About Lightning War (Blickrig Plan) Briefly

• Japanese blitzkrieg

A brief definition of the concept of a blitzkrieg plan is lightning war. In the modern world, blitzkrieg is a strategy in which large tank formations act autonomously. Deep behind enemy lines, tank units break through. There is no battle for fortified positions. The main ones are the control center and supply lines. If they are destroyed, the enemy will be left without control and supply. Thus, it loses its combat capability.

Germany used this method ("Molnienosnaya vojjna") of waging war in the First World War. The most famous use of Blitzkrieg as a military tactic is seen in the context of World War II. And again the plan of lightning war did not give the desired results.

The failure of the Blitzkrieg in World War II

The outbreak of World War II showed that the Blitzkrieg plan was Germany's military strategy. European states surrendered to the Nazis one by one. After the declaration of war on the USSR, the German leadership was confident that the Soviet Union would succumb to them quickly enough, namely in two weeks. Of course, they understood that the Russian people would not submit so easily, but they were sure that they would be able to deal with the Union quickly enough with the help of their plan. Why was the blitzkrieg plan ineffective when applied to the Soviet Union? There are many answers. It is worth briefly understanding the reasons for the collapse of the blitzkrieg in World War II.

Having entered the territory of the USSR, the German army sent its troops straight inland. The tank troops could not move as fast as the German command would like, due to the slow advance of the infantry. The infantry was given the task of eliminating the remnants of Soviet forces in the west.
So why did the blitzkrieg succeed? Of course, the huge territory of the USSR could be considered the cause, but, by no means, this was not the reason. The distance between Berlin and Moscow could be compared with what the German invaders had already passed in Europe, capturing a number of countries.
And back to the tanks and infantry. The soldiers were exhausted by the constant movement on foot and on horseback. The infantry did not keep up with the tank troops. The front expanded, which complicated the advance. Roads, or rather their absence, also played a role.

Very soon, logistics problems began to arise in the German army. There were hardly enough vehicles and modern weapons for half of the divisions. I had to use weapons recaptured from the enemy and their own transport, which was simply abandoned. Since the Blitzkrieg plan is a lightning war, and in the USSR, the German troops had to face difficulties, and it took longer than planned. The soldiers began to experience a shortage of simple essentials.

It is worth noting that the German army was slowed down not only by Russian off-road. Stalin was preparing for war as a possible prospect. Therefore, in the border areas there was a place for the deployment of Soviet soldiers. The purges and repressions in the 1930s led to the weakening of the officer corps of the Red Army. That is why the concept was developed for enhanced defense of the front line. This explained the heavy losses at the initial stage of the war. Since the USSR was a prosperous country with a large population, the army had no problems with either material or human resources.

Although the German army was moving east, as required by their concept, this was not enough to reach Moscow on time. In numerical terms, the Germans were also inferior. It soon became clear that it would not be possible to capture both Kyiv and Moscow at the same time. So tank troops began to fight for Kyiv. The German infantry began to retreat.

The end of September urged the German command to make a decision: to attack Moscow at a rapid pace or start preparing for winter. The decision was made in favor of Moscow. Again, the soldiers were exhausted by a many-kilometer throw. The weather took its toll, and the mud slowed down any forward movement of the Nazi troops. With the onset of winter, the Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive. Again, the unsuccessful "Blitzkrieg" could be attributed to weather conditions or the numerical superiority of the enemy. But it was the overconfidence of the German leadership. Having captured a number of European countries, they were sure of their lightning victory on the territory of the USSR. In addition, the lightning-fast capture of European countries became possible thanks to luck. Breaking through the Ardennes was a very risky move, but after its successful completion, propaganda about a lightning victory did its job.

Germany at that time was not ready for war. Her resources were limited. The unfinished war with England also made its contribution, and not so little was left before the victory over it.
The Nazi command remembered the victories in the First World War. Arrogance and arrogance played into the hands of the Soviet army, as they were not considered a strong and worthy opponent.
The German army, hoping for good luck in the blitzkrieg, came to the territory of the Soviet Union unprepared for winter. They were not prepared for the fact that they would stay for a long time, to conduct military operations. As a result, the plan to quickly conquer Moscow turned into a shortage of equipment, food and banal socks.

Blitzkrieg as a military tactic in the ancient world

Rome already had the ability to defeat its opponents in a war of attrition. A protracted war was the best solution for fighting with an adequate enemy. But, in aggressive wars, a bet was made on blitzkrieg. Even the "barbarian" states of that time understood this. In defensive terms, the border fortresses were surrounded by walls to disrupt the enemy blitzkrieg.
There are many examples in history in which the aggressors both won and lost with the help of blitzkrieg.
The Scythians in the wars used all their military power in one battle. They departed from the classical understanding of warfare and instead of the "main battle", the population skillfully mobilized at a rapid pace. Thus, they used blitzkrieg to defend against the aggressor.
Reasons that can disrupt the blitzkrieg
Any tactic of warfare is not perfect. There are factors hindering military plans. Therefore, choosing one or another strategy, you need to weigh all the factors. Let's try to explain using the example of the failure of the blitzkrieg in the Second World War on the territory of the USSR.

