - how this proposal should be put. And at the same time he was given under the authority of the Sultan, and was accepted by him as a vassal - there is a Sultan's letter of 1650, in which the Sultan informed Khmelnitsky about this and sent him a caftan, a sign of his patronage and supremacy. Khmelnitsky also had a relationship with the Transylvanian prince, inviting him to become the king of Ukraine, and later surrendered himself under the protection of the Swedish king and at the same time entered into conditions with the Polish king, recognizing him as his supreme overlord.

Khmelnytsky had a great political and state talent, undoubtedly loved Ukraine and was devoted to its interests. But he was too cunning and wise, caring more, as already noted, about foreign assistance than about developing strength, endurance, consciousness and energy in his own people. Although already in Kyiv conversations at the beginning of 1649 he set himself the goal of liberating the entire Ukrainian people, all the same, these new thoughts and plans did not yet appear to him quite clearly; even later he remained too much a Cossack, was under a much stronger influence of purely Cossack views and interests than the new nationwide, all-Ukrainian. It took time for the latter to develop, become clear and penetrate into consciousness. But life did not wait, it was necessary to forge the share of Ukraine without delay at the same moment. It was not easy to move the huge masses of the people, cut off directly from the plow, or this changeable, stormy Cossack mass, accustomed to changing hetmans over the course of several months. Too important questions were being decided to be entrusted to the momentary moods of the Cossack Rada. Khmelnytsky ruled over the Cossacks with an iron hand, but not relying on his restraint, and even less on the masses, eagerly sought help abroad. It was a misfortune for him and for all of Ukraine that the highest impulse, when the real liberation of the people was set as the goal and all forces were directed towards this goal, ended in the Zborov catastrophe. This failure disappointed the masses, deprived them of the energy of action, and after that they no longer responded so quickly to further calls for an uprising. After all, these were not people of military craft, in the overwhelming majority it was the agricultural peasantry who took part in the uprising in order to free themselves from the pan yoke and Polish domination and become the master of their labor, to live freely and provide for their well-being, for the satisfaction of their economic and cultural needs. When the uprising did not justify their hopes, these peasant masses renounced it and began to leave the restless Right Bank across the Dnieper, further and further, to the steppe borderlands, to the Moscow border, beyond the Moscow border, Khmelnitsky more and more had to rely on foreign assistance for their plans for liberation from Polish captivity.

Keeping an eye on Khmelnytsky's foreign relations, the Polish government, shortly after the Peace of Zboriv, ​​also began preparations for war. However, the first encounter came rather unexpectedly. Kazakov touched Kalinovsky in the Bratslav region and was again defeated in the winter of 1650 near Vinnitsa no worse than near Korsun. The Polish government was not yet ready for war, and now Khmelnitsky had a very convenient opportunity to defeat Poland again. However, he missed the time, trying to get the Khan to come to his aid. Khan finally moved, but was very angry that Khmelnitsky tried to force him to participate in the war through the Sultan, and at the first opportunity he took revenge on Khmelnitsky for such moves. When in August 1651 Khmelnitsky met with the Polish army near Berestechko (not far from Vladimir-Volynsky), the horde left the Cossacks in a decisive battle, fled, and when Khmelnitsky rushed to catch up with the khan to return him, he grabbed him and took him away . Left without a hetman, the colonels did not dare to take command, knowing how jealous Khmelnytsky was in such matters. They decided to retreat, but when crossing the quagmire behind the camp, confusion occurred, the Cossack army went scattered and was terribly defeated. Potocki moved after that with the Polish army through Volhynia to Ukraine; from the north, from Lithuania, the Lithuanian hetman proceeded to Kyiv and took possession of it. Having escaped from the khan, Khmelnitsky began to gather an army near Korsun. But the Cossacks lost their will to war after such a pogrom, and the peasantry was even more tired and disappointed by all these fruitless wars. However, the Poles, seeing how stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, the Ukrainian population is defending everywhere and what difficulties the campaign encounters, also lost their desire to continue the war. Kissel again assumed the role of a mediator and brought to a new agreement, concluded in mid-September 1651 near Belaya Tserkov.