The first factor is the location. On a specific example of the Second World War, you can see that the German troops simply confused the Russian impassability and the vastness of the territory. If the territory is hilly, swampy or wooded, then heavy tanks in close combat with infantry noticeably lose. Of course, the mountains of the Ardennes did not prevent the victory over France. But this is mere luck, rather than an axiom. In addition, one should not rely only on natural conditions, because if France had left a more powerful military fortification in that area, and not a light defensive system, then the victory of the German army would not have been so obvious. Weather conditions can also slow down the enemy's blitzkrieg plan.

Air superiority is also an integral part of Blitzkrieg's success. Again, using the example of World War II, it is clear that the success of the invaders in Europe, in part, depended on the inability of the allies to deploy for defense in the air. One of the main reasons was the lack of air combat tactics in the current situation. When trying to destroy the German pontoon bridges, everything turned into the defeat of the French aviation, and the safety of the bridges. On the territory of the USSR, the Germans faced the vastness of the territory and, accordingly, the dispersal of the army. As a result, allied aviation made it impossible for German troops to move during daylight hours. Initially, it was planned to attack in bad weather in order to exclude air interference, however, it was not expected that bad weather would slow down the advance of their own troops.

Despite the effectiveness of rapid campaigns against Poland and France, mobile operations could not succeed in the following years. Such a strategy must take into account that the enemy can retreat in order to regroup forces, and only then strike. The German command did not think about it, so the army was cut off from the supply of fuel, ammunition and food.

Japanese blitzkrieg

In 1941, the Japanese government decided to secretly increase its military training. They planned to wait until they needed to start military operations in the Far East and Siberia to strengthen their own borders.
The strategic idea of ​​the Japanese.

The strategy consisted in a series of successive strikes by the Japanese army against the Red Army in the areas of Primorye, Amur and Transbaikalia. As a result, the Red Army had to capitulate. The plan also included the capture of the most important strategic objects: military, industrial, food bases and communications.
. In the first hours of the offensive, it was planned to defeat the Air Force of the Soviet Union, by surprise.
. The entire operation to advance to Lake Baikal was calculated for six months.

The first stage of the plan came into effect, namely, the mobilization of the Kwantung Army began, and its increase by 2 divisions. For the whole world, Japan held training camps. The population was warned that in no case should there be a send-off, and the term "mobilization" was replaced by the term "extraordinary formations".

By the end of July, Japanese troops began to concentrate near the borders with the Soviet Union. However, such large-scale gatherings were difficult to disguise as exercises. It was reported to Berlin that a little less than a million people were called up and to the territory of Northern China, people who spoke Russian were sent.
The result of the planned lightning attack was the complete surrender of Japan and the defeat of the Kwantung Army.

When a modern Russian person hears the words "blitzkrieg", "blitzkrieg", the first thing that comes to mind is the Great Patriotic War and Hitler's failed plans for an instant conquest of the Soviet Union. However, this tactic was not used by Germany for the first time. At the beginning of the war, the German General A. Schlieffen, who was later called the blitzkrieg theorist, developed a plan for the "lightning" crushing of enemy forces. History has shown that the plan was unsuccessful, but it is worth talking about the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan in more detail.

World War I: causes, participants, goals

Before analyzing what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan, one should first analyze the prerequisites for the outbreak of hostilities. The conflict was caused by the contradictions between the geopolitical interests of two political blocs: the Entente, which included Great Britain, France and the Russian Empire, and the Triple Alliance, the participants of which were Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy, and later (since 1915) Turkey. There was a need to redistribute the colonies, markets and spheres of influence.

The Balkans became a particular area of ​​political tension in Europe, where many Slavic peoples lived, and the European great powers often took advantage of the many contradictions between them. The reason for the war was the assassination of the heir of the Emperor of Austria-Hungary Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, in response to which Serbia received an ultimatum from Austria-Hungary, the terms of which practically deprived it of sovereignty. Despite Serbia's willingness to cooperate, on July 15 (July 28, New Style), 1914, Austria-Hungary launched a war against Serbia. Russia agreed to side with Serbia, which led to Germany's declaration of war on Russia and France. The last member of the Entente - England - entered the conflict on 4 August.

General Schlieffen's plan

The idea of ​​the plan, in essence, was to devote all forces to victory in the only decisive battle, to which the war would boil down. The enemy (French) army was planned to be surrounded from the right flank and destroyed, which would undoubtedly lead to the surrender of France. It was planned to strike the main blow in the only tactically convenient way - through the territory of Belgium. On the Eastern (Russian) front, it was supposed to leave a small barrier, based on the slow mobilization of Russian troops.

Such a strategy seemed well thought out, albeit risky. But what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan?

Moltke's changes

The high command, fearing the failure of the blitzkrieg plans, considered the Schlieffen plan too risky. Under pressure from dissatisfied military leaders, some changes were made to it. The author of the modifications, Chief of the German General Staff H. I. L. von Moltke, proposed to strengthen the left wing of the army to the detriment of the attacking grouping on the right flank. In addition, additional forces were sent to the Eastern Front.

Reasons for making changes to the original plan

1. The German command was afraid to radically strengthen the right wing of the army, which was responsible for encircling the French. With a significant weakening of the forces of the left wing, combined with an active offensive by the enemy, the entire rear of the Germans was threatened.

2. Resistance of influential industrialists over the possible surrender of the Alsace-Lorraine region into the hands of the enemy.

3. The economic interests of the Prussian nobility (Junkers) made it necessary to divert a rather large group of troops to the defense of East Prussia.

4. The transport capabilities of Germany did not allow supplying the right wing of the army to the extent that Schlieffen assumed.

Campaign of 1914

In Europe, there was a war on the Western (France and Belgium) and Eastern (against Russia) fronts. Actions on the Eastern Front were called the East Prussian operation. In its course, two Russian armies coming to the aid of allied France invaded East Prussia and defeated the Germans in the Gumbinnen-Goldap battle. In order to prevent the Russians from striking at Berlin, the German troops had to transfer part of the troops to East Prussia from the right wing of the Western Front, which ultimately became one of the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg. We note, however, that on the Eastern Front this transfer brought success to the German troops - two Russian armies were surrounded, and about 100 thousand soldiers were captured.

On the Western Front, the timely assistance of Russia, which pulled the German troops back on itself, allowed the French to put up serious resistance and prevent the German blockade of Paris. The bloody battles on the banks of the Marne (September 3-10), in which approximately 2 million people participated on both sides, showed that the First World War turned from a lightning-fast one into a protracted one.

Campaign of 1914: Summing up

By the end of the year, the advantage was on the side of the Entente. The troops of the Triple Alliance were defeated in most of the battlefields.

In November 1914, Japan occupied the German port of Jiaozhou in the Far East, as well as the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands. The rest of the Pacific passed into the hands of the British. In Africa at that time, hostilities were still going on, but it was clear that these colonies were lost for Germany.

The fighting in 1914 showed that Schlieffen's plan for a quick victory did not live up to the expectations of the German command. What reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan have become apparent by this point will be discussed below. A war of attrition began.

As a result of hostilities, by the end of 1914, the German military command moved the main military operations to the east - in order to withdraw Russia from the war. Thus, by the beginning of 1915, Eastern Europe became the main theater of military operations.

Reasons for the failure of the German blitzkrieg plan

So, as mentioned above, by the beginning of 1915 the war had entered a protracted stage. Finally, consider what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan.

To begin with, we note that the German command tritely underestimated the strength of the Russian army (and the Entente as a whole) and its readiness for mobilization. In addition, following the lead of the industrial bourgeoisie and the nobility, the German army often made decisions that were not always tactically correct. Some researchers in this regard argue that it was Schlieffen's original plan, despite its riskiness, that had a chance of success. However, as mentioned above, the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan, which were mainly the unpreparedness of the German army for a long war, as well as the dispersal of forces in connection with the demands of the Prussian junkers and industrialists, are largely due to the changes made to the plan by Moltke, or, as they often referred to as "Moltke's errors".

In post-Soviet Russia, it became fashionable to trample on old conclusions and opinions, and the liberal fad also affected Soviet-Japanese relations during World War II.

Despite the conclusions of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which summed up the foreign policy of Imperial Japan towards the USSR: ““The Tribunal believes that the aggressive war against the USSR was envisaged and planned by Japan ... that it was one of the main elements of Japanese national policy and that its goal was to seize the territories of the USSR ... ", current liberal publicists and modern Japanese historians are trying to refute this conclusion.

Even the plan of aggression against the Union, carefully worked out and begun to be carried out - "Kantokuen" ("Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army") - is being presented as a purely defensive plan, adopted to protect against an attack by Soviet troops.

Although in Japan a whole layer of previously secret documents of the imperial meetings, the coordinating committee of the imperial headquarters and the government, the General Staff and the Main Naval Headquarters, and other bodies of state and military leadership, which confirm the conclusions of the International Military Tribunal, have been published.

Japanese Lightning War

At a meeting of the Imperial Conference held on July 2, 1941, the Japanese leadership took a course towards preparing a solution to the problem of the "North": "Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact (an alliance of three powers - Germany, Japan, Italy. - S.A.). However, until we interfere in this conflict. We will covertly increase our military training against the Soviet Union, adhering to an independent position. At this time, we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great precautions. If a German-Soviet war will develop in a direction favorable to our empire, we, by resorting to armed force, will solve the northern problem and ensure the security of the northern borders.

With the adoption of this course, the General Staff of the Army and the Ministry of War of Japan planned a whole system of measures aimed at the rapid preparation of the Kwantung Army for an offensive war in the Far East and Siberia. This plan was called "Kantokuen" in secret documents.

On July 11, 1941, the imperial headquarters sent a special directive number 506 to the Kwantung Army and other Japanese armies in North China. It confirmed that the purpose of the “maneuvers” was to prepare for an attack on the USSR. This plan was taken as the basis for the development of the Japanese General Staff in 1940.

Tojo, Hideki Minister of the Army from 1940 to 1944.

The essence of the strategic plan:

It was supposed to defeat the troops of the Red Army in Primorye, the Amur region and Transbaikalia with a series of successive strikes by Japanese forces in the main directions and force them to capitulate; seize strategic military, industrial facilities, food bases and communications;

Much attention was paid to the Air Force, they were supposed to liquidate the Soviet Air Force in the first hours of the war with a sudden blow;

The task is to break through to Baikal in 6 months and complete the main operation;

On July 5, a directive from the high command was issued, according to which the first stage of mobilization was carried out, increasing the Kwantung Army by 2 divisions (51st and 57th).