This second treaty was a stripped-down repetition of Zborowski. The number of registered troops was reduced to 20 thousand, and the Cossacks could live and enjoy Cossack rights only in the royal estates of the Kyiv province. There was no longer any talk of abolishing the union. The gentry and the administration received the right to immediately return to their estates and residences, and only the collection of taxes and the dispatch of duties were postponed for several months until the register was compiled. Khmelnytsky had to send a horde and not enter into relations with foreign states.

This time, Khmelnitsky probably did not attach any importance to these conditions from the very beginning and accepted them only in order to interrupt hostilities for a while. By the spring of 1652, he was already inviting the horde to the campaign and went with her, seeing off his son Timosh, who went to Moldavia to marry the ruler's daughter. Khmelnytsky, obviously, foresaw that the Poles would not let Timosh through, and so it really happened. Kalinovsky blocked Timosh's path to Podolia and unexpectedly, on the Southern Bug in the tract of Batog, ran into Khmelnitsky himself with all his army and Tatars. On May 22-23, 1652, another pogrom of the Polish army took place; Kalinovsky himself fell in battle, the Cossacks paid back for Berestechko. But the further war dragged on slowly, gray and boring. Both sides, both Ukrainian and Polish, did not have the strength and energy to hit the enemy boldly and decisively; the endless war has exhausted and tormented everyone. The main attention of both sides was turned to Timosh's expedition, which ended with the intervention of the Poles and the siege of Timosh in Suceava, where he died, killed by a cannonball. Not in time to help his son, Khmelnitsky met with the Poles in Podolia near Zhvanets, and both troops stood for a long time, not having the desire to attack the enemy. Finally, the khan once again betrayed the Cossacks and entered into an agreement with the Poles, reprimanding them to return to the Cossacks the rights recognized by the Zborovsky treaty. But this time Khmelnitsky no longer wanted to enter into negotiations with the Poles: he no longer cared about the khan, since he had news that a new ally, the Muscovite tsar, was entering his struggle with Poland.

The Moscow government had a great desire to intervene in the Cossack war in order to compensate for the losses of the Time of Troubles, and perhaps to acquire something from the Ukrainian lands; however, it fluctuated greatly, fearing the risk: so recently Poland had still cruelly made itself felt by Moscow in previous wars. But, on the other hand, Moscow politicians had to take into account the fact that having defeated Khmelnitsky, the Poles would first of all turn the Crimeans and Cossacks against Moscow and even did

Commonwealth. The population was subjected to double oppression: feudal and national-religious.

Remark 1

In $1596$ was adopted Union of Brest which led to the creation of the Russian Uniate Church. Those who joined the union united with the Catholic Church, preserving the rites according to the Greek Orthodox model.

Polish magnates forcibly annexed vast lands, becoming owners of huge latifundia. Also, Russian nobles who converted to Catholicism and were loyal to the Polish-Lithuanian authorities, such as the Vishnevetskys, Ostrogskys, and others, became large landowners. At the same time, the growth of extortions and various abuses from the townspeople and peasants increases.

The Cossacks were also not happy with their position. For protecting borders and repelling threats, they were put on a special list - registry. The registry was supposed to reward. However, the number of Cossacks in the Zaporozhian Sich was constantly growing, but the register did not change. This led to riots at the beginning of the 17th century in ordinary Cossacks against the pro-Polish hetmans.

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The immediate cause that led to the uprising of Khmelnytsky was another Polish lawlessness. Daniil Chaplinsky, the Polish captain and elder of the city of Chigirin took away the estate, kidnapped his beloved and killed the son of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, a registered Cossack, to death.

move

Bohdan Khmelnytsky was born in $1596$ and was of rather noble origin. He received a good European education, but did not convert to Catholicism. Participated in the Polish-Turkish war and was taken prisoner. Bogdan Khmelnitsky was on good terms with the king Vladislav IV.

Who hated the Khmelnytsky underage Daniil Chaplinsky attacked his farm Subotov, kidnapped his beloved Gehlen and married her. The ten-year-old son was severely beaten and died. Khmelnytsky's appeal to the authorities and even to the king personally did not help, on the contrary, he was imprisoned on charges of rebellion.

Not having achieved retribution according to the law, Khmelnitsky decided to act independently. In February $1648$ a group of Cossacks on the island Tomakovka decided to go to the Sich, where she defeated the Polish garrison.

Negotiations were held with the Crimean Khan, as a result of which the Khan did not declare war on Poland, but provided a detachment.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky was elected hetman of the Zaporizhian Army.