On July 7, the emperor allowed a covert conscription and conscription of half a million people into the armed forces, and ships with a tonnage of 800 thousand tons were also allocated for the transport of military goods to Northern China. All activities were carried out in the strictest secrecy, under the legend of training camps for assigned staff, and was called "extraordinary call". The families were forbidden to send off, in the documents the word "mobilization" was replaced by the term "extraordinary formations."

On July 22, troops began to be concentrated near the Soviet border, but such large-scale events were difficult to keep secret. Up to 10,000 fighters and 3,500 horses passed through points in Korea alone per day. The Ambassador of the Third Reich in Japan, Ott, and military attaché Kretschmer, reported to Berlin on July 25 that 900,000 people aged 24 to 45 had been drafted in Japan. Persons who spoke Russian were sent to Northern China.

3 fronts were formed - eastern, northern and western, 629 units and subunits were sent to them, a total of 20 divisions, then they planned to strengthen their numbers with another 5 divisions. Part of the units was transferred from the Sino-Japanese front. After the second stage of mobilization (order No. 102 of July 16, 1941), the number of Japanese troops near the borders of the USSR increased to 850 thousand people.

Military units on the Kuril Islands, South Sakhalin and Hokkaido were put on full alert.

In total, it was planned to involve up to a million people in the attack, stocks of ammunition, fuel, food, and medicines were created in Korea and in northern China to wage an intense war for 2-3 months.

Auxiliary forces

In addition to the Japanese army itself, it was planned to introduce the armed forces of puppet state formations into battle - Manchu imperial army state of Manchukuo. Its number was more than 100 thousand people (in 1944 - over 200 thousand), small arms were no worse than Japanese, machine guns were in sufficient quantity, artillery was weak, also, practically, without air force and armored vehicles.

Mengjiang National Army- Mengjiang, a puppet state formed by the Japanese military administration on the territory of the central part of Inner Mongolia (the provinces of Chakhar, Rehe and Suiyuan). The size of the army ranged from 4 to 20 thousand people. The armament is weak, most of the composition is cavalry.

They were under the command of the Kwantung Army Headquarters and under the direct supervision of Japanese military advisers. Japanese officers prepared military-trained reserves from local residents. In 1940, Manchukuo introduced a law on compulsory military service. Mengjiang's army was intended to invade the Mongolian People's Republic as part of the Japanese forces. According to the Kantokuen plan, "the creation of a situation in which there would be a voluntary unification of Outer Mongolia with Inner Mongolia" was envisaged.

white emigrants, the Japanese did not forget about the White Guards, since 1938, units were formed from Russians (who had vast combat experience) for the war with the USSR, for example: the brigade of Colonel Makoto Asano of the Kwantung Army, Cossack cavalry detachments under the command of Colonel Ivan Alexandrovich Peshkov, united in the unit " Peshkovsky detachment. Due to their vast combat experience, they were intended to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage operations: their tasks included damaging railways and other communications, communications, attacking supply bases in the rear of the Soviet troops, conducting reconnaissance, committing sabotage, conducting anti-Soviet propaganda. According to the Kantokuen plan, by order of the commander of the Kwantung Army, special units were formed from them.

"Russian Fascist Organization", Harbin.

Tasks of the Japanese Imperial

The Japanese Navy was supposed to support the landing of landing forces in Kamchatka, support the operation from the sea to occupy Northern Sakhalin and capture Vladivostok, and destroy the Soviet Pacific Navy. On July 25, an order was given to form the 5th fleet specifically for the war with the USSR.

Operation readiness

By August, the Japanese armed forces were ready for the "blitzkrieg". By the beginning of the Soviet-German war, Japan had 14 divisions in Korea and North China. At the beginning, they planned to bring their strength to 34 divisions, transferring 6 divisions from Japan and 14 from the Chinese front. But the command of the Japanese expeditionary army in China opposed it.

At the end of July, the War Ministry and the General Staff decided to reduce the invasion force to 25 divisions, then to 20. On July 31, 1941, at a meeting of the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Tanaka, with the Minister of War, Tojo, a final decision was made: 24 divisions would be needed for the war against the Soviet Union. In reality, the Japanese concentrated a force grouping of 850 thousand "bayonets", which is equal to 58-59 Japanese infantry divisions. The Japanese command believed that they would be opposed by up to 30 Soviet divisions, and created a double superiority.

Doubts of the Japanese command

In the second half of July, the Japanese command had doubts about the success of the German "blitzkrieg". The Japanese began to analyze the course of hostilities and made several comments:

The vastness of the tetra of military operations allows the Wehrmacht to conduct a mobile war, but at the same time helps the Soviet troops to conduct a correct retreat, and the Red Army was not destroyed in border battles.

Guerrilla warfare will seriously complicate the life of the Wehrmacht.

Japan is trying to find out from Berlin the timing of the completion of the campaign. The Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, subsequently testified: “In July - early August, it became known that the pace of the German army’s offensive had slowed down. Moscow and Leningrad were not captured on schedule. In this regard, I met with Ribbentrop to get clarifications. meeting with Field Marshal Keitel, who said that the slowdown in the advance of the German army was due to the large length of communications, as a result of which the rear units were lagging behind. Therefore, the offensive was delayed by three weeks. " Tokyo is increasingly doubting the possibility of a quick defeat of the USSR. Doubts are also reinforced by the increasingly insistent demands of Berlin to open a second front against the Soviet Union.

Japan had doubts that the Red Empire was a titan with feet of clay before. Thus, an employee of the Japanese embassy in Moscow, Yesitani, warned in September 1940: "It is completely absurd to think that Russia will fall apart from the inside when the war starts." On July 22, 1941, the Japanese generals were forced to admit in the "Secret Diary ..." (it assessed the events and situation on the fronts of the Second World War): "Exactly a month has passed since the beginning of the war. Although the operations of the German army continue, the Stalinist regime, contrary to expectations, turned out to be durable".

By the beginning of August, the 5th Department of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (its direction of activity is the USSR) concluded in the document "Assessment of the current situation in the Soviet Union" that: "Even if the Red Army leaves Moscow this year, it will not capitulate. Germany's intention is to quickly the decisive battle will not be completed. The further development of the war will not be beneficial for the German side."

But the military command of the army and navy did not support the doubts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence, military preparations were in full swing. Chief of Staff Sugiyama and Minister of War Tojo said: "There is a strong possibility that the war will end with a quick victory for Germany. It will be extremely difficult for the Soviets to continue the war. The assertion that the German-Soviet war is dragging on is a hasty conclusion." The Japanese army elite did not want to miss the opportunity to strike at the Union along with Germany.

The military of the Kwantung Army was especially insistent: its commander, Umezu, transmitted to the center: “The favorable moment will definitely come ... Right now, a rare opportunity has presented itself, which happens once in a thousand years, to implement the policy of the state towards the Soviet Union. It is necessary to seize on this ... If there is an order to start fighting, I would like the leadership of operations to be provided to the Kwantung Army ... I repeat once again that the main thing is not to miss the moment for the implementation of state policy. The Kwantung Army insisted on an immediate strike. Its chief of staff, Lieutenant General Yoshimoto, urged Tanaka, Chief of Operations of the General Staff: “The beginning of the German-Soviet war is an opportunity sent down to us from above to solve the northern problem. can be expected to succeed."

Why didn't Japan hit

The main sign of the appearance of a favorable moment - "ripe persimmon" - was considered the weakening of Soviet forces in the Far East and Siberia. The Japanese General Staff believed that a "blitzkrieg" in Japanese style was possible only if the Russian grouping was reduced from 30 divisions to 15, and the number of armored vehicles, artillery and aircraft - by two-thirds.

Intelligence reported that during the 3 weeks of the war only 17% of the personnel and about a third of armored vehicles were transferred from the Far East. In addition, the personnel were immediately replenished with reservists. It was noted that the forces of the Trans-Baikal Military District were deployed mainly, while other groups of the Red Army were almost unaffected.

With great attention, the Japanese General Staff also followed the Soviet one. According to him, the Soviet Air Force had 60 heavy bombers, 450 fighters, 60 attack aircraft, 80 long-range bombers, 330 light bombers and 200 naval aircraft. One of the headquarters documents dated July 26, 1941 stated: "In the event of a war with the USSR, as a result of several bombing attacks at night by ten, and in the daytime by twenty to thirty aircraft, Tokyo can be turned into ashes." After the German attack from the Far East, according to Japanese intelligence, no more than 30 squadrons were transferred. This was not enough to weaken the Soviet Air Force, especially its bomber potential.

The Soviet army in the Far East remained a formidable force, the Japanese perfectly learned the lesson of Halkin-Gol. It is one thing to strike a sudden blow on a country that is suffering defeat, and another thing is to strike at a well-trained and technically equipped army. Berlin's promise to capture Moscow in 3 weeks was not fulfilled.

On August 28, an entry full of pessimism was made in the Secret War Diary: “Even Hitler is mistaken in his assessment of the Soviet Union. Therefore, what can we say about our intelligence agency. The German war will continue until the end of the year ... What is the future of the empire? The prospects are gloomy. …"

On September 3, at a meeting of the coordinating council of the government and the imperial headquarters, the meeting participants came to the conclusion that "since Japan will not be able to deploy large-scale operations in the north until February, it is necessary to quickly carry out operations in the south during this time."

Thus, in the summer of 1941, the Red Army broke not only the plan of the German blitzkrieg, but the idea of ​​the Japanese "blitzkrieg" against the USSR, in Tokyo they decided not to take risks and come to grips with the Southern strategic direction. On September 6, in the "Program for the implementation of the state policy of the empire," it was decided to seize the colonies of the Western powers in the South, if necessary, go to war with the USA, Great Britain, Holland. To do this, before the end of October to complete all military preparations. The meeting participants came to the unanimous opinion that there would be no better time to attack England and the USA.

Military preparations against the USSR were postponed until the spring of 1942, and Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge reported this to Moscow.