In May $1648$, the Cossacks defeated the army of the crown hetman Potocki in the battle near Yellow Waters and at Korsun. The victory provided an influx of participants, the war became liberation. For $1648$ the Poles were expelled from Left-bank Ukraine, as well as Kyiv, Podolsk and Bratslav provinces.

$5$ August $1649$ Khmelnitsky defeated the king at Zborov. was concluded Zboriv Treaty: formed autonomy - Hetmanate with its capital in Chyhyryn, with the only ruler in the person of the elected hetman and the supreme body - the All-Cossack Rada; the register was brought up to $40 thousand.

At the same time, uprisings were going on in Belarus, but much weaker. Khmelnitsky sent Cossacks to help.

From the beginning of the uprising, Khmelnitsky repeatedly asked the Russian Tsar to accept the Cossacks as citizenship, but he evaded an answer.

In June $1651$, the Crimean Tatars betrayed the Cossacks in the battle near Berestechko, as a result they were defeated. By Treaty of Bila Tserkva the registry has been greatly reduced.

Finally, in the fall of $1653, the Zemsky Sobor approved the admission of Ukraine to Russia. In winter $1654$

Remark 2

The war with the Commonwealth began. In $1654$, Smolensk was occupied, as well as $33$ of Belarusian cities (including Polotsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev).

Sweden seized the moment and captured most of Poland, including Warsaw. The strengthening of Sweden did not suit Russia, so a truce was signed with the Commonwealth in $1656$, while Bohdan Khmelnitsky died in Chyhyryn from a stroke in $1657$.

Results

The war between Russia and the Commonwealth resumed in $1658$ and lasted until the conclusion of $1667$ in January. Andrusovo truce. According to it, the inclusion of Left-Bank Ukraine in Russia, the return of Smolensk was recognized. Then the eternal peace of $1686$ secured Kyiv for Russia. These achievements were made thanks to the dedication of Bogdan Khmelnytsky.

By the time of the uprising of Bogdan (or Zinovy) Khmelnitsky in the territory of Southwestern Russia, Polish influence had, in fact, turned into a pronounced feudal exploitation. Great dissatisfaction was caused by the signing and operation of the Brest Union, according to which the Ukrainian Church came under the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Church. Representatives of the gentry and magnates owned vast territories, and the Russian nobles, who became Polonized and converted to Catholicism, did not lag behind them. For example, the Vyshnevetsky princes completely owned the entire Poltava region. The memoirs of contemporaries say that the local population "had fewer rights than galley slaves."

Beginning in 1625, they periodically flared up, which were quickly suppressed and did not give any noticeable results.

The beginning of the riot

Despite the fact that Bogdan Khmelnitsky was in the position of the Chigirinsky centurion, and he had to experience the boundless terror of the Polish lords.
The details of the incident are interpreted differently in the sources. In particular, information differs about the fate of one of his sons, who was flogged half to death or killed at the age of 10. It is known that the Subbotinsky estate, which Khmelnitsky owned, was ruined and taken away by the elder's assistants. The Polish woman, with whom the Chigirinsky centurion lived after the death of his wife, was taken away in an unknown direction. The Polish court refused to satisfy the centurion's claim on the pretext that the documents for the Subbotinsky estate were not properly executed, and the woman was not his married wife.
To restore justice, Khmelnitsky also met with the king, whom he knew, but he, not wanting to come into conflict with the influential gentry, did not take any action himself. Many historical books and even scientific articles mention that in response to Khmelnytsky's claims, the king replied: "You have your saber." One way or another, but after that the Chigirinsky centurion went to Zaporozhye.

Hetman Khmelnytsky

Bogdan Khmelnitsky belonged to a respected Cossack family, he received an excellent education and, according to historians, during his studies he demonstrated outstanding talents. Along with this, he was an excellent warrior and fought at the beginning of his military career alongside his father. In one of the battles, his father was killed, and Bogdan was captured, from which he did not manage to get out immediately.
The uprising demonstrated not only the patriotism of Khmelnytsky and his outstanding gift as a military leader, but also excellent organizational skills. Already on the way to Zaporozhye, he managed to create a small detachment, which, however, managed to defeat several medium-sized Polish military formations.