In Berlin, Japanese Ambassador Oshima told the Reich leadership: “At this time of the year, military operations against the Soviet Union can only be taken on a small scale. It will probably not be too difficult to occupy the northern (Russian) part of Sakhalin Island. In view of the fact that Soviet troops suffered heavy losses in battles with German troops, they can probably also be pushed back from the border. However, an attack on Vladivostok, as well as any advance towards Lake Baikal, is impossible at this time of the year, and due to the circumstances, it will have to be postponed until spring. The Japanese army had experience in invading the Far East and Siberia in 1918-1922, so it was even more dangerous to start an invasion in the conditions of the Siberian winter.

Results

Japan did not attack the USSR, not because of the strict implementation of the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan, but because of the failure of the German blitzkrieg plan and Moscow's preservation of a reliable cover for the Eastern regions of the country.

Tanaka Shinichi, Chief of the 1st (Operational) Directorate of the General Staff.

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

The Barbarossa plan is a plan for Germany's attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to be ended by November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, a 12th century emperor who became famous for his conquests. This traced elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany prepared 190 divisions for war and 24 divisions as a reserve. For the war, 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated. The total number of the contingent that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in the technology of the USSR should not be taken into account, since by the beginning of the wars, German technical tanks and aircraft were superior to Soviet ones, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

The Barbarossa plan defined 3 main directions for the strike:

• Army Group South. A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group Center. Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, leveling the line "Wave - Northern Dvina".
• Army Group North. Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance towards Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the army "Norway" was to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Table - offensive goals according to the Barbarossa plan

	SOUTH	CENTER	NORTH
Target	Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus	Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow	Baltic States, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk
population	57 divisions and 13 brigades	50 divisions and 2 brigades	29 division + army "Norway"
Commanding	Field Marshal von Rundstedt	Field Marshal von Bock	Field Marshal von Leeb
common goal	Get on line: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan (Northern Dvina)

Approximately by the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga-Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan of the blitzkrieg. After the blitzkrieg, the lands beyond the Urals should have remained, which, without the support of the center, would quickly surrender to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that only a few weeks were left before the end of the war with the USSR is the speech of Goebbels. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans additionally collect warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army advanced rapidly, winning victories, the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 disabled.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

During the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops inland was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the army group "North" occupied almost the entire territory of the Baltic states, providing access to Leningrad, the army group "Center" reached Smolensk, the army group "South" went to Kyiv. These were the last achievements that fully corresponded to the plan of the German command. After that, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

German failures in the North

The army "North" occupied the Baltic states without problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. It turned out that the Wehrmacht was not capable of this task. The city did not capitulate to the enemy, and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany failed to capture it.

Failures of the Army Center

The "Center" army reached Smolensk without any problems, but got stuck under the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advance of the troops, since such a delay under the city, which was planned to be taken without heavy losses, was unacceptable and cast doubt on the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today evaluate the battle for Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, as they managed to stop the advance of troops on Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

Complicated the advance of the German army deep into the country partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the Army of the South

The "South" army reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like the "Center" army near Smolensk, got stuck in battles. In the end, it was possible to take the city in view of the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also made it difficult for the German army to advance, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of the Barbarossa plan.

Map of the advance plan of the German troops

Above is a map showing the plan of the German command for the offensive. The map shows: green - the borders of the USSR, red - the border to which Germany planned to reach, blue - the deployment and the plan for the advancement of the German forces.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• In the Center, with great difficulty, we managed to get to Moscow. At the time the German army entered the Soviet capital, it was clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South, they failed to take Odessa and capture the Caucasus. By the end of September, the Nazi troops had only captured Kyiv and launched an offensive against Kharkov and the Donbass.

Why did the blitzkrieg fail in Germany?

Germany failed the blitzkrieg because the Wehrmacht was preparing the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, on false intelligence. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The lightning war tactics were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was sure that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then rapidly move inland without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed, and Germany could not win the war. The fact that World War II lasted until 1945 only proves that the Germans fought very organized and brave. Due to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they managed to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(landmark - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, because the lightning war did not work, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark - intelligence data) - the plan was implemented. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan on the basis that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country's border, there were no additional defense echelons. There are no reserves and reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command has reserves, not all troops are located on the border, mobilization brings quality soldiers into the army, there are additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kyiv.

Therefore, the disruption of the Barbarossa plan must be regarded as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians associate this person with the agents of England, but there is no evidence for this. But if we assume that this is indeed the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris slipped Hitler an absolute “linden” that the USSR was not ready for war and that all troops were located on the border.

2.1 The beginning of the war of Germany against the USSR. The collapse of Hitler's "Lightning War" strategy

At dawn on June 22, fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war. It was still dark, armadas of airships rose from German airfields, crossed the borders on a wide front from the Baltic to the Black Seas and rushed to the east.

One of the first to take on an air strike was the main base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol. The enemy's attempt by a sudden raid to disable warships and mine the exit from Severnaya Bay into the sea was thwarted by parts of the air defense of the city and the fleet. Failed to damage the bases and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

Events unfolded differently in the land theater of operations. The aviation units of the districts did not have time to disperse and camouflage their aircraft and suffered heavy losses from sudden attacks by the enemy, who had gained air supremacy. The troops of the Soviet Army lost reliable air cover.

The unpreparedness of the USSR for war had a decisive effect on the nature and results of hostilities in the first days of the war. The suddenness of the attack by the German troops had a strong psychological impact on the fighters and commanders.