The course of the uprising and the most striking battles

One of the most acute problems in organizing the Khmelnytsky uprising was the lack of good cavalry at his disposal. Proclaimed hetman in Zaporozhye, Khmelnytsky in this respect counted on attracting the Tatars to his side. Having won Khan Islam-Giray over to his side under the patronage of familiar Tatar murzas, Khmelnitsky accomplished what his predecessors only dreamed of. However, the Tatars at that time also had their own reasons for engaging in hostilities - Poland stopped paying them the agreed tribute. The beginning of the uprising dates back to January 1648.
The main battles of the first stage of the uprising can be considered the battles at Zhovti Vody and the Battle of Korsun. The main opponents of the proclaimed hetman were Stefan Potocki and Martyn Kalinovsky. Khmelnytsky ruthlessly defeated the Polish army near Zhovti Vody, deceiving the hopes of the commanders for the Kodak castle, which was a good fortification on the way of the Cossacks. The hetman and his army simply bypassed the fortress, wasting no time and incurring no losses.
The battle of Korsun became an even more difficult defeat for the Poles - not only a twenty-thousandth army was destroyed, but also its commanders were captured, who were later handed over to the Tatars for help and support.

The situation in the territory where the uprising took place periodically changed. In 1648, Vladislav IV, who was tolerant and loyal to the Cossacks, died. Along with this, independent pockets of rebellion broke out, more and more new forces joined the army of Khmelnitsky. Driven to extremes, the peasants and non-registered Cossacks were hardened and sometimes staged a real massacre. The Jews who lived in this area were especially affected. Khmelnitsky, fearing that he would not be able to control the rebellious force that had escaped to freedom, turned to Russia for protection. An additional problem was the internal discord and contempt of the Cossacks for the peasants.
The result of the first stage of the uprising was negotiations during the siege of Lvov and Zamostye. In order to give rest to the army that was tired and suffering from the plague, the hetman lifted the siege, taking an indemnity.
The second stage coincided with the end of the 30 Years' War. In addition, the Crimean Khan, who received gifts from the new king, Jan Casimir, refused to fight further and demanded a peace.
Jan Kazimierz was not going to satisfy Khmelnitsky's demands, but the result of the negotiations was the signing of peace on compromise terms, including:

• the formation of an autonomous Hetmanate with an elected hetman and the supreme authority of the All-Cossack Rada,
• formation of a register of 40 thousand sabers,
• amnesty for the participants of the rebellion,
• prohibition of Jews to stay on the territory of the autonomy.

Despite the careful preparation of the third stage, the battles during this period (since January 1651) went on with varying success. The defeat in the Battle of Berestets led to the need to sign the unfavorable Bila Tserkva peace. After the victory at Batog came the defeat at Zhvanets.
The end was put in place when, after Khmelnytsky's appeal for a protectorate in Moscow, the Zemsky Sobor decided to grant the hetman's request. At the Pereyaslav Rada on January 8, 1654, the Cossacks swore an oath to the Russian sovereign and passed under his hand with all possessions.
The uprising of Khmelnytsky was one of the few in history that were crowned with success. The long-awaited freedom from Polish oppression was obtained.

Ivan Bohun
Maxim Krivonos
Stepan Pobodaylo
Michal Krzychevsky
Islam III Giray
Tugai Bey
File:Russian coa 1882.gif Vasily Buturlin Vladislav IV
Jan II Casimir
Mykola Potocki
Jeremiah Koribut Vishnevetsky
Stefan Czarnecki
Martyn Kalinovsky
Janusz Radziwill Side forces more than 100 thousand60-80 thousand

Khmelnytsky uprising
Yellow Waters - Korsun - Starokonstantinov - Pilyavtsy - Mozyr - Loev (1649) - Zbarazh - Zborov - Krasnoe - Kopychintsy - Berestechko - Loev (1651) - White Church - Batog - Monastery - Zhvanets

Anti-Polish uprisings in Ukraine
Kyiv 1018 - Flies - Bratslav-Vinnitsa - Kosinsky - Nalivaiko - Zhmailo - Fedorovich - Sulima - Pavlyuk - Ostryanin - Guni - Khmelnytsky- Barabash and Pushkar - Bohun - Stavyshcha - Paliy - Gaidamakov 1734 - Gaidamakov 1750 - Koleevshchina - Volyn Massacre

Russian history
Ancient Slavs, Russ (before the 9th century)
Old Russian state (-XIII century)
Russian principalities (XII-XVI centuries)
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Rulers | Chronology | ExpansionPortal "Russia"

Khmelnytsky uprising- the name of the national liberation war against Polish rule in the territory of modern Ukraine, which lasted from 1654 to 1654 and was led by hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In alliance with the Crimean Khan, the Zaporozhye Cossacks repeatedly met on the battlefield with the crown armies and gentry mercenary detachments of the Commonwealth. The result of the uprising was the destruction of the influence of the Polish gentry, the Catholic clergy and their Jewish tenants.

The uprising broke out as a local revolt of the Zaporozhian Sich, but was supported by other Orthodox strata (peasants, townspeople, nobles) and developed into a broad popular movement. The struggle against the Poles was carried out with varying success and led to the transition of the Zaporizhian Army under the rule of the Russian state.

The modern Ukrainian historian Natalia Yakovenko characterizes the Uprising of 1648 and the subsequent war as a "nationwide war - a Cossack revolution", the meaning of which was the social claims of the Cossacks, who sought to become a legitimate social class in the Commonwealth and opposes the interpretation of the war as "national liberation" since the war took place before the emergence of nations as such.

Reasons and reason

The strengthening of the political influence of the "gentry oligarchy" and the feudal exploitation of the Polish magnates were especially evident in the territory of Western and Southwestern Russia. Huge latifundia of such magnates as Konetspolsky, Pototsky, Kalinovsky, Zamoysky and others were created by violent seizures of land. He also owned vast lands on the left bank of the Dnieper. At the same time, the large landownership of the Russian nobility also grew, which by this time was adopting the Catholic religion and becoming Polonized. These included the Vishnevetskys, Kisels, Ostrozhskys and others. The Vishnevetsky princes, for example, owned almost the entire Poltava region with 40 thousand peasant and city households, Adam Kisel - huge estates on the Right Bank, etc. All this was accompanied by an increase in peasant duties, infringement their rights and religious oppression in connection with the adoption of the church union and the subordination of the church to the See of Rome. The French engineer Beauplan, who was in the Polish service from the early 1630s until 1648, in particular, noted that the peasants there are extremely poor, they are forced to give their lord everything he wants; their situation is "worse than that of galley slaves" [ source not specified 318 days] .The forerunner of the war were numerous Cossack uprisings -30s:

• Zhmayl's uprising of 1625
• Shaker's rebellion of 1630
• Ivan Sulima's uprising of 1635
• Pavliuk's uprising of 1637
• Ostryanitsa and Guni uprisings of 1638

However, all of them were defeated and in - years. the so-called period of "golden peace" was established, when the Cossack uprisings ceased.

Occasion

The reason for the beginning of the uprising was another manifestation of magnate lawlessness. Agents of the Chigirinsky elder, led by the elder D. Chaplitsky, took away his Saturday estate from Bogdan Khmelnitsky, ruined the economy, spotted his ten-year-old son to death and took his wife away. Khmelnytsky began to look for courts and justice for these outrages, but the Polish judges found that he had not been properly married to his Polish wife, and did not have the necessary documents for Subbotin's possessions. Then Khmelnitsky, as an "instigator", ended up in the Starostinsky prison, from which only his friends released him. Irritated and frustrated, Khmelnitsky turned from a homely owner into a leader of the uprising.

The beginning of the uprising

Cooking

Events at the end of 1648

Knowing about the disagreements among the lords, Khmelnitsky, meanwhile, began negotiations with the Polish government. By this time, however, supporters of the merciless suppression of the uprising had gained the upper hand, and a 40,000-strong army was hastily formed in Poland, led by magnates D. Zaslavsky, N. Ostrorog and A. Konetspolsky. Ironically over the effeminacy of Zaslavsky, the inexperience of the young Konetspolsky and the learning of Ostrorog, Bogdan Khmelnitsky called this Polish “triumvirate” - “feather bed, dytyn and Latin.” It was this army that met with the rebel army at the small Pilyavets castle near the river. Pilyavka. The battle broke up into a series of fights and lasted several days. The decisive battle was on September 13, 1648; which ended with the complete defeat of the Polish-gentry troops. The Ukrainian army captured rich trophies. The remnants of the enemy troops sought salvation in a stampede (“pilyavchiki”, as the people of the gentry who fled from the field contemptuously called, overcame 300 miles in three days). .