The enemy in the first battles in the directions of his main attacks outnumbered the Soviet troops in terms of the number of people by 3-5 times, guns and mortars - more than 3 times and had an absolute superiority in tanks. His aircraft dominated the air. Such superiority provided the enemy's tank and motorized divisions with the opportunity on the first day of the war to advance deep into Soviet territory by 35, and in some places by 50 km.

The situation in the border military districts was difficult on June 22, 1941. The capacity of the railways in the new border regions that became part of the USSR, starting from 1939, was three to four times lower than on the German side. The construction of fortifications along the new frontiers was also in June 1941 only at an early stage.

In the Smolensk region, for the first time, Soviet troops managed to stop the lightning-fast offensive of the Germans for at least only two months. But thereby the maneuvering freedom of the German high command, moreover, in the direction of the main attack, aimed directly at Moscow, was severely constrained, and the deadlines set by him, which were of paramount importance, were frustrated.

The command of the Red Army brought in reserves on a wide front from Velikiye Luki to Mozyr, which, with their contacts, successfully delayed the German offensive. Although Smolensk itself fell, fighting continued in the city area, throughout the second half of July and throughout August, the Germans failed to break through the front, which was firmly stabilized about 30-40 km east of Smolensk, along the line Yartsevo - Yelnya - Desna.

The battle of Smolensk was one of the turning points of the war. The Red Army stopped the German "blitzkrieg" and forced Hitler to change his plans.

Simultaneously with the battle of Smolensk, the Red Army waged defensive battles in other directions. Fierce fighting unfolded over the Moonsund Islands.

By the end of August, German troops reached the nearest approaches to Leningrad and, together with the Finnish troops advancing from the north, on September 8 blockaded the city.

Communication with Leningrad became possible only by air and via Lake Ladoga. By September 26, it was possible to stop the advance of the Nazis.

The front stabilized along the line Coal pier, Pulkovskie heights, Pushkin, south of Kolpino and along the Neva to Lake Ladoga; on the Karelian Isthmus - along the line of the state border of 1939, to the north of Lake Ladoga, Finnish troops reached the Svir River. Kyiv and almost all of Right-Bank Ukraine were captured by the enemy. To restore in the south, the Headquarters had to use up a significant part of the strategic reserves, and the fascist command was able to reinforce the Center group again to resume the offensive against Moscow.

On the southern wing of the front, the Separate Maritime Army, cut off from the rest of the Red Army, was assigned to Odessa in early August. The Nazis sought at any cost to take this largest economic center, a trading port in the south of the country and one of the bases of the Black Sea Fleet.

At the end of September 1941, the Headquarters decided to leave Odessa due to the deteriorating situation of Soviet troops in the Crimea and the need to strengthen its defenses. By mid-October, the evacuation of the civilian population and industrial equipment from Odessa had ended.

2.2 Defense of Moscow

The operation to seize Moscow was codenamed "Typhoon".

On the way to Moscow, the fascist command concentrated three field armies, three tank groups and a large number of reinforcement units in three strike groups - a total of 77.5 divisions (more than 1 million people), almost 14.5 thousand guns and mortars and 1700 tanks. Air support for the ground forces was carried out by the 2nd Air Fleet and the 8th Aviation Corps, which had 950 combat aircraft. The troops were commanded by Field Marshal Bock, Kluge, Generals Strauss, Guderian, Goth and others.

The first operation "Typhoon" was launched by the southern strike force from enemy areas. On September 30, she struck at the troops of the Bryansk Front from the Shostka-Glukhov region in the direction of Orel and around Bryansk from the southeast.

On October 2, the remaining two groups from the regions of Dukhovshchina and Roslavl went on the offensive. Their attacks were directed in converging directions to Vyazma in order to cover the main forces of the Western and Reserve fronts. Deep breakthroughs of enemy tank groups, their encirclement of significant forces on three fronts, the incomplete construction of lines and the absence of troops on the Mozhaisk line of defense - all this created a threat of access to Moscow.

On the night of October 5, the State Defense Committee decided to defend Moscow. The Mozhaisk line of defense was determined as the main line of resistance, where all forces and means were urgently sent. At the same time, it was decided to concentrate the efforts of all state bodies and public organizations on the speedy creation of new strategic reserves in the depths of the country, their arming and training for combat.

To improve the front-line situation and assist the headquarters of the Western and Reserve fronts in establishing control and creating a new grouping of forces to repel the enemy, representatives of the State Defense and Headquarters Committee V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov and A.M. Vasilevsky. They sent up to five divisions from among the retreating troops to the Mozhaisk line. The headquarters took measures to transfer forces from other fronts and from the depths of the country. Three rifle and two tank divisions hurried from the Far East to Moscow.

On October 10, the State Defense Committee, at the suggestion of a group of its representatives, united the command and control of the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts in one hand. Their troops were included in the Western Front, headed by G.K. Zhukov, who had previously commanded the Leningrad Front. N.A. remained a member of the Military Council of the front. Bulganin, the chief of staff of the front - General V.D. Sokolovsky. It was decided to build another line of defense on the immediate approaches to the capital - the Moscow zone.