Second phase

Attempted negotiation

In early December, Jan Casimir becomes King of Poland. Upon learning of this, Bogdan Khmelnitsky solemnly enters Kyiv on December 23. Realizing that now the rebels have tremendous power and can threaten the territorial integrity of Poland itself, Bogdan Khmelnitsky sends an ultimatum to the new king. It consisted of a number of requirements, among which the main ones were:

• liquidation of the Union of Brest
• restriction of the movement of Polish troops (no further than Starokonstantinov)
• prohibition of Polish magnates to appear east and south of Bila Tserkva
• leave the Left Bank for the Cossacks

Jan Casimir, of course, did not agree to such conditions, but decided to continue negotiations with the rebels and in January sent an embassy to Khmelnitsky, headed by his close friend Adam Kisel. However, Khmelnytsky rather coldly received the delegation and the negotiations were not completed until February. It became clear that a new stage of the war could not be avoided, and the parties continued to gather new military forces. Here, the end of the Thirty Years' War in Europe came in very handy for the Poles, since a large number of mercenaries were left "out of work." Therefore, in 1649, the Polish army was seriously strengthened by German, Swedish, Italian troops.

Continuation of the war

By the beginning of May 1649, Poland and the rebels completed preparations for a new stage of the war. In the middle of the month, Jan Casimir moved the Polish army to Volhynia. On May 31, the army crosses Starokonstantinov, that is, it violates the requirements of Bohdan Khmelnitsky. When the Poles were convinced of the superiority of the enemy forces, the crown army began to retreat and stopped under the well-fortified castle of Zbarazh. Vishnevetsky joined the Polish army, and he was given overall command. Khmelnytsky besieged Zbarazh and began to torment the Polish army with incessant attacks and cannonades, so that the Poles were soon exhausted. They called on the king, begging him to hurry to their aid, but the king had nothing to go with, since the gentry militia was just gathering. Finally, in order to prevent the army from dying near Zbarazh, he moved, not expecting all the regiments, but unexpectedly fell into an ambush. Khmelnytsky, leaving part of the army near Zbarazh, himself with the Tatars moved against the king and blocked his path at the crossing near Zborov. He besieged the king so that he had no way out. Panic seized the royal army: the soldiers were already ready to flee, but at this critical moment a way out was found. They decided to attract the Tatars to their side at all costs, wrote to the khan, who this time personally led the horde, promised him everything he wanted, if only he would back down from Khmelnitsky. And Khan changed. He began to insist that Khmelnitsky make peace with the king. It was only then that Khmelnitsky realized how imprudently he relied on the help of the horde; now he had to fulfill the desire of the khan, if he did not want him not to unite against him with the Poles. It was decided to sign a peace. Even despite such an unexpected betrayal, Khmelnitsky could still dictate his terms in signing a peace treaty. On August 8, 1649, the Zborovsky peace was signed. His articles read:

• Poland recognized Ukraine as an autonomy in its composition - the Hetmanate.
• The elected hetman was recognized as the only ruler on the territory of Ukraine
• The All-Cossack Rada was recognized as the supreme body of the Ukrainian autonomy
• The Rada of the general foremen was recognized as an advisory and executive body under the hetman.
• The register was set at 40 thousand sabers
• Chyhyryn was recognized as the capital of Ukrainian autonomy
• Everyone who is not included in the register is ordered to return to their previous social status
• Amnesty was announced to all participants in the uprising

Third stage of the war

Throughout 1650, both Poland and the Hetmanate were preparing for a new stage of the war. Only in December the Seim approved a new punitive campaign. In January 1651, the Polish army moved to the Bratslav region, then to Vinnitsa. The Battle of Berestets, which ended in defeat for the Cossacks (June 18, 1651), opened a series of failures of the Cossack army in the summer of 1651. On September 18, 1651, the Cossacks were forced to conclude the Treaty of Bila Tserkva with Poland, which canceled the terms of the peace in Zborov and introduced additional conditions, for example, a ban on international negotiations for Khmelnytsky. A little less than a year later, in April, the Cossack officers decided to resume the war. The Cossacks won a major victory near Batog, where the full hetman Martyn Kalinovsky died, however, in the battle near Zhvanets, the situation was repeated again, when the Poles in a hopeless, from a military point of view, situation were saved thanks to the betrayal of the Crimean Tatars. Realizing that the Hetmanate alone would not be able to maintain its newly acquired positions and success, in the autumn of 1653 Bogdan Khmelnitsky turned to the Russian Tsardom for a protectorate.

The decision of the Zemsky Sobor in 1653

<…>And about the hetman about Bogdan Khmelnitsky and about the entire Zaporizhzhya Army, the boyars and duma people sentenced that the great sovereign tsar and grand duke Alexei Mikhailovich of all Russia deigned that hetman Bogtan Khmelnitsky and all the Zaporizhzhya Army with their cities and lands to take under his sovereign high hand for Orthodox Christian faiths and the holy churches of God, because the pans are glad and the whole Commonwealth on the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God have risen and want to eradicate them, and for the fact that they, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporizhian Army, sent to the great sovereign To the Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich to beat the weight of Russia with his forehead many times, so that he, the great sovereign, uproot the Orthodox Christian faiths and ruin the holy churches of God by their persecutor and perjurer, and had mercy on them, ordered them to be accepted under his sovereign high hand. And if the sovereign does not grant them, he will not be accepted under his sovereign high hand, and the great sovereign for the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God interceded in them, ordered them to reconcile through his great ambassadors, so that that world would be reliable for them.

And according to the sovereign’s decree, and according to their petition, the sovereign’s great ambassadors in response to the pan council said that the king and pans of the council would calm the civil strife, and reconcile with the Cherkasy, and the Orthodox Christian faith would not be persecuted, and the churches of God would not be taken away, and captivity would not be in what they didn’t repair, but taught the world according to the Zboriv Treaty.

And the great sovereign, his royal majesty for the Orthodox Christian faith, Jan Casimer, will commit such an act to the king: those people who, in his sovereign name in registrations, showed up, those of their guilt orders them to give. And Jan Kazimer, the king and the pans of the Rada, and that matter was put into nothing and in the world with Cherkasy they refused. Yes, and that’s why you should accept them: in the oath of Jan Casimer to the king it is written that he, in the Christian faith, will protect and defend, and by no measures for faith himself should be oppressed, and no one should be allowed to do so. And if he does not keep his oath, and he makes his subjects free from all loyalty and obedience.

The first military force of the rebels was the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks, who elected Khmelnitsky as their hetman. Zaporizhzhya Sich was located on the islands beyond the rapids of the Dnieper and was a kind of "Cossack republic". The main occupation of the Cossacks was military raids on the possessions of the Crimean Khan and the Turkish Sultan. They received money and weapons from the Polish king, but on occasion they were ready to direct their weapons against him. At the same time, the Cossacks more than once took part in hostilities against the Moscow troops.

In addition to the Cossacks, the Ukrainian city Cossacks also joined the detachments of Bogdan Khmelnitsky - the local military service class, united in regiments and on the salary of the Polish king. However, the lists (registers) for receiving money, weapons and clothing from the royal treasury did not include all the city Cossacks. The Cossacks, who were not included in the register, considered themselves unfairly offended.

The Crimean Khan was a temporary ally of the rebels in the fight against the Polish king. He wanted to use the movement of Bohdan Khmelnitsky for his own purposes - to capture booty and receive generous rewards for military services.

Moscow closely followed the events in Ukraine. Back in 1648, Khmelnitsky turned to the Moscow government with a request for help. However, the cautious Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich at first limited himself to sending bread and weapons to the rebellious Cossacks. Moscow diplomats stood up for the Cossacks before the Polish king. Only in 1653, when Khmelnytsky's affairs went very badly, did the tsar order secretly to begin preparations for a big war. The secret became clear after in October 1653 the Zemsky Sobor spoke in favor of the annexation of Ukraine.

In January 1654 the Moscow embassy headed by the boyar V. V. Buturlin took an oath of allegiance from the Ukrainian nobility and representatives of the cities. This historical event took place in the city of Pereyaslavl near Kyiv and was called Pereyaslav Rada. The conditions for the reunification of Ukraine with Russia corresponded to the wishes of the rebels. The tsar raised the number of registered Cossacks to 60,000 and retained autonomy for Ukraine.