By October 10, a fierce struggle unfolded at the front from the upper reaches of the Volga to Lgov. German troops captured Sychevka, Gzhatsk, reached the approaches to Kaluga, fought in the Bryansk region, near Mtsensk, on the outskirts of Ponyri and Lgov. The greatest success in the following days was achieved by the northern shock group of the Wehrmacht troops, which on October 14 broke into the city of Kalinin. On October 17, the Headquarters created the Kalinin Front here under the command of General I.S. Konev.

On the morning of December 5, 1941, after artillery preparation, the troops of the Kalinin Front crossed the Volga on the ice and started fighting for Kalinin. The next day, the Western and Southwestern fronts went on the offensive.

All the forces of the 9th German Army were drawn into the struggle in the Kalinin direction, which, thus, turned out to be turned off from the attack on Moscow.

The defenders of Tula wrote a heroic page in the history of the Battle of Moscow. This city stood as an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the southern shock group of fascist troops. The troops of the 50th Army under the command of General A.N. Ermakov, the Tula Air Defense District, with the support of detachments of Tula workers, repelled all the attacks of the Nazis. This was the limit of the October offensive. To resume it, the Germans had to spend two weeks preparing. This pause was used by the Soviet command to further strengthen the fronts and strengthen the defenses on the nearest approaches to Moscow.

The bloody, exhausting struggle continued throughout the second half of November. North of Moscow, the Germans managed to break through to the Moscow-Volga canal and cross it in the Yakhroma region, in the south - bypass Tula from the east and go to Kashira.

On December 4-5, a decisive turning point occurred on the Moscow front. The enemy's advance bogged down. It became clear to the German - fascist command that Moscow could not be taken. As early as December 3, Halder pointed out that it was dangerous to stop the offensive and go over to the defensive.

The defensive period of the Battle of Moscow is over. This is how Hitler's "Typhoon" was pacified - the last bet of the Nazi generals to achieve the goals of the Barbarossa plan they had worked out.

Army Group Center suffered a heavy defeat. 23 infantry, 11 armored and 4 motorized divisions suffered significant losses. The enemy was thrown back from the capital far to the west.

A.M. Gorchakov - an outstanding diplomat of the 19th century

But, despite all the merits of Gorchakov, clouds were gathering over his head. Foreign Minister Nesselrode, with his intrigues, tried in every possible way to create trouble for Alexander Mikhailovich ...

The Great Patriotic War

The Great Patriotic War was the most difficult and bloody of all the wars ever experienced by the Soviet Union. However, she was not only dramatic...

Great Patriotic War, final stage

By the end of 1943, more than half of the territory occupied by the enemy had been liberated. But in his hands were still the Right-Bank Ukraine and a significant part of Belarus, the Crimea, Moldova, the entire Baltic ...

The foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s of the XX century

September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland. Poland's allies, Great Britain and France, declared war on Germany on 3 September. However, they did not provide real military assistance to the Polish government, which ensured A. Hitler a quick victory...

The Second World War

After the defeat of Poland in Europe, a somewhat unusual situation developed, which went down in history under the name "strange war". The fact is that until April 1940 the Anglo-French coalition did not conduct active operations against Germany ...

World War II and the Great Patriotic War: victory - its price and lessons

World War II was not a surprise. Already in 1934, Adolf Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" was published, which, in essence, was its ideological premise. In the book, the Fuhrer declared the racial superiority of the Aryans ...

World War II: causes, participants, stages, results and consequences

In the process of preparing for the war, the fascist regime, having created an extensive and powerful apparatus, launched the ideological indoctrination of the population on an unprecedented scale. “After the Nazis came to power,” notes the Australian author E. Bramsted ...

Foreign intervention in the Russian Far East during the Civil War (1917-1922)

Mensheviks during the Civil War

The aggravation of the civil war and foreign intervention, the revolution in Germany and the process of international recognition of Bolshevik power - all this led to the further disintegration of Menshevism. In the autumn of 1918 something happened ...

Polybius: political portrait of Philip V

In 220, Philip arrived in Corinth, where a council was held, at which the allies of Macedon expressed all their grievances against the Aetolians. The Boeotians complained that the Aetolians in peacetime desecrated the temple of Athena Itonia...

The Polish question in the Russian Empire in the 18th century

During the period of aggravation of the political situation in the world in connection with the religious wars, Ukraine was, as a suffering party, at the epicenter of the most important European events. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Catholicism ...

The Spread of the Ideas of National Socialism in Germany in the Context of Foreign Policy (1918–1933)

At the end of World War I, the German Empire was liquidated. The German bourgeoisie looked at the formation of the Weimar Republic as a necessity, and made plans to revive the monarchy. Even before the end of hostilities...

Russia in World War II

By June 1941, the strength of the Soviet armed forces was over 5 million people: in the Ground Forces and the Air Defense Forces (Air Defense) - over 4.5 million, in the Air Force (Air Force) - 476 thousand, in the Naval Navy (Navy) - 344 thousand people ...

USSR in the Great Patriotic War

The prelude to any war is some kind of diplomatic activity. Planning for German aggression against the Soviet Union began long before the war. In 1933, Adolf Hitler became the new Chancellor of Germany...

The fate of Soviet prisoners of war during the Great Patriotic War

From July 1 to July 27, 1929, an international conference was held in Geneva. It ended with the adoption of a new international convention on the regime of prisoners of war. It seemed that this was the end of the path along which mankind had been walking since time immemorial